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Abstract 
This  thesis  develops  a  new  framework  for  explaining  the  effects  and  possible 
trajectories of state building interventions (SBIs). This is for both examining specific 
interventions and learning about the precise nature of the post-Cold War global order – 
how power is distributed, exercised, constrained and challenged within and between 
states.  
In  the  post-Cold  War  years,  but  particularly  since  the  September  11  2001 
terrorist  attacks,  so-called  failed  states  have  become  a  central  security  concern  for 
policymakers. In tandem, there has been an influx of practitioner and scholarly interest 
in international ‘state building’. Prevalent approaches to state building are premised on 
a static conception of the state and therefore seek to evaluate SBIs in terms of whether 
they help create ‘more’ or ‘less’ state. In contrast, this thesis examines SBIs as a new 
mode  of  governance  in  the  global  political  economy  that  is  transformative  of  both 
intervened and intervening states, leading to the creation of a transnationalising and 
transnationally regulated form of statehood. Based on a conception of the state as a site 
of social and political struggle this study examines the ways in which SBIs affect the 
distribution, production and reproduction of political power in intervened states: Who 
rules and how? What social and political conflicts are engendered or exacerbated by 
SBIs,  and  how  are  they  managed?  What  alliances  and  coalitions  support  the 
production/reproduction of power relationships associated with SBIs?  
The  thesis  provides  a  conceptual  framework  for  understanding  the  complex 
governance terrain SBIs open up. SBIs are conceptualised as multilevel regimes – sets 
of social and political relationships, institutions and ideas – that exist simultaneously 
within  and  outside  intervened  states.  While  preserving  the  formal  sovereignty  of 
intervened states, these regimes are nevertheless established to shape political outcomes 
by limiting the political choices available to domestic leaders. This is operationalised by 
opening up and shifting power to multilevel spaces of governance within the apparatus 
of  these  countries.  Through  case  studies  from  Australia,  Solomon  Islands  and 
Cambodia, the thesis analyses the politics of SBIs and their broader implications for 
contemporary statehood. Ultimately it establishes that regardless of whether SBIs are 
successful or otherwise in achieving their stated objectives they are associated with the 
emergence  of  increasingly  authoritarian,  hierarchical  and  anti-competitive  forms  of 
political rule, both within and between states.   vi 
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Introduction 
In  the  post-Cold  War  years,  but  particularly  since  the  September  11  2001  terrorist 
attacks  in  the  United  States  (US),  the  postcolonial  state  and  the  functioning  of  its 
institutions  have  become  primary  security  concerns  for policymakers  in  the  world’s 
major  states  and  multilateral  organisations.  Initially,  failed  and  fragile  states  were 
viewed mainly in relation to humanitarian crises, economic development prospects and 
human rights violations. However, in the course of the 1990s they have come to be seen 
as constituting considerable risk to states and societies many kilometres away, due to 
the  perception  that  the  absence  or  poor  functioning  of  governance  structures  of  a 
particular  kind  increases  the  likelihood  of  transnational  risks,  such  as  terrorism, 
international crime, environmental degradation and disease, to fester unchecked within 
their borders and eventually migrate elsewhere.  
Indeed,  for  many  renowned  policymakers  and  public  intellectuals,  effective 
global action to tackle governance ‘black holes’ and build/rebuild failed or fragile states 
is seen as one of the most pressing issues on the world’s agenda for the twenty-first 
century. The September 2002 US National Security Strategy paper turned conventional 
strategic thinking on its head when it stated that: ‘America is now threatened less by 
conquering states than we are by failing ones.’
1 Former United Nations (UN) Secretary 
General Kofi Annan said that ‘ignoring failed states creates problems that sometimes 
come back to bite us.’
2 Political scientist Francis Fukuyama, who famously proclaimed 
the post-Cold War era as heralding the ‘end of history’,
3 has argued more recently in a 
less triumphant mood that ‘state-building is one of the most important issues for the 
world community because weak or failed states are the source of many of the world’s 
most serious problems, from poverty to AIDS to drugs to terrorism.’
4 Robert Rotberg 
posited that state building was ‘one of the critical all-consuming strategic and moral 
imperatives  of  our  terrorized  time.’
5  Afghanistan’s  first  post-intervention  Finance 
Minister, Ashraf Ghani, and co-author Clare Lockhart have summarised the prevailing 
                                                 
1  White  House,  ‘National  Security  Strategy  of  the  United  States’,  Washington  DC:  White  House, 
September 2002, p. 1.  
2  Annan,  Kofi,  ‘Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General  Kofi  Annan  at  United  Nations 
Headquarters’,  United  Nations,  21  March  2005,  available  at 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9772.doc.htm>, accessed 31 October 2008. 
3 Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992). 
4  Fukuyama,  Francis,  State-Building:  Governance  and  World  Order  in  the  Twenty-First  Century 
(London: Profile Books, 2005), p. xvii. 
5 Rotberg, Robert I., ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair’, in 
When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, edited by Robert I. Rotberg (New  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), pp. 1-45, p. 42. INTRODUCTION 
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sentiment in claiming: ‘A consensus is now emerging that only sovereign states—by 
which we mean states that actually perform the functions that make them sovereign—
will allow human progress to continue.’
6  
As such, there has been a massive influx of practitioner and scholarly interest in 
developing  suitable  and  successful  approaches  to  international  state  building.  State 
building has to a considerable extent come to replace or greatly transform the earlier 
concern in the post-Cold War era with ‘building’ the ‘peace’ in post-conflict states and 
societies.
7  Peacebuilding  initially  referred  to  interventions  and  programs  intended  to 
turn violent conflict into peace. In contrast, state building is a term commonly used to 
refer to the broad range of programs and projects designed to build or strengthen the 
capacity of institutions, organisations and agencies – not all of which are necessarily 
part of the state apparatus – to effectively perform the functions associated with modern 
statehood. While state building interventions (SBIs) are in some cases deployed to deal 
with violent conflict on a large scale,
8 this is not a precondition as state building has 
taken  on  a  more  pre-emptive,  risk  management,  form  than  earlier  post-Cold  War 
interventions.
9 Indeed, the state building agenda has now been extended beyond ‘post-
conflict’  situations  to  be  regarded  as  ‘applicable  to  a  wide  spectrum  of  developing 
countries, both in war and peace.’
10   
This  study  has  emerged  out  of  dissatisfaction  with  existing  accounts  of 
contemporary state building and its effects. As I elaborate in the first chapter, most 
approaches to the examination of state building, whether critical or otherwise, implicitly 
accept the premise that these interventions are, or should be, about building the capacity 
of the state to govern domestically. Therefore, the literature has tended to conceive and 
evaluate SBIs in terms of their effects on state capacity and institution building, or in 
some  cases  on  state  sovereignty.  Such  perspectives  are  established  upon  static 
                                                 
6 Ghani,  Ashraf  and  Clare  Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured 
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 4. 
7 Bendaña, Alejandro, ‘From Peace-Building to State-Building: One Step Forward and Two Backwards?’, 
paper  presented  at  the  Nation-Building,  State-Building  and  International  Intervention:  Between 
'Liberation' and Symptom Relief, Paris, 15 October 2004. 
8 See Barnett, Michael, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell and Laura Sitea, ‘Peacebuilding: What is in a 
Name?’, Global Governance 13, no. 1 (2007), pp. 35-58. 
9 As Oliver Richmond notes, peace has recently become synonymous with governance and the existence 
of  governance  structures  of  a  particular  kind.  In  this  sense,  the  meaning  of  peacebuilding  and  state 
building has largely merged. Richmond, Oliver, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), p. 69. 
10 Bickerton, Christopher J., ‘State-Building: Exporting State Failure’, in Politics without Sovereignty: A 
Critique of Contemporary International Relations, edited by Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe 
and Alexander Gourevitch (London: University College Press, 2007), pp. 93-111, p. 93. INTRODUCTION 
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institutional, legal and procedural conceptions of statehood and thus tend to mask the 
inherently political and ideological underpinnings of all projects of state construction 
and reconstruction, whether internally or externally driven, as well as the conflict-ridden 
and  dynamic  nature  of  such  processes.  They  also  reify  rigid  dichotomies,  such  as 
domestic-external,  state-society,  formal-informal  and  public-private,  that  are  drawn 
along formal institutional and jurisdictional lines. By  focusing on the links between 
state building and capacity building, state building and sovereignty, or indeed capacity 
and sovereignty, the literature on state building misses the crucial political nature of 
contemporary SBIs – the ways in which they affect the distribution, production and 
reproduction of political power in intervened states – and is therefore unable to explain, 
rather than describe, the possible trajectories of such interventions.  
In  contrast,  I  begin  from  the  premise  that  the  state  is  not  an  amalgam  of 
institutions and actors governing a particular territory, but a site of social and political 
conflict.
11 I argue that SBIs represent a new mode of governance, or a new form of 
political rule, that rather than merely build the capacity of the state, is in actual fact 
transforming the very nature of statehood in both intervened and intervening countries, 
leading to the emergence of a transnationalising and transnationally regulated state. This 
new, complex and contested form of statehood does not find adequate expression within 
traditional readings of international relations and international law and its true nature is 
obfuscated by the prevailing methodological nationalism of existing accounts of state 
building, which take the state as a given and its ‘performance’ as their object of enquiry.        
Contemporary SBIs are premised on the perception that the absence or poor 
functioning  of  domestic  governance  institutions  of  a  particular  kind  represents  an 
unacceptable  security  risk  to  the  intervening  states  and  their  societies.  Therefore, 
managing  risk  in  the  longer  term  is  seen  to  require  the  ‘strengthening’,  indeed  the 
transformation, of domestic governance structures and their outputs in intervened states. 
However,  despite  the  ambitious  and  far-reaching  nature  of  such  objectives,  their 
implementation does not involve directly ruling intervened states. Rather, SBIs are set 
up to shape political outcomes primarily by circumscribing the spectrum of political 
choices available to domestic leaders, by means of transforming intervened states from 
within;  that  is,  they  seek  to  shift  policymaking  into  transnationalised  spaces  of 
                                                 
11  Poulantzas,  Nicos,  Political  Power  and  Social  Classes,  Translated  by  Timothy  O'Hagan,  David 
McLellan, Anna de Casparis and Brian Grogan (London: Ne w  Left Books and Sheed and Ward 1973 
[1968]); Jessop, Bob, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1990). INTRODUCTION 
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governance opened up within or near the domestic governance apparatus of intervened 
states and into the hands of experts and managers who are not politically or popularly 
accountable. While such emerging governance arrangements are inherently hierarchical, 
in that they are structured to preference particular political outcomes and interests over 
others,  SBIs  almost  without  exception  preserve  the  formal-legal  sovereignty  and 
territorial integrity of intervened states. Indeed, SBIs are also found outside the state, in 
the  shape  of  more  traditional  forms  of  diplomatic-international  interactions  between 
sovereign governments or multilateral organisations. This unique ‘multilevel’ character 
of SBIs – simultaneously within and without the state – is important to understand and 
theorise in order to make sense of the potential trajectories of particular interventions 
and the broader implications of this mode of governance for the emerging global order.   
Crucially, rather than manifestations of an already consolidated post-Cold War 
global order – defined by either Westphalian pluralism or new imperialism – SBIs are 
part of the very process by which this global order is being defined, resisted, extended 
and modified. Because this process is very much contested, learning about the nature, 
scope, trajectories, and most importantly, the limitations of interventions in the world’s 
‘fringes’
12 is a particularly useful way of understanding the dynamics of the emerging 
post-Cold War global order and its implications for states, societies and political agency 
more  broadly.  Indeed,  this  study  demonstrates  that  SBIs  are  dynamic  and  often 
innovative forms of rule that can produce political outcomes that greatly diverge from 
those anticipated by their planners and implementers. This ‘inside-out’ approach stands 
in  contrast  to  more  prevalent  ‘outside-in’  approaches,  that  seek  to  understand 
interventions and interventionism in relation to pre-conceived and static conceptions of 
the global order and national politics.  
Examining SBIs as a novel form of political rule – or a new mode of governance 
– that complicates traditional conceptions of statehood throws up a set of questions that 
is mostly overlooked by the prevailing tendency to examine these interventions in terms 
                                                 
12 I use the term ‘fringes’ in a similar manner to Mark Duffield’s usage of ‘borderlands’ in: ‘Social 
Reconstruction  and  the  Radicalization  of  Development:  Aid  as  a  Relations  of  Global  Liberal 
Governance’,  in  State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction,  edited  by  Jennifer  Milliken  (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp.  291-312. ‘Fringe’ is not merely a geographical attribute, relating to 
so-called failed and rogue states, but something that can potentially refer to pockets of ‘illegitimate’ 
activity within or across the territorial borders of Western states as well, such as terrorist cells and 
illegal migrants. In recent years, some of these security threats have been dealt with outside the usual 
legal rules and procedures. Jayasuriya defines this as a ‘global state of exception’. See Jayasuriya, 
Kanishka,  Reconstituting the Global Liberal Order: Legitimacy and Regulation  (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2005).  INTRODUCTION 
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of  their  institutional  outputs  at  the  national  or  in  some  cases  sub-national  levels  of 
governance. This thesis sets out to explicitly examine the ways in which SBIs affect the 
production/reproduction and distribution of political power in intervened states: Who 
rules?  How  do  they  rule?  What  social  and  political  conflicts  are  engendered  or 
exacerbated  by  SBIs,  and  how  are  they  managed?  And  finally,  what  alliances  and 
coalitions  support  or  resist  such  power  relations?
13  It  is  structured  to  address  these 
issues  by  developing  a  theoretical  and  conceptual  framework  for  examining 
contemporary SBIs, as well as providing three case studies that each examine a different 
dimension of the ways in which these interventions transform the state.  
After critically evaluating the existing literature on state building and outlining 
the theoretical premises of the thesis in Chapter One,  I proceed in Chapter Two to 
provide  a  conceptual  framework  for  understanding  the  complex  governance  terrain 
opened up by SBIs and its relationships with other levels of governance, above and 
below  the  state.  SBIs  are  conceptualised  as  multilevel  regimes  –  sets  of  social  and 
political  relationships,  institutions  and  ideas  –  that  exist  simultaneously  inside  and 
outside intervened states. However, SBIs never operate in a social and political vacuum 
– intervention regimes tend to coexist and come into conflict with other regimes within 
the  state,  which  have  different  support-bases  and  ideational  underpinnings.  Such 
conflicts may have transformative effects on all regimes within the state and hence on 
the nature of emergent forms of political rule.  
In Chapter Three I examine the historical conjuncture within which this form of 
intervention has emerged. Four interrelated historical developments are identified as 
particularly pertinent – the perceived failure of the UN-led humanitarian interventions 
of the 1990s; the evolution in market-led approaches to development towards greater 
focus  on  the  state  and  the  quality  of  institutions  as  determinants  of  successful 
development  outcomes;  the  ongoing  transformation  of  the  Western  state  after  three 
decades of neoliberalisation, and the associated shift away from government and the 
politics of interest-representation to governance and the politics of values; and finally, 
the supposed emergence of existential global-transnational risks and the reorientation of 
policymaking towards managing and containing risks of various kinds. By relating SBIs 
                                                 
13  The  development  of  this  set  of  questions  has  been  influenced  by  Snyder’s  critique  of  the 
democratisation  literature’s  obsession  with  examining  and  evaluating  the  institutional  outputs  of 
regimes, while neglecting more fundamental questions such as those relating to the nature of political 
rule. Snyder, Richard, ‘Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Nondemocratic Regimes’, 
in  Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition,  edited  by  Andreas  Schedler 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 219-31. INTRODUCTION 
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to broader historical processes the third chapter demonstrates that contemporary SBIs 
are  not  exceptional  responses  to  crisis  situations,  reflecting  localised  lapses  in  state 
capacity and governance, but a new and dynamic mode of governance in the global 
political  economy  that  is  transforming  the  state  from  within,  rather  than  from  the 
outside.  In  this  way  SBIs  constitute  an  important  pillar  in  the  architecture  of  an 
emerging anti-pluralist, hierarchical and increasingly authoritarian liberal global order. 
In  the  fourth  chapter  I  proceed  to  examine  more  closely  the  political  and 
ideological nature of SBI regimes, by interrogating the relationship between processes 
of state transformation in intervening states, the kinds of actors – public and private – 
that  participate  in  these  interventions  and  their  functions.  In  particular,  I  focus  in 
Chapter  Four  on  the  role  of  what  I  call  meta-governance  actors,  who  are  often 
concentrated in the core executive of states and multilateral organisations, in providing 
the broad set of rules that structure diffuse multilevel regimes. As the discussion in 
Chapter Four makes clear, whether public power is in the hands of public or private 
actors is less significant than the shifts in the location and purpose of state power that 
we  have  seen  through  ongoing  processes  of  state  transformation-neoliberalisation. 
These shifts have led to the reframing of public policy, not as an inherently political 
matter pertaining to conflicts between competing and often irreconcilable interests, but 
as a matter of ‘expertise’ and ‘good’ management.  
The following three chapters are structured as thematic case studies. Chapter 
Five follows on directly from the theme of the transformation of intervening states and 
its implications for intervention objectives and organisation. The chapter focuses on the 
recent transformation and expansion of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) as a way of 
understanding  the  emergence  of  a  new  partly  (and  strategically)  deterritorialised, 
‘regional’, frontier of the Australian state, located within Australia’s neighbouring states 
of  the  Southwest  Pacific  and  Southeast  Asia.  Within  this  new  frontier,  whose 
fluctuating outlines the AFP not only polices but also to a considerable extent defines, 
Australian security is portrayed as contingent on the quality of the domestic governance 
of  neighbouring  states,  thereby  creating  linkages  between  the  hitherto  domestic 
governing apparatus of the Australian state and those of other countries. This allows for 
the rearticulation of the problems affecting intervened states and societies – indeed, 
their very social and political structures – in the depoliticised terms of the breakdown of 
‘law  and  order’  and  the  absence  of  ‘good  governance’,  which  not  only  rationalises 
emergency  interventions  to  stabilise  volatile  situations,  but  also  delegitimises  and INTRODUCTION 
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potentially criminalises oppositional forms of politics. The AFP’s transnational policing 
activities  also  open  up  a  field  of  multilevel  governance  within  the  apparatus  of 
intervened states that exists in separation from international and domestic law, thereby 
leaving intact the legal distinction between the domestic and international spheres and 
circumventing the difficult issue of sovereignty. As a result, police obtain discretionary 
ordering powers, without dislodging the sovereign governments of those countries.  
Chapter  Six  focuses  on  intervention  regimes.  It  examines  the  limits  of  the 
interveners’ efforts to routinise political outcomes by constraining the political choices 
of  domestic  leaders  through  the  example  of  the  Regional  Assistance  Mission  to 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) – an extensive and expensive Australian-led state building 
exercise, under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). RAMSI has often been 
lauded a great success and a model for good practice for other state builders to follow, 
in that its activities have managed to halt violent conflict and foster a return to economic 
growth in the small Pacific archipelago state. In contrast, it is argued that RAMSI’s 
achievements  to  date  are  established  upon  an  unstable  political  coalition  that  has 
emerged due to the unsustainable availability of high levels of foreign investment in 
logging and fishing and a housing and services boom in the capital, Honiara, created by 
the arrival of many well-paid RAMSI employees and contractors, as well as upon the 
capacity  of  RAMSI’s  leaders  to  mobilise  superior  coercive  force  when  necessary. 
Ultimately, I argue that rather than providing a blueprint for good governance as it is 
meant  to  do,  RAMSI  remains  a  form  of  crisis  management,  putting  out  ‘spot-fires’ 
when those emerge. 
Finally,  Chapter  Seven  examines  the  history  of  international  intervention  in 
Cambodia  since  the  early  1990s,  focusing  on  the  development,  characteristics  and 
interrelations of two apparently opposite regimes within the state – the regimes of state 
building  and  patronage  –  as  a  way  of  learning  about  the  nature  of  the  state  forms 
emerging  through  heightened  transnationalisation.  Clashes  between  the  two  regimes 
have been common, at times over contentious issues that threaten the central role of the 
patronage system in determining the distribution of power in Cambodian public life. 
However, it is argued that Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and his associates have 
become  adept  at  using  the  state  building  agenda  with  its  emphasis  on  building 
‘effective’  institutions  as  a  way  of  displacing  and  transforming  social  and  political 
conflicts in Cambodia into technical matters now framed and managed in the context of 
the ‘international’ relationship between the Cambodian government and its development INTRODUCTION 
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partners. Although the donors’ shift to state building since the late 1990s has presented 
Cambodia’s  ruling  cabal  with  new  challenges,  primarily  by  opening  up  non-
competitive, ‘administrative’, channels for contesting arbitrary executive power, it has 
also provided new opportunities for regime consolidation. Indeed, the two seemingly 
conflicting  regimes  of  patronage  and  intervention  are  highly  compatible  in  their 
disempowering effect on the emergence of meaningful political and civil oppositions. 
This  is  because  both  regimes,  implicitly  or  explicitly,  advance  anti-competitive  and 
hierarchical  visions  of  social  and  political  organisation  as  essential  for  Cambodia’s 
stability and future development, as well as act, in different ways, to curb unregulated 
political  mobilisation.  I  conclude  the  chapter  by  arguing  that  since  the  conditions 
supportive of ‘effective’ governance, as it is understood by interveners, do not exist in 
Cambodia  and  are  unlikely  to  emerge  in  the  foreseeable  future,  international  state 
building,  by  attempting  to  depoliticise  policymaking,  has  ironically  ended  up 
strengthening a radically different and repressive political order.  
In sum, this thesis presents and develops an analytical framework that enables us 
to  critically  evaluate  and  explain  the  trajectories  of  contemporary  SBIs.  These 
interventions  are  examined  as  dynamic,  new  forms  of  political  rule  in  the  global 
political economy that are transformative of the state. By deploying the analytical and 
conceptual tools elaborated herein, we are able to determine how these interventions 
affect key issues relating to the exercise and distribution of power in today’s world: 
Who  exercises  it  and  how?  Who  supports  it?  And  who  resists  it,  how  and  why? 
Ultimately,  my  investigation  establishes  that  contemporary  state  building  –  whether 
successful  or  otherwise  in  achieving  its  stated  objectives  –  is  associated  with  the 
emergence  of  increasingly  authoritarian,  hierarchical  and  anti-competitive  forms  of 
political rule, both within and between states.  
 
Case study selection and approach 
The examination of contemporary SBIs in this thesis employs a qualitative methodology 
that draws upon primary and secondary research materials and is disciplined towards 
answering  the  research  questions  outlined  above.  Secondary  research  materials,  full 
citations for which are provided in the bibliography section, include a wide array of 
academic, governmental, organisational, and media sources. Primary research material 
was derived from interviews conducted in Solomon Islands, the Australian capital city, 
Canberra, and Cambodia, during five fieldtrips between September 2007 and March INTRODUCTION 
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2008.  In  each  destination  I  conducted  semi-structured  interviews  with  strategically 
selected  state  building  practitioners,  policy  officers,  consultants,  nongovernmental 
organisations’  workers,  local  politicians  and  bureaucrats,  academics,  journalists  and 
trade union leaders.  
Many  of  the  interviewees  were  identified  and  contacted  before  the  fieldtrips 
because of their roles within important organisations. These contacts then often referred 
me on to other interviewees they thought were relevant to my research. Less than half of 
the interviews I conducted are actually quoted in the final text, although some of the 
interviews that are not quoted directly have been important in directing me to written 
sources as well as to new research trajectories. For example, an interview with a UN 
Development Programme officer in Phnom Penh, which is not quoted in the thesis, has 
led  to  my  investigation  into  new  forms  of  aid  harmonisation  and  coordination  in 
Cambodia. The diffuse nature of contemporary SBIs, which in most cases cannot be 
reduced  to  the  agency  of  one  organisation  or  government,  dictated  that  substantial 
preliminary work had to be done before the fieldtrips were conducted so that a general 
picture of the state building terrain in particular countries – who intervenes and in what 
ways  – was available to guide my planning. This initial picture was mainly based on 
secondary sources, but almost inevitably ended up being refined or even transformed by 
investigations on the ground.  
The case study chapters of the AFP, RAMSI and Cambodia are thematically 
based,  with  each  one  particularly  examining  contemporary  SBIs  from  a  different 
perspective  by  focusing  on  the  intervening  state(s),  the  intervention  regime,  or  the 
intervened state. They were also selected for practical reasons, such as the cost of travel, 
time constraints, language issues and the security situation on the ground at the time of 
travel.  Nevertheless,  as  I  argue  in  the  respective  chapters,  these  examples  are 
particularly pertinent to sustaining the broader theoretical argument in that all were at 
different  times  held  up  by  important  observers  as  examples  for  good  international 
practice to be emulated by state builders elsewhere.   
The  AFP  was  selected  as  a  way  of  examining  the  transformation  of  the 
intervening state and its relationship with the emergence of non-traditional intervention 
actors, which operate in new transnationalised spaces of governance. The AFP’s rapid 
expansion from a relatively small domestic law enforcement agency to now include the 
well-funded International Deployment Group (IDG) – a quasi-gendarmerie force that 
operates transnationally – serves to illustrate SBIs’ nature, not as a new kind of peace INTRODUCTION 
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operation, but as a new mode of governance which confounds traditional notions of 
statehood.  While  the  AFP’s  new  structure  and  capacities  are  currently  unique,  the 
agency’s transformation has attracted considerable positive international attention, as 
the unusually high number of international visitors to the  IDG’s training compound 
outside  Canberra  attests.  For  this  chapter  I  interviewed  AFP  federal  agents  at 
management and policy levels, as well as police officers on the ground in Solomon 
Islands  and  Cambodia.  These  interviews  were  essential  for  gaining  a  sense  of  how 
people  within  the  AFP  understand  their  new  roles,  as  well  as  their  organisation’s 
relationship  with  other  state  building  agencies,  the  Australian  government  and  the 
governments of the states in which they operate.  I  also spoke to people from other 
agencies who work with AFP personnel at various levels, such as the Australian Agency 
for International Development and the Australian Defence Force. 
RAMSI was selected as an example of an intervention regime since it represents 
one of the most ambitious attempts to-date at developing a coordinated response to state 
fragility.  RAMSI  was  lauded  on  a  number  of  occasions  by  the  Organisation  of 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee as a 
rare state building success and as a model for others to follow.
14 Furthermore, because 
the  material  and  human  resources  at  the  disposal  of  RAMSI  officials  have  been 
enormous relative to the overall size of Solomon Islands’ economy and bureaucracy and 
since RAMSI military and police forces did not have to deal at any point with large-
scale civil war, RAMSI provides an excellent case study for how contemporary state 
building is operationalised in apparently favourable conditions. By outlining RAMSI’s 
considerable  limitations  at  achieving  its  stated  objectives  we  can  draw  relevant 
conclusions for other interventions in which conditions are less conducive to this kind 
of involvement. I conducted many interviews in Solomon Islands, including with high 
level  RAMSI  officials,  policy  officers,  program  managers,  employees  in  RAMSI’s 
various program pillars, contractors and police officers in order to find out what they 
saw  as  RAMSI’s  achievements  to  date  and  the  main  impediments  to  program 
implementation.  I  also  spoke  to  Solomon  Islander  politicians,  bureaucrats,  NGO 
workers, trade union leaders, academics and journalists to learn what they thought were 
RAMSI’s current and future challenges.   
                                                 
14  For  example,  OECD  Development  Assistance  Committee,  ‘Whole of Government  Approaches  to 
Fragile  States’,  Paris:  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development,  2006;  OECD, 
‘Policy Brief: Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice’, Paris: Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, May 2004, p. 6. INTRODUCTION 
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Finally, Cambodia was selected as an example for the kind of state emerging 
under conditions of heightened transnationalisation because of its long and extensive 
history of international intervention from the early 1990s. In fact, few other countries 
have  had  similar  levels  of  sustained  intervention  over  the  past  two  decades.
15  This 
allows for a historical examination of the emergence of different regimes within the 
state, including the state building regime, the interrelations between these regimes, and 
the consequences for the distribution and production of political power. In Cambodia I 
interviewed numerous officials from donor agencies, as well as contractors working on 
specific  projects  and  their  Cambodian  counterparts.  I  also  spoke  to  NGO  workers, 
academics and journalists. Interviewing Cambodian government ministers or high level 
politicians  proved  very  difficult,  but  relevant  quotes  from  them  were  sufficiently 
available through secondary sources to substantiate my arguments.   
       
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15  See  Hughes,  Caroline,  Dependent Communities: Aid and Politics in  Cambodia and Timor-Leste, 
forthcoming. CHAPTER ONE 
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Chapter One 
Contemporary  Approaches  to  State  Building  and  Their 
Limitations: Towards a New Framework 
 
Introduction 
The  effects  of  state  building  interventions  (SBIs)  have  been  a  matter  for  extensive 
scholarly concern in recent years. The two primary and related debates that have taken 
place  in  the  literature  have  focused  on  ‘capacity  building’  and  ‘sovereignty’.  The 
capacity building debate has centred on the question of whether interventions build state 
and  institutional  capacity,  or  whether  they  fail  to  and  even  actually  corrode  state 
capacity.  The  sovereignty  debate  revolves  around  the  question  of  whether  SBIs 
constitute an erosion of state sovereignty, or alternatively whether dealing with state 
weakness  requires  the  development  of  new  forms  of  sovereignty  other  than  the 
traditional ‘non-intervention’ variant. The sovereignty debate is intrinsically linked to 
the  debate  on  capacity  building,  since  the  main  point  of  contention  is  whether 
independent  political  agency  should  be  contingent  upon  an  empirically  observable 
capacity for acceptable standards of governance.
1 This is not to suggest that the effects 
of interventions on more immediate issues, such as violent conflict and humanitarian 
crises, have been entirely ignored. However, while violent conflict has concerned some 
observers,  this  is  usually  within  a  framework  that  sees  a  hierarchical  relationship 
between  capacity  building  and  conflict  management  or  resolution;
2  or  as  Oliver 
Richmond puts it, ‘[d]ealing with conflict [is] now [seen to] depend upon the reform of 
governance by an alliance of actors which become custodians of the liberal peace.’
3 
  In  contrast,  I  argue  that  while  there  are  important  divergences  within  the 
literature, both debates are misplaced. The emphasis, rather, has to shift from capacity 
and  sovereignty  –  concepts  which  essentially  represent  institutional  and  legal 
benchmarks  –  to  the  ways  in  which  interventions  affect  the  distribution  and 
production/reproduction of political power in intervened states. Hence, the key thematic 
                                                 
1 Clapham, for example, argues for capacity to become the only parameter for sovereignty; Clapham, 
Christopher, ‘Degrees of Statehood’, Review of International Studies 24, no. 2 (1998), pp. 143-57. 
2  See  for  example,  Arnson,  Cynthia  J.,  ‘The  Political  Economy  of  War:  Situating  the  Debate’,  in 
Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed, edited by Cynthia J. 
Arnson and I. William Zartman (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), pp. 1-22, p. 
10. 
3 Richmond, Oliver, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 69. CHAPTER ONE 
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question posed in this thesis is about the nature of the relationship between intervention 
and changing forms of political rule within these states. 
By concentrating on the links between state building and capacity building, state 
building and sovereignty, or indeed capacity and sovereignty, the literature misses the 
crucial political nature of SBIs and is therefore unable to explain, rather than describe, 
the possible trajectories of interventions. The prevailing analyses are problematic for at 
least two reasons. First, they are constrained by a realist or a Weberian conception of 
the state, viewing the state as a ‘neutral’ set of institutions and actors. Consequently, 
what these authors fail to understand in relation to SBIs is that these interventions are 
not  simply  about  building  states’  capacity  to  govern  domestically  or  restoring  their 
sovereignty.  Rather,  SBIs  in  effect  constitute  attempts  to  transform  the  state  – 
fundamentally altering the political and social relations that underpin state power, the 
ways in which state power is exercised, and the interests it serves. Because the effects of 
interventions  are  examined  and  evaluated  against  the  expected  performance  of  a 
prototypical state, this results in a functional and technocratic view of politics that seeks 
to ‘measure’ the success of political processes in terms of pre-conceived institutional 
benchmarks.  
Second,  the  literature  is  constrained  by  static  dichotomies  such  as  domestic-
external, state-society and formal-informal that are drawn along formal institutional and 
jurisdictional  lines.  This  is  manifested  in  a  tendency  to  leave  the  interventions 
themselves  under-theorised  –  they  remain  within  this  view  nothing  more  than  a 
collection of ‘external’ actors, organisations, agencies and contractors, operating with 
varying degrees of coordination ‘inside’ the territorial boundaries of other states. The 
literature thus neglects the importance of the social and political power relationships 
that  emerge  within  and  around  interventions  and  the  ways  in  which  these  alter  the 
power structures of the state.  
In breaking with such technocratic notions of intervention and its effects, I argue 
that  the  state  has  to  be  understood  as  a  site  of  social  and  political  conflict.  The 
institutional materiality of the state reflects historical and ongoing social and political 
conflicts between dynamic coalitions of interests over access to power and resources. 
The significance of institutions resides not in their ‘capacity’, but in the sort of interests 
they promote or marginalise, and in the kinds of conflicts they give expression to, or 
structure out of politics. This structural, institutionalised, set of power relations is what I 
call  in  this  thesis  a  ‘form  of  political  rule’.  Therefore,  whether  framed  in  terms  of CHAPTER ONE 
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capacity building, conflict resolution or risk management, the most important dimension 
of contemporary state building programs pertains to the ways in which these affect the 
relationship between rulers and ruled, as well as the constitution of these groups.  
The chapter contains two main sections. In the first I identify the limitations of 
the debates in the literature over the effects of interventions. The second part of the 
chapter takes an initial step towards developing a new framework for explaining SBIs 
by elaborating on the theorisation of the state advanced in this study and its relevance 
for the analytical approach taken in the coming chapters.  
 
Evaluating the effects of state building interventions: Current debates and their 
limitations 
The term state building has come to refer to a broad range of externally driven programs 
and projects designed to build or strengthen the capacity of institutions, organisations 
and agencies – not all of which are necessarily part of the state apparatus – to effectively 
perform  the  functions  associated  with  modern  statehood.  Since  state  failure  –  the 
problem state building is putatively called upon to ‘fix’ – is primarily seen as an issue of 
poor governance and weak state capacity and with state builders reluctant to assume 
direct responsibility for the outcomes of such interventions,
4 debate in recent years has 
focused on identifying strategies and techniques for successful capacity building. In this 
way,  capacity  building  has  come  to  be  placed  at  the  centre  of  the  state  building 
problematic  and  is  often  seen  as  essential  for  the  long-term  success  of  such 
interventions  and  for  sustaining  and  building  upon  any  short-term  security  and 
development gains.
5   
However, state capacity, rather than being an objective and technical measure of 
performance  that  can  be  ‘built’,  essentially  constitutes  a  political  and  ideological 
mechanism for operationalising projects of state transnationalisation. The notion of state 
capacity  masks  an  implicit  preference  for  a  particular  set  of  social  and  political 
relationships  and  the  institutional  arrangements  seen  to  be  supportive  of  this.  It 
embodies a normative preference for order and stability of a particular kind, rather than 
a framework for understanding and explaining social and political dynamics in their 
own  terms,  including  those  that  may  lead  to  the  disintegration  of  certain  power 
                                                 
4 Chandler, David Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto Press, 2006). 
5 Hameiri, Shahar,  ‘Capacity  and Its  Fallacies: International State Building as  State Transformation’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, forthcoming. CHAPTER ONE 
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structures. Contemporary state building programs, with their associated emphasis on 
capacity building and the promotion of good governance, essentially attempt, though 
not necessarily succeed, to transform intervened states from within towards the creation 
of what Harrison called ‘governance states’ and Mkandawire ‘choiceless democracies’, 
in which the political choices available to domestic political leaders are circumscribed.
6  
Below I examine the capacity building and sovereignty debates to demonstrate 
their limitations for examining SBIs.  
   
The capacity building debate 
The  primary  question  authors  have  been  debating  in  relation  to  the  effect  of  state 
building on capacity is, quite simply, whether these interventions succeed in building 
state capacity or not. What has received less critical attention, though, is the actual 
meaning  of  state  capacity  in  this  context,  and  the  limitations  of  this  concept  for 
explaining institutions and the way they function. The literature is divided into two 
main  approaches.  Those  can  be  broadly  termed  neoliberal  institutionalism  and  neo-
Weberian institutionalism. As we shall see, despite some differences both approaches 
tend  to  abstract  the  state,  its  institutions  and  their  functioning  from  the  social  and 
political  conflicts  that  accompany  processes  of  capitalist  economic  development. 
Capacity  is  articulated  in  technical  and  ‘objective’  terms  that  dehistoricise  and 
naturalise  the  highly  political  and  conflict-ridden  nature  of  all  projects  of  state 
construction  and  reconstruction.  Therefore,  state  capacity,  which  is  essentially  a 
descriptive category, is accorded explanatory power that it does not possess.
7 This, of 
course, brings into question the utility of these conceptions of capacity for explaining 
the effects of SBIs. 
  Neoliberal  institutionalism  (sometimes  called  institutional  neoliberalism),  a 
hegemonic  perspective  within  the  major  multilateral  and  bilateral  development  aid 
agencies,
8 as well as among state building practitioners, refers to those approaches that 
combine the normative preference, associated with neoliberalism, for extending market 
                                                 
6 Harrison, Graham, The World Bank and Africa: The Construction of Governance States (New York and 
London:  Routledge,  2004);  Mkandawire,  Thandika,  ‘Crisis  Management  and  the  Making  of 
“Choiceless Democracies” in Africa’, in The State, Conflict and Development in Africa, edited by 
Richard Joseph (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 119-36.  
7  See  Hameiri,  Shahar,  ‘Failed  States  or  a  Failed  Paradigm?  State  Capacity  and  the  Limits  of 
Institutionalism’, Journal of International Relations and Development 10, no. 2 (2007), pp. 122-49. 
8  See  Craig,  David  and  Doug  Porter,  Development  Beyond  Neoliberalism?  Governance,  Poverty 
Reduction and Political Economy (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). CHAPTER ONE 
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relations into all social, economic and political spheres, with an emphasis on creating 
and building the capacity of institutions – mostly, but not exclusively, state institutions 
– to provide the conditions for the effective functioning of markets. This approach is 
rooted in neoclassical economics but more closely linked to new institutional economics 
(NIE).
9  Neoliberal  institutionalists’  primary  concern  is  and  has  always  been  the 
effectiveness of the institutions that are directly associated with the operations of the 
market, such as independent central banks, the treasury, and secured property rights and 
intellectual  property  rights.  However,  in  recent  years,  particularly  within  the  World 
Bank, the strength of social institutions, social capital and social safety nets has also 
become an area of considerable interest, although this is still in relation to their potential 
to support the successful extension and consolidation of liberal markets and market 
relations.
10  
To gain an understanding of what state capacity means here we may turn to the 
World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment document (CPIA).
11 This is 
a questionnaire designed to help Bank staff assess the quality of countries’ institutional 
frameworks  so  that  they  can  supposedly  tailor  country-specific  capacity  building 
programs. The questionnaire is divided into four major categories, comprising each of 
five sub-categories. The main categories are economic management, structural policies, 
policies for social inclusion/equity and public sector management and institutions. In 
each  sub-category  a  country  is  rated  from  one  to  six,  with  one  indicating  an 
‘unsatisfactory for an extended period’ performance.
12 States that perform consistently 
poorly according to this questionnaire are considered fragile or low-income countries 
under stress (LICUS).
13 
                                                 
9 This is particularly in relation to the capacity of well-functioning state institutions to reduce transaction 
costs and infuse stability and predictability in markets. See North, Douglass, Structure and Change in 
Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981); North, Douglass, ‘The New Institutional Economics and 
Third World Development’, in The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, edited 
by John Harris, Jane Hunter and Colin M. Lewis (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 17-26. 
10  World  Bank,  World Development Report 2000/2001 (Oxford:  Oxford  University Press, 2001). A 
critique of the World Bank’s approach to social institutions is available in: Carroll, Toby, ‘The Politics 
of the World bank’s Socio-Institutional Neoliberalism’, PhD thesis, Perth: Murdoch University, 2007. 
The concern with social institutions is associated with the shift within the World Bank from the so-
called Washington consensus to the post-Washington Consensus. Toby Carroll’s work clearly identifies 
that  the  distinction  between  the  PWC  and  the  Washington  consensus  is  not  in  the  fundamental 
prescriptive content of reform, but primarily in the emphasis upon broad institutional prerequisites for 
the  earlier  reforms  (to  assist  with  market  embedding  and  operation)  and  the  particular  delivery 
techniques and devices associated with the implementation of such neoliberal policies.  
11 World Bank, ‘Country Policy and Institutional Assessment’, Washington DC: World Bank, 2003. 
12 Ibid., p. 2. 
13 The World Bank, as well as other major development agencies, prefers the term ‘fragile state’ and 
LICUS to ‘failed state’ because of the less judgemental and loaded overtones of the former.  In  the CHAPTER ONE 
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Importantly,  because  the  benchmarks  in  relation  to  which  state  capacity  is 
evaluated are understood as ‘objective’ and technical, the politics within which such 
policy  objectives  are  conceived  tends  to  be  obscured.
14  While  the  role  of  domestic 
politics  and/or  organisational/institutional  traditions  in  the  West  in  undermining  the 
efficiency  of  interventions  are  often  mentioned  by  critics,
15  these  limited  critiques 
neglect the social and political conflicts within which these very ‘objective’ benchmarks 
have emerged and the interests that benefit from their promotion elsewhere.  
In the CPIA framework for country assessment, the emphasis is not on achieving 
certain  development  outcomes  per  se  (poverty  reduction,  millennium  development 
goals etc.), but rather on the existence and proper functioning of institutions, mostly 
those related to market-led development. As Rosser points out:  
The criteria that make up the CPIA emphasise the importance of deregulated markets, 
conservative macroeconomic and fiscal policies and public administrative and other 
institutional structures that provide transparency and accountability.
16     
The implicit assumptions of the CPIA are therefore that the main development problems 
that fragile states face are weak governance, policies and institutions, and that there is 
only  one  way  to  go  about  ameliorating  this  weakness  –  through  market-led 
development.
17 Hence, overcoming state fragility (and therefore failure) is seen as a 
matter  of  setting  up  the  right  processes  rather  than  in  terms  of  achieving  certain 
outcomes. Outcomes are seen to flow from the existence of the right processes.  
  As we can see, state capacity within the neoliberal approach is essentially the 
capacity  of  the  institutions  of  the  state  to  provide  the  conditions  for  market-led 
development to occur. Aside from technical capacity and suitable infrastructure this also 
necessarily  involves  insulating  markets  from  the  supposedly  damaging  effects  of 
                                                                                                                                               
prevailing jargon, failed and collapsed states are in essence more extreme cases of state fragility in 
which, according to Torres and Anderson, ‘the central state has effectively ceased to function.’ See 
Torres, Magui Moreno and Michael Anderson, ‘Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for 
Poverty  Reduction’,  Poverty  Reduction  in  Difficult  Environments  Team,  Policy  Division,  United 
Kingdom Government Department for International Development Woking Paper No. 1, August 2004, 
p. 5. For donor literature on fragile states see: DfID, ‘ W h y   W e   N e e d   t o   W o r k   M o r e   E f f e c t i v e l y   i n  
Fragile  States’,  United  Kingdom  Government,  Department  for  International  Development,  January 
2005;  USAID,  ‘Fragile  States  Strategy’,  Washington  DC:  United  States  Agency  for  International 
Development, January 2005 ; Anderson, Ian, ‘Fragile States: What Is International Experience Telling 
Us?’ Canberra: Australian Agency for International Development, June 2005.  
14 See Löwenheim, Oded, ‘Examining the State: A Foucauldian Perspective on International “Governance 
Indicators”’, Third World Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2008), pp. 255-74. 
15 See for example, Jenkins, Kate and William Plowden, Governance and Nationbuilding: The Failure of 
International Intervention (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006).  
16 Rosser, Andrew, ‘Introduction: Achieving Turnaround in Fragile States’, IDS Bulletin 37, no. 2 (2006), 
pp. 1-13, p. 2. 
17 Ibid. CHAPTER ONE 
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distributional  coalitions,  rent-seekers  and  other  vested  interests  that  can  potentially 
distort  markets.  However,  more  than  just  a  matter  of  economic  markets  and 
development,  Collier  argues  that  weak  institutions  and  poor  governance  provide 
incentives  to  warlords  and  corrupt  elites  that  benefit  from  disorder  to  prolong  civil 
conflict.
18 He states starkly that ‘[i]t does not really matter whether rebels are motivated 
by greed, by a lust for power, or by grievance, as long as what causes conflict is the 
feasibility of predation.’
19  
  In recent years there has been a tendency to associate economic liberalisation – 
the primary concern of neoliberal capacity building efforts – with democracy, either 
because it is viewed as the best shell for capitalist development or due to the assumed 
inherently pacific nature of democracy and free markets – the so-called ‘liberal peace’ 
thesis.
20  Democracy  building,  however,  is  not  a  concern  for  all  neoliberal 
institutionalists.  Some  argue  that  economic  liberalisation  and  the  rule  of  law  take 
priority.
21 In any case, political liberalisation and support to civil society organisations 
in intervened states have come to be seen not as important objectives in their own right, 
but  as  forms  of  accountability  designed  to  promote  good  governance.  While  the 
concepts  of  democracy  and  democratisation  are  themselves  heavily  contested,
22  it 
suffices  to  say  for  our  purposes  that  in  the  context  of  SBIs,  the  concern  with 
democratisation is not inconsistent with capacity building in general, as democracy here 
is associated with, and evaluated in relation to, the development and proper functioning 
of ‘effective’ political governance institutions, supportive of liberal markets.  
                                                 
18 Collier, Paul, ‘Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy’, Washington DC: 
World Bank, 15 June 2000. A similar argument is provided by Bates, Robert, ‘State Failure’, Annual 
Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (2008), pp. 1-12. 
19 Ibid, p. 4. 
20 Plattner, Marc F., ‘Liberalism and Democracy; Can’t Have One Without the Other’, Foreign Affairs 77, 
no.    2  (1998),  pp.  171-80;  Shattuck,  John  and  Brian  J.  Atwood,  ‘Defending  Democracy;  Why 
Democrats Trump Autocrats’, Foreign Affairs 77, no. 2 (1998), pp. 167-80; Matlary, Janne Haaland, 
Values and Weapons: From Humanitarian Intervention to Regime Change? (Basingstoke:  Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006); Talbott, Strobe, ‘Democracy and the International Interest’, Remarks to the Denver 
Summit of the Eight Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights, 11 October 1997, US Department of 
State  website,  available  at 
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/971001_talbott_democracy.html>, accessed 10 November 
2006. This notion of the liberal-democratic peace is based on Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace: A 
Philosophical  Sketch,  1795,  available  at  <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm>, 
accessed 1 June 2005.     
21 For example: Dorn, James A., ‘Economic Liberty and Democracy in East Asia’, Orbis 37, no. 4 (1993), 
pp. 599-619. 
22 See for example: Schmitter, Philippe C. and Terry L. Karl, ‘What Democracy is… and is not’, Journal 
of Democracy 2, no. 3 (1991), pp. 75-88;  Jayasuriya,  Kanishka  and  Garry  Rodan,  ‘Beyond  Hybrid 
Regimes: More Participation, Less Contestation in Southeast Asia’, Democratization 14, no. 5 (2007), 
pp. 773-94; Carothers, Thomas, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 
(2002), pp. 5-21. CHAPTER ONE 
  20 
It is apparent from the above that, for neoliberal institutionalists, state capacity is 
a universal standard that pertains to the existence and proper functioning of a particular 
institutional set and mode of governance – that which supports the effective functioning 
of markets, which in themselves are theorised as universal, apolitical and abstract. This 
approach is therefore very descriptive and prescriptive, but does little to systematically 
explain why institutions operate differently in various structural, political and economic 
settings, even when designed in the same way, aside from the usual circular reasoning 
of  blaming  failure  on  weak  state  capacity  and  vested  interests.  This  notion  of  state 
capacity also promotes as inherently rational and beyond legitimate contestation anti-
competitive and hierarchical forms of politics – what some have called ‘antipolitics’.
23 
This is because a ‘capacitated’ state is seen, at least implicitly, as one which effectively 
marginalises  any  form  of  politics  that  challenges  the  effective  operations  of  liberal 
markets.  Therefore,  other  political  agendas  are  seen  as  inherently  constituting  ‘bad’ 
public policy.
24  
The  neo-Weberian  institutionalist  conception  of  capacity  presents  some 
improvements upon the neoliberal institutionalist perspective and it allows a degree of 
critical  engagement  with  the  dominant  model  of  state  building.  Yet,  it  too  remains 
constrained by a functional view of state capacity.  
  Neo-Weberian  approaches  to  the  state  have  had  an  ongoing  concern  with 
defining and measuring capacity. This is not entirely surprising considering the central 
place the state occupies within this intellectual tradition. For example, Theda Skocpol 
argues: 
States  conceived  as  organizations  claiming  control over territories and people may 
formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of 
social groups, classes, or society. This is what is usually meant by ‘state autonomy’… 
Pursuing matters further, one may then explore the ‘capacities’ of states to implement 
official  goals,  especially  over  the  actual  or  potential  opposition  of  powerful  social 
groups or in the face of recalcitrant economic circumstances.
25   
According to Skocpol, state capacity has two dimensions: the capacity to resist societal 
influence  and indeed to shape society – a form of  capacity  which is recognised by 
                                                 
23 Jayasuriya, Kanishka and Kevin Hewison, ‘The Antipolitics of Good Governance: From Global Social 
Policy to a Global Populism?’ Critical Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (2004), pp. 571-90. 
24 Rodan, Garry, Kevin Hewison and Richard Robison, ‘Theorising Markets in South-East Asia:  P o wer 
and Contestation’, in  The Political Economy of South-East Asia: Markets, Power and Contestation, 
e d i t e d   b y   G a r r y   R o d a n ,   K e v i n   H e w i s o n   a n d   R i c h ard Robison (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
2006), pp. 1-38, p. 3. 
25 Skocpol, Theda, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’, in Bringing 
the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-37, p. 9. CHAPTER ONE 
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neoliberal institutionalists – and the capacity to shape economic outcomes. Capacity, 
therefore, defines state-society relations and state-market relations. Whereas neoliberal 
institutionalists view the market as fundamentally apolitical and abstract, neo-Weberian 
institutionalists recognise the potentially useful role that political leadership can play in 
facilitating  and  sustaining  economic  development  – a  role  that  goes  beyond  merely 
protecting markets from political interference. In fact, for some neo-Weberians, well-
targeted and effective state interference in markets is highly desirable, if not essential, 
for positive economic development outcomes.
26 Although strong state capacity is still 
ultimately associated here with successful economic development, sustained growth is 
not necessarily seen as established on free markets but rather on the capacity of state 
institutions  and  state  elites  to  harness  societal  forces  and  manipulate  domestic  and 
external constraints to the state’s advantage.
27 
State  capacity,  however,  is  not  merely  seen  as  a  comparative  measure  that 
positions  the  state  in  relation  to  society  and  markets.  Rather,  it  is  also  conceived 
vertically in relation to the Weberian ideal-type modern state. As Milliken and Krause 
point out:  
From  the  outset,  the  modern  state…represented  an  ideal  of  sovereign  territoriality  to 
which  rulers  aspired,  but  which  they  seldom  achieved.  Even  Western  European  states 
today  do  not  always  reach  the  Weberian  pinnacle  in  which  a  rationalized  central 
bureaucracy  enjoys  a  monopoly  of  organized  violence  over  a  given  territory  and 
population.
28 
There are, it is argued, certain core functions, aside from international recognition, that 
a  state  must  fulfil  satisfactorily  in  order  to  be  considered  a  state.
29  The  distinction 
between the state’s capacity to enforce its will on society and its capacity to implement 
‘proper’ policies, often despite societal resistance, is precisely the difference Zartman 
identifies between a ‘strong’ state and a ‘hard’ state.
30 Strong states, he argues, provide 
positive authority that is fundamentally for the benefit of their citizens, whereas hard 
                                                 
26 Wade, Robert, ‘The Visible Hand: The State and East Asia’s Economic Growth’, Current History 92 
no. 578 (1993), pp. 431-40; Weiss, Linda, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1999). 
27 Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State, pp. 4-5. Also see Mann’s notion of infrastructural power: 
Mann, Michael, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State, Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results’, Archives 
Européens de Sociologie 25 (1984), pp. 185-213.    
28 Milliken, Jennifer, and Keith Krause, ‘State Failure, State Collapse and State Reconstruction: Concepts, 
Lessons and Strategies’, in  State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction, edited by Jennifer Milliken 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 1-24, p. 3, their italics. 
29 Zartman, I. William, ‘Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse’, in Collapsed States: The 
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, edited by I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1995) pp. 1-14, p. 5; Fukuyama, Francis, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 
21st Century (London: Profile Books, 2005). 
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states  only  repress  their  citizens  and  exploit  them  for  the  benefit  of  very  narrow 
interests. Thus, the concept of capacity here is two-pronged: it contains a comparative 
component that measures the state’s strength relative to society and markets, and an 
‘objective’  component  that  measures  the  state’s  capacity  vis-à-vis  the  Weberian 
prototype. It is important to note that these are two components of the same concept and 
not two different concepts of capacity.
31  
Key to our critique of this approach is the way it tends to conflate capacity with 
legitimacy.  Capacity  plays  an  essential  legitimising  role  for  states  within  this 
framework.  For  instance,  Robert  Rotberg  has  tied  legitimacy  directly  with  state 
performance: 
Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer 
deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, 
and the very nature of the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the hearts of a 
growing plurality of its citizens.
32 
While Rotberg’s very linear connection between capacity and legitimacy (or lack of 
capacity and illegitimacy) is perhaps more narrowly functional than that theorised by 
most neo-Weberians, it is nevertheless instructive of the sort of analyses this perspective 
provides. Zartman argues that when a state ‘overplays its control functions, it loses the 
willing allegiance and support of its population.’
33 This does not mean, he maintains, 
that there are no core functions that all states anywhere have to perform adequately to 
gain legitimacy.  
For others, legitimacy has to do with the fit between state and society.
34 The 
postcolonial  state,  these  authors  argue,  has  to  accommodate,  and  even  come  to 
                                                 
31 This is in contrast to von Einsiedel’s contention that these two dimensions of state capacity are based in 
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Failure’,  in  Making  States  Work:  State  Failure  and  the  Crisis  of  Governance,  edited  by  Simon 
Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 
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Weberian, tradition defines the state as the organisation that claims to monopolise the legitimate use of 
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without  reference to the state’s capacity to deliver political goods. See, Hameiri, ‘Capacity and Its 
Fallacies’. 
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Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, edited by  Robert I. Rotberg  (Washington  DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 1-28, p. 1. 
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Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Migdal, Joel S., ‘State Building and the 
Non-Nation-State’, Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 1 (2004), pp. 17-46; Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius 
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approximate at times, traditional forms of governance in order to be legitimate in the 
eyes of its citizens, for example by giving tribal authority structures a formal role in 
governance.
35 While this approach has benefits in challenging more linear approaches to 
state legitimacy, it nevertheless relies on a problematic distinction between modern and 
traditional  governance,  and  at  its  core  it  still  links  legitimacy  with  state  capacity. 
Essentially, the very conception of capacity has not changed, only the ways to develop 
it. This way of relating legitimacy to state capacity ironically means that legitimacy is 
not understood to be based on responding to domestic political pressures, but on the 
existence and proper functioning of central authority structures and institutions that are 
able to rule society effectively, thereby depoliticising legitimacy. It becomes, within this 
approach, less about state-society relations and more about satisfying ‘objective’ criteria 
for effective and ‘rational’ governance.   
No consensus exists in the neo-Weberian literature over what the basic functions 
of  statehood  are.  The  three  fundamental  functions  Milliken  and  Krause  identify  are 
security, representation and welfare.
36 They argue that at the very least a state should 
protect its citizens from harm and provide order; represent the symbolic identity of its 
citizens; and assist in the development of wealth. Others have a more specified list of 
political goods. Rotberg, for example, includes health services, infrastructure, law and 
order, education and many more, while noting that some functions are more important 
than others, with security – both internal and external – being the most important.
37 
Based  on  this,  neo-Weberian  approaches  define  state  failure  as  a  relation  of  state 
capacity: failed states are simply those whose institutions are unable or unwilling to 
perform the functions associated with modern statehood. Regardless of their differences 
over what the primary functions of statehood are or should be, in all neo-Weberian 
accounts  these  functions  –  which,  they  argue,  ideally  should  be  provided  by  state 
institutions – are seen as intrinsic to the very existence of the state. This means that the 
                                                                                                                                               
Pacific 17, no. 2 (2005), pp. 283-308; Morgan, Michael, and Abby McLeod, ‘Have We Failed Our 
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35  Boege  et  al.,  for  example,  talk  of  ‘hybrid  political  orders’,  combining  traditional  and  modern 
characteristics. For state building to be successful they argue that state builders must not ignore existing 
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state  is  understood  in  terms  of  pre-conceived  outputs  pertaining  primarily  to  the 
effectiveness  of  centralised  authority  and  its  capacity  to  assert  itself  in  a  particular 
territory, often over recalcitrant societal forces that attempt to undermine the task of 
state  building.  In  this  sense,  the  neo-Weberian  way  of  theorising  capacity,  like  the 
neoliberal institutionalist approach we examined earlier, also has strong hierarchical, 
anti-competitive, top-down hues. In much the same way, it still embodies a normative 
preference for order and stability of a particular kind, rather than an analytical lens for 
understanding particular states and societies.  
The  two  conceptions  of  state  capacity  outlined  above  have  structured  the 
parameters of the debate in the state building literature over the  effects of SBIs on 
capacity  building.  The  capacity  building  debate  has  revolved  mostly  around  the 
question of whether SBIs are useful for building state capacity or not.    Most responses 
to this question are located somewhere between the two extreme poles of ‘yes’ or ‘no’, 
with explanations based to a considerable extent on the author’s understanding of what 
state capacity means. The prevailing attitude is that SBIs are for the most part relatively 
unsuccessful in building state capacity, but that this lacklustre performance has more to 
do  with  inadequate  planning,  lack  of  funding,  unsuccessful  implementation, 
coordination problems, insufficient local knowledge, inappropriate goal-setting, wrong 
sequencing, or any combination thereof of such technocratic shortcomings, than it does 
with any fundamental incommensurability between SBIs and capacity building.
38 As we 
shall see, even staunch critiques of current state building approaches remain constrained 
in their capacity to understand how interventions work and what they do because they 
continue to examine SBIs through the lens of state capacity.  
One of the foremost scholars to realign the study of contemporary international 
interventions around the notion of state capacity is Roland Paris. While Paris focuses 
specifically on how to reconstruct ‘post-conflict’ states and societies his prescriptions 
                                                 
38 For example: Paris, Roland, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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for  interveners  resonates  with  contemporary  state  building  common-wisdom  more 
broadly.  Paris  strongly  criticises  the  humanitarian  interventions  of  the  1990s  for 
proceeding too quickly on the path to marketisation and democratisation, because of the 
simplistic understanding of the liberal peace thesis that underpinned their planning and 
implementation. In themselves, he says, democracy and functioning liberal markets are 
worthwhile  objectives,  but  ignoring  the  potentially  harmful  effects  of  transitions  to 
democracy  and  free  markets  on  fragile  post-conflict  societies  in  barely  functioning 
states is not conducive to the task of long-term state building. The latter, he argues, has 
to involve ‘institutionalization before liberalization’, meaning strengthening the rule of 
law  and  state  institutions  through  intervention  before  exposing  these  states  to  the 
insecurities of markets and the political instability associated with the early stages of 
democratisation. Because intervenors in the 1990s rushed to achieve tangible results, 
such as elections and deregulation, to please Western governments and fickle domestic 
constituencies they tended to jeopardise the prospects of peace and reconstruction, he 
argues.
39  
The sequencing of the different stages of intervention is an issue highlighted by 
Jenkins and Plowden, who also emphasise lack of donor coordination and clear goal-
setting  as  partly  responsible  for  the  inability  of  interventions  to  build  capacity.  As 
practitioners  and  former  consultants  in  the  field  of  official  development  assistance 
(ODA) delivery they provide an abundance of examples for botched up interventions, 
suffering from inconsistencies, glaring inefficiencies and little or no accountability, both 
to donor and to recipient constituencies.
40 The effectiveness of interventions is also an 
ongoing concern for the main donor agencies. For example, the British Department for 
International Development’s (DfID) report ‘Why we need to work more effectively in 
fragile  states’  specifies  the  particular  difficulties  associated  with  delivering  aid  and 
promoting reform in fragile states, and recommends identifying domestic ‘drivers of 
change’ within the public sector and civil society whose capacity can be built in order to 
achieve  positive  development  outcomes.  The  report  also  singles  out  issues  of 
coordination and prioritisation as relevant for the success or failure of interventions.
41  
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Those who believe that interventions are useful for building state capacity often 
cite the post-war experience in Germany and Japan as examples for successful state 
building  that  led  to  the  emergence  of  both  as  prosperous,  democratic  and  peaceful 
countries. In a report from think-tank RAND, the authors argue that: 
Nation-building  is  not  principally  about  economic  reconstruction;  rather  it  is  about 
political transformation… what principally distinguishes Germany, Japan, Bosnia and 
Kosovo from Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan are not their levels of Western culture, 
economic  development,  or  cultural  homogeneity.  Rather  it  is  the  level  of  effort  the 
United  States  and  the  international  community  put  into  their  democratic 
transformations.
42   
In a similar manner, Robert Rotberg claims that to pull states up, away from collapse, 
the most important ingredients an intervention requires are a willingness to stay the 
course  and  sufficient  resources.
43  Zartman  argues  that  what  is  lacking  for  capacity 
building is international will to intervene early before states have reached the point of 
failure  or  collapse.  Capacity  building  assistance  by  international  actors  at  an  earlier 
stage  is  more  likely  to  be  successful  and  is  less  expensive  than  later  operations 
involving military force, says Zartman. Therefore, he argues that the emphasis has to be 
placed on developing early warning and detection tools and protocols.
44  
In contrast with the literature examined so far, there is a smaller group of authors 
who  argue  adamantly  that  interventions  cannot,  in  and  of  themselves,  build  state 
capacity. This group mostly frames its critique in anti-imperialist terms, reminiscent of 
‘world system’ theories from the 1970s. It nevertheless employs what is essentially a 
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neo-Weberian conception of capacity to claim that external intervention is incapable of 
building  the  ‘real’  capacity  of  local  leaders  for  authoritative  rule-making  –  the 
‘comparative’ element of state capacity. Therefore, from their perspective, there is a 
high likelihood that conflict will resume once the intervention ends, because the state 
built by outsiders is very weak. State capacity, they say, can only be built by domestic 
groups over time. Because SBIs demonstrate a preference for governance of a particular 
kind  with  their  promotion  of  pro-market  development  models  and  institutions,  it  is 
argued  that  interventions  undermine  domestic  political  groups  that  are  viewed  as 
antagonistic  to  liberal-democracy  and  therefore  restrict  these  groups’  capacity  to 
develop their political authority. These versions, while highly critical of the notion that 
interventions  can  build  capacity,  still  assume  that  the  absence  of  effective  and 
authoritative governance institutions is the primary problem facing those states in crisis.  
The leading exponent of this approach is David Chandler. Chandler argues that 
‘“state-building”  non-Western  states  without  self-government  will  result  in  the 
institutionalisation of weak states which have little relationship with their societies and 
lack legitimate authority.’
45 Elsewhere, focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), he 
claims that: 
The one theme that comes out clearly…is that of the tendency for the international 
administrative  authority  in  BiH  to  separate  state-building from  politics.  There  is  a 
tendency to see state-building as a technical or administrative process, one which does 
not require building a popular consensus for policy-making.
46   
What SBIs represent in this view – and this is a very salient point which will be taken 
up in the coming chapters – is a form of political rule that is not accountable to domestic 
constituencies. Technocratic rule does not see its source of legitimacy as coming from 
the societies it governs but from outside those states in international organisations and 
foreign governments: ‘Political institutions could only cohere society if they emerged 
out of existing social forces’, Chandler argues, echoing Huntington.
47 He also criticises 
Roland  Paris  and  others  for  assuming  that  politics  and  the  political  process  are  not 
central to the legitimacy of the state. Paris’ ‘institutionalization before liberalization’ 
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suggests, Chandler says, that he believes that ‘the problems of politics can be resolved 
outside  the  realm  of  the  political,  in  the  realms  of  law,  social  policy  and 
administration.’
48 Furthermore, unlike their predecessors in the colonial era, 
[i]nternational administrators are loath to be held to account for the policies they pursue 
or the outcomes of their interventions into the political process. At the same time, local 
actors are denied the political autonomy to reach their own compromise solutions and 
assume accountability themselves.
49 
He concludes that although the international administration in BiH has been able to 
meet the ‘externally decided needs of good governance’, it has been unable to build the 
institutions of government, without which the legitimisation of the state is impossible.
50 
  Alejandro Bendaña has couched his criticism of SBIs in a broader critique of 
global neoliberalism and the eroding effect it has on state capacity and sovereignty. In a 
similar vein to Chandler he argues: 
Good  governance  or  state-building,  like  good  behavior,  has  deep  ideological 
presumptions which purport to offer technical solutions to what in essence are political 
problems.
51    
He ties in the economic failures associated with failed states with the neoliberal reforms 
forced upon many states in the Third World by the international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and the donor states and points out that only rarely is it mentioned that some of 
the crises of state collapse that are depicted as challenges to international order are in 
fact a consequence of that very same order. Similarly, Mark Berger argues that the 
world-historical dimensions of current state building are often missing in the literature 
on interventions: 
[T]he  dominant  theories  of  nation-building,  international  security  and  national 
development, as they emerged and were revised in the cold war era (and as they have 
been further revised in the post-cold war era), routinised, and continue to routinise, the 
nation-state  as  their  key  unit,  or  sub-unit,  of  analysis…By  contrast,  a  more  useful 
approach to conceptualising nation-building and promoting economic prosperity, social 
progress and political stability in the post-cold war era would start by historicising and 
de-routinising the nation-state. State formation and nation-building need to be set in the 
context of the history of the universalisation of the nation-state system and the way in 
which  the  subsequent  spread  of  globalisation  has,  in  an  increasingly  uneven  and 
incomplete fashion, pushed nation-states in many parts of the world to the limits of 
their potential as a vehicle for security and development.
52  
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Both conclude that the attempt to build states to serve, in essence, as vehicles of global 
neoliberalism diminishes state capacity and unconducive to the emergence of legitimate 
states that provide security and development to their citizens.  
  From a less critical perspective, Ottaway and Lacina have nevertheless argued 
that ‘far from imposing a new imperial order, international interventions have had a 
surprisingly limited ability to bring positive transformation to targeted countries.’
53 The 
authors argue that interventions in the 1990s were unable to substantially alter the pre-
existing  distribution  of power  and  develop  democratic  regimes.  Elsewhere,  Ottaway 
explains: 
The externally-led or donors’ model demands a transition from the collapsed de jure 
state to the Weberian de facto state; the internally-led model more modestly accepts a 
transition from the collapsed de jure s t a t e   t o   a   r a w   p o w e r   de facto state that slowly 
develops institutions, though not necessarily democratic ones.  The  latter  process  is 
closer to the way in which states have developed historically.
54  
She argues that what external agents do is ‘set up organizations, not institutions.’
55 
These  organisations,  says  Ottaway,  will  become  institutions  –  significant  and 
established rule-making practices – only if local actors believe they provide solutions to 
what they perceive as real problems, and not if they provide solutions to what donors 
perceive  as  the  real  problems.  The  transformation  of  organisations  ‘into  legitimate 
institutions is the result of domestic political processes that take time and can only be 
marginally affected by donors.’
56  
  Simon  Chesterman  is  also  pessimistic  about  the  ability  of  external  actors  to 
build  state  capacity  in  the  Weberian  sense.  However,  in  contrast  with  the  previous 
authors he claims that ‘domestic ownership’ of the post-conflict reconstruction process 
cannot be relied upon to bring results, because it is precisely the malevolence of local 
political dynamics that preceded the collapse of the state in the first place.
57 Writing 
about  UN  transitional  administrations,  he  argues  that  there  is  a  fundamental 
contradiction  between  the  ends  –  establishing  legitimate  and  sustainable  national 
governance – and the means – a period of ‘benevolent foreign autocracy’.
58 He claims 
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that this discrepancy has been further accentuated in post-September 11 interventions. 
These  ‘war  on  terror’  interventions  cannot  even  be  seen  as  ‘benevolent’,  says 
Chesterman, since they have much more to do with the interests of the interveners than 
with the interests of people in intervened states.     
Other observers have argued that as difficult as capacity building by outsiders 
may be, the security risks and humanitarian crises associated with state failure are far 
too great for the international community to ignore. Therefore, Western governments 
and  international  organisations  have  to  intervene  in  those  countries  to  stabilise  the 
security situation and mitigate the crisis, while attempting to transfer knowledge and 
capacity in areas in which there is a greater likelihood of success.
59 These authors urge 
policy-makers  to  exercise  caution  in  goal-setting  for  interventions,  but  nevertheless 
encourage  interventionism  as  a  necessary  evil  in  the  currently  unstable  security 
environment. 
Whether optimistic or pessimistic about the prospects of interventions to build 
state capacity, phrasing the question in these terms is inherently problematic. It betrays 
a  conception  of  the  state  that  is  formalistic  and  functionalist,  focusing  on  state 
institutions  rather  than  the  broader  power  relations  within  which  these  emerge  and 
develop, and therefore missing out on the underlying dynamics that may systematically 
explain why institutions that are seemingly designed in the same way produce markedly 
different outcomes. Institutions themselves are evaluated within this debate in terms of 
their  functionality,  which  in  turn  is  measured  against  an  ideal-typical  state  of  the 
neoliberal  (‘good  governance’)  or  neo-Weberian  (cohesive  and  rational)  kind, 
depending on the conception of capacity favoured. Both of these are not real-existing 
states, or states that have ever existed, but forms of ‘best practice’ in terms of both 
governance  structures  and  policy  output.  These  approaches,  therefore,  do  not  give 
adequate expression to the power struggles that have taken and continue to take place 
everywhere, including in Western states, over the form and direction of the usage of 
state power.  
Those who argue that interventions are not likely to build state capacity, like 
Chandler and Ottaway for example, recognise the difficulty associated with constructing 
states and institutions. However, rather than develop this important finding theoretically 
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by attempting to overcome the limitations of static notions of capacity for explaining 
both  interventions  and  state  forms – before  and  after  interventions – they  prefer  to 
emphasise the need for local leadership to establish its legitimate authority organically, 
as if domestic actors emerged in a vacuum, in a harmonious conflict-free process, and as 
if they are incapable of manipulating SBIs to support radically different ends. What 
emerges  is  a  problematic  model  in  which  there  are  two  closed  and  under-theorised 
systems  –  the  state  and  the  intervention.  The  intervention’s  effects  on  the  state  are 
understood in a mechanistic way that obfuscates the political struggles involved in the 
attempted  production  or  reproduction  of  particular  governance  structures.  Therefore, 
these authors do not recognise that interventions do not merely constitute attempts to 
lock out certain ‘unsavoury’ actors from the domestic political process, but to reshape 
the  very  way  in  which  political  power  is  produced  and  reproduced,  leading  to  the 
emergence of a new kind of state.  
 
The sovereignty debate  
The debate over the effects of SBIs on state sovereignty has been shaped to a large 
extent by the one we just examined. This is because there has been a tendency in the 
post-Cold  War  era  to  redefine  sovereignty  to  mean  states’  demonstrable  capacity, 
understood primarily in terms of the neoliberal institutionalist variant outlined above, to 
provide  good  governance  domestically  and  to  participate  positively  in  international 
politics  externally.  The  primary  definitional  distinction  in  this  literature  is  between 
those who view sovereignty as a rigid, unitary and indivisible legal status and those who 
can conceive of gradations in sovereignty, in relation for example to state capacity, or 
governments’ human rights record. As with the related capacity building debate above, 
the internal disagreements here over how to understand sovereignty are more useful as a 
way of reflecting on the limitations of the literature than for explaining the effects of 
interventions.  This  is  because  sovereignty  represents  either  a  legal  benchmark  or  a 
corollary of capacity but not a way of understanding the internal dynamics of intervened 
states, both before and after interventions commence.  
While  the  sovereignty  debate  has  primarily  revolved  around  the  question  of 
whether  SBIs  erode  sovereignty  or  alternatively  promote  new  forms  of  sovereignty, 
what this debate really demonstrates is not only disagreements over the meaning of the 
concept of sovereignty itself, but diverging views over the definition of statehood in our 
time. In particular, the redefinition of sovereignty to mean satisfying universal criteria CHAPTER ONE 
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for state performance serves to transnationalise the accountability relations of domestic 
governments,  leading  to  the  emergence  of  a  transnationalising  and  transnationally 
regulated form of statehood. While some have argued that this ‘hollows out’ the state,
60 
the example of Cambodia in Chapter Seven demonstrates that such transnationalisation 
actually  provides  new  opportunities  for  domestic  governments  to  limit  the  political 
space available to regime outsiders and consolidate their rule. What this example also 
shows is that it is problematic to view the transition from one form of sovereignty to 
another  and  its  implications  simply  in  terms  of  ideational  shifts  within  liberalism, 
affecting  states  from  the  outside-in;  rather,  we  need  to  examine  this  shift  from  the 
inside-out, in terms of how it affects and is affected by struggles over power and wealth 
within and beyond the state. I begin by examining the different ways sovereignty has 
been defined and later relate these to the state building literature.      
Paraphrasing  Isaiah  Berlin’s  notion  of  two  liberties,  Robert  Jackson  has 
distinguished  between  ‘negative’  sovereignty  and  ‘positive’  sovereignty.  Negative 
sovereignty is states’ right for non-interference in their internal affairs by other states, 
whereas  ‘positive’  sovereignty  denotes  the  capacity  of  the  state  to  rule  within  its 
territorial boundaries.
61 Negative sovereignty is a formal-legal condition – it is ‘the legal 
foundation  upon  which  a  society  of  independent  and  formally  equal  states 
fundamentally  rests.’
62  Positive  sovereignty  is  a  ‘substantive  rather  than  a  formal 
condition.’
63  A  positively  sovereign  government  in  this  view  is  one  that  provides 
political  goods  to  its  citizens  and  participates  in  alliances  and  other  international 
arrangements  with  other  states.  Negative  sovereignty  for  Jackson  is  absolute,  while 
positive  sovereignty  is  a  quality  found  mostly  in  developed  states  and  in  varying 
degrees in developing states. 
Others – primarily international lawyers, who have had to contend with a rapidly 
changing legal landscape in the post-Cold War period – have argued that new forms of 
sovereignty are emerging and that sovereignty itself is being disaggregated along with 
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the state.
64 Because of the complexity of contemporary interactions between and within 
governments,  international  organisations,  NGOs,  corporations  and  international 
regulatory bodies, these authors argue that the monolithic conception of sovereignty is 
obsolete.  Sovereignty  is  rather  an  attribute  of  different  government  agencies  and 
institutions and is largely dependent on their compliance with international regulatory 
frameworks and their capacity to participate in implementing these regimes.
65 Crucially, 
instead of being accountable to domestic constituents, bureaucrats and administrators 
are seen as accountable to the policy communities within which they operate.
66   
  The conceptions of sovereignty above have shaped the debate over the effects of 
SBIs on the sovereignty of intervened states. However, rather than examine changing 
notions of sovereignty as a way of learning about struggles over access to political and 
economic power within and across state borders and the way these shape the notion of 
‘legitimate’ statehood,
67 the state building literature has engaged in the rather sterile 
pursuit of determining what state sovereignty should be and how specific states measure 
in relation to this ideal-type. They have therefore focused on how interventions affect 
the  sovereignty  of  intervened  states  in  relation  to  their  ideal  notion  of  sovereignty, 
rather than examine how conflicts over sovereignty itself have played out, particularly 
in the postwar and post-Cold War periods. These conflicts can tell us much about the 
form of politics associated with SBIs. In this respect, it is particularly telling that despite 
a discernable shift towards the conflation of sovereignty and capacity, the notion of self-
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rule  as  a  value  (regardless  of  the  realities  of  power)  has  not  been  dropped  from 
international  political  discourse  –  we  see  no  serious  return  to  the  language  and 
institutions of colonialism. In fact, the framing of the new interventions in terms of state 
building demonstrates the enduring centrality of the state as the object of international 
action and as the building block of the global order.  
Bellamy, Williams and Griffin view interventions in the post-Cold War era as 
‘post-Westphalian’  forms  of  peacekeeping,  in  contrast  with  more  traditional 
‘Westphalian’  peacekeeping  operations,  which  were  assigned  with  maintaining  the 
peace between states. As post-Westphalian operations, such interventions necessarily 
erode the non-intervention principle Bellamy et al. view as a fundamental element of 
state sovereignty. However, the erosion of sovereignty, they argue, is not necessarily a 
negative outcome if human development and security are best achieved by undermining 
and replacing the Westphalian world order of sovereign states.
68  
  David Chandler argues that the erosion of state sovereignty by interventions has 
occurred  through  two  related  phases.  In  the  initial  phase  of  humanitarian 
interventionism in the 1990s, the rights of individuals began to take precedence over the 
sovereignty  of  states  as  humanitarian  interventions  undermined  the  non-intervention 
norm of the Cold War in the name of protecting human rights.
69 The second phase – that 
of  state  building  –  has  also  had  deleterious  implications  for  the  sovereignty  of 
intervened states despite the emphasis on these states as the objects of reconstruction, he 
says. This is because sovereignty has been redefined to mean state capacity rather than 
political independence. It is therefore something that external forces can take away from 
states, rather than an inalienable right. Chandler casts the erosion of sovereignty in a 
negative light because he argues that what state building allows is for interveners to 
exercise power without responsibility and accountability to domestic constituencies.
70 
He cites the influential 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect,
71 as a key moment in the 
transition between the two phases because of the way it helped shift the emphasis from 
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arguments over the ‘right of intervention’, which focus on intervening forces, to the 
obligations of intervened states. In the process, the essence of sovereignty has shifted 
from  ‘control  to  responsibility’,  thereby  devaluing  the  sovereignty  of  postcolonial 
states.
72  
Echoing  Chandler’s  concerns,  Bickerton  et  al.  view  the  dilution  of  state 
sovereignty, associated with contemporary forms of intervention, as a normative issue. 
They argue that no other political organisation is capable of advancing the political 
agency of people as well as the truly sovereign state, because it provides a framework 
for political accountability. Therefore, they conclude that despite its flaws sovereignty 
should be vigorously defended against attempts to dilute it and equate it with capacity.
73    
  In  response,  there  are  those  who  argue  that  interventions  actually  restore 
sovereignty  to  failed  states;  indeed,  this  has  been  a  prominent  sentiment  among 
policymakers and practitioners. For instance, Former US President George W. Bush 
defended the invasion of Iraq by arguing it ‘restored sovereignty to the Iraqi people’.
74 
In the same vein, James Batley, former Special Coordinator of the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), claimed that RAMSI’s mission was to restore 
sovereignty to the Solomon Islands government by building the state’s capacity.
75 In 
this  view,  sovereignty  is  not  so  much  an  absolute  legal  status,  but  a  conditional 
empirical benchmark. There are also those who have a preference for popular forms of 
sovereignty and therefore argue that interventions help build ‘democratic’ sovereignty 
or other models that emphasise individual rights over traditional state sovereignty. This 
is based in a liberal ‘social contract’ view of the state as the guarantor of rights and the 
provider of political goods.
76 In a similar manner to the ICISS report, state sovereignty 
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here denotes the capacity of states to provide political goods, including democracy and 
ethical governance, to their citizens.    
Among those that seek to link sovereignty to capacity there are commentators 
who  advocate  temporary  suspension  of  independent  rule  and  the  establishing  of 
international administrations to assist the development of local capacity.
77 Others are 
advocating  longer  term  arrangements  to  replace  traditional  sovereignty  altogether. 
Herbst and Clapham, for example, advance a similar argument that states fail because of 
the mistaken extension of the sovereignty norm to fragile postcolonial entities with no 
history of centralised rule of any kind. Therefore, Herbst argues that such ‘states’ should 
be ‘decertified’  and their sovereign rights abolished indefinitely by the  international 
community.
78 A number of prominent realist/rational choice scholars have argued that 
sovereignty  has  always  been  conditioned  on  the  capacity  of  governments  to  rule 
domestically and that this was perhaps erroneously presupposed by the postwar norm of 
sovereign equality.
79 They argue that permanent new institutions of ‘shared sovereignty’ 
should  be  developed  by  the  international  community.  SBIs  are  currently  relatively 
unsuccessful in building sovereignty, they claim, because the means are not suitable for 
the  ends.  Krasner,  for  example,  argues  that  powerful  local  actors  tend  to  aggravate 
sectarian  tensions  in  their  jostle  for  position  in  the  post-intervention  political  order 
because they know external involvement is only a temporary situation. By developing 
new models of indefinite shared sovereignty in which some state functions are to be 
carried out by local actors and some by external ones this security dilemma could be 
averted, he says.
80 Similarly, Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart propose the concept of 
‘double compacts’. These compacts are a kind of ‘sovereignty strategy’, they argue, 
which formally establishes the foundations of the relationship between states, citizens 
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and the international community. With the ultimate objectives of a functioning state and 
market in mind, Ghani and Lockhart argue that international actors should constantly 
monitor governance improvements and change their focus accordingly from substituting 
state functions to ‘becoming coproducers, catalysts, and referees of local systems’.
81 
Focusing more specifically on the implications of contemporary state building 
for the institution of sovereignty, some authors have argued persuasively that while in 
the post-Cold War the concern with state capacity (and particularly the capacity for 
good  governance)  seems  to  have  taken  precedence  over  ‘hard’  conceptions  of  state 
sovereignty this is not a new phenomenon, but rather a return to a pre-decolonisation-
style hierarchical world order in which international law, at least implicitly, recognises 
some states as more sovereign than others. Gerry Simpson, for example, claims that the 
post-Cold War period is an anti-pluralist liberal moment in the same way as the late 
nineteenth  century-early  twentieth  century  ‘civilisation  standard’  created  a  hierarchy 
between Europe and European-descent societies and the rest of the world.
82 Similarly, 
William Bain draws up a comparative analysis between contemporary trusteeships and 
those of the pre-Second World War era. He argues that both denote a hierarchical world 
order,  although  contemporary  trusteeships  are  not  couched  in  the  language  of 
civilisation and progress but in that of security and risk-prevention.
83  
The problem with these otherwise very useful analyses is that both Simpson and 
Bain presuppose an existing global order that projects a uniform homogenising force 
from the West onto all other states. Both are looking at interventions from the ‘outside-
in’ and end up explaining interventionism in ideological/ideational terms – the shift 
between pluralist and anti-pluralist forms of liberalism, for example.
84 Yet, what is most 
striking about SBIs is precisely their ad hoc and inconsistent nature, as well as the 
unevenness of application. Why is it that an intervention has taken place in Cambodia, 
but not in Burma or North Korea, for example? All three were at some point – or still 
are – considered ‘excluded’ states with very few liberal credentials, but their treatment 
by Western governments has been different.  
While Simpson and Bain are correct to point out the increasingly hierarchical 
nature of international society, this emerging hierarchical liberal order does not denote a 
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simple  relationship  between  interventionism  and  dominant  ideology.  Specific 
interventions can be explained more accurately in relation to the intersection of three 
crucial factors: risk assessment for potential spill-overs of security risks – terrorism, 
transnational crime, mass migration, disease and others – to the West or to strategically 
important neighbouring countries; the assessed potential for the intervention to succeed; 
and the political palatability of the intervention to domestic constituencies and powerful 
interests in Western states. What matters more than the changing contours of liberalism 
is the political economy and politics within which such ideological shifts have taken 
place in the West and the political struggles that are involved in the promotion of such 
ideologies elsewhere. This is not a one-way relationship though, since the conflicts that 
accompany  interventions  in  so-called  failed  states  arguably  affect  the  political 
palatability  of  such  interventions  in  the  West  and  the  form  that  these  interventions 
assume. We have seen, for example, a declining willingness to intervene militarily after 
the failure of the American-led operation in Somalia, as well as an emerging emphasis 
on building state capacity, rather than on ‘automatic’ liberalisation and democratisation 
in later interventions.  
Simpson and Bain are also limited in their critique by only examining the inter-
state dimensions of hierarchy, which is unsurprising, considering their focus is state 
sovereignty. However, Hobson and Sharman criticise the tendency in the international 
relations literature – realist, liberal or constructivist – to view post-1648 international 
system  as  an  ‘anarchical  system  comprising  the  interactions  of  like  units 
(states)…selected  and  socialized  in  accordance  with  Westphalian  sovereignty.’
85 
Instead, they argue that the international system historically contained both sovereign 
states  existing  in  a  state  of  anarchy  and  hierarchical  sub-systems  in  which  not  all 
political  units  enjoyed  ‘ultimate  authority  in  certain  politico-juridical  areas’  –  for 
example, transcontinental empires and the Soviet ‘informal imperial hierarchy’.
86 The 
latter  example  of  a  hierarchical  sub-system  had  co-existed  with  the  Cold  War  –  a 
supposed age of liberal pluralism in international relations according to Simpson – and 
involved states that were formally sovereign but had transnational hierarchical relations 
built into their domestic political order.  
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In sum, changing notions of sovereignty are important for our understanding of 
the effects of interventions, but this has to be done within an ‘inside-out’ approach, 
focusing  not  on  whether  interventions  bring  states  closer  to  an  ‘ideal-type’  of 
sovereignty, but on how and why the constitution of sovereignty itself has changed and 
in what ways this affects social and political power relationships between and within 
states.  
The literature, as we have seen, has been debating the effects of intervention in 
relation to capacity and sovereignty.  The  primary  problem  with  using  capacity  and 
sovereignty  as  ways  of  examining  and  explaining  the  effects  of  SBIs  is  that  both 
concepts are presented as ‘objective’ measures that are not understood to be inherently 
grounded  in,  nor  necessarily  related  to,  any  historically  specific  social  and  political 
relationships.  These  categories,  therefore,  are  understood  to  exist  separately  from 
patterns  of  economic  and  political  development  and  the  way  these  relate  to  the 
emergence of, and the relationships between, social forces and the state. Furthermore, 
both concepts betray  an apolitical conception of the state, emphasising institutional, 
procedural, functional or legal facets.  
  While the depoliticisation of the effects of state building is most definitely a 
problem for those technocratic approaches that view the prospects of these interventions 
as an issue of institutional design and reform implementation, the emphasis on capacity 
and  sovereignty  is  also  where  the  otherwise  powerful  critique  provided  by  David 
Chandler and others of the anti-political nature of state building falls short of grasping 
the  full  extent  of  what  SBIs  do.  As  we  have  seen  Chandler,  as  well  as  Bickerton, 
Cunliffe and Gourevitch, argue that these interventions cannot build real state capacity 
because they circumscribe domestic politics and that they dilute state sovereignty by 
making it contingent upon capacity. He claims that turning political issues into matters 
for technocratic problem-solving can only lead to the institutionalisation of weak states 
that  lack  legitimate  authority  and  popular  support.
87  However,  this  implicitly 
presupposes that the state is a given – a closed system whose capacity for achieving 
equilibrium  interventions  necessarily  undermine.  In  this  view,  when  the  supposed 
condition of ‘natural’ power equilibrium is reached, the state will become legitimate and 
possess the capacity to deliver political goods such as security and development. In a 
sense, this is not very different from realists’ view of the international order and the 
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balance of power. They typically argue that any attempt by great powers to undermine 
the system’s equilibrium will result in other states mobilising to maintain the balance of 
power.
88  The  main  difference,  of  course,  between  the  realist  theory  of  international 
politics and Chandler’s analysis of domestic politics is that no external force is believed 
to  exist  in  international  relations,  whereas  interventions  play  that  role  in  relation  to 
domestic politics. But just as realism is often guilty of turning the state into a ‘black 
box’,  so  is  Chandler  guilty  of  failing  to  adequately  theorise  social  forces  and  their 
relationship  with  the  state.  For  example,  we  cannot  understand  the  development  of 
social forces and social and political relations in postcolonial states without taking into 
consideration earlier interactions between colonisers and colonised.
89  
Indeed,  Chandler’s  perspective  neglects  that  systemic  conflict  between 
competing interests is an inherent part of not only all state building projects, but also of 
all forms of political organisation. Rather than theorise the linkages between interveners 
and  domestic  social  forces,  Chandler  remains  constrained  by  an  internal-external 
dichotomy and by an evaluation criteria that is dissociated from the social and political 
dynamics that shape the exercise of state power. In short, he accurately identifies the 
antipolitics  character  of  interventions,  but  fails  to  specify  what  sort  of  politics 
interventions advance and by what methods, how this affects existing interests and what 
new political coalitions mobilise to support or resist such processes. By presupposing 
the  state,  even  highly  critical  accounts  of  contemporary  state  building,  such  as 
Chandler’s,  remain  limited  in  their  capacity  to  explain  variation  across  different 
interventions, as well as their potential trajectories.      
   
State building interventions: towards a new approach 
Thus far, we have examined the existing literature on interventions and outlined the 
limitations of employing capacity and sovereignty as ways of evaluating the effects of 
SBIs. This study, rather than fitting into these lively but ultimately unhelpful debates, 
develops an alternative framework for examining interventions that focuses on the state 
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and  the  ways  in  which  SBIs  affect  the  production,  reproduction  and  distribution  of 
political  power  in  intervened  states.  In  the  next  chapter  I  explain  the  nature  of  the 
relationship between SBIs and intervened states, but as a necessary step I briefly outline 
in this section the theoretical approach to the state that underpins this analysis.  
It is, perhaps, surprising that although the state building literature purports to 
have  the  ‘state’  as  its  primary  object  of  inquiry  and  reconstruction,  this  body  of 
research,  for  the  most  part,  has  had  little  engagement  with  the  literature  on  state 
theory.
90 As we have seen through the earlier discussion on the capacity building and 
sovereignty debates, while there is some diversity in the literature, the general tendency 
is to dehistoricise and presuppose the state and explain the functioning of particular 
cases in relation to their approximation of a prototypical state. At the extreme end, 
Robert Rotberg introduces the contributions to his edited volume on state building in 
this way:  
The  remainder  of  this  book  takes  the  nation-state,  whether  appropriately  or 
inappropriately so designated, as a given. Whatever their origins ontologically, states 
are the constituted repositories of power and authority within borders. They are the 
performers  and  suppliers  of  political  goods  recognized,  strong  or  weak,  by  the 
international system.
91   
Rotberg’s ahistorical conception of the state is in fact at the mainstream of the state 
building  literature,  particularly  that  produced  by  policymakers,  practitioners  and 
consultants.  
However,  even  when  the  state  is  historicised  this  usually  involves  either 
sweeping historical studies of the emergence of the modern state as an institution,
92 or 
alternatively country-specific studies that are primarily disciplined to the problematic 
question of state capacity. So while Charles Tilly, for example, famously examined the 
social  forces  and  conflicts  associated  with  the  development  of  the  modern  state  in 
Western Europe,
93 focusing particularly on the role of capitalism, this kind of analysis is 
rarely extended systematically by others to the examination of the social forces that 
have  shaped  and  are  shaping  real-existing  postcolonial  states.  Because  the  state  is 
examined  essentially  as  an  institution,  or  a  set  of  institutions,  with  predefined 
characteristics and outputs, particular cases are evaluated as either ‘more’ or ‘less’ state 
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and  not  on  their  own  terms  as  complex  social  and  political  structures.  This  is 
exemplified  by  Clapham’s  contention  that  many  postcolonial  states  are  weak  today 
because  the  introduced  notions  of  statehood  and  central  rule  have  no  historical 
grounding in the experiences of their societies.
94 
  These different, but proximate, ways of conceiving the state also contain tacit 
assumptions  about  the  relationship  between  state  and  society.  Rotberg’s  ahistorical 
perception of the state dehistoricises social forces and their relationship with the state as 
well. His is a rational choice view of state-society relations, which assumes a distinction 
between state and society and a functional relationship between people and institutions 
of authority – if the state provides ‘political goods’, defined essentially as services, to 
citizens  it  will  win  their  allegiance.
95  He  therefore  places  significant  store  in 
institutional design by  external state builders  as a way of shaping the incentives of 
strategic  domestic  actors  and  social  forces.
96  The  second,  more  historical,  approach 
focuses on the fit between the modern state and society. Coming broadly from within a 
historical institutionalist perspective,
97 it primarily seeks to examine the degree to which 
the state is socially embedded and how it transforms and is transformed by various 
social forces.
98 On this point commentators diverge with some, like Clapham,
99 arguing 
that  a  well  functioning  modern  state  is  impossible  to  achieve  where  there  is  little 
commensurability between state and society, while others argue that the postcolonial 
state itself, understood  as a Western-colonial imposition, has to change to better fit 
society if it is to function well.
100 Although this approach is sceptical of contemporary 
state building’s potential to achieve its objectives, it nevertheless remains constrained in 
its  capacity  to  adequately  explain,  rather  than  describe,  the  ways  in  which  such 
interventions affect the state and state-society relations. This is because the latter is still 
viewed through the prism of how it affects the functioning of the state.  
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This conception of the state feeds into a theorisation of conflict that betrays the 
literature’s roots in earlier structural-functional theory.
101 Social and political conflict is 
understood as an aberrant phenomenon, representing systemic dysfunction or deviant 
behaviour. While Paul Collier’s aforementioned influential ‘civil conflict as economic 
predation’  thesis  highlights  the  role  of  institutions  for  market-led  development  in 
overcoming  rent-seeking  behaviour,  thereby  advancing  a  narrow,  economistic 
conception  of  social  conflict,
102  others  have  sought  to  expand  on  this  to  identify 
different potential sources for systemic breakdown. Particularly ambitious is a recent 
edited volume by Arnson and Zartman, in which these authors and other contributors 
aim to theorise the interplay between conflicts motivated by ‘need, creed and greed’.
103 
While scathing of Collier’s economism, Zartman ends up arguing that: ‘States on the 
road to failure [are] the initial precondition of the conflict’.
104  
Or,  in  other  words,  state  collapse  or  failure  gives  rise  to  rebellion,  but  prolonged 
rebellion leads to state collapse, not so much at the hands of the rebellion as by self-
destruction on the part of the state itself.
105         
In  short,  in  Zartman’s  view  it  is  state  failure  that  explains  both  the  emergence  of 
intractable conflict and the downward spiral that follows. This means that, within this 
approach, conflicts of need, creed or, indeed greed, only emerge in earnest when central 
authority is lacking and the state does not function properly. Since social conflict is 
taken  out  of  the  wider  structural  context  the  result  is  to  encourage  an  emphasis  on 
monitoring and strengthening institutional performance as a way of pre-empting conflict 
from  emerging  in  the  first  place;  indeed,  this  is  precisely  what  Zartman  himself 
recommends in a different publication.
106  
In contrast, I argue that it is impossible to separate the state and its institutions 
even in theory from the social and political relationships that run through them. This is 
based on Poulantzas’ and Jessop’s conception of the state not as a set of institutions and 
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agencies, but as an expression of power.
107 State power is a set of complex and dynamic 
social relationships that shape the use of the state apparatus. Because these invariably 
exist and develop within a context of social relations, it is misleading to view the state 
or  its  apparatus  as  neutral.
108  Such  a  framework  emphasises  the  role  of  conflicts 
between and within historically specific coalitions of interests rooted primarily in the 
political economy – classes, class fractions, distributional coalitions and other societal 
groups – as crucial for understanding why particular institutions emerge, the way they 
function and their potential future development. Hence, the significance of institutions 
resides  not  in  their  capacity  per  se,  but  in  the  sort  of  interests  they  promote  or 
marginalise, and in the kinds of conflicts they give expression to, or structure out of 
politics. This means that state ‘capture’ by particular interests and coalitions, predatory 
or otherwise, is not an aberration, but something that is inherent to every state, or indeed 
every political structure. Crucially, the various social and political relationships that 
underpin the use of state power are not confined to the state’s geographical borders. 
Indeed, for the most part, and particularly in postcolonial states, it is impossible to make 
sense of existing state forms and their development without examining international and 
transnational linkages, as well as the effects of colonial relations and the Cold War.  
Furthermore,  the  definition  of  social  forces  and  the  analysis  of  their 
interrelations are not economistic, but take into consideration the historical development 
of such interests, including the effects of ideology, mobilisation and cooption.
109 The 
emphasis here on the social and political relationships underpinning state power does 
not mean that I view the state as ‘trapped’ by social forces, or determined by society. 
Indeed, as Jessop has forcefully argued: 
If one posits the need to choose between the state and society as the independent variable 
in  social  analysis,  one  implies  that  both  exist  as  independent  entities  which  are  fully 
constituted, internally coherent and mutually exclusive and that one always unilaterally 
determines the other. This would reify and absolutize what is really an emergent, partial, 
unstable and variable social distinction.
110 
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If this is true for the Western capitalist state with its institutionalised and formalised 
power structures, it is doubly so for poor, conflict-ridden postcolonial states in which 
the distinction between private and public power is blurry and in a state of flux.
111 
Despite  interveners’  self-professed  emphasis  on  ‘state’  building,  the  complex 
relationship between broader structural social conflicts and the state suggests that no 
such clear separating line exists.  
Examining the state as a dynamic set of power relationships allows us to see the 
political nature of SBIs in a way that the capacity/sovereignty frameworks cannot, in 
turn  opening  up  a  range  of  related  questions  that  will  be  taken  up  in  the  coming 
chapters. Because the social and political conflicts associated with patterns of economic 
development are integral to every social system and political community, intervention is 
never a complete project, but rather a continuous process of state transformation – a 
transformation  of  the  ways  in  which  political  power  is  distributed,  produced  and 
reproduced in particular states and societies. It is an attempt to reconfigure the social 
and  political  relationships  that  shape  the  exercise  of  state  power.  Since  such 
interventions attempt to transform the state in ways that support the extension of liberal 
markets and ‘good governance’ public policy, this often constitutes a direct challenge to 
established interests, potentially leading to the emergence of new conflicts, interests and 
coalitions  within  the  state.  How  this  is  played  out  is  of  great  importance  to  our 
understanding of what possible trajectories interventions may take.  
 
Conclusion 
The first chapter of the thesis has outlined the primary debates in the state building 
literature and sought to highlight their limitations for examining the effects of these 
interventions. The literature we have examined implicitly accepts that SBIs constitute 
attempts to build the capacity of the state to govern domestically. As a result, the study 
of SBIs has been framed by unhelpful debates over their effects upon state capacity and 
sovereignty – concepts which in effect represent institutional and legal benchmarks. 
These perspectives serve to mask the inherently political and ideological underpinnings 
of all projects of state construction and reconstruction, as well as the conflict-ridden and 
dynamic nature of such processes. Examining SBIs in terms of capacity and sovereignty 
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also  reifies  static  dichotomies,  such  as  domestic-external,  state-society  and  formal-
informal that are drawn along formal institutional and jurisdictional lines. In contrast, I 
have argued that to grasp the political nature of SBIs it is essential to examine the ways 
in which these interventions affect the social and political relationships that underpin 
the  exercise  of  state  power.  This  is  premised  on  a  conception  of  the  state  that 
emphasises conflicts between and within historically specific coalitions of interests as 
crucial for understanding why particular institutions emerge, the way they function and 
their potential future development. What is unique about SBIs, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, is that state transformation is attempted without formally replacing the 
domestic state apparatus or challenging the legal sovereignty of intervened states but 
through the selective transnationalisation of the governing institutions of these states. 
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Chapter Two 
State  Building  Interventions  as  Risk  Management:  State 
Transformation and Multilevel Regimes 
 
Introduction 
The first chapter demonstrated the weakness of both capacity and sovereignty as ways 
of evaluating the effects and understanding the dynamics of state building interventions 
(SBIs). One of the primary implications of the state building literature’s institutionalist 
bent, briefly mentioned in the introduction to Chapter One, is that the interventions 
themselves remain under-theorised. Because the focus is on how they affect the capacity 
of the state, interventions are viewed in essence as collections of actors, agencies and 
organisations operating ‘inside’ other states with varying degrees of coordination and 
success. In this chapter, I move beyond the institutional problematic to theorise the form 
and structure of SBIs and the social and political power relationships they embody, as 
well as the way in which these interventions relate to institutional and jurisdictional 
arrangements  in  the  intervened  state.  What  the  preoccupation  with  capacity  and 
sovereignty neglects is that these interventions  constitute political regimes – sets of 
social and political relationships, institutions and ideas – that affect the ways in which 
political  power  is  produced  and  reproduced  within  intervened  states,  though  not 
necessarily in the way intended by interveners. Premised on the idea that the weakness 
of the governing institutions of intervened states represents an unacceptable security 
risk  to  intervening  states  and  their  societies,  SBIs  are  set  up  to  manage  risk  by 
transforming these states from within.  
  SBIs represent a new mode of governance whose nature is obfuscated by the 
prevailing methodological nationalism of existing accounts, which take the state as their 
unit of analysis and its performance as their object of enquiry. What is unique about 
SBIs is that they are multilevel regimes – simultaneously within and outside the state. 
These multilevel regimes open up transnational spaces of governance within or near the 
structures and institutions of intervened states, without formally replacing the domestic 
state  apparatus  or  challenging  the  formal  sovereignty  of  these  states.  That  is,  they 
establish competing spaces of governance or jurisdictions within the local governing 
apparatus, or transnationalise existing ones. These spaces incorporate complex vertical 
and horizontal multi-scalar governance structures, connecting the local with the global CHAPTER TWO 
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but within the intervened state. They bring together public and private actors, as well as 
actors  from  transnational  civil  society  and  multilateral  organisations  in  new  and 
innovative ways that confound traditional notions of statehood and public policy. In 
that,  they  demonstrate  a  degree  of  dependence  on  intervened  state  structures  and 
institutions that is crucial to their modus operandi and rationalisation, as well as to their 
limitations. Rather than heralding the decline of the state or the rise of an all-powerful 
and disciplinary global liberal governance, as some argue,
1 what these multilevel state 
building  regimes  denote  is,  first,  the  enduring  importance  of  state-based  forms  of 
regulation of both security risks and the spread of the world economy;
2 and, second, the 
diffuse, fragmentary, contested, inconsistent and often ad hoc nature of emergent forms 
of global/transnational governance, particularly those associated with interventions in 
the world’s periphery.   
The question then is how do these multilevel regimes relate to other levels of 
governance, above and below the state? In particular, it is important to identify what 
conflicts are generated, exacerbated or marginalised, as these intervention regimes clash 
with other regimes within the state, representing other sets of interests and ideologies, 
and what coalitions are mobilised in support of or resistance to intervention regimes. To 
answer  these  questions,  it  is  essential  to  first  gain  a  sense  of  the  ideologically  and 
politically  conditioned  risk  management  rationale  that  underpins  contemporary  state 
building  efforts,  as  well  as  the  ways  in  which  risk  management  relates  to  the 
transformation  of  the  state  and  the  particular,  multilevel,  form  state  transformation 
assumes. The following section examines the notion of multilevel regime as a way of 
conceptualising contemporary SBIs and their relationship with intervened states, while 
the final section looks at the limitations of state transformation of this kind by taking the 
legally ‘exceptional’ status of intervention spaces as an example.  
 
                                                 
1 For example see, Bickerton, Christopher J., ‘State-Building: Exporting State Failure’, in Politics without 
Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations, edited by Christopher J. Bickerton, 
Philip  Cunliffe  and  Alexander  Gourevitch  (London:  University  College  Press,  2007),  pp. 93-111; 
Chandler,  David,  Empire  in  Denial:  The  Politics  of  State-Building  (London:  Pluto  Press,  2006); 
Duffield, Mark R., Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and Security 
(London: Zed Books, 2001). 
2 Jayasuriya, Kanishka, ‘Beyond New Imperialism: State and Transnational Regulatory Governance in 
East Asia’, in Empire and Neoliberalism in Asia, edited by Vedi R. Hadiz (London and New York: 
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Risk management and state transformation  
Contemporary  SBIs  are  often  rationalised  in  terms  of  pre-empting  state  failure  or 
resuscitating failed states and hence as managing the risk such failure potentially poses 
to  the  security  of  intervening  states  and  their  societies  and  to  global  stability  more 
broadly. The relationship between SBIs and risk management is usually understood in 
terms of complementary short-term and long-term objectives. In the short term, SBIs 
are deployed to physically contain security risks such as terrorism, transnational crime 
and refugee outflows emanating, or potentially emanating, from within the borders of 
so-called fragile or failed states. It is the hard-edged security dimension that is usually 
understood to constitute their raison d’être.
3 For example, when justifying the extensive 
and  expensive  Australian-led  intervention  in  Solomon  Islands  in  mid  2003,  then 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard argued it was incumbent upon Australia to: 
arrest this downward spiral, which, if not addressed, could result in the total collapse of 
the  Solomon  Islands’  governance  and  sovereignty…  A  failed  state  would  not  only 
devastate the lives of the peoples of the Solomons but could also pose a significant 
security risk for the whole region.
4 
Howard’s Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer was more specific in identifying the 
potential risks posed to Australian security by the disintegration of Solomon Islands’ 
governing apparatus: 
We  will  not  sit  back  and  watch  while  a  country  slips  inexorably  into  decay  and 
disorder. I say this not just for altruistic reasons. Already the region is troubled by 
business scams, illegal exploitation of natural resources, crimes such as gun running, 
and the selling of passports and bank licences to dubious foreign interests.
5 
Crucially, Solomon Islands did not present any immediate, palpable threat to 
Australian security at the time of intervention. Rather, Howard and Downer rationalised 
their actions as way of reducing the potential for future security problems to emerge and 
affect Australia. This means that the decision whether to intervene or not, and what the 
emphasis of the intervention should be, often depends on risk assessment exercises, 
somewhat akin to those associated with the insurance industry.
6 Indeed, the form state 
                                                 
3 Michael Wesley dubbed this the ‘realist ethics of intervention’. See Wesley, Michael, ‘Toward a Realist 
Ethics of Intervention’, Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005), pp. 55-72. 
4 Howard, John, ‘Ministerial Statement to Parliament on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands  (RAMSI)’,  Australian  Government  Department  of  Prime  Minister  and  Cabinet,  12  August 
2003, available at <http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech422.html>, accessed 24 August 2005. 
5 Downer, Alexander, ‘Security in an unstable world – Speech to the National Press Club’, Australian 
Government  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Trade  website,  26  June  2003,  available  at 
<http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030626_unstableworld.html>,  accessed  21  March 
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6  See  for  example,  Treverton,  Gregory  F.,  ‘Enhancing  Security  through  Development:  Probing  the 
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building assumes in specific cases – for example, whether coercive force is threatened 
or used – is associated with risk assessment and framed in terms of risk management.  
In  the  longer  term,  SBIs  are  set  up  to  manage  the  perceived  risk  posed  by 
‘ineffective’ states by generating supply and to a lesser extent demand for effective 
governance in intervened states. This is mostly seen to involve establishing and building 
the  capacity  of  state  institutions  to  regulate  security  threats  and  to  provide  suitable 
conditions for economic development. These objectives are usually understood in terms 
of  transferring  successful  policies  and  institutions  and/or  strengthening  institutional 
environments for the functioning of liberal markets.
7 It also often involves supporting 
civil society groups that appear sympathetic to reform, as a way of applying pressure on 
state institutions to be more accountable. Effective, ‘good’ governance, backed by state 
capacity,  is  seen  as  the  bedrock  of  long-term  stability,  both  internally  and 
internationally, by reducing poverty, disaffection and therefore the potential for security 
risks to emerge in the first place.
8 In this manner, the programs and policies associated 
with  state  building  have  now  been  extended  beyond  ‘post-conflict’  situations  and 
peacekeeping in war-affected societies to be regarded as ‘applicable to a wide spectrum 
of developing countries, both in war and peace.’
9  
In summary, managing the risk that failed or fragile states supposedly pose to 
world security, aside from direct interventions to eradicate obvious threats or manage 
existing crises that are seen to have the potential for spilling across borders, is seen to 
require the ‘strengthening’, indeed the transformation, of domestic governance and its 
outputs in intervened states. This, in turn, fuses together the objectives and practice of 
security  and  development  like  never  before  –  the  security  of  Western  states  and 
societies is seen to depend on the quality of the domestic governance of some of the 
                                                                                                                                               
States Fail: Causes and Consequences, edited by Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton : Princeton University 
Press, 2004), pp. 135-50. 
7  See  Hughes,  Caroline,  Dependent  Communities:  Aid  and  Politics  in  Cambodia  and  Timor-Leste, 
forthcoming; Brinkerhoff, Derick W. and Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, ‘Governance Reforms and Failed 
States: Challenges and Implications’, International Review of Administrative Sciences 68, no. 4 (2002), 
pp. 511-31;  
8  For  example,  as  Carroll  and  Hameiri  argue,  the  Australian  government’s  2006  White  Paper  on 
Australia’s overseas aid programme makes a claim that would have been considered radical in major 
policymaking circles only a few years ago, that Australian security is put at risk due to high levels of 
poverty in its near region. This view has become mainstream among the world’s major governments 
and  multilateral  organisations  in  recent  years.  See  Carroll,  Toby  and  Shahar  Hameiri,  ‘Good 
Governance and Security: The Limits of Australia's New  Aid Programme’, Journal of Contemporary 
Asia 37, no. 4 (2007), pp. 410-30.  
9 Bickerton, ‘State-Building’, p. 93. CHAPTER TWO 
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world’s poorest states, which is also seen, in a kind of circular reasoning, as prerequisite 
for successful economic development in those countries.
10  
The supposed synergy between the security interests of the major powers and 
the  economic  development  prospects  of  developing  countries  has  been  branded 
‘enlightened  self-interest’.  For  example,  when  launching  the  Africa  Commission 
development report in 2005, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair said that famines 
and instability ‘thousands of miles away lead to conflict, despair, mass migration and 
fanaticism that can affect us all. So for reasons of self-interest as well as morality, we 
can no longer turn our back on Africa.’
11 This new orthodoxy has been reflected in the 
‘securitisation’  of  the  international  development  assistance  programmes  of  most 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member-states in 
recent years. Aid programmes have become increasingly reorientated to focus on state 
building and good governance objectives, and aid agencies are now often physically 
embedded  in  ‘whole  of  government’  structures  that  include  more  obvious  security 
organisations,  such  as  police  and  the  military,  whose  roles  have  also  been 
‘developmentalised’ in the process.
12  
However,  despite  the  ambitious  and  far-reaching  nature  of  state  building’s 
objectives,  their  operationalisation  does  not  involve  taking  over  intervened  states.
13 
Rather, SBIs are set up to shape political outcomes primarily by limiting the spectrum 
of  political  choices  available  to  domestic  leaders  –  an  exercise  associated  with  the 
selective transnationalisation of the domestic governing apparatus of intervened states.
14 
                                                 
10  Duffield,  Mark,  Development,  Security  and  Unending  War:  Governing  the  World  of  Peoples 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).  
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2005, available at 
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12  Hameiri,  Shahar,  ‘Risk  Management,  Neo-liberalism  and  the  Securitisation  of  the  Australian  Aid 
Program’,  Australian  Journal  of  International  Affairs  62,  no.  3  (2008),  pp.  357-71;  Carroll  and 
Hameiri, ‘Good Governance and Security’; Brown, Stephen, ‘CIDA Under the Gun’, in Canada Among 
Nations 2007: What Room to Manoeuvre? edited by Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s  University Press, 2008), pp. 91-107; Patrick,  Stewart  and  Kaysie  Brown,  Greater 
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circle’ of encouraging good governance and building state capacity without direct rule. Fukuyama, 
Francis, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile 
Books, 2005), p. 164. 
14 Indeed, the limited nature of this endeavour is reflected in the discernable reluctance of interveners to 
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For  example,  the  Governance  and  Economic  Management  Assistance  Program 
(GEMAP)  in  Liberia  is  a  comprehensive  multi-actor  effort  to  ‘build  a  system  of 
economic  governance  to  promote  accountability,  responsibility  and  transparency  in 
fiscal management’.
15 It involves the coordinated insertion of international advisors into 
key  roles  along  the  entire  Liberian  ‘public  revenue  and  expenditure  management 
stream’  – tax collection, budgeting, government procurement and corruption control, 
and more.
16  
Philippa  Atkinson  has  chastised  international  actors  for  the  limited  scope  of 
intervention in Liberia, with its focus on economic governance to the relative exclusion 
of issues relating to democratic governance.
17 Atkinson argues that it is only because 
the Liberian government, led by charismatic President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, has shown 
real commitment to reform that the GEMAP partnership has been able to make some 
progress  in  achieving  successful  post-conflict  transition.
18  Atkinson’s  critique  is 
misguided, however, in that she examines GEMAP in terms of the extent to which it 
fulfils the criteria for ‘just’ interventions as set out by the Independent Commission on 
Intervention  and  State  Sovereignty  (ICISS).
19  In  fact,  GEMAP  has  been  established 
primarily  to  manage  the  risk  poor  governance  is  seen  to  pose,  while  seeking  to 
circumvent or marginalise difficult ‘political’ issues. In other words, GEMAP attempts 
to advance and institutionalise a technocratic notion of politics, understood as demand 
for good governance, since other forms of politics are seen as potentially destabilising 
and therefore risky.  Indeed, despite the intrusive nature of GEMAP, which imposes 
considerable limitations on the distribution of resources through Liberian public policy, 
ultimate responsibility remains with Liberian leaders:  
[i]nternational experts do have co-signing authority, and the international partners can 
advise the government through their participation in the EGSC [Economic Governance 
Steering Committee – the body responsible for the oversight of the implementation of 
GEMAP]…the  President  of  Liberia  has  ultimate  decision-making  authority,  not  a 
                                                                                                                                               
institutions in limiting the scope of politics in recipient states. See Harrison, Graham, The World Bank 
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16 Ibid. 
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18 Ibid., p. 30. 
19 See International  Commission on Intervention  and  State  Sovereignty,  The Responsibility to Protect 
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foreign  expert  or  foreign  government.  GEMAP  will  ultimately  enable  Liberia  more 
control over its affairs.
20 
As the Liberian example indicates, while emerging governance arrangements in 
intervened states are inherently hierarchical, in that they are structured to preference 
particular  political  outcomes  and  interests  over  others,  this  is  not  as  some  have 
suggested  colonialism  redux  –  the  reappearance,  perhaps  in  new  guises,  of  the  old 
institutions of trusteeships and protectorates.
21 In the majority of cases, including that of 
Solomon Islands which will be examined in detail in Chapter Six, SBIs co-exist with, or 
exist  within,  formally  sovereign  domestic  governments  and  their  bureaucracies. 
Domestic leaders are formally in charge even when external administrators are afforded 
considerable  veto  powers  over  their  decisions,  including  the  power  to  sack  elected 
representatives. For  example, European Union (EU) High Representatives to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) have used their authority to veto more than 100 elected officials 
from  the  time  they  were  granted  the  so-called  Bonn  Powers  in  1997.  In  particular, 
Paddy Ashdown, EU High Representative to BiH from 2002 to 2006, used his veto 
powers  so  frequently  that  the  territory  became  known  as  a  ‘European  raj’.
22 
Nevertheless, BiH officially remains a sovereign state on the path to EU accession.  
In those cases in which transitional international administrations are established 
to  directly  govern  particular  territories,  and  such  ‘formal’  arrangements  are  getting 
fewer  and  further  between,  these  have  been  justified  and  legitimised  as  temporary 
steppingstones towards self-rule, with formal authority transferred to domestic leaders 
as  quickly  as  those  could  be  identified,  usually  through  internationally  regulated 
elections.
23 For example, in Timor-Leste – an entirely new state established by United 
Nations (UN) resolution and initially governed by a UN transitional administration – 
sovereignty was officially handed over to East Timorese leaders after only three years. 
This is a blip in time considering that in the first half of the previous century, hundreds 
of years of colonial rule were not judged sufficient for preparing non-European descent 
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colonies for self-rule in the eyes of most Europeans.
24 In Timor-Leste the transfer of 
authority  took  place  despite  massive  levels  of  devastation  created  by  Indonesian 
military-backed  militias  following  1999’s  independence  referendum.  In  Iraq  formal 
authority was handed back to domestic leaders within approximately 12 months from 
the  beginning  of  the  US-led  intervention,  and  in  Afghanistan  it  happened  almost 
immediately after intervention commenced, in spite of ongoing large-scale hostilities 
and  the  presence  of  thousands  of  foreign  troops  and  civilian  administrators  on  the 
ground in both countries.  
Indeed,  SBIs  involve  the  attempt  to  manage  the  risk  supposedly  posed  by 
‘ineffective’ states by transforming intervened states from within, while preserving their 
formal sovereignty and territorial integrity. These interventions are set up to ensure the 
governance outputs of state institutions, but without assuming responsibility for directly 
governing populations within their borders. This duality leads to the emergence of a 
new  form  of  transnationalising  and  transnationally  regulated  statehood  that  is  not 
encompassed within either a Westphalian pluralist or an imperialist international system 
and that does not find adequate expression within traditional readings of international 
relations and international law.
25  
  The complex internal-external relationship between SBIs and intervened states is 
also manifested in the way these interventions simultaneously preserve the territory-
bounded legal order of  intervened states – the  principle known as legal spatiality – 
while nevertheless selectively transnationalising their legal spaces for the purpose of 
risk management. There are two dimensions to this. First, there is a discernable trend 
towards prompting or coercing governments to adopt laws, rules and regulations, as 
well  as  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  that  are  developed,  evaluated  and  regulated 
outside  the  usual  political  and  legal  apparatus  of  those  countries  and  that  domestic 
lawmakers have a limited capacity to shape and subsequently change.
26 In a notable 
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example,  the  accession  of  Eastern  and  Central  European  states  to  the  EU  was 
preconditioned upon the full incorporation of the Acquis Communautaire – the sizeable 
and exceptionally detailed corpus of EU rules and regulations – into their domestic legal 
systems. This highly contested process was associated with the sidelining of national 
parliaments  and  the  strengthening  of  the  executive  arm  of  government  in  those 
countries.
27  
Second, SBIs in some cases punctuate the legal spatiality of intervened states, 
thereby  also  deterritorialising  the  legal  reach  of  intervening  states,  principally  by 
awarding the spaces of governance opened up by interventions an ‘exceptional’ legal 
status. This is not a feature of all forms of state building, such as those associated more 
limited donor efforts to build the institutions of ‘less risky’ developing states, but only 
of interventions in states that are seen to constitute a higher level of risk to Western 
states and societies. For example, Australian and other Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon  Islands  (RAMSI)  personnel  in  Solomon  Islands  enjoy  immunity  from 
prosecution under local laws while operating in that country, despite being embedded in 
its policymaking apparatus and even in some cases charged with drafting or enforcing 
the very same laws to which they are immune. This is not to say RAMSI personnel 
operate in a legal ‘black hole’. Firstly, they are still subjected to the laws of their home 
countries; and second, the suspension of legal spatiality is not done by fiat, but rather 
through the enactment of enabling legislation by the Parliament of Solomon Islands. 
This legislation, which has to be ratified every year by parliament, was put forward as a 
prerequisite for the commencement and continuation of intervention.  
By punctuating the legal spatiality of intervened and intervening states, SBIs 
establish  flexible  governance  ‘frontiers’  within  the  territorial  borders  of  the  former. 
These frontiers reproduce the politics of inter-state borders, meaning the strategic way 
in  which  borders  structure  the  relationship  between  security  and  rights  and  thereby 
distinguish between different legal subjects,
28 but without reproducing the international 
legal obligations associated with intervention in and occupation of other states. This is 
not simply a matter of subverting international law and international norms, but a form 
of political rule that provides considerable discretionary powers for outsiders to police 
                                                                                                                                               
Morgan, Bronwen, ‘Turning Off the Tap: Urban Water Service Delivery and the Social Construction of 
Global Administrative Law’, The European Journal of International Law 17, no. 1 (2006), pp. 215-46. 
27 Bickerton, ‘State-Building’, pp. 97-98. 
28 Basaran, Tugba, ‘Security, Law, Borders: Spaces of Exclusion’, International Political Sociology 2, no. 
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the  social  and  political  order  of  intervened  states.  Since  legal  spatiality  is  the 
constitutive principle of the Westphalian order, its alteration is also an indication that 
statehood itself is being transformed.          
The particular manner in which SBIs attempt to reconcile the tension between 
risk management, which as we have seen is understood to require particular political 
and  governance  outputs  from  state  institutions,  and  the  reluctance  of  interveners  to 
exercise direct rule is manifested in the multilevel structuring of SBIs. The notion of 
multilevel governance, which essentially refers to the reallocation of the authority and 
functions of the state upwards, downwards  and sideways into spaces of governance 
outside  the  traditional  public  policy  apparatus,
29  captures  the  way  in  which  SBIs 
transnationalise parts of the domestic governance of intervened states, thereby affecting 
the production and distribution of political power there, but without doing away with 
their  constitution  as  independent  political  units.  Yet,  while  the  term  multilevel 
governance is mostly used descriptively to refer to a particular organisation of public 
policy,  in  this  study  it  is  understood  as  inherently  political  in  that  it  works  to  lock 
particular  issues  out  of  popular  or  political  contestation,  as  well  as  build  in  new 
relationships of domination.   
As multilevel regimes – a concept further developed in the next section – SBIs 
have a simultaneous expression within intervened states, in that they transform their 
domestic  governance  institutions,  and  outside  these  states,  in  the  shape  of  more 
traditional  forms  of  diplomatic-international  relations  between  governments  or 
multilateral organisations. In turn, interveners’ insistence on the formal sovereignty and 
‘ownership’  of  domestic  governments  often  generates  tensions  between  the  inside-
outside  manifestations  of  the  state  building  regime  that  denote  its  limitations  as  a 
technocratic exercise
30 and that other regimes within the state can capitalise upon to 
advance  and  consolidate  radically  different  forms  of  rule  to  those  embodied  in  the 
notion  of  state  building.  Indeed,  rather  than  constituting  a  coherent  blueprint  for 
securing  predictable  governance  outcomes,  SBIs  for  the  most  part  remain  internally 
inconsistent,  crisis-prone  and  often  incapable  of  producing  sustainable  political 
arrangements  in  intervened  states.  Such  tensions  also  suggest  that  the  formal 
                                                 
29 See Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level 
Governance’, American Political Science Review 97, no. 2 (2003), pp. 233-43. 
30  See  for example, Barbara, Julien,  ‘Antipodean  Statebuilding:  The  Regional  Assistance  Mission  to 
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sovereignty of domestic leaders is not merely a façade for the wholesale domination of 
intervened states by outsiders, but manifestation of a new form of contested political 
rule associated with the emergence of a transnationalising and transnationally regulated 
statehood.  
 
State  building  interventions  as  multilevel  regimes:  conceptual  and  theoretical 
issues 
I argue above that SBIs should be understood and studied as multilevel regimes, set up 
to transform intervened states from within as a way of managing the risk supposedly 
posed by weak domestic governance. In this section I develop the concept of multilevel 
regime, first, by illustrating the ways in which it relates to and differs from existing 
theorisations of regime in the international relations and comparative politics literature; 
and, second, by examining the specific structure and characteristics of such regimes and 
their relationship with the structures and institutions of intervened states.  
The starting point to our discussion is the influential concept of ‘international 
regime’.
31 Defined broadly as ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area’,
32 this concept emerged 
initially from within realist international relations theories to account for the persistence 
of international arrangements despite the supposedly brittle and reflexive nature of the 
balance of power in the international system.
33 The theory retains the realist notion of 
states as unitary and rational actors, but inserts regimes as ‘intervening variables’ that 
mitigate  the  propensity  of  the  state  system  towards  conflict  and  discord.  ‘It  is  the 
infusion  of  behavior  with  principles  and  norms  that  distinguishes  regime-governed 
activity in the international system from more conventional activity, guided exclusively 
by  narrow  calculations  of  interest’,  argues  Krasner.
34  Understood  in  such  a  way, 
international regimes are based in neoliberal theories of rational choice institutionalism 
                                                 
31  Notable  publications  include,  Krasner,  Stephen  D.,  ‘Structural  Causes  and  Regime  Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982), pp. 185-205; Young, 
Oran  R.,  ‘The  Politics  of  International  Regime  Formation:  Managing  Natural  Resources  and  the 
Environment’, International Organization 43, no. 3 (1989), pp. 349-75.  
32 Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences’, p. 185. 
33  Mastanduno,  Michael,  ‘A  Realist  View:  Three  Images  of  the  Coming  International  Order’,  in 
International  Order  and  the  Future  of  World  Politics,   e d i t e d   b y   J o h n   A .   H a l l   a n d   T .   V .   P a u l  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 19-40. 
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and  new  institutional  economics.
35  These  emphasise  the  capacity  of  institutional 
arrangements  to  guarantee  complementary  behaviour  by  other  actors  and  thereby 
potentially overcome problems associated with collective action.
36 
The problem with this way of understanding international regimes is that it does 
not attempt to open up the ‘black box’ of the state, but prefers to treat all states as 
essentially abstract, atomised and rational entities. Nor does it attempt to explore the 
interrelations between domestic and international politics in the way that the ‘second 
image  reversed’  literature  did,  for  example.
37 But  even  more  than  that,  this  way  of 
theorising  international  regimes  misconceives  the  nature  of  political  power  by 
neglecting the interrelations between state forms and state power and the global political 
economy. Indeed, as Panitch argues: 
The ‘regime’ theories dominant in the field of international relations are manifestly 
unhelpful…misrepresenting  as  cooperative  understandings  what  were  in  reality 
structural  manifestations  of  a  hierarchically  organized  international  political 
economy.
38  
Also problematic, as Jayasuriya notes, is the concept’s dependence on a Westphalian 
notion of sovereignty, reifying an increasingly blurry domestic-external dichotomy.
39 
Clearly, such a conception of regime falls short of grasping the complex structures of 
contemporary interventions. This is not simply because these operations involve non-
state  and  transnational  actors  alongside  state  actors.  Rather,  more  importantly,  SBIs 
attempt to transform the very nature of statehood by constructing multilevel governance 
structures within and around the existing institutions of the state. In this sense, a concept 
of  an  ‘international  regime’  that  narrowly  focuses  on  the  terrain  between  states  is 
inadequate, because the greatest transformations are occurring in what has traditionally 
been conceived as inside states. 
  Another significant body of literature on political regimes is found in the field of 
comparative politics. In the comparative politics literature, which usually focuses on 
intrastate political organisation, it has long been the practice to examine and compare 
states on the basis of their regime-types. One of the most interesting and well-known 
                                                 
35 Notable examples include, North, Douglass C., Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: 
Norton, 1981); Williamson, Oliver, Markets and Hierarchies (New York: Free Press, 1975).  
36 Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, 
MPIFG Discussion Paper 96/6, Cologne: Max-Planck-Institut fur Gesellschaftsforschung, 1996, p. 12. 
37  Gourevitch, Peter, ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics’, 
International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978), pp. 881-912. 
38 Panitch, Leo, ‘The New Imperial State’, New Left Review 2 (2000), pp. 5-20, p. 13.  
39 Jayasuriya, Kanishka, Reconstituting the Global Liberal Order: Legitimacy and Regulation (London 
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such studies is Pempel’s enquiry into the links between political change and economic 
restructuring in Japan. Pempel has argued that the term regime refers to the ‘mid-level 
complex of legal and organizational features’.
40 In his view, regimes could be seen as a 
tripod  comprising  ‘socioeconomic  alliances,  political-economic  institutions,  and  a 
public policy profile. These three overlap and reinforce one another… They interact in 
complex  ways,  developing  and  responding  to  a  discrete  internal  logic’.
41  When  the 
relationships between the three legs of this tripod are stable and mutually reinforcing 
political  outcomes  are  more  predictable,  Pempel  says,  however,  when  one  leg  is 
removed the regime collapses. As we can see, Pempel understands regimes essentially a 
way  of  shaping  (or  more  accurately,  attempting  to  shape)  and  routinising  political 
outcomes. 
Jayasuriya and Rosser accept Pempel’s argument that political outcomes should 
be  understood  in  the  context  of  specific  regimes,  but  challenge  the  currency  of  the 
tripod  metaphor.  In  their  view,  which  is  adopted  in  this  study,  a  regime  ‘is  best 
characterised as being similar to a pyramid, with coalitions at the base, institutions in 
the centre, and ideas at the apex.’
42 In other words, rather than seeing institutions as 
existing in an equal, if complex, relationship with social structures, ‘systems of social 
hegemony [are] able to transcend different institutional structures.’
43 Indeed, in some 
cases  ‘regime  change’  is  the  only  way  by  which  an  embattled  social  coalition  can 
preserve its hegemonic position. This is illustrated well in Robison and Hadiz’s analysis 
of the ways in which a powerful coalition, nurtured in the Soeharto era, was able to 
reorganise and continue to dominate the Indonesian state after democratisation, through 
vastly different political institutions.
44  
In a similar vein, Hewison, Rodan and Robison define a regime as a ‘particular 
type of organisation of the state apparatus which may take a variety of forms: liberal 
democracy,  democratic  corporatism,  oligarchic  democracy  or  dictatorship…  and  so 
                                                 
40 Pempel, T.J., Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy (Ithaca  and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 20. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Jayasuriya, Kanishka and Andrew Rosser, ‘Pathways from the Crisis: Politics and Reform in South-
East Asia since 1997’, in The Political Economy of South-East Asia: Markets, Power and Contestation, 
3rd  Edition,  edited  by  Garry  Rodan,  Kevin  Hewison  and  Richard  Robison  (Melbourne:  Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp. 258-82, p. 263. 
43 Robison, Richard and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Power in an 
Age of Markets (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 17 in note. 
44 Ibid. CHAPTER TWO 
  60 
on.’
45 This definition is based upon a conception of the state, outlined in the previous 
chapter,  in  which  state  power  is  understood  to  be  ‘activated  through  the  agency  of 
definite political forces in specific conjunctures.’
46 Because the state ‘is not so much a 
set of functions or a group of actors, [but] an expression of power’,
47 the state and its 
apparatus cannot be seen as neutral. What this means is that more than just an attempt to 
routinise  the  outcomes  of  politics,  regimes  are  set  up  to  do  this  in  the  interests  of 
identifiable, though shifting and historically contingent, social and political coalitions. 
Therefore regimes involve an attempt to shape the ways in which political power is 
produced or reproduced within a particular system – who is allowed to take part in 
politics and on what basis.
48    
While this way of understanding regimes is useful, it remains confined to the 
state. Whereas Hewison et al.’s conception of the state and of state power is capable of 
sustaining  broader  analyses  of  power  structures  and  relationships,  including  those 
extending state boundaries, political regimes for them remain essentially an intrastate 
matter. This is largely justifiable, because the state remains the most significant site of 
conflict  over  power  and  resources  –  even  in  an  age  of  supposed  globalisation/new 
imperialism
49  –  and  in  this  sense  domestic  regimes  play  a  crucial  mediating  role. 
However,  in  the  comparative  politics  literature,  inasmuch  as  in  the  international 
relations literature mentioned above, notions of regime operate within a methodological 
nationalist framework, which fails to adequately capture the nature of contemporary 
SBIs.  
SBIs  evade  the  scope  of  these  regime  theories  by  having  a  simultaneous 
existence within and outside the state. While undoubtedly set up to shape and routinise 
political outcomes, these interventions open up transnationalised spaces of governance 
within  the  state,  but  are  also  manifested  in  inter-governmental  agreements  and 
diplomatic  discussions  between  representatives  of  sovereign  entities.  Therefore  the 
concept of regime has to be developed to capture the ways in which SBIs relate to, and 
transform, the existing social and political structures of intervened states. 
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This  brings  us  to  the  concept  of  multilevel  regime.  Multilevel  regimes  are 
neither domestic nor international, but this is not merely a ‘twilight zone’ category. 
Rather,  it  is  rooted  in  broader  developments  associated  with  changes  in  the  global 
political economy and the global security environment in the post-Cold War era and the 
associated  transformation  of  the  state,  in  the  West  and  elsewhere.  A  vast  body  of 
literature has emerged in recent years to discuss the emergence and contours of ‘global’ 
or  ‘transnational’  governance  and  the  implications  for  states,  societies  and  political 
agency more broadly.
50 In this respect, Mark Duffield has written about the emergence 
in the post-Cold War era of ‘liberal strategic complexes’ in response to the ‘new wars’
51 
and the merging of security and development, combining a variety of state and non-
state, public and private actors from the hitherto distinct worlds of development and 
security.  Such  diffuse  strategic  complexes,  he  argues,  are  the  repositories  and  real-
existing agents of ‘global liberal governance’, a manifestation of the liberal desire to 
govern and reform underdeveloped states and their societies.
52 However, as Chandler 
argues, rather than representing an all-encompassing and pre-existing liberal ‘will to 
govern’,  contemporary  interventions  are  manifestations  of  its  exact  opposite  –  the 
reluctance  of  the  world’s  most  powerful  governments  and  organisations  to  exercise 
power  directly,  leading  to  more  limited  exercises  in  state  building.
53  Indeed,  it  is 
inaccurate to view contemporary SBIs as transnational or global regimes, since rather 
than  seeking  to  circumvent  or  replace  the  institutions  of  intervened  states  they  are 
established towards transforming these states from within. In that they are dependent on 
and inherently linked to the institutions and structures of intervened states. 
There are two primary characteristics to the organisation of multilevel regimes. 
First,  they  establish  coordinated  transnational  spaces  of  governance  within  the 
intervened state. Second, intervention regimes have a multilevel governance structure 
                                                 
50  Examples  include,  Duffield,  Global  Governance;  Beeson,  Mark,  ‘Global  Governance’,  in 
Encyclopaedia of Public Policy: Governance in a Global Age,  edited  by  Phillip  O'Hara  (London: 
Routledge, 2004);  Zürn,  Michael,  ‘Global  Governance  and  Legitimacy  Problems’,  Government and 
Opposition  39,  no.  2  (2004),  pp.  260-87;  Djelic,  Marie-Laure,  and  Kerstin  Sahlin-Andersson, 
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in the journal Global Governance. 
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52 Duffield, Global Governance, Ch. 3; Duffield, Mark, ‘Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of 
Development:  Aid  as  a  Relations  of  Global  Liberal  Governance’,  in  State Failure,  Collapse and 
Reconstruction, edited by Jennifer Milliken (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 291-312, p. 294. 
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that is integral to regime rules and functions. By this I mean that it is only by examining 
the relationship between those different levels of governance that one can understand 
how SBIs operate. This is in contrast to the institutionalist approaches outlined in the 
first chapter that focus on the level of the intervened state to the exclusion of other 
levels of governance, many of which are not even necessarily bounded by or defined in 
relation to territory. Crucially, this multilevel structure is located, not only above or 
below,  but  within  the  established  spaces  of  governance  themselves  and  in  this  way 
transnational interests are integrated into domestic governance processes and the social 
and political power relationships associated with these.  
For example of what this means in practice we can look at the United Nations 
Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH in the French acronym). MINUSTAH was 
established by UN Security Council resolution 1542 of 30 April 2004
54 to prevent Haiti 
from slipping into large-scale civil strife, following an earlier stabilisation mission by 
American and French armed forces.
55 The UN resolution, which framed and authorised 
MINUSTAH’s mandate, reflected an inter-governmental agreement in which Haiti was 
represented by a transitional government, led by former UN bureaucrat Gérard Latortue, 
who was installed earlier by American and French interveners. However, MINUSTAH 
is also internal to the Haitian state in that its various programs and components are 
intimately involved in the reform of Haiti’s domestic governance institutions and the 
exercise of state power. In the area of policing, for example, MINUSTAH’s civilian 
police (CIVPOL) component was given its authority by resolution 1542 and Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. Due to the perceived inability of the Haitian National Police 
(HNP), itself a construct of an earlier American intervention in 1994, to provide public 
order and stability, CIVPOL has been increasingly engaged in the dual task of restoring 
law and order and building the capacity of the HNP.
56 Hence, CIVPOL, which brings 
together police officers from 33 countries, has been enforcing Haitian law but remains 
unaccountable to Haiti’s legislature and judiciary.   
                                                 
54 Available at 
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Short in Haiti’, International Peacekeeping 13, no. 4 (2006), pp. 462-76, p. 469. 
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This new mode of governance, which transnationalises some of the domestic 
governance functions and structures of states, challenges Keohane and Nye’s famous 
notion of ‘complex interdependence’ that has gained popularity in recent times as a way 
of understanding the effects of globalisation on the state.
57 Keohane and Nye, as well as 
others  writing  about  emerging  forms  of  transnational  governance,  recognise 
interdependence, improved coordination between states and even the disaggregation of 
states’  functions  to  transnational  or  intergovernmental  governance  networks  as 
important emerging characteristics of a world system in which economic relations and 
security risks are increasingly global or transnational in scope.
58 However, they often 
inadequately  capture  the  ways  in  which  changing  state  forms  are  related  to  this 
‘interdependence’. Processes of state transformation – whether in developing states or, 
as  we  shall  see  in  Chapter  Four,  in  developed  states  –  rather  than  constituting 
functional-rational responses to the external demands of globalisation, are intrinsically 
related to the establishment of spaces and sites within the state by powerful interests, 
through which these ‘global’ forces are brought to bear on the political economy of 
those  states  and  their  governing  structures.
59  Therefore,  globalisation  (or 
transnationalisation) is not ‘out there’ and acts on states from the outside-in, but can 
only be meaningfully understood by the ways in which it transforms, and is contested 
within, the state.  
Consequently, the disaggregation of state functions and the related emergence of 
networked or multilevel forms of governance cannot be seen as a teleological process 
leading  towards  more  effective  governance  for  the  globalised  age.  Rather,  it  is  a 
manifestation of inherently political attempts to lock particular issues out of political 
and popular contestation and enshrine a particular set of power relations. It is in this 
light that we should understand the way in which SBIs, as multilevel regimes, transform 
                                                 
57 Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 
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intervened  states.  What  emerges  is,  in  effect,  a  new  form  of  political  rule  that  is 
transformative of statehood, and not merely a new mode of interaction between states.
60      
 The  first  and  perhaps  most  significant  defining  characteristic  of  multilevel 
regimes is that unlike domestic and international regimes they are not simply framed by 
pre-conceived  state  boundaries,  although  they  are  constituted  for  the  purpose  of 
governing particular territories and peoples. Rather, they comprise more malleable and 
manipulable transnational spaces of governance. Existing near or within the apparatus 
of  intervened  states,  as  well  as  (but  usually  less  so)  in  important  junctures  in  civil 
society,  they  assume  many  forms  and  guises.  These  range  from  governing  or 
government-supporting institutions, such as transitional administrations, to consultancy 
and training and even aid and relief NGO-led projects. But more than simply a group of 
people  or  a  physical  location,  transnational  spaces  of  governance  can  include  anti-
corruption  and  accountability  mechanisms,  free  trade  agreements,  grievance  and 
arbitration  procedures  and  other  forms  of  capacity  building  ‘partnerships’  and 
regulatory governance spaces – both formal and informal.  
While  such  spaces  of  governance  are  mostly  established  as  independently 
operating  and  regulating,  three  attributes  mark  them  as  constituting  elements  of  a 
regime.  First,  the  actors  that  establish  and  operate  in  intervention  spaces  share  an 
ideological affinity, or at the very least are not antagonistic to the dominant ideology. 
As  I  have  argued  in  the  first  chapter,  contemporary  state  builders  have  generally 
adopted  neoliberal  ideology,  as  reflected  in  the  concept  of  state  capacity,  which 
associates  long-term  stability  with  the  existence  and  proper  functioning  of  liberal 
market economies in intervened states. From a broader historical perspective, this is a 
more recent manifestation of the centuries-old idea of the liberal peace. However in 
contrast with its Kantian antecedent,
61 the nature of ‘good’ states is now seen as an 
almost scientific matter pertaining to the existence of particular institutional sets, for 
whose construction the expertise of outsiders is essential.
62 This transformation of the 
idea of the liberal peace, argues Richmond, has made peace ‘technically plausible’ and 
thereby contingent on the intervention of external actors, who are seen to exist ‘in an 
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almost omniscient position in relation to the peace they construct.’
63 Second, the spaces 
of governance opened up by SBIs are sites of social and political conflict, in which, to 
paraphrase  Schattschneider,  bias  is  mobilised,
64  meaning  they  are  constructed  to 
preference particular interests over others. Finally, multilevel regimes comprise various 
modes and mechanisms of coordination that are constitutive of their multilevel structure 
and that link various spaces of governance. Coordination can be institutionalised, as in 
the case of RAMSI’s Office of the Special Coordinator, or more ad hoc through task-
specific committees, for example. By intersecting ideology and politics, the spaces of 
intervention combine to form a regime.
65  
The second important aspect of multilevel regimes is their multilevel structure. 
The  concept  of  multilevel  governance  has  been  previously  used  in  the  literature 
primarily  as  a  way  of  describing  the  exercise  of  public  policy  in  the  ‘postmodern’, 
disaggregated,  Western  state,  especially  but  not  strictly  in  unifying  Europe.
66  Zürn 
argues  that  in  an  increasingly  ‘denationalized’  world,  in  which  risk  and  economic 
interactions are often cross-border, ‘the convergence of the dimensions of statehood in 
one  political  organization  dissolves and  a  new  architecture  of  statehood  emerges.’
67 
This,  he  says,  involves  ‘multi-level  statehood’,  which  ‘will  be  constituted  by  the 
interplay of different levels and organizations, with each level and organization unable 
to  work  unilaterally.’
68  This  form  of  governance,  which  is  associated  with  the 
transformation of the state, is not unique to Europe, but is actually appearing in a variety 
of radically different settings. In the case of SBIs, multilevel governance is emerging as 
a way of addressing the inherent tension between the exigencies of risk management 
and the reluctance of interveners to govern intervened territories and their peoples.  
Hooghe and Marks distinguish between two types of multilevel governance – 
type  I  multi-level  governance  describes  jurisdictions  that  are  general-purpose  and 
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defined in relation to territory, while type II refers to specialised jurisdictions that are 
functionally specific and flexible, usually aimed at solving a particular problem and are 
sometimes in competition with other jurisdictions.
69 SBIs are better understood in terms 
of  type  II  multilevel  governance,  although  they  almost  invariably  incorporate 
territorially based governance levels into other problem-solving multilevel governance 
arrangements. Marks and Hooghe prefer to view the increasing prevalence of type II 
forms of multilevel governance as a matter of policy choice pertaining to the respective 
effectiveness  of  either  model  in  particular  circumstances.
70  Similarly,  while  Zürn 
recognises  the  potential  problems  multilevel  structures  pose  for  democracy,
71 
participation  and  the  representation  of  weaker  localised  interests  in  governance  and 
decision-making processes, he nevertheless maintains a functionalist understanding of 
the emergence and development of such processes of state fragmentation, choosing to 
see them primarily in problem-solving and reactive terms.  
In  contrast,  Philip  Hirsch,  in  his  study  of  water  governance  in  the  Mekong 
region, has highlighted the complex, conflict-prone and contingent nature of multilevel 
governance structures.
72 Hirsch makes two particularly salient observations. First, he 
argues that the complexity of these structures and the large number of stakeholders and 
interests involved make it meaningless to discuss such governance processes in terms of 
technocratic notions of ‘best practice’. Second, he points out the tough competition that 
exists within such multilevel structures between different bodies and agencies (and the 
interests that are associated with them) with overlapping and competing functions over 
who gets to govern what, and how, as well as over the nature of overarching framework 
within which they interact.  
In the case of interventions in so-called failed states Hirsch’s observations are 
particularly relevant because of the perception that existing governance arrangements 
(and often social structures as well) are inadequate and constitute a risk to other states 
and societies. However, while the notion of multilevel governance suggests a ‘principal-
agent’ relationship, in which each level is responsive to the one below and accountable 
                                                 
69 Hooghe,  Liesbet  and  Gary  Marks,  ‘Unraveling  the  Central  State,  but  How?  Types  of  Multi-Level 
Governance’, American Political Science Review 97, no. 2 (2003), pp. 233-43, p. 236. 
70 Marks, Gary and Liesbet Hooghe, ‘Contrasting Visions of Multi-Level Governance’, in Multi-Level 
Governance, edited by Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 
15-30. 
71  See  Papadopoulos,  Yannis,  ‘Problems  of  Democratic  Accountability  in  Network  and  Multilevel 
Governance’, European Law Journal 13, no. 4 (2007), pp. 469-86. 
72 Hirsch, Philip, ‘Water Governance Reform and Catchment Management in the Mekong Region’, The 
Journal of Environment and Development 15, no. 2 (2006), pp. 184-201, p. 196. CHAPTER TWO 
  67 
to the one above, the actual power relationships between the different levels of SBIs is 
not necessarily vertical, but quite variable. In many cases there is incongruence between 
formal hierarchies and the reality of power. In the case of RAMSI, for example, the 
Australian  government  has  made  a  strategic  choice  to  intervene  through  a  regional 
framework involving the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
73 This was meant to be mostly a 
legitimating  mechanism  for  the  operation,  but  the  Forum’s  subsequent  reviews  and 
meetings, though not binding, have enabled oppositional voices to be heard – albeit 
from within the ranks of the elite in the South Pacific – and present the argument, for 
example, that Canberra has usurped too much power at the expense of more inclusive 
regional frameworks.
74 Furthermore, the relationship between the PIF, RAMSI and the 
Australian government on one hand, and the Solomon Islands government on the other 
has been presented as a ‘partnership’ and not as hierarchical, with the latter supposedly 
driving the reform and state building agenda.
75 In reality, however, the Solomon Islands 
government’s inability to shape the agenda had underpinned the conflict in 2006-2007 
between former Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and the Australian government and 
RAMS I.
76  Crucially,  these  conflicts  between  the  different  levels  of  RAMSI  are  not 
about what arrangement is most suitable for the relationship between states in the South 
Pacific, although this is how it is often understood and presented, but about how the 
transnationalisation of Solomon Islands – and to a lesser degree other South Pacific 
states – is to occur and what interests are to be favoured in this process.  
As we have seen, rather than attempting to govern directly, multilevel regimes 
are  set  up  to  shape  and  routinise  political  outcomes  in  intervened  countries  by 
transnationalising parts of their domestic governing apparatus. Such output, however, is 
far from guaranteed, because SBIs never take place in a social and political vacuum. 
Intervention regimes tend to coexist and come into conflict with other regimes within 
the  state,  which  have  different  support-bases  and  ideational  underpinnings.  Such 
conflicts have transformative effects on all regimes within the state and hence on the 
nature of political rule – who rules and how.    
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What this means is that it is problematic to examine the power relationships 
SBIs embody in terms of inter-state relations and the power asymmetries associated 
with  these.  This  argument  is  demonstrated  by  Anthony  Payne’s  analysis  of  US–
Caribbean  relations.  Payne  provides  a  useful  critique  of  the  prevalent  realist  and 
‘structuralist’ (the term he uses essentially for dependency or third worldist approaches) 
tendency  to  assume  that  political  outcomes  are  directly  derived  from  power 
asymmetries between different national units. While such power imbalances certainly 
matter,  the  US-Caribbean  relationship  is  far  more  intricate  than  these  simplistic 
representations can account for, he says. Specifically Payne claims that, 
…the  sheer  complexity,  the  diffusion  and  the  relative  openness  of  the  US  policy 
apparatus  mean  that  the  manner  of  US  hegemonic  control  is  not  imperial  in  the 
traditional sense…  US power in the Caribbean is not exercised in a style that can 
accurately be called authoritarian, in large part because US policies are openly debated 
in different policy communities and can be influenced from inside and outside.
77  
In the case of SBIs it is not so much the openness of policy debates that applies. Rather, 
it is the overarching concern with risk management and the dynamic nature of the social 
coalitions that develop within and around the spaces of intervention that make political 
outcomes more open-ended and less predictable.  
The point is that while interveners are often able to open up regulatory spaces 
within  intervened  states  and  even  coerce  domestic  interests  into  adopting  new 
institutions  and  modes  of  governance  this  tells  us  little  about  whether  sustainable 
political coalitions emerge to support such arrangements. It also does not tell us which 
interests  benefit  from  real-existing  governance  structures  that  emerge  through 
intervention. With this I do not so much echo Chandler’s lament that SBIs undermine 
the capacity for legitimate domestic leadership to develop,
78 but highlight the need for 
constant refinement and conflict management that is at the heart of the intervention-led, 
crisis-prone process of state transformation.  
Thus  far,  I  have  argued  that  SBIs  constitute  multilevel  regimes  that  are  (a) 
imbued with the logic of risk management seen as a matter of establishing governance 
structures of a particular kind within intervened states; (b) establish transnational spaces 
of  governance  within  or  near  the  state  apparatus  of  target-states;  and  (c)  have  a 
multilevel  structure  incorporating  several,  potentially  conflicting  and/or  overlapping, 
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levels  of  governance  within  these  spaces.  In  the  next  section  I  look  at  legal 
exceptionalism as a manifestation of the limitations of risk management of this kind.  
 
State  building  and  legal  exceptionalism:  the  ever-changing  demands  of  risk 
management 
Nowhere are the limitations of risk management as state building – understood as a 
political project of state transformation – better illustrated than through the issue of 
exceptional powers. The complexity and conflict-proneness of the political and social 
relationships  that  develop  within  and  around  interventions  is  manifested  in  and 
demonstrated by the exceptional status often attached to intervention spaces in those 
countries that are deemed to constitute high levels of risk. Ironically, while institutions 
and legal frameworks in intervened states are ‘built’ to provide ‘good governance’ and 
establish  the  ‘rule  of  law’,
79 these  processes  are  often  sidelined  or  suspended  when 
powerful interests appear to be threatened as a result of these frameworks’ failure to 
produce intended outcomes or when the ‘rule of law’ itself is seen as an obstacle to 
effective risk management.
80 The same inconsistency also pertains with varying degrees 
to the adherence of interveners to the norms and rules of international law, such as the 
UN Charter. The significance of this is not strictly legal, but that such exceptionalism, 
when established, is meant to allow powerful actors greater discretion in shaping the 
political outcomes of intervention. However, it also represents the difficulty SBIs often 
encounter in producing governance structures that are capable of managing conflict in a 
way that generates a sustainable political accommodation in intervened states. In this 
section I examine legal exceptionalism both as a technique of political rule, associated 
with  risk  management,  and  as  a  manifestation  of  the  problematic  fit  between 
technocratic notions of good governance and the realities of social and political conflict 
that often cannot be accommodated by these structures.  
Legal exceptionalism is important to consider not simply because of the way it 
shapes the outcomes of specific interventions. Rather, it is because of the way exception 
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works to redefine the statehood of both intervened and intervening states. Since legal 
spatiality  is  the  constitutive  legal  principle  of  a  Westphalian  world  order,  its 
transformation  or  punctuation  also  denotes  the  emergence  of  a  new  kind  of  state. 
Raustiala argues that: 
The  Westphalian  ideal  of  statehood  is…fundamentally  a  spatial  conception  of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty and territoriality in turn provided the bedrock principles for 
the development of international law in the Westphalian era... Westphalian sovereignty 
thus creates a system in which legal jurisdiction is congruent with sovereign territorial 
borders.
81 
Legal  spatiality  essentially  distinguishes  between  jurisdictions  on  the  basis  of 
territoriality. The spaces of intervention, however, while physically within the territorial 
boundaries of states, often exist outside their jurisdiction, thus making  international 
personnel immune from prosecution. They enjoy a kind of ‘personal sovereignty’ in 
that their person constitutes a moving ‘border’ – or a frontier.
82 Interactions between 
interveners and local populations are therefore ‘international’ in nature, almost as if 
they were standing on two sides of a land border between different states. However, in 
contrast  with  international  relations  or  international  law  as  traditionally  understood, 
interveners exercise state power in intervened states by virtue of being embedded into 
their governing apparatus; they perform some of the functions traditionally associated 
with sovereign rule but without being at all accountable, not even in principle, to the 
populations  they  (usually  indirectly)  govern.  This  also  means  that  the  relationship 
between  various  parts  of  the  state  apparatus  is  also  transformed  in  relation  to  their 
degree of transnationalisation.  
The notion of exception has its historical roots in the work of Carl Schmitt, the 
notorious critic of liberalism and the Weimar Republic and later a supporter of and 
apologist for the Nazi regime. Schmitt’s most famous dictum – ‘he who decides on the 
exception is sovereign’
83 – underlines his argument that ‘any legal order necessarily 
presupposes a moment of legally unrestrained power’.
84 In this sense, the extent of the 
rule of law is set by the relationship between the actor with the authority to exercise 
extralegal emergency powers and the legal order itself – the sovereign simultaneously 
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stands  outside  the  legal  order,  but  belongs  to  it.
85  The  sovereign,  for  example,  can 
decide at his/her discretion to suspend the constitution if this is required to respond to 
emergency situations.  
Jayasuriya has developed Schmitt’s concept of the ‘state of exception’ to argue 
that  the  post-September  11  global  order  resembles  what  he  calls  a  ‘global  state  of 
exception’. Jayasuriya  argues that exceptional powers are now invoked regularly by 
Western governments, both inside and outside their countries’ borders, to fight what 
they claim to be ‘existential’ threats to the Western ‘way of life’, such as radical Islamic 
terrorists.
86 In this way, long-established norms of non-intervention and pluralism in the 
international  system  have  been  eroded.  Similar  arguments  have  been  advanced  in 
relation to the implications for state sovereignty of the post-Cold War preoccupation 
with human security and human rights.
87 However, such a global state of exception does 
not mean the existence of a global legal order. Indeed, the real-existing manifestation of 
the global state of exception is in state transformation projects of the kind examined in 
this thesis. It means that Western governments and the major international organisations 
claim  the  moral  right  to  intervene  in  other  jurisdictions  to  contain  the  risk  these 
supposedly present to international security and stability.  
There are a couple of important differences between the Schmittian notion of 
exception and the legal exceptionalism associated with contemporary SBIs that shed 
light  on  the  way  in  which  these  interventions  transform  the  state.  First,  contrary  to 
Schmitt’s conception of the relationship between exception and the legal order, in the 
case of SBIs the holders of exceptional powers do not claim to be above the legal order 
(and in this sense, a part of it and a point of reference to others belonging to that legal 
order).  Rather,  they  derive  their  authority  from  being  outside  that  legal  order  all 
together, leaving the ultimate governing responsibility with the sovereign governments 
of intervened states. Crucially, it is not so much whether interveners disregard domestic 
laws in practice that is important, but that they open up political and legal spaces within 
which discretionary actions by certain actors are permitted. SBIs construct a punctuated 
legal order within intervened states that unlike earlier colonial arrangements does not 
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distinguish  between  citizen  and  subject,
88  but  between  citizen-subjects  –  these 
categories  become  contingent  and  fluid  –  and  those  with  the  power  to  exercise 
exceptional authority, which are neither citizen nor subject because they do not belong 
to the same legal order.  
The  exceptional  status  of  intervention  is  nowadays  often  established  and 
sanctioned  formally  through  an  inter-governmental  agreement.  Such  agreements 
typically require the domestic government to legislate an exceptional legal space within 
the state as precondition for deployment.
89 By being embedded in the state apparatus 
SBIs exist outside the scope and obligations of traditional international law with its 
focus on interstate relations.
90 However, these interventions are outside the state as well 
in the sense that no formal responsibility and accountability relations are established 
and by remaining outside the scope of its legal spatiality.
91  
Second,  for  Schmitt  exceptional  powers  were  essentially  a  form  of  crisis 
containment – the sovereign’s response to actual emergencies, for the greater good, on 
behalf of his subjects
92 – whereas in the case of SBIs exception is strongly related to 
and rationalised by the notion of risk management. It is therefore a more pre-emptory, 
rather than responsive,  concept of exception that grants those who hold exceptional 
powers  the  authority  to  intervene  before  crisis  situations  developed.  Furthermore, 
interveners do not act on behalf of intervened populations, nor are they accountable to 
them,  but  in  the  name  of  international  stability  and  on  behalf  of  the  international 
community.
93  The  pre-emptory  rationale  underlies  the  ubiquitous  notion  that  early 
prevention is preferable to and cheaper than later intervention and that therefore the 
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development  of  effective  risk  assessment  and  detection  tools  is  crucial  for  dealing 
effectively with failed states.
94 By turning the power of exception into the power of pre-
emption, it becomes more acceptable for intervening actors to use exceptional powers to 
weigh in and shape the outcomes of conflicts over governance and politics that are not 
necessarily attached to immediate security threats, while simultaneously claiming to be 
promoting the ‘rule of law’ and good governance. This is not to suggest that exception 
is no longer associated with more immediate forms of crisis management; the scope of 
emergency,  however,  has  been  significantly  expanded  in  contemporary  forms  of 
intervention. The irony, then, is that exception is justified in terms of the expansion of 
the rule of law. In other words, this means that managing the risks of unpredictable 
governance is seen to require the transformation of the state in a way that limits the 
capacity of ‘undesirable’ influences to shape political outcomes.      
Of course, the development of the legal order itself in any polity is not above, or 
removed  from,  ideology,  politics  and  the  interests  of  dominant  social  groups.  The 
contemporary liberal notion of the rule of law can only be understood in the historical 
context of the rise of the bourgeoisie as the dominant social class in the late eighteenth 
century  and  subsequent  struggles  between  fractions  of  this  class  and  between  the 
bourgeoisie and the aristocratic and working classes. Therefore, the rule of law is never 
a static concept, but one that is related to social change and the social and political 
struggles associated with this. It is in this context that we should also understand the 
conflicts  over  intervention-led  processes  of  state  transformation.  These  processes 
involve attempts to establish and regularise governance structures and institutions that 
are  often  incompatible  with  the  interests  of  powerful  social  and  political  forces  in 
intervened states. However, the uniqueness of current attempts at state transformation, 
vis-à-vis earlier forms of intervention, is not that laws and systems of governance are 
externally imposed, but rather that rule of law, good governance and capacity building 
are used, whether intentionally or not, to mask the ideological and political nature of 
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these projects. In this way, some domestic grievances are delegitimised and the interests 
associated with them depoliticised and possibly even criminalised.
95  
The  point  is  that  there  is  an  inherent  incommensurability  between  liberal 
conceptions of good governance and the rule of law and the state-society relations these 
envisage  on  one  hand,  and  the  actual-existing  relationships  between  SBIs  and 
intervened states as understood through the concept of the multilevel regime. The liberal 
notion of the rule of law essentially determines the legitimate scope of state intervention 
in individual rights. William Scheuerman argues that in the liberal tradition such forms 
of state intervention are required to be, ‘(1) general in character, (2) relatively clear, (3) 
public, (4) prospective, and (5) stable’.
96 However,  
…if state bodies are permitted to regulate basic rights in accordance with inconsistent, 
ambiguous,  open-ended,  or  retroactive  norms,  excessive  discretionary  authority  is 
likely  to  accrue  to  state  authorities,  and  the  sphere  of  individual  liberty  will  suffer 
significant damage.
97  
It is not so much the damage to individual liberties that matters here, but the fact that 
legal  exceptionalism  and  discretionary  power  define  the  relationship  between 
intervention  spaces  and  the  state  when  the  functioning  of  the  latter  is  seen  to  be 
particularly risky. The liberal ‘rule of law’ presupposes a stable distinction between 
state and society, however because of the overarching rationale of risk management and 
the  constant  need  to  manage  the  conflicts  emerging  out  of  state  transformation 
discretionary powers end up not a ‘stopgap’ measure, as they are meant to be, but a key 
tool of political rule.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter focused on conceptualising SBIs and theorising the way in which these 
interventions  relate  to  intervened  states.  It  has  been  argued  that  the  constitution  of 
contemporary SBIs as multilevel regimes is related to the ever-changing demands of 
risk  management  in  environments  that  are  perceived  as  unpredictable  and  conflict-
ridden, but that interveners are nevertheless reluctant to govern directly. Thus, while 
serious effort goes into transforming states from within through capacity and institution 
building programs, considerable spaces of exception for ‘emergency’ intervention are 
left open, particularly in those cases that are deemed as constituting higher risk; albeit, 
                                                 
95 Chandler, Empire in Denial, pp. 51-69. 
96  Scheuerman,  William  E.,  ‘Cosmopolitan  Democracy  and  the  Rule  of  Law’,  Ratio  Juris  15, no. 4 
(2002), pp. 439-57, p. 447. 
97 Ibid., p. 448. CHAPTER TWO 
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without burdening interveners with the responsibility that is attached to the notion of 
sovereignty and that is an essential aspect of the power of exception in the Schmittian 
conception. However, this development cannot be understood in functional terms, but 
must  be  seen  in  relation  to  contested  processes  of  state  fragmentation  and 
transformation  in  the  context  of  increasingly  globalised  economic  and  security 
environments.  
Indeed, all forms of risk management are techniques of political rule in that they 
invariably emerge within a particular political context and attempt to shape political 
outcomes  to  serve  particular  interests.  Rather  than  representing  functional-rational 
responses to risky situations, as the depoliticised notion of risk management implies, 
intervention regimes are themselves immersed in dynamic political and social power 
relationships, from above and below, that shape risk perceptions, priorities, modes of 
operation, the extent to which they prosecute certain outcomes, and their capacity to 
accommodate contending forms of politics. Indeed, in the case of multilevel regimes 
multiple regimes, embodying potentially conflicting political logics and coalitions of 
interests, might coexist within the state. Such conflicts between regimes within the state 
highlight the limitations of technocratic approaches to risk management. 
The  paradox  inherent  in  SBIs  is  that  although  these  interventions  set  out  to 
mitigate conflict, by depoliticising or even criminalising political and social relations in 
intervened states, when viewed through the prism of risk, they often end up forcing 
political disaffection into informal and chaotic  channels by denying them legitimate 
political  representation.
98  Furthermore,  by  attempting  to  produce  environments 
conducive to the effective functioning of liberal markets, which are seen as mitigating 
risk in the longer term, SBIs often generate tensions that not only serve to potentially 
undermine  the  implementation  of  governance  reforms,  but  also  make  sustainable 
political accommodation difficult to achieve. However, by attempting to limit the scope 
of politics, SBIs also present domestic interests with new opportunities to manipulate 
the outcomes of governance in ways that are not necessarily intended by interveners. 
The next chapter examines the historical conjuncture within which contemporary state 
building has developed to illustrate the dynamic and contested nature of this mode of 
governance. 
                                                 
98 A case in point is the April 2006 Honiara riots during which the city’s bustling Chinatown district was 
reduced to rubble by angry mobs after the election of Snyder Rini to prime minister. See Walters, 
Patrick and Cath Hart, ‘Honiara Torched by Rioters’, The Australian, 20 April 2006, pp. 1, 4.   CHAPTER THREE 
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Chapter Three 
The Emergence of State Building: State Transformation and the 
Globalisation of Risk  
 
Introduction 
After  laying  down  the  theoretical  and  conceptual  foundations  for  this  study  in  the 
previous two chapters, I proceed here to address an important question: why has this 
mode of governance emerged at this particular historical juncture? The issue of timing 
is crucial for our understanding of the social, political and ideological environments in 
which  state  building  interventions  (SBIs)  have  developed,  and  thereby  the  interests 
associated with their promotion and the sorts of political and social conflicts that run 
through them.  
  There  are  no  simple  answers  to  this  question.  Rather  than  being  a 
straightforward  matter  of  cause  and  effect,  the  emergence  of  SBIs  could  more 
accurately  be  seen  as  associated  with  a  confluence  of  four  interrelated  historical 
developments. These are, first, the perceived failure of the early post-Cold War UN-led 
interventions with their emphasis on rapid democratisation and marketisation; second, 
the evolution in market-led approaches to development associated with advances in the 
economic theory of institutions and its ascendance within the major donor organisations 
following  the  failure  of  the  structural  adjustment  programs  of  the  1980s  and  early 
1990s; third, the shift in Western states from the politics of government and interest 
representation  to  the  politics  of  governance  and  values,  associated  with  the  rise  of 
neoliberalism from the late 1970s; and finally, the supposed emergence of de-bounded 
and  potentially  existential  global  security  risks  and  the  associated  reorientation  of 
policymaking towards managing and containing the risks of an interconnected world – 
many of which are unknown. The preoccupation with risk predates, but has intensified 
in the wake of, the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States (US) and the 
subsequent declaration of the ‘war on terror’ (now often referred to as the ‘Long War’).  
Crucially,  SBIs  are  not  an  effect of  these  developments.  Rather,  by  locating 
current interventions in relation to these historical processes it becomes apparent that 
SBIs constitute a form of reflexive political rule that has developed precisely because of 
the tensions and contradictions inherent to ongoing processes of economic globalisation 
and the state-society transformations associated with these. Together they manifest a CHAPTER THREE 
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particular historically specific conjuncture in the global political economy, which can be 
termed a ‘second phase’ in the post-Cold War era. Why second phase? Paraphrasing 
Polanyi’s famous ‘double movement’ argument, Ian Clark has identified the existence 
of  contradictory  processes  of  inclusion  and  exclusion  in  the  development  of 
international society from the late nineteenth century. On the one hand, he says, there 
has been a trend of massive expansion of the state system and universalisation of the 
state as the only legitimate form of political rule. On the other hand and inseparable 
from  the  first  process,  he  argues  that  there  has  also  been  a  reverse  tendency  of 
increasing stratification of international society. The core liberal Western states, says 
Clark, have ‘sought to guard their existing privileges in the unregulated global state 
system by deploying the institutions of the embedded liberal solution at the international 
level’.
1 The end of the Cold War for Clark is not the starting point for this trend, but 
rather ‘an important stage in the advancement of this “double movement” towards a 
more  overtly  normative  style  of  international  society,  as  defined  by  the  core  states 
within it.’
2  
While Clark captures well the increasingly unequal terrain between states, by 
focusing  exclusively  on  the  international  level  he  neglects  the  ways  in  which  this 
counter-movement is itself divided into two phases in the post-Cold War period. For our 
purposes, the distinction between the two phases is manifested in a transition between 
two modes of international intervention, as well as in a related shift in the rationale 
underlying interventionism. In terms of the shifting form of intervention, the transition 
has  been  from  external  forms  of  ‘peacebuilding’,  usually  orchestrated  and 
operationalised by the UN, to new modes of governance that are mostly located within 
intervened states. However, these SBIs do more than merely attempt to facilitate at the 
national level the embedding of the liberal ‘solution’, with its associated hierarchical 
relations and normative preferences, as a complementary and parallel process to the one 
taking place at the international level. Indeed, Clark’s analysis is constrained on this 
point by his methodological nationalism. Rather, the very nature of statehood is being 
transformed and so is the increasingly blurry distinction between what occurs inside and 
outside  the  state,  what  is  international  and  what  is  national,  who  policymakers  are 
                                                 
1 Clark, Ian, ‘Another “Double Movement”: The Great Transformation after the Cold War?’ Review of 
International  Studies  27,  no.  5  (2001),  pp.  237-55,  p.  238.  For  a  similar  argument  on  the  ‘two 
liberalisms’  –  pluralist  and  anti-pluralist  –  see  Simpson,  Gerry,  Great Powers and Outlaw States: 
Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
2 Clark, ‘Another “Double Movement”’. CHAPTER THREE 
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accountable to, and where policy decisions are made. Crucial to this development is the 
now almost commonsensical notion that in an increasingly globalised world domestic 
crises and conflicts have the potential to become global security risks and therefore that 
the quality of domestic governance has potential global security implications.
3  
With  the  demise  of  the  communist  bloc  and  the  near-dissolution  of  serious 
traditional military threats to the US and its allies, early post-Cold War interventions 
were rationalised in terms of progressive liberal notions of radical humanitarianism and 
protecting  human  rights.  However,  the  humanitarian  cause  has  more  recently  been 
usurped,  if  not  entirely  replaced,  by  the  more  security-centred  rationale  of  risk 
management as the driver of increased state building interventionism, leading to a more 
pre-emptive  approach  to  state  building  combining  strategies  traditionally  associated 
with overseas development assistance delivery. In this respect, Duffield has argued that 
security  and  ‘political  containment’  are  at  the  heart  of  the  ‘new  aid  paradigm’  and 
contemporary forms of humanitarian intervention.
4 To the extent that human rights and 
humanitarian concerns are incorporated as justification for contemporary state building 
this  is  usually  framed  in  terms  of  ‘enlightened  self-interest’  –  the  supposed 
commensurability between the security objectives of state building and the human rights 
of populations in intervened states.
5 
As the shift from liberal internationalist humanitarianism to risk management 
suggests, the second phase in post-Cold War era is decidedly less optimistic than that of 
the early 1990s. Initial euphoria – the so-called ‘end of history’
6 – has dissipated, to be 
replaced  with  a  sense  of  anxiety  and  uncertainty  in  major  policymaking  circles. 
Chandler has argued that currently ‘Western political elites lack a strong political vision 
and therefore have a transformed perception of and relation to political power.’
7 He says 
that  it  is  these  elites’  urge  to  avoid  the  responsibilities  of  power  that  drives  the 
expansion of contemporary forms of state building, which seek to hide power behind 
benign terms such as ‘partnership’ and ‘empowerment’. Indeed a string of operational 
                                                 
3 Jonathan Kirshner, for example, argues that globalisation is reshaping the nature of conflict, leading to 
an increasing incidence of conflict in weak states. Kirshner, Jonathan, ‘Globalization, American Power, 
and International Security’, Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 3 (2008), pp. 363-89. 
4 Duffie l d ,   M a r k ,   ‘ N G O   R e l i e f   i n   W a r   Z o n e s :   T o w a r d s   a n   A n a l y s i s   o f   t h e   N e w   A i d   P a r a d i g m ’ ,   Third 
World Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1997), pp. 527-42. 
5  See  Duffield,  Mark,  Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the  World of Peoples 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); Wesley, Michael, ‘Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention’, Ethics 
and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005), pp. 55-72. 
6 Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992). 
7 Chandler, David, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto Press, 2006), p. 19. CHAPTER THREE 
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failures in the early 1990s shook the confidence of Western policy elites in their ability 
to quickly affect social and political change towards liberal-democracy. Thus, instead of 
liberal-democratic expansion, which characterised the first phase of the post-Cold War, 
we  now  see  risk  management  –  the  containment  of  transnational  terrorism, 
environmental  degradation,  refugee  outflows,  illegal  drug  trafficking,  and  other  de-
bounded  risks  –  emerging  as  pivotal  to  policymaking,  both  internationally  and 
domestically. It is now argued that the ubiquitous, amorphous and unpredictable nature 
of these supposedly transnational or even global risks necessitates the development of 
functioning state institutions that are capable of producing stable environments in crisis 
spots. The state has thus come to be placed at the very centre of the post-Cold War 
security problematic. As we have seen, however, state building does not mean a return 
to  earlier  forms  of  ‘hard’  sovereignty  and  non-interference,  but  the  development  of 
transnational modes of regulation and surveillance within those very state institutions. 
The  securitisation  of  the  governance  structures  and  institutions  of  intervened  states 
serves  to  simultaneously  depoliticise  the  processes  of  their  formation,  as  well  as 
marginalise and delegitimise those interests who oppose the transnationalisation of the 
state and the power relations this entails.
8  
What the discussion in this chapter illuminates, thus, is that contemporary SBIs 
are  not  exceptional  responses  to  crisis  situations,  reflecting  localised  lapses  in  state 
capacity and governance.
9 The emergence of SBIs in their current form also cannot be 
seen, as some have argued, as related to the overall weakening of the state system in the 
post-Cold  War  period,
10  since  such  depictions  ignore  the  development  of  complex 
forms  of  governance,  discussed  in  previous  chapters,  with  the  state,  albeit  much 
transformed, remaining at the centre of these constellations. Rather, contemporary SBIs 
must be seen as a new and dynamic mode of governance in the global political economy 
that is located within, rather than outside the state and is transformative of it. In this way 
state building constitutes an important pillar in the architecture of an emerging anti-
pluralist, hierarchical and increasingly authoritarian liberal global order. 
                                                 
8 Securitisation, as Buzan et al. note, is a way of taking an issue ‘beyond the established rules of the game 
and frame the issue as either a special kind of politics or as above politics’. See Buzan, Barry, Ole 
Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 
p. 23.  
9  For  instance  see  Rotberg,  Robert  I.,  ‘The  New  Nature  of  Nation-State  Failure’,  The  Washington 
Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002), pp. 85-96. 
10  See  for  example,  Berger,  Mark  T.,  ‘From  Nation-Building  to  State-Building:  The  Geopolitics  of 
Development, the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order’, Third World Quarterly 27, no. 
1 (2006), pp. 5-25. CHAPTER THREE 
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The  coming  sections  examine  each  of  the  four  aforementioned  historical 
processes in brief, focusing on the ways in which these relate to the development of 
contemporary SBIs.  
 
The failure of the humanitarian interventions of the early 1990s  
The post-Cold War period began with proclamations of a ‘new world  order’ in the 
making.
11  Saddam  Hussein’s  invasion  of  Kuwait  in  August  1990  was  met  with  a 
vigorous response from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). For the first time 
since the inception of the UNSC, liberated from bipolar Realpolitik, the group of five 
permanent  members  voted  unanimously  to  use  force  to  remove  Iraqi  troops  from 
Kuwait. The success of Operation Desert Storm in early 1991 emboldened those who 
wanted to see the UN play a more active role in promoting international security and 
ushered in an era of increased UN-led humanitarian interventionism.
12  
This new mood in the UN was most adequately captured in a report by then 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali – Agenda for Peace.
13 In the report, Boutros-
Ghali argued that the historic opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War to 
develop  the  UN  as  a  collective  security  framework  should  not  be  wasted.
14  He 
proceeded to distinguish between three types of UN operations – peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement  and  post-conflict  peacebuilding.  Peace  enforcement  and  peacebuilding 
went beyond the traditional, Cold War, role of UN peacekeeping – hitherto restricted to 
observing  the  peace  between  two  or  more  states  once  their  governments  reached  a 
ceasefire agreement. The new models were designed to enforce and/or secure the peace 
in intrastate conflicts, the number of which increased exponentially in the post-Cold 
War period relative to that of interstate wars.
15  
While there was a significant gap between Boutros-Ghali’s ambitious rhetoric 
and  intentions  and  the  actual  willingness  of  governments  to  commit  troops  and 
resources to UN missions or authorise these troops to fight in often intractable civil 
                                                 
11  Bush,  George  H.W.,  ‘New  World  Order,  Speech  to  Congress’  6  March  1991,  available  from 
<http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm>, accessed 9 June 2005. 
12 Mayall, James, ‘Introduction’, in The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in 
Cambodia,  Former  Yugoslavia  and  Somalia,  edited  by  James  Mayall  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 1-24, p. 10. 
13 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: 
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992). 
14 Ibid., paragraph 75. 
15  Wallensteen,  Peter  and  Margareta  Sollenberg,  ‘Armed  Conflict,  1989–2000’,  Journal  of  Peace 
Research 38, no. 5 (2001), pp. 629-44, p. 632. CHAPTER THREE 
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wars,
16 the UN nevertheless began involving itself in matters pertaining to the domestic 
governance  of  states  in  crisis  and  post-conflict  states.  In  the  early  1990s,  the 
organisation  embarked  on  a  number  of  large-scale  and  complex  interventions,  most 
notably  in  Cambodia,  the  former  Yugoslavia  and  Somalia.  These  operations  and 
particularly the ones in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia were often characterised by 
so-called  ‘mission  creep’.  Their  objectives  and  scope  continuously  morphed  and 
expanded as conflicts and unforseen problems kept emerging. Ultimately, it was left to 
the  commanders  of  the  particular  missions  and  the  political  leaders  of  the  major 
participating countries to negotiate how the mandate was to be interpreted.
17  
The ascension of Bill Clinton to the American presidency in early 1993 was 
initially seen as a further sign that the new UN interventionism was here to stay. His 
election,  said  Stedman,  ‘mark[ed]  the  accession  to  power  of  a  generation  intent  on 
making America live up to its professed ideals.’
18 The reliance on the UN and collective 
security  was  seen  at  the  time  as  a  way  for  the  US  to  pursue  a  vigorous  liberal 
internationalist  foreign  policy  agenda  without  the  massive  defence  expenditure  and 
public debt that characterised the 1980s.
19 A telling example of the prevalent optimism 
in  the  early  1990s  regarding  the  UN’s  potential  to  play  a  major  security  and 
humanitarian role in the post-Cold War era can be found in Gerald Helman and Stephen 
Ratner’s influential Foreign Policy article, ‘Saving Failed States’. In the article, one of 
the first to conceptualise state failure and argue for its growing incidence in the post-
Cold  War  era,  the  authors  proposed  to  rescue  failed  states  by  turning  them  into 
‘conservatorships’  of  international  society,  including  the  delegation  of  government 
authority  and  sovereignty  to  international  trusteeships.
20  Notably  and  in  line  with 
prevailing thinking about failed states in the 1990s, the authors justified the dilution of 
the principles of self-determination and sovereignty associated with such arrangements 
by reference to humanitarian and ethical (human rights) considerations, as well as to the 
possible implications of failed states for regional stability. Since the post-Cold War was 
                                                 
16 For instance, the UN operation in Cambodia was not authorised to use force. This made it exceedingly 
difficult to operate, since the Khmer Rouge decided to not honour the Paris peace agreement to which it 
was party. See Berdal, Mats and Michael Leifer, ‘Cambodia’, in The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: 
United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia, edited by James Mayall 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 25-58. 
17 Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2004). 
18 Stedman, Stephen John, ‘The New Interventionists’, Foreign Policy 72, no. 1 (1992/1993), pp. 1-16, p. 
7. 
19 Ibid., p. 6. 
20 Helman, Gerald B. and Stephen R. Ratner, ‘Saving Failed States’, Foreign Policy 89 (1992), pp. 3-20. CHAPTER THREE 
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touted as the age of ethical foreign policymaking, in which geopolitical considerations 
no longer carried the same weight as before, the UN and its leading member-states had a 
moral duty, it was argued, to prevent gross violations of human rights and come to the 
aid  of  suffering  individuals  wherever  they  may  be,  regardless  of  national  borders.
21 
Intervention was thus seen more as ethical foreign policy than as an expression of the 
national interest of intervening countries.    
The optimism surrounding the UN’s new role  did not last long.  By the mid 
1990s  massive  difficulties  encountered  by  UN  interventions  led  to  a  weakening  of 
policymakers’  appetite  for  large-scale,  ambitious,  expensive  and  risky  humanitarian 
interventions in trouble spots.
22 The sense of disappointment was so acute that Michael 
Wesley, who was critical from the outset of the perception that the UN could resolve 
civil conflicts, entitled his book on UN interventionism in the early post-Cold War era 
Casualties of the New World Order.
23 The main turning point was arguably a disastrous 
night on 3 October 1993, in which 18 US Rangers and Special Forces and more than 
500 Somalis died in a bloody and protracted battle on the streets of Mogadishu, with the 
body of one US troop captured on news cameras being dragged on the ground by an 
angry  mob.
24  The  Clinton  administration  in  particular  was  subsequently  reluctant  to 
commit troops to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, leading in part to a 
very weak initial international response to the brutal Rwanda genocide in 1994.
25  
The seeming failure of the early post-Cold War interventions has led to much 
soul-searching in practitioner and scholarly circles. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin in a 
comprehensive study of the historical transformations of UN peacekeeping argue that 
the  UN-led  humanitarian  interventions  of  the  early  1990s  suffered  from  four  main 
problems that led to their relative failure: (a) political will – member states lacked the 
political will to match their rhetorical commitments. This resulted in poorly equipped 
and badly prepared missions; (b) funding – the UN did not receive the funding it needed 
to carry out the mandates authorised by the Security Council; (c) institutional capacity – 
the UN lacked the capacity to manage its increasing volume of work, coordinating and 
                                                 
21 Matlary, Janne Haaland, Values and Weapons: From Humanitarian Intervention to Regime Change? 
(Basingstoke:  Palgrave  Macmillan,  2006);  Chandler,  David,  From  Kosovo  to  Kabul  and  Beyond: 
Human Rights and International Intervention, 2
nd edition (London: Pluto Press, 2006), pp. 37-38. 
22 Mayall, ‘Introduction’, p. 1. 
23 Wesley, Michael, Casualties of the New World Order: The Causes of Failure of UN Missions to Civil 
Wars (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997). 
24 Bellamy et al., Understanding Peacekeeping, p. 82. 
25 Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul, p. 61; Bellamy et al., Understanding Peacekeeping, p. 81. CHAPTER THREE 
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executing complex peace operations; (d) practical competence – there was no pool of 
‘lessons learned’ to draw upon and therefore the various missions were very different 
from one another.
26 This analysis captures the prevalent sentiment among those who are 
generally sympathetic to the principle of humanitarian interventionism. Such critics tend 
to argue that the 1990s missions failed primarily due to problems in the relationship 
between  the  UN  and  the  governments  of  member-states,  as  well  as  due  to  related 
organisational and technical problems in the structures of the missions themselves.
27 
These combined, it is argued, to generate strong pressures for quick and tangible results, 
leading to a problematic focus on rapid democratisation and marketisation reforms in 
intervened states, followed by disengagement. 
The perception that the early post-Cold War interventions were unsuccessful and 
even  counterproductive  at  times  had  been  one  of  the  primary  causes  for  the  later 
emergence  of  SBIs  in  the  particular  form  discussed  in  previous  chapters.  However, 
despite the decreasing funding and political will for humanitarian interventions, this has 
not spelt the total demise of humanitarianism as a legitimising rationale for intervention. 
It is not so much the humanitarian cause that has been discredited in the wake of these 
early failures; in fact, contemporary interveners often seek to legitimise their actions, at 
least in part, by referring to the human right abuses and humanitarian disasters they can 
put an end to.
28 For instance, American, British and Australian leaders, who initially 
sought to legitimise the 2003 invasion of Iraq in terms of risk management, as a means 
for disarming Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction, started arguing that 
regime change was justified on humanitarian grounds once it became clear Iraq had no 
such weapons.
29 Thus, it is not necessarily the rhetoric of ethical foreign policy and 
interventionism  that  has  been  challenged.  Rather,  it  is  the modus  operandi  of  these 
interventions, particularly their tendency to pursue rapid democratisation and economic 
liberalisation and then quickly disengage, that has come under attack.  
                                                 
26 Bellamy et al., Understanding Peacekeeping, p. 81. 
27 See for example, Brahimi, Lakhdar et al., ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’, 21 
August  2000  (A/55/305–S/2000/809),  New  York:  United  Nations;  Chayes,  Antonia  Handler  and 
Abram  Chayes,  Planning for Intervention: International Cooperation in Conflict Management (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999). On the other hand, in the US there has always been powerful 
conservative  elements  in  foreign  policy  circles  objected  to  expansive  interventionism  and  ‘nation-
building’. See Haig, Alexander M., ‘Nation Building: A Flawed Approach’, Brown Journal of World 
Affairs 2, no. 1 (1994), pp. 7-10. 
28 See for example, Blair, Tony, ‘Full Text of Tony Blair’s Speech to the Labour Party Conference’, 2 
October 2001, available at <http://www.australianpolitics.com/news/2001/01-10-02b.shtml>, accessed 
13 April 2007.  
29 Matlary, Values and Weapons, pp. 119-20. CHAPTER THREE 
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What has also come to the fore is the perception in some policymaking circles, 
mostly in the US, that the UN process is frustratingly cumbersome, slow, ineffective, 
and often does not allow the freedom of operation and flexibility needed for successful 
engagement with the new risks posed by rogue and/or failed states. For example, in late 
2002 US President George W. Bush attempted to pressure the UNSC to reach a decision 
on Iraq with a rather explicit threat that the US would attack regardless of the outcome 
of that vote,
30 thereby effectively undermining the credibility of the UNSC process from 
the outset. Nonetheless, Bush’s attempt to secure UNSC mandate for the invasion of 
Iraq seems to suggest that the UN and multilateralism still enjoy a greater degree of 
international legitimacy than unilateral operations or ‘coalitions of the willing’ and this 
legitimacy has made it difficult even for a hawkish American president like George W. 
Bush to completely bypass the UN. By framing interventions as a matter of national or 
indeed global security, broad multilateral consensus can be presented as a luxury, rather 
than  as  a  precondition  for  action.  In  any  case,  even  those  interventions  that  were 
sanctioned by the UNSC (before or after the fact) since the mid 1990s tended to be 
operationalised through regional multilateral bodies or leading states and not by UN 
bodies.
31  However,  regardless  of  such  squabbles  over  whether  unilateralism  or 
multilateralism  offers  the  best  shell  for  intervention,  the  UN’s  own  approach  to 
‘peacebuilding’ currently contains essentially the same assumptions and objectives as 
those  we  have  earlier  associated  with  contemporary  state  building,  albeit  with  less 
emphasis on hard-edged enforcement. Indeed, UN agencies, such as the United Nations 
Development Programme, now often participate in state building regimes alongside a 
variety of other public and private actors.       
  There are two elements of the early humanitarian UN-led interventions that are 
important  to  mention  in  relation  to  the  subsequent  emergence  of  SBIs.  First, 
international  interventions  have  mostly  developed  ad  hoc  and  not  in  an  organic  or 
planned  fashion  from  ‘traditional’  interstate  peacekeeping  to  more  complex  ‘post-
Westphalian’  peace  enforcement  and  ‘peacebuilding’  operations  and  finally  to 
contemporary  SBIs.
32  While  this  reflexive  development  trajectory  highlights  the 
dynamic  nature  of  these  interventions,  it  is  not  only  operational  needs  and  new 
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challenges that have led to ongoing refinement, but also broader political and economic 
issues  –  contemporary  SBIs  cannot  be  understood  as  merely  an  attempt  to  apply 
‘lessons  learned’  from  earlier  interventions.  Rather,  the  very  rationalisation  for 
intervention has changed from humanitarian/regional to risk management/global. It is 
this shift that also explains the renewed and invigorated interest in interventionism from 
the late 1990s onwards.  
Second,  the  early  interventions  were  broadly  based  on  a  straightforward 
application of the principles of the ‘liberal peace thesis’, first articulated by German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay Perpetual Peace.
33 The ‘liberal peace 
thesis’ – the idea that liberal-democracies do not fight each other and therefore that 
establishing liberal democracies everywhere is the best guarantee for world peace
34 – 
had underpinned their objectives and implementation. These interventions, aside from 
the physical containment of violent conflict where necessary, tended to pursue rapid 
democratisation  and  marketisation  as  a  form  of  ‘cure-all’  conflict  resolution.
35 
Democratisation entailed the facilitation of popular elections for political power in as 
short  a  timeframe  as  possible  and  marketisation  entailed  deregulation,  trade  and 
financial liberalisation and privatisation of state-owned enterprises at a rapid pace. The 
democratisation-marketisation model for peacebuilding emerged out of the perception 
that to stop countries from slipping back into armed conflict,
36 there was a need to do 
more than just halt the violence – peacebuilding had to involve considerable economic 
and political reforms: 
Underlying the design and practice of these operations was the hope and expectation 
that democratization would shift societal conflicts away from the battlefield and into 
the peaceful arena of electoral politics, thereby replacing the breaking of heads with the 
counting of heads; and that marketization would promote sustainable economic growth, 
which would also help to reduce tensions. Peacebuilding, in this sense, was a specific 
kind of social engineering, based on a particular set of assumptions about how best to 
establish durable domestic peace.
37 
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35 Paris, Roland, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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This  preference  for  peacebuilding  of  a  particular  kind  was  coupled  with  an 
unfavourable view of the state in the developing world as a mostly corrupt, inefficient 
and predatory institution that had to be marginalised, reduced, and checked as much as 
possible  if  post-conflict  recovery  was  to  succeed.  It  was  not  uncommon  during  the 
1990s for international agencies and donors to completely circumvent the institutions of 
the local state and establish parallel networks of domestic NGOs and private contractors 
to provide services traditionally associated with the state.
38 Therefore, democratisation-
marketisation  interventions  were  in  effect  seen  as  a  way  of  combining  conflict 
resolution with structural adjustment.    
  This model for intervention and post-conflict reconstruction was unsuccessful in 
meeting its stated objectives in most of the 14 cases examined by Roland Paris in his 
comprehensive  analysis  of  post-conflict  rebuilding  in  the  1990s.  None  of  the 
interventions  examined  managed  to  establish  a  flourishing  liberal  democracy  in  the 
intervened  state  and  in  some – Angola,  El  Salvador  and  Guatemala,  for  example – 
violent conflict re-emerged shortly after the operation ended. In the only partial success 
stories  Paris  covers  –  Namibia  and  Mozambique  –  civil  wars  were  related  to  the 
involvement of external parties in those countries that withdrew when the wars ended, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict reigniting.
39 In both states, however, massive 
inequalities and widespread poverty remain. In Somalia, which Paris does not examine, 
the UN operation ended without even managing to stop the fighting or securing any 
political arrangement.    
Despite  these  failures,  the  idea  of  the  ‘liberal  peace’  continues  to  be  highly 
influential today and this is reflected in the ways contemporary SBIs are legitimated; in 
fact, in contemporary  discourse on humanitarian interventions there is a discernable 
tendency  to  conflate  humanitarianism  with  human  rights  and  with  liberal  individual 
rights more broadly, so that the right to live in a liberal-democracy is itself construed as 
an  inalienable  human  right.
40  In  this  way,  the  existence  of  a  particular  system  of 
governance is also construed as a moral issue.  
However, current received wisdom is that democratisation and marketisation are 
not sufficient for successful recovery in the absence of ‘good governance’ and adequate 
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state capacity to implement and sustain these transitions. Therefore, as we have already 
seen,  contemporary  state  building  goes  beyond  quick  reform  followed  by 
disengagement and sets out to establish the state itself as the ultimate regulator and 
guarantor of the ‘liberal peace’. Thus, while a functioning market democracy is still 
considered a desirable outcome because of the supposedly inherent pacific nature of this 
regime type, the sequencing of reform has become a crucial issue for interveners and the 
focus has shifted onto the more immediate concerns of functionality and governance.
41 
This more recent approach is not counter-posed to democratisation-marketisation but 
rather advocates a different implementation strategy for the supposedly ‘tumultuous’ 
transition period to liberal democracy.
42   
An important point highlighted by our discussion thus far of the transition from 
early humanitarian interventions to contemporary state building is that there is a strong 
link  between  the  objectives  and  implementation  modalities  of  various  forms  of 
intervention and development orthodoxy more broadly. This linking is related to the 
ways in which security and development have increasingly become fused in the post-
Cold  War  period  in  mainstream  policymaking  circles.
43  The  democratisation-
marketisation doctrine of the early interventions was conceived in the broader context of 
the so-called Washington consensus and the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s and 1990s, 
while the more recent form of SBI has emerged in the context of increased attention to 
the role of the state in facilitating sustained economic development, albeit still within a 
neoliberal framework. The next section examines the ways in which transformations in 
development theory and policy have affected the form and objectives of contemporary 
state building. 
 
The return to the state in development theory and policy  
From the late 1990s, neoliberal development orthodoxy has shifted its attention from 
focusing  primarily  on  economic  policy  towards  emphasising  the  functioning  of  the 
domestic  governing  institutions  of  recipient  states  as  prerequisite  to  successful 
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development outcomes.
44 While initially the ‘good governance’ agenda was associated 
with  donors  pulling  out  of  ‘poorly  performing’  countries  because  aid  was  seen  as 
ineffective there,
45 the more recent concern with the potentially risky nature of poor 
domestic governance has meant a considerable convergence in both theory and practice 
between international development assistance and state building. This section examines 
the  contours  of  the  transformation  of  development  orthodoxy  and  relates  it  to  the 
particular form and objectives of contemporary SBIs. 
Jamie  Peck  and  Adam  Tickell  have  argued  that  the  political  and  ideological 
project of neoliberalisation has progressed from what they call ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ 
to ‘roll-out neoliberalism’. They say that, 
…the agenda has gradually moved from one preoccupied with the active destruction and 
discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions (broadly defined) 
to one focused on the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state 
forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations.
46  
While Peck and Tickell focus on the neoliberalisation of the advanced capitalist states, a 
similar  transition  towards  ‘roll-out  neoliberalism’  has  taken  place  in  the  theory  and 
practice of economic development in the Third World. The recent emphasis on ‘state 
building’ by organisations such as the World Bank
47 is thus not merely a subset of the 
growing concern with state failure and its consequences in the post-Cold War period, 
although there is little doubt that the increasing concern with risk management has had a 
real  effect  on  the  centrality  that  state  building  has  now  assumed  for  bilateral  and 
multilateral donors. Rather, the shift towards state building as a key aspect of economic 
development,  to  a  considerable  extent,  has  had  its  own  political,  institutional  and 
intellectual  history  and  dynamics.  In  particular,  the  transformation  within  neoliberal 
development  orthodoxy  is  linked  to  attempts  to  overcome  the  problems  of 
implementation  and  outcome  associated  with  the  more  destructive  ‘roll-back 
neoliberalism’ of the SAPs in the 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, the prevailing 
conceptions of state failure and civil conflict as manifestations of stunted economic and 
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political  national  development
48  have  led  to  increasing  convergence  between  the 
supposed prerequisites for sustained economic development and those relating to risk 
management more broadly. This merging has also extended to the policy approaches to 
economic development and security and to the apparatus that has been set up to deal 
with both. For this reason it is essential to gain an understanding of how and why the 
role afforded to the state has changed within development theory and practice. 
It was not until the era of decolonisation, beginning in the immediate post-war 
years and through to the 1950s and 1960s, that economic and political development in 
the former  colonies, now independent states, became  a serious concern for Western 
policymakers.  The  Bretton  Woods  institutions  –  the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF  – 
established in 1944 to form the backbone of international economic cooperation after 
the Second World War, were also entrusted with assisting the development of the new 
states.  Development  orthodoxy  in  the  early  decades  of  decolonisation  was  heavily 
influenced by modernisation theory and Keynesian economics. Modernisation theory 
tended to view the state as the main driver of the modernisation of society,
49 while 
Keynesianism allocated the state a central role in the national economy. The state was to 
use fiscal means to control supply and demand, as well as intervene directly to shape 
industrial policy, employment and income distribution.
50 Developing states were often 
encouraged  and  supported  by  donors  to  embark  on  so-called  import-substitution 
industrialisation programs and develop domestic industrial capacities. In the meanwhile, 
Western bilateral aid was largely shaped by the geo-strategic imperatives of the Cold 
War, with past colonial masters providing aid to their former subjects and successive 
US administrations handing out substantial sums of money to often corrupt and brutal 
rulers that were seen as anti-communist.
51  
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While bilateral aid arguably continued to be a tool of the Cold War until the late 
1980s, multilateral development aid delivery underwent a neoliberal revolution in the 
early 1980s.
52 This, of course, was related to the ascendency of neoliberalism in the 
main Western states at approximately the same time, an issue I take up in the next 
section.  Most  notably,  the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF  began  promoting  structural 
adjustment in recipient states as a way out of the debt crisis that crippled many of those 
countries, particularly in Latin America, and as the only path to sustained economic 
growth. The Washington consensus, as it later became known,
53 was a set of policies 
stipulating  fiscal  austerity,  severe  cuts  in  public  spending,  trade  and  financial 
liberalisation, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the outsourcing of public 
services. The state, which for Keynesian economists was seen as essential for economic 
modernisation  through  its  planning,  implementing  and  coordinating  capacities,  was 
suddenly viewed as the main obstacle to development in the Third World.
54 University 
of Chicago economist Harry Johnson, one of Keynesianism’s staunchest critics in the 
1970s, argued that the promotion of Keynesian-style economics in the Third World was 
to blame not only for these countries’ chronic balance of payment problems and their 
governments’  propensity  for  misguided  and  counterproductive  interventions  in  the 
economy, but also for the existence of problematic social attitudes such as corruption.
55 
The way to ‘remove’ the state from the economic sphere was through the extensive use 
of external conditionalities as leverage by the Bretton Woods lenders at a time when 
other borrowing options for developing countries were disappearing fast.
56  
The  shift  from  the  Washington  consensus  to  the  so-called  Post-Washington 
Consensus  (PWC)
57  in  the  mid  to  late  1990s  and  the  related  return  to  the  state  in 
development  orthodoxy  is  associated  with  advancements  in  the  economic  theory  of 
institutions (new institutional economics – NIE),
58 particularly in relation to the role that 
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institutions  are  seen  to  be  playing  in  reducing  ‘transaction  costs’  and  ‘information 
asymmetries’ within markets;
59 and more directly, with the failure of the World Bank 
and IMF’s SAPs in the 1980s and early 1990s, in terms of both policy outcome and 
implementation.
60  While  the  first  has  provided  reformers  with  their  intellectual  and 
theoretical vocabulary, the second provided them with the impetus for change. In fact, 
even within the neoliberal camp, many blamed the exponential growth in the number of 
fragile and failing states in the 1990s on ‘shock therapy’ structural adjustment and the 
unchecked privatisation and rampant criminalisation of state power this entailed in some 
countries.
61 I shall examine these in brief.  
NIE has sought to overcome what its exponents saw as the main deficiencies in 
neoclassical economics. North argues that neoclassical economists are wrong to neglect 
the role of institutions and wrong to assume that all actors in the market always possess 
full knowledge of the world, thereby facilitating the accuracy of the price mechanism. 
He says that neoclassical economic models are based on a zero transaction cost reality 
that could never be anything but hypothetical.
62 NIE, argues North, 
… extends economic theory by incorporating ideas and ideologies into the analysis, 
modelling the political process as a critical factor in the performance of economies, and 
as the explanation for ‘inefficient’ markets.
63  
The implications of this theory for development policy, as North himself notes, is that, 
… the state can never be treated as an exogenous actor in development policy, and 
getting the prices right only has the desired consequences when agents already have in 
place a set of property rights and enforcement that will then produce the competitive 
market conditions.
64 
The state, thus, acquires within this theory a crucial role in ensuring the success of 
economic development by regulating markets and by protecting them from unwanted 
and  negative  interference  from  political  actors  that  benefit  disproportionately  from 
inefficiencies and market distortions. But even more than that, some social institutions 
are seen as better suited for market efficiency than others. Therefore, intervening to 
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shape  social  institutions  is  also  legitimised  within  this  framework  as  necessary  for 
maintaining reforms and ensuring long-term development outcomes.
65 
While these intellectual developments preceded the PWC, the more immediate 
impetus for change came from the growing perception in the mid and late 1990s that the 
‘shock  therapy’  SAPs  associated  with  the  Washington  consensus,  were  difficult  to 
implement and were failing to deliver expected development outcomes. In particular, 
the  Mexican  crisis  of  1994-95,  the  difficult  experience  of  Russia  and  other  post-
communist states in transitioning to market capitalism in the 1990s, and the Asian crisis 
of 1997-98 were pivotal events that underlined, for some, the need for a policy and 
theory rethink. The many failures of SAPs, as detailed by the Structural Adjustment 
Participatory  Review  Initiative  report  include  the  decimation  of  the  manufacturing 
sector as a result of trade liberalisation; adverse effects on production and the small 
enterprise sector as a result of financial sector liberalisation; strong downward pressures 
on wages and worsening employment conditions for labour; declining food security; 
and a significant deterioration in public spending on education and healthcare. To make 
matters  worse,  economic  growth  has  also  stagnated  in  many  structural  adjustment 
countries  with  poverty  levels  rising  and  inequalities  expanding.
66  In  many  of  these 
countries, well-placed elites were able to draw huge benefits to themselves and their 
cronies by either using their positions to capture previously state-owned industries or by 
forcefully taking over parts of the private sector.
67  
From  within  the  neoliberal  camp,  then  World  Bank  Chief  Economist Joseph 
Stiglitz argued that the botched up transition from a command economy to free markets 
in Russia and other post-communist states was directly related to the inadequacies of the 
Washington consensus. He argued that rather than rushing to deregulate, privatise and 
liberalise, the problem in development policy was ‘… one of balance, and where that 
balance is may depend on the country, the capacity of its government, the institutional 
development of its markets.’
68 What this suggests, in line with NIE’s understanding of 
the relationship between institutions and markets, is that it is not the fundamentals of 
neoclassical  economics  that are challenged. Rather, it is argued that donors need to 
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spend more time and resources to ensure that the right institutions are in place before 
proceeding  with structural adjustment. This was accompanied by a discernable shift 
from a policy of external conditionalities, in which the top-down and coercive nature of 
external  intervention  was  apparent,  to  one  of  ‘post-conditionality’  or  ‘transformed 
conditionality’.
69 Here ‘capacity building’, ‘partnership’ and ‘domestic ownership’ are 
seen as ways for supporting the emergence of policy elites that would work to establish 
‘good policy environments’ without the need for overt forms of outside leverage. In this 
way, the overall responsibility for the success or otherwise of economic development 
has  been  placed  firmly  in  the  hands  of  political  and  bureaucratic  elites  in  recipient 
countries and their capacity to generate the ‘right’ institutional environment for liberal 
markets.
70        
The focus on economic development as an internally generated process, but one 
that outsiders can influence by supporting the development of institutions, links up with, 
and  has  greatly  influenced  the  form  and  objectives  of,  contemporary  SBIs.  To 
understand  the  latter,  the  return  to  the  state  in  development  theory  and  policy  is 
important for at least two reasons. First, state ‘failure’, in the same way as development 
‘failure’, is essentially understood as a problem of poor domestic governance and low 
state capacity, supposedly leading to stunted economic and political development and 
conflict, with governance construed and measured in technical and ‘objective’ terms.
71 
There is a growing convergence, which we have already noted, between security and 
development, both conceptually and at the policy level as manifested in the notion of 
state  failure.
72  The  linking  of  security  and  development  is  not  an  entirely  new 
phenomenon,  but  as  Berger  and  Weber  argue,  the  neoliberal  post-Cold  War 
manifestation of this linking differs from that which prevailed during the Cold War. 
Contemporarily,  both  development  and  security  are  conceived  in  technical  and 
apolitical terms, whereas previously international development assistance policy  was 
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viewed  more  explicitly  as  a  form  of  politics,  in  terms  of  supporting  ‘sympathetic’ 
political leaders in the Third World.
73 Understanding development and security as a 
relation  of  good  governance  also  means  that  state  failure  is  viewed  as  an  issue  of 
technical state capacity and not as related to any social and political conflicts associated 
with capitalist economic development.
74  
Second, in terms of the techniques and modalities of reform implementation and 
maintenance  there  is  also  a  great  degree  of  convergence  between  SBIs  and 
contemporary donor activities, as noted in the second chapter. Matlary, for example, has 
defined the latter as essentially ‘non-military interventions’ with the military course of 
action  but  one  possible  option  in  the  ‘toolbox’  of  Western  policymakers  to  affect 
desired governance outcomes.
75 The aid and development sector, including many NGOs 
that receive their funding from these agencies, has in this way been absorbed into the 
greater security apparatus, leading in part to a shifting emphasis towards governance 
and  security-related  programs  and  away  from  traditional  donor  activities,  such  as 
infrastructure  projects,  health  and  education.
76  The  most  obvious  example  for  the 
securitisation  of  bilateral  aid  is  the  Bush  administration’s  Millennium  Challenge 
Account that has essentially been used to support governments that are seen as key 
allies of the US in the ‘war on terror’, but without ditching the supposedly apolitical 
insistence  on  good  governance  as  a  precondition  for  aid  delivery.
77  However,  the 
broader preoccupation with managing the risk supposedly presented by state fragility 
has meant that the aid programs of most Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development member-states, as well as the major multilateral development banks, have 
been increasingly focused on state building and governance. For example, in Cambodia, 
which is examined in Chapter Seven, governance is no longer seen as one of the sectors 
in which the World Bank operates, but as the overarching theme of the Bank’s entire 
program in that country.
78 
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Neoliberalism and the transformation of Western states  
It is impossible to comprehend contemporary risk perceptions, the policy prescriptions 
associated with these, as well as the development of the real-existing mechanisms for 
state  building,  without  relating  these  to  the  ways  in  which  the  Western  state  has 
transformed  in  the  past  three  decades  and  the  implications  of  this  for  politics  and 
political agency. While the precise nature of this transformation varies across different 
polities, it is nevertheless possible to identify broad trends associated with the onset of 
the  neoliberal  revolution  in  the  late  1970s.  The  Western  state  is  currently  a  vastly 
different beast from the Westphalian archetype common in the international relations 
literature, having shed some of its traditional roles and acquired new regulatory ones. 
The neoliberal regulatory state complicates traditional notions of statehood in that its 
components are incorporated in a variety of ways into complex, border-spanning modes 
of network and multilevel governance. However, the state’s disaggregation cannot be 
understood  merely  in  terms  of  the  attempt  to  develop  more  effective  forms  of 
governance in an age of globalisation and rapid technological change.
79 Rather, this 
process concerns the production and reproduction of the social and political relations 
supportive  of  a  market  society  out  of  the  ‘embedded  liberalism’  of  the  post-war 
Keynesian  welfare state – the political settlement between labour and  capital. More 
specifically, the shift to the regulatory state has meant the emergence of a managerialist 
ideology  and  an  associated  set  of  technocratic  governance  structures  that  seek  to 
reframe  social  phenomena,  including  conflicts  over  the  distribution  of  material 
resources and power, as problems to be resolved or managed by actors who are not 
popularly, or in many cases even politically, accountable. Along with the emergence of 
such anti-competitive governance arrangements, we have also seen a related shift to the 
totalising and ‘post-political’ discourse of values, with conflict over social values now 
constituting the main point of difference between the Left and Right of politics in most 
Western states. Both trends have fed into and underpinned the contemporary concern 
with managing trans-boundary risks.  
Based  on  our  conception  of  the  state  as  an  expression  of  power,  state 
transformation effectively means a transformation of the ways in which political power 
is distributed, produced and reproduced in particular states and societies leading to the 
emergence of new institutionalised forms of political rule. It constitutes an ongoing, 
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politically  contested,  uneven  and  multidimensional  set  of  processes,  encompassing 
shifts in three interrelated dimensions – the ‘purpose’ of state power, the location of 
state power, and the actors exercising state power. In this way, it involves not only 
structural,  institutional  and  legal  reforms,  but  also  a  normative-ideological  shift 
concerning the objectives for which public power is to be appropriately exercised.  
Neoliberalism, in turn, is not merely a set of policy prescriptions derived from 
neoclassical economics – it is primarily an ideological disposition: 
Neoliberal ideologues have a normative preference for market relations, which means 
that  they  think  that  these  relations  should be  the  basis  of  social  activity.  This  is  a 
statement about a preferred set of power relations and institutional forms.
80 
The ideology of neoliberalism, which has been around long before its ascendance in the 
1970s, is in most cases coupled with the political project of neoliberalisation. Crucially, 
neoliberalisation is not a project of state destruction but one of state construction and 
transformation.  It  is  driven  by  particular  and  dynamic  coalitions  of  interests  and 
employs neoliberal ideology as a way of rationalising what is effectively the restoration, 
or in some cases constitution, of capitalist class power following its relative decline in 
the 1970s. This means that there may not necessarily be congruence between neoliberal 
ideology and the real-existing manifestations of neoliberalisation, particularly when the 
former is not conducive to interests of the powerful forces that drive the latter or in the 
face  of  significant  political  opposition  from  other  coalitions.
81  Indeed,  real-existing 
neoliberalism has never meant the decline of the state. Neoliberalism assumes certain 
political and social relations and these must be produced and reproduced as they are 
almost never pre-existing. New state forms and institutions are the sites in which this 
contested process takes place. 
The prevailing, but mistaken, tendency to understand neoliberalism strictly in 
terms of the ideology of ‘free markets’ explains the misplaced shock with which many 
observers reacted to the massive state interventions in financial markets following the 
deep financial crisis that began with the collapse of the sub-prime mortgages market in 
late 2007.
82 Neoliberalisation in practice has never been about ‘freeing up’ markets, but 
about  creating  ‘effective’  markets,  meaning  markets  that  function  in  a  way  that 
promotes the interests of those establishing them. In turn, the organisation of social life 
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around markets is a highly political exercise in that it atomises political agency, thereby 
restricting  the  degree  to  which  mass  political  mobilisation  is  capable  of  securing 
political goods vis-à-vis powerful interests in the political economy.  
However, because market extension is a highly contested political project that 
involves  considerable  social  change,  neoliberalisation  has  never  been  a  linear 
straightforward process, nor has it ever been completed; it has rather evolved through 
ongoing conflict, refinement and resistance from a variety of interests and coalitions. In 
turn, these highly conflicted processes have had their own independent transforming 
effects on the project of neoliberalisation. Therefore, it is wrong to reduce emerging 
state  forms  to  the  effects  of  neoliberalism.  Nevertheless,  three  decades  of 
neoliberalisation have transformed Western states in all three dimensions mentioned 
above – purpose, location and actors. In particular, we have seen the emergence of a 
new managerialist logic of political rule – rule by ‘expertise’ – whereby public policy is 
justified and framed in terms of ‘sound’ management based upon expert assessment and 
advice  and  not  in  terms  of  reaching  a  political  accommodation  between  competing 
interests. The rhetoric of expertise and managerialism has also been associated with the 
formation and further development of new modes of governance, in which decision-
making is placed in the hands of managers and experts, who are usually not elected nor 
accountable to the institutions of representative democracy.
83   
The shift to managerialism and its associated modes of governance is linked to 
the transition from the early 1990 to ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism – a phase ‘focused on the 
purposeful  construction  and  consolidation  of  neoliberalized  state  forms,  modes  of 
governance, and regulatory relations.’
84 While in its earlier phase, born out of the 1970s 
crisis of Keynesianism and Fordism, the neoliberal project sought primarily to destroy 
then-powerful  and  well-established  Keynesian-welfarist  and  social-collectivist 
institutions, it was only through later forms of ‘socialised’ neoliberalism, such as the 
‘third way’ and neoconservatism that the longer term reproduction of the socio-political 
relations necessary for neoliberalism was attempted, although intractable conflicts and 
contradictions remain.
85  
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The  emergence  of  ‘roll-out’  neoliberalism  is  directly  related  to  the  crises  of 
‘shallower’ forms of neoliberalism in the age of high capital mobility.
86 Indeed, it is the 
strengthening of those transnationalised interests associated with financial capital – and 
more  broadly,  the  trend  towards  the  financialisation  of  capital  in  the  context  of 
economic  liberalisation  and  the  enormous  growth  of  unstable  global  markets  for 
financial  products  –  which  links  the  structural  shifts  of  the  neoliberal  age  with  the 
particular  state  forms  that  have  emerged.
87  The  prevalence  of  ‘market  failure’, 
combined  with  the  intolerance  of  the  neoliberal  state  (and  particularly  the  US)  of 
massive financial defaults due to its need to maintain confidence in the soundness of the 
domestic currency,
88 provided credence to the work of neo-institutionalist economists 
who  argued  that  without  the  existence  and  proper  functioning  of  the  prerequisite 
domestic  institutional  environments  countries  will  not  benefit  from  liberalisation, 
privatisation, or indeed, globalisation.
89 This has coincided with the emergence of new 
political agendas – the ‘third way’ and neoconservatism – that have attempted to more 
clearly give the neoliberal project a social purpose and a wider coalitional foundation.   
By  seeking  to  deeply  embed  market  relations,
90  the  effects  of  the  new 
‘socialised’ variants of neoliberalism extend well beyond economic policy and even 
social  policy.  Rather,  as  Jayasuriya  argues,  the  new  emphasis  on  social  policy  and 
‘inclusion’ is concerned with changing regimes of citizenship, which he defines as ‘a 
socially constituted relationship between state and society through which new forms of 
statehood or stateness are created.’
91 Indeed, the state has not retreated but instead has 
undergone considerable transformation away from the ‘social state’ of the post-war and 
the  politics  of  interest  and  compensation  associated  with  it,  towards  new  forms  of 
regulation and coordination. The ‘regulatory state’ that has emerged is aimed towards 
managing the conflicts associated with economic liberalisation and social change while 
at the same time working to secure the integrity of markets. Jayasuriya has argued that,  
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…while domestic stability remains a major imperative of the state, it is now achieved 
through  credible  commitment  to,  or  compliance  with,  policies  directed  towards 
ensuring the confidence of international markets.
92 
The key lesson we can derive from the above is that the state continues to be 
crucial to the  reproduction of the social and  economic relationships associated with 
capitalist accumulation, no less in our supposedly ‘globalised’ epoch than at any other 
time. Neoliberal globalisation is not simply ‘out there’, nor is it a homogenous force. 
Rather, it is both a product and facilitator of changes within the state and its spread is 
advanced through the agency of specific interests and coalitions that often cut across the 
formal boundaries of state and society, as well as those between states. Indeed, capitalist 
accumulation is not simply an objective measure of material wealth but essentially a 
social relation of power that has to be reproduced, socially, politically and ideologically, 
if it is to be sustained.
93  
Therefore, the shift towards the regulatory state from the post-war welfare state 
cannot  be  seen  as  a  teleological  process.  Rather,  it  is  about  the  production  and 
reproduction of the social relations necessary for a market society in the age of highly 
mobile  capital.  While  the  socialisation  of  politics  stood  at  the  core  of  the  post-war 
welfare state and its compensatory-redistributive mechanisms, the socialisation of the 
market  represents  the  very  opposite  of  the  post-war  ‘social  constitutionalism’  –  it 
represents the denial of the very existence of broad-based social cleavages centred on 
class  and  the  discrediting  of  the  legitimacy  of  claims  made  in  relation  to  material 
inequality. This denial of material conflict, ironically, comes at a time in which the 
reconstitution – or in some cases, constitution – of capitalist class power across most of 
the world has reached a peak unparalleled since the 1920s.
94  
The task of government has changed in this context from managing the national 
economy to managing ‘national politics in such a way as to adapt them to the pressures 
of  transnational  market  forces.’
95  This  has  entailed  the  increasing  insulation  of 
policymaking from popular or political interference so that non-market friendly agendas 
are  difficult  to  advance  through  democratic  parliamentary  means.  Public  policy  has 
shifted  into  spaces  of  governance  that  are  not  politically  or  popularly  accountable, 
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located either within the state apparatus or bringing together state agencies and other 
transnational regulatory  actors. This does not only mean the insulation of economic 
policy from popular interference, as the regulatory state cannot be seen simply in terms 
of the imposition of market discipline on individuals. In recent years, governments have 
sought to legitimise their role in terms of managing the various forms of de-bounded 
risks associated with the ‘dark side’ of globalisation.
96 However, the treatment of risk as 
an  almost  natural  phenomenon  lends  itself  to  technocratic  solutions  that  serve  to 
obscure the political and ideological underpinnings of the phenomena defined as ‘risk’ 
and the political and social implications of policy responses.  
The  rise  of  governance  in  the  place  of  the  politics  of  interest-representation 
through broad-based political parties is often presented as heralding the emergence of a 
‘post-political’ landscape in Western states.
97 It is now often argued, even by some of 
those who claim to be on the Left of politics, that old class divisions under capitalism 
are  obsolete  and  that  rather  than  being  about  representing  sectoral  interests,  good 
politics should be about values, leadership and market inclusion.
98 Indeed, to the extent 
that material conflict is recognised this is usually related to the uneven availability of 
opportunities for market participation between different groups in society and across 
borders. The blurring of the old Left-Right agendas has also manifested in changing 
voting  patterns.  Giddens,  for  example,  has  argued  that:  ‘In  virtually  all  Western 
countries voting no longer fits class lines, and has shifted from a left/right polarization 
to a more complex picture.’
99 The ‘third way’ that Giddens propagates as a suitable 
political program for our times represents an attempt to define a politics of consensus in 
‘a world where there are [according to Giddens] no alternatives to capitalism’.
100  
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What  Giddens  neglects,  however,  is  the  way  in  which  the  reorganisation  of 
political  contestation  as  a  competition  between  almost-identical  political  parties  has 
been associated with voter apathy and the disengagement of many citizens from politics 
altogether.
101  Indeed,  rather  than  representing  the  ‘renewal  of  social  democracy’,  as 
Giddens  would  have  it,  the  prominence  from  the  1990s  of  the  ‘third  way’,  which 
purports to be both socially progressive and market-friendly,
102 actually demonstrates 
just how hegemonic neoliberalism has become in contemporary mainstream politics in 
most Western states. In this new and supposedly ‘post-political’ reality the place of 
social conflict and class in politics is not only transformed but is actually denied and 
under broad attack. This does not mean that traditional politics of class never gets an 
airing, but this is usually the preserve of a shrinking union movement. Trade unions are 
in any case limited in their capacity to promote the interests of workers in the regulatory 
state since capitalist class relations are now often cross-border and because the social 
reproduction of the working class now occurs not only in the workplace but increasingly 
through  the  transformation  of  all  workers  into  investors,  through  compulsory 
superannuation schemes, for example.
103  
  In tandem with the supposed rise of ‘post-political’ governance, one trend that 
has gathered momentum, has been the rise of the politics of values – what Jayasuriya 
calls ‘the new culturalism’.
104 It is primarily on social values that the main Left-Right 
divisions have centred in the West in recent years. Issues such as gay marriage, civil 
rights,  immigration,  the  relationship  between  state  and  religion,  and  abortions,  have 
provided the main point of disagreement between conservatives and so-called liberals or 
even social-democrats in domestic politics.    
While September 11 has undoubtedly provided a catalyst, the politics of values 
have been powerful in the West in a variety of forms long before 2001, as manifested in 
the prominence in the 1980s and 1990s of the humanitarian and human rights discourse 
both domestically and as a template for ethical foreign policy, as well as the ubiquitous 
‘culture  wars’  that  followed  the  cultural  and  sexual  revolutions  of  the  1960s  and 
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1970s.
105 Also related to the ‘new culturalism’ is the way in which multiculturalism – 
until recently a highly influential regime for resolving the tensions that supposedly run 
through poly-ethnic societies – has come under attack in many Western countries. In 
Britain, France, the US and Australia, to name but a few, multiculturalism has been 
denounced  as  divisive  and  potentially  dangerous,  undermining  the  cohesiveness  of 
society  as  a  whole  and  creating  ghettos  of  radicalised  and  alienated  minorities.
106 
Whether multiculturalism is lauded or derided depends on whether one sees culture and 
values  from  a  relativist  or  a  universalist  perspective,  but  both  approaches  still 
effectively place such cultural values above politics. Indeed, what the politics of values 
shares  with  the  ‘antipolitics’  of  governance,  and  this  allows  them  to  cohabitate 
(although  not  without  serious  and  often  irreconcilable  tensions),  is  that  both  are 
presented as existing above politics and interests, which is precisely why they converge 
on the notions of risk and risk management. The discourse of values, in much the same 
way as that of ‘good governance’, casts these as absolute and incontrovertible.  
The politics of values is associated not only with a shifting domestic landscape, 
but also with considerable transformations of the international-transnational landscape. 
Ruggie  famously  argued  that  the  postwar  economic  order  reflected  the 
‘internationalization  of  domestic  authority  relations’  –  it  was  largely  shaped  by  the 
desire of the major Western governments to protect the requisite domestic conditions 
for  the  ‘compromise  of  embedded  liberalism’  between  labour  and  capital.
107  The 
maintenance of this domestic political accommodation necessitated the protection of the 
relative independence of national economies within which labour could be protected 
and compensated. This, in turn, has been an important factor in shoring up ‘harder’ 
forms of national political authority.
108 In much the same way, the decline of this social 
settlement  at  home  has  been  mutually  constituted  by  a  changing  global  political 
economy and associated with a more exclusionary international society, a weakening of 
the non-intervention norm, and a more transnationalised economic order. Liberalism, in 
the process, ‘has been transformed both domestically and globally from a politics of 
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interest to a new emphasis on the politics of values or culture.’
109 This ‘culturalist’ and 
anti-pluralist  manifestation  of  liberalism  essentially  denies  the  contingent  nature  of 
politics that is a crucial part of the practice of political liberalism.
110 It is this ‘new 
culturalism’  that  to  a  considerable  extent  mobilises  much  of  the  current  risk 
management agenda, including SBIs, and underpins the ways in which risk is conceived 
in the first place, because of its tendency to present particular social phenomena as 
posing potentially existential danger to the Western ‘way of life’.    
  In summary, the shift in the West from ‘government’ and ‘interests’ towards 
‘governance’ and ‘values’, from the ‘social state’ to the ‘regulatory state’, that began 
with the rise of neoliberalism in the late 1970s, is important to understand in order to 
make sense of the objectives and form of contemporary SBIs. A number of important 
points present themselves: Firstly, it is clear that the state being ‘built’ where it is seen 
to  fail  is  a  regulatory  state.  The  institutions  of  this  state  are  designed  to  provide  a 
suitable  environment  for  market-led  development  and  not  to  perform  a  Keynesian 
steering role.
111 Secondly, the form of SBIs, encompassing complex, multilevel spaces 
of governance, would not have emerged without the concomitant growth in regulatory 
and governance networks associated with the neoliberalisation and disaggregation of the 
Western state. Thirdly, the rise of the politics of values is associated with a kind of 
‘political existentialism’
112 in the West and heightened perceptions of risk associated 
with the rapid economic, social, political and technological transformations of recent 
decades.  Following  on  from  this,  I  focus  in  the  next  section  on  the  perceived 
globalisation of risk and the relationship between risk management and contemporary 
SBIs.    
 
The globalisation of risk and the localisation of risk management 
One of the most prominent features of the second phase of the post-Cold War era – 
particularly, but not exclusively, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in 
the US – is the emergence of risk as the main security concern and of risk management 
as the main security strategy for the US and other Western governments. The object of 
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security  can  be  defined  as  either  ‘threat’  or  ‘risk’.
113  Threats  refer  to  sources  of 
insecurity that are mostly known – for example, a hostile state and its armed forces. 
Once identified the issue becomes assessing intent and capability to harm. Risks, on the 
other hand, are seen to comprise probabilities and consequences and by definition are at 
least partly unknown.
114 The inherent ‘unknowness’ of risks is said to lead to reflexive 
and anticipatory forms of thinking, which ceaselessly attempt to assess the potential 
consequences of unfolding events, with the aim of intervening to pre-empt disastrous 
outcomes.
115  However,  by  definition  every  risk  is  at  least  potentially  apocalyptic, 
because the full extent of all possible scenarios can never be pre-captured.
116  
Since risk is seen as ever-present, risk management takes one of two proximate 
forms – building resilience, or pre-emption and containment
117 – and both can be found 
in contemporary SBIs. Resilience-building is usually deployed at the level of population 
and involves developing mechanisms for limiting the impact of future crises.
118 Pre-
emption and containment in practice involves establishing systems, tools and indicators 
for assessing the potential for risks to materialise, as well as building the capacity of 
such systems to prevent risks from reaching disastrous proportions once they emerge. In 
this way, low state capacity (measured in a particular way, as we have seen in the first 
chapter) has become a major – if not the major – risk that is to be managed.
119 This is 
because the breakdown of governance is seen to be increasing the likelihood that risks 
of  various  kinds  would  emerge  and  eventually  migrate  towards  Western  states  and 
societies.  The  best  way  to  avoid  such  potentially  devastating  scenarios,  it  is  often 
argued,  is  to  build  effective  states.
120  Risk  management  and  SBIs  are,  therefore, 
intimately linked. 
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The  shift  from  ‘threat’  to  ‘risk’  perceptions  of  the  contemporary  security 
environment is clearly articulated in the September 2002 US National Security Strategy 
(NSS) paper. The NSS has turned conventional thinking on its head when it stated in no 
uncertain terms that: ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than…by 
failing ones.’
121 This statement marked an interesting development, not only in relation 
to the Cold War strategies of big power ‘deterrence’ and ‘containment’, but also vis-à-
vis the optimistic internationalist proclamations of the early post-Cold War era. Because 
of the elimination of the Soviet threat, the early post-Cold War was heralded as the birth 
of a ‘new world order’, in which international collective action would act to alleviate 
human suffering. Of course, many soon became aware of the increasing preponderance 
of  civil  conflicts,  what  some  have  called  the  ‘transformation  of  war’  or  the  ‘new 
wars’,
122 but these were seen primarily as localised or regionalised humanitarian crises. 
However, in the second phase of the post-Cold War this image has progressively been 
reversed, as the quote from the NSS indicates, and local crises are now often seen as 
harbouring potentially global risks. But it is not the crises and conflicts themselves that 
are seen as the main security problem. Rather, it is the unknown potential for these to 
develop  into  bigger  problems  that  could  affect  Western  states  and  societies  which 
underpins the concern with pre-emptive action and interventionism. But why have risk 
and risk management become such major preoccupations for policymakers and public 
policy in our time?     
This cannot simply be seen as an outcome of the September 11 attacks. Already 
in 1999, then British Prime Minister Tony Blair sought to justify the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation bombing campaign in Serbia by saying that because of increasing 
global interconnectivity, ‘[w]e cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of 
human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure.’
123 Earlier in 1998 the 
Clinton  administration’s  national  security  strategy  also  focused  on  ‘non-traditional’ 
security risks as the main source of insecurity to the US.
124 Both examples point to the 
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assumed  link  between  globalisation  and  the  preponderance  of  security  risks.  In  this 
vein, Christopher Coker has argued that we live in an age defined by ever-present risk: 
We no longer seek to insure against risks by constructing new world orders or putting 
together  new  security  systems,  as  we  did  in  the  past.  Instead,  we  have  a  risk 
management ethos which has emerged in response to the greater insecurity that seems 
to stem from globalisation.
125 
De-bounded risks, it is often argued, are the main by-product of globalisation. 
While the notion of risk is very old indeed – it is intrinsically related to the emergence 
of the insurance industry many centuries ago – it is often argued there is something 
distinct about contemporary risks and our awareness of them.
126 The term ‘world risk 
society’,
127 made famous by German sociologist Ulrich Beck, essentially refers to what 
he describes as the ‘de-bounding of uncontrollable risks’.
128 De-bounding for Beck is 
both  spatial  and  temporal  –  risks  do  not  respect  national  borders  and  can  have 
catastrophic  implications  beyond  the  immediately  foreseeable  timeframe.  The  de-
bounded and potentially catastrophic nature of contemporary risk, argues Beck, means 
that they defy the kind of calculative rationality associated with earlier forms of risk 
assessment. He claims that the ‘world risk society’ is part of a ‘second modernity’ (or 
‘reflexive modernization’ for Giddens
129), in which social relations and therefore risk 
awareness are no longer territorially bound by the nation-state.
130 Indeed, even before 
the  September  11  attacks  in  the  US,  scholars  and  practitioners  claimed  that 
globalisation  and  the  increasing  interconnectivity  it  entails,  while  on  the  whole  an 
unprecedentedly powerful force for economic development and wealth generation, also 
has  a  ‘dark  side’  that  has  to  be  controlled  and  contained.
131  The  ‘dark  side’  of 
globalisation refers in such arguments to both the unintended and potentially harmful 
side-effects of new technologies and the potential for terrorists and criminals to exploit 
new networks and means of communication for their purposes.  
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For Beck, ‘world risk society’ is the harbinger of true cosmopolitanism, since 
individuals  everywhere  realise  that  it  has  become  impossible  to  isolate  risks  within 
particular states or regions and that a truly global response is needed to meet these 
challenges.
132  However,  while  he  recognises  that  risks  are  not  evenly  distributed  – 
‘Pollution follows the poor’
133 – and that their representation is to a great extent social l y  
constructed,  Beck  nevertheless  argues  that  the  global  nature  of  risk  means  that  the 
conditions of the first ‘industrial modernity – class antagonisms, national statehood, as 
well  as  the  images  of  linear,  technical-economic  rationality  and  control  –  are 
circumvented and annulled.’
134  
As we can see, what is unique about the contemporary notion of de-bounded risk 
is its supposed ‘post-political’ nature – risks are said to potentially pose ‘existential’ 
danger to civilisation itself and from this it follows that dealing with them involves 
stepping beyond particularistic interests, defined by class, nationality or ethnicity. Since 
risks  are  argued  to  be  ever-present  and  because  their  inherent  ‘unknowness’  means 
‘[they] can only be managed, not completely eradicated’,
135 risk management strategies 
from this perspective have to be all the way up (the international system) and all the 
way down (the individual), leading to the emergence of ‘reflexive’ forms of governance 
and coordination. However, as Jayasuriya argues: 
What remains problematic about these formulations [of risk] is the fact that they fail to 
recognize the links between reflexive modernization and the illiberal and authoritarian 
notions of political existentialism. By conceiving of these threats as various types of 
risk, these theories of reflexive modernization work to dislodge the social and political 
context that produces these threats, and end up naturalizing these risks and failing to 
understand  the  way  in  which  these  risks  are  both  naturalized  and  politicized.  To 
understand  this  as  a  transition  within  modernity  is  to  overlook  the  ideological  and 
political dimensions of the construction of risk and the way it reshapes the landscape of 
legitimacy  that  valorizes  the  role  of  existential  division  in  opposition  to  material 
conflict.
136     
What Jayasuriya highlights is the inherent tension within contemporary notions of de-
bounded risk and risk management. On the one hand, risk is construed in totalising and 
indivisible terms as potentially endangering a ‘way of life’. On the other hand, framing 
complex  social  phenomena  in  terms  of  risk  serves  to  mask  the  inherent  material 
dimension of the social and political relations risk representations presume and risk 
management serves to reproduce. In much the same way, while both the ‘threat’ and 
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‘risk’ definitions of security present themselves as ‘existential’ the difference is that the 
former recognises the political nature of the relationship between ‘us’ and the ‘danger’, 
whereas the latter naturalises and depoliticises that relationship. This, in turn, leads to 
technocratic solutions of the kind associated with contemporary SBIs. 
Indeed, as already indicated, there is a strong link between the transformation of 
the Western state examined in the previous section and the current preoccupation of 
governments with risk and risk management. Giddens has argued that: ‘States without 
enemies  depend  for  their  legitimacy  more  than  before  upon  their  capacity  for  risk 
management.’
137 To be sure, the state has sought to legitimise itself as a risk manager 
for quite some time and indeed a social ‘risk compact’ had underpinned state-society 
relations in the welfare state.
138 However, in the welfare state, risk management had a 
distinctly political character and a crucial redistributive element, with the state acting to 
minimise  both  the  risk  associated  with  the  uneven  nature  of  capitalist  economic 
development  and  the  risk  associated  with  the  cost  of  technological  innovation  and 
industrialisation. In contrast, and this is the problem with Giddens’ conception of the 
state as a risk manager, current forms of risk assessment and management are not seen 
as political, but as a matter of management by experts.  
This link between risk management and expertise requires some explanation. 
Giddens and Beck, respectively, make the point that contemporary risks are unique in 
that they expose the limits of scientific knowledge and expertise.
139 Indeed, Giddens 
argues that ‘Decision-making in these contexts cannot be left to the “experts”, but has to 
involve  politicians  and  citizens.’
140  However,  by  essentially  naturalising  and 
depoliticising risk both Beck and Giddens ignore the political and ideological context in 
which risk assessment and the real-world systems established to ‘manage’ risk emerge 
and develop. Instead of arguing the utility of different ways of defining and containing 
risk, we should understand such systems as mechanisms for the allocation of power. In 
this  way,  they  are  not  separate  from  social  and  political  conflicts,  but  rather  these 
conflicts run through them.  
So while Giddens may have argued that risk management should not be a matter 
of  ‘expertise’  but  of  politics  and  debate,  in  practice  risk  management  means  the 
development of complex forms of surveillance, regulation, assessment and auditing by 
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experts, since risk in itself is not defined as political. However, it is not ‘scientific’ 
expertise that is associated with contemporary risk management mechanisms. In fact, as 
we have seen from recent debates over global warming the credibility of ‘science’ is an 
immensely contested issue. Rather, what we witness is the emergence of expertise over 
governance itself as the new political logic that underpins the usage of public power. 
The  consequence  of  the  reframing  of  the  purpose  of  public  power  in  terms  of  risk 
management is to delink processes of knowledge production from their political and 
ideological setting and the interests that benefit from particular forms of risk assessment 
and  management,  both  domestically  and  in  foreign  policy.
141  In  turn,  this  works  to 
naturalise and reinforce a particular social and political order.
142    
Therefore, by neglecting the relationship between risk,  risk management and 
material conflict, contemporary notions of ‘world risk’ ironically end up legitimising, 
even promoting, illiberal and authoritarian interventions in state and society, rather than 
leading to the emergence of true cosmopolitanism as Beck envisages. Seen from this 
perspective, the ‘Long War’, which Borer and Berger ridicule as a futile campaign with 
no identifiable enemy, waged against a war-making strategy – the equivalent, they say, 
of  declaring  war  on  ‘the  Panzer  manoeuvre’
143 – exhibits the  problematic  and  anti-
pluralist  nature  of  risk  management  as  a  security  doctrine,  but  also  exemplifies  the 
centrality of the notions of risk and risk management to the emerging global order and 
contemporary SBIs.  
 
Conclusion 
SBIs are often presented, as we have seen in the first chapter, as a way of shoring up 
localised breakdowns in governance and political order. However, the discussion in this 
chapter  has  demonstrated  that  the  emergence  of  this  mode  of  intervention  is  not  a 
functional  response  to  empirically  observed  problems  of  state  capacity  and  poor 
governance. Rather, it is closely related to at least four processes that together manifest 
what I have called a second phase in the post-Cold War era. These processes – the 
discrediting of the earlier intervention mode of the immediate post-Cold War years, the 
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return to the state in development theory and policy, the transformation of the Western 
state  associated  with  the  rise  of  neoliberalism,  and  the  emergence  particularly  after 
September  11  of  risk  management  as  a  crucial  objective  of  and  framework  for 
policymaking – are all interlinked and have only been disaggregated here to underline 
the  complex  and  variegated  origins  of  contemporary  SBIs  and  the  sort  of  political, 
ideological and social conflicts that run through them.  
  What has been made clear from the analysis provided in this chapter is that SBIs 
are not the endpoint of a now-complete transformation of the global order, but rather a 
form of reflexive political rule that has developed precisely because of the tensions and 
contradictions inherent to ongoing processes of economic globalisation and the state-
society transformations associated with this. Crucially, the emergence of SBIs is not 
simply reduced to the changing nature of risk, stemming from rapid advancements in 
communication  and  transportation  technologies,  nor  is  it  simply  reduced  to  the 
detrimental effect globalisation has had on the capacity of states to provide security and 
development.  The  simultaneous  processes  of  state  disaggregation  and  the 
disaggregation of the policy apparatus mobilised towards dealing with so-called failed 
states that we witness today are not functional developments, as Slaughter and Holm 
seem to argue respectively,
144 but are rather manifestations of a contested and politically 
and  ideologically  conditioned  process  of  state  transnationalisation,  associated  with 
broader structural shifts in the global political economy.   
In the next chapter  I develop the theme of the transformation of intervening 
states to examine the kinds of actors, many of whom relatively new, that now take part 
in planning and operationalising SBIs, and their roles within intervention regimes.  
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Chapter Four 
Who  Intervenes  and  Why?  State  Transformation  and  Meta-
Governance  
 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter I related the development of state building interventions (SBIs) 
in their current form to, among other things, the transformation of Western states in the 
context of globalisation and the associated preoccupation with de-bounded risk and risk 
management. State transformation was conceptualised in terms of shifts in the purpose 
of  state  power,  its  location  and  the  kinds  of  actors  now  exercising  state  power.  In 
particular,  I  mentioned  the  emergence  of  a  new  logic  of  political  rule  –  rule  by 
‘expertise’ – whereby public policy is justified in terms of ‘sound’ management based 
upon expert advice and not in terms of reaching a political accommodation between 
competing interests. This normative-ideological disposition, as we have seen, is also 
associated  with  the  formation  and  further  development  of  new  modes  of  multilevel 
governance, which problematise traditional notions of what is inside or outside of the 
state. In this chapter, I proceed from these premises to more specifically examine the 
ways in which such developments have shaped the kinds of actors that participate in 
SBIs  and  their  roles  within  intervention  regimes.  Examining  the  actors  and  their 
respective functions, as well as explaining why some are included and others excluded, 
is essential for identifying the particular form of political rule SBIs constitute. In turn, 
this  allows  us  to  develop  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  potential 
trajectories of these interventions in particular settings. 
The  increasing  involvement  of  private  actors  of  various  types  in  planning, 
executing and regulating interventions has received substantial attention in recent years, 
particularly in relation to the massive growth in the role of private military companies 
(PMCs), or private security companies (PSCs), and consultants. The debate over the 
role of private actors in SBIs (and governance more broadly) has usually centred on 
normative or relative efficiency arguments regarding the desirability or otherwise of this 
trend.
1 Perspectives critical of privatisation have usually been based on the common but 
                                                 
1 For example, Duffield, Mark, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and 
Security (London: Zed Books, 2001), particularly Ch. 3; Chayes, Antonia Handler and Abram Chayes, 
Planning for Intervention: International Cooperation in Conflict Management (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1999); Singer, Peter W., Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military CHAPTER FOUR 
  114 
erroneous  perceptions  that  private  power  and  state  power  exist  in  a  ‘zero-sum’ 
relationship. Consequently, it is often argued that the disaggregation of the state and the 
seepage of policymaking authority to other jurisdictions at various levels, as well as to 
private  actors  and  out  of  the  hands  of  traditional  state  actors,  such  as  government 
ministries,  signify  the  weakening  of  the  state  and  its  vulnerability  to  the  forces  of 
globalisation.
2 However, such criticisms fail to recognise that what we are witnessing is 
a process of state transformation, involving the relocation of power from traditional 
centres of authority to new modes of governance. This is a shift in the locus of state 
power that also encompasses a shift in the way the state is represented ideologically to 
those subject to its authority. The ‘zero-sum’ way of understanding the new modes of 
governance, including SBIs, in which private actors play key roles, betrays a narrow 
and static conception of the state, similar in character to those perspectives critically 
evaluated in the first chapter. What these accounts neglect is the relationship between 
the partial privatisation of governance and the political nature of state transformation. 
Without making this link, it becomes difficult to systematically explain precisely which 
public or private  actors are included in, or excluded from, SBIs; what the relations 
between  actors  within  intervention  regimes  are;  and  the  ways  in  which  private  and 
public actors have themselves changed in recent years through their participation in 
SBIs.  
What we see is not the rise of private power at the expense of the state, but 
rather private actors increasingly taking on public governance functions alongside, or 
within, public actors in public-private constellations: 
…the distinctive feature of the regulatory state  lies  not  so  much  in  the  capturing  of 
public power by the private actors…but in the diffusion of public power to private 
organisations creating new private or quasi-public governance regimes.
3 
This means a transformation in the nature of public power and authority, and even more 
than  that,  a  transformation  of  the  very  notion  of  ‘stateness’,  which  underpins  state-
society  relations  towards  new  forms  of  economic  constitutionalism.
4  In  reality,  the 
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emergence of private actors has not been accompanied by a retreat of the state from 
governance more broadly or from interventions specifically. In many cases, there has 
actually  been  an  increase  in  the  size  of  the  state  apparatus  associated  with  such 
activities. The nature of state activities, however, has changed considerably. Two trends 
particularly stand out. First, with the exercise of state power rationalised in terms of 
expertise  and  risk  management,  state  actors,  particularly  from  core  parts  of  the 
executive arm of government, have tended to shift their roles towards various forms of 
meta-governance. In this capacity they act to provide the broad set of rules within which 
independently operating spaces of multilevel governance, governed by specialists, are 
established to manage various aspects of intervention.  
Second,  the  emphasis  on  expertise  has  also  underpinned  the  trend  in 
contemporary state building (and other governance activities) towards the fashionable 
‘whole of government’ (WofG) or ‘joined-up’ approaches to public policymaking and 
public  sector  management.  These  involve  various  forms  of  formal  and  informal 
bureaucratic-level collaborations between state agencies from the executive branch of 
government,  as  well  as  between  these  and  other  actors  outside  the  formal  state 
apparatus.  It  has  frequently  been  argued  in  recent  years  that  the  complexity  and 
interrelated nature of the problems afflicting intervened states requires the incorporation 
of expertise extending beyond the traditional ‘foreign policy’ and international relations 
apparatuses – military forces, foreign affairs ministries, aid agencies, and multilateral 
organisation bureaucracies.
5 We have thus seen state agencies which until recently had 
had  a  strictly  domestic  role,  such  as  the  treasury,  attorney-general  and  the  police, 
become involved in the planning and implementation of SBIs. The WofG trend, which 
sees parts of the state apparatus increasing their scope of action, suggests that what we 
are witnessing is more than the usual neoliberal ideological preference for privatisation, 
associated with the ‘new public management’ (NPM) agenda of the 1980s and 1990s.  
With private actors too we see a shift towards an increased role for capacity 
building and governance experts in various areas of policy, as well as the increasing 
professionalisation  and  corporatisation  of  this  sector,  including  of  non-profit 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). The involvement of private actors has become 
not only a way of establishing new markets, but also a way of legitimising interventions 
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by  referring  to  the  ‘neutrality’  and  apolitical  role  of  independent  experts,
6  while 
nevertheless narrowing  down the political choices available to domestic leaders and 
constituents.  For  example,  the  Regional  Assistance  Mission  to  Solomon  Islands 
(RAMSI) referred its internal review to external private sector performance assessors, 
while  at  the  same  time  RAMSI  officials  fought  to  derail  a  Solomon  Islands 
parliamentary review of the mission, which they argued would be politically biased.
7  
The chapter begins by outlining a theoretical framework for relating the agency 
of particular actors to the internal organisation of multilevel regimes. As we have seen, 
regimes combine social and political coalitions, institutions and ideas.
8 Therefore, the 
relationship  between  actors  and  regimes  requires  some  clarification  if  we  are  to 
incorporate the former into the analysis. The literature on SBIs, surveyed in Chapter 
One, essentially defines intervention as a set of actors operating inside other countries. 
It therefore tends to view actors and their interrelations in terms of the  governance 
functions they either perform or help build domestic capacity in – as understood against 
a Weberian or neoliberal prototype – thereby implicitly accepting that ‘state building’ of 
a legal-rational kind is what contemporary interventions do, or at least attempt to do. 
This  way  of  defining  actors  also  tends  to  depoliticise,  or  wholly  ignore,  questions 
pertaining to the inclusion or exclusion of actors within interventions, as well as to the 
conditions  of  their  inclusion.  The  framework  provided  here,  however,  serves  to 
illuminate  that  intervention  actors  are  first  and  foremost  actors  within  a  multilevel 
regime, and in this sense their roles, as well as the ways in which these change over 
time,  can  only  be  meaningfully  understood  in  relation  to  regime  functions  –  the 
politically  and  ideologically  conditioned  exigencies  of  risk  management,  which 
underpin highly contested processes of state transformation.  
My framework focuses primarily on the role of meta-governance actors and their 
relations  with  other  actors  that  typically  act  as  regulators  or  implementers  within 
                                                 
6 Frank Vibert has made the argument that the rise of the ‘unelected’ as key governance actors adds to the 
legitimacy  of  governance  by  providing  a  more  reliable  and  trustworthy  source  of  information  for 
decisions  than  that  associated  with  political  actors.  See  Vibert,  Frank,  The Rise of the Unelected: 
Democracy and the New Separation of Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
7  See Winter, John and Kaye Schofield, ‘Annual Performance  Report 2006/2007: A Report  on  the 
Performance  of  the  Regional  Assistance  Mission  to  Solomon  Islands’,  RAMSI  Performance 
Assessment Advisory Team, July 2007; and ‘RAMSI Voices Concern Over Basis of Proposed Review 
of  FIA  Act’,  Regional  Assistance  Mission  to  Solomon  Islands  press  release, 20 September 2007, 
available at <http://www.ramsi.org/node/229>, accessed 15 October 2007. 
8 See Chapter Two; Jayasuriya, Kanishka and Andrew Rosser, ‘Pathways from the Crisis: Politics and 
Reform in South-East Asia since 1997’, in The Political Economy of South-East Asia: Markets, Power 
and  Contestation,  3rd  Edition,  edited  by  Garry  Rodan,  Kevin  Hewison  and  Richard  Robison 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 258-82. CHAPTER FOUR 
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independently  operating  spaces  of  governance.  The  boundaries  between  these  actor 
categories are not fixed – one organisation or parts of it can perform simultaneously, or 
at different times, two or more roles in the regime. The utility of this framework resides 
in its capacity to highlight the unequal strategic power of actors to shape the multilevel 
regime and the spaces of governance within interventions – the inclusion or exclusion of 
other actors; the ways in which these actors are coordinated; the ways in which the 
spaces themselves are structured and coordinated; the ways in which output is assessed 
and measured; and the specific policy content promoted. Crucially, this framework is 
not based on an institutionalist premise that centres on the role of strategic actors as the 
explanatory variable for understanding regime formation and change,
9 but rather locates 
the regime functions of particular actors in the broader context of the transformation of 
the  state  outlined  earlier.  This  discussion  will  be  followed  by  two  sections  devoted 
respectively to examining the kinds of public and private actors now participating in 
interventions. Dividing our examination into the categories of ‘private’ and ‘public’, 
which are increasingly  difficult to disentangle  within the new modes of governance 
associated with the regulatory state, should not distract us from the primary point of my 
argument: whether power is in the hands of public or private actors is less significant 
than the shifts in the location – outside the institutions of representative democracy – 
and  purpose  of  state  power  that  we  have  seen  through  recent  processes  of  state 
transformation.  
 
Actors and multilevel regimes  
The role of actors in SBIs is rarely explicitly defined in the state building literature, but 
it is implicit that actors are conceived in relation to their ‘state building’ function, with 
state building defined in terms of, and measured against, an ahistorical, legal-rational, 
ideal-typical state.
10 Such frameworks essentially accept, wittingly or unwittingly, that 
these  interventions  are  about  building  the  capacity  of  intervened  states  to  govern 
domestically. Therefore the assumption is that the function of intervention actors is to 
build capacity in the particular areas of governance in which they specialise, or, in the 
shorter  term,  replace  dysfunctional  domestic  institutions  until  the  capacity  of  these 
                                                 
9 See for example, Macintyre, Andrew, The Power of Institutions: Political Architecture and Governance 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
10 Examples  include,  Brinkerhoff, Derick W. (ed.) Governance in Post-Conflict Societies: Rebuilding 
Fragile States (New York and London: Routledge, 2007); various chapters in Part II of Rotberg, Robert 
I. (ed.) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). CHAPTER FOUR 
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institutions  is  satisfactorily  built.  Viewed  through  the  prism  of  state  building,  the 
relationship between different actors only matters to the extent that it helps or hinders 
their capacity to perform these functions. This way of understanding agency implies that 
the relationship between ‘external’ and ‘domestic’ actors is at its essence not seen as 
political. Some contributors indeed recognise that actors have political interests that in 
some cases run counter to their state building task in that these interests often lead them 
to perpetuate the problems they were called in to fix.
11 However, such arguments are 
established upon pre-existing assumptions that this constitutes deviance from ‘proper’ 
apolitical,  professional,  practice  and  that  given  the  right  incentives  errant  behaviour 
could be corrected.  
One  of  the  primary  problems  with  this  way  of  defining  actors  is  its 
methodological nationalism. Essentially, intervening actors can never be anything more 
than  ‘external’  to  a  system  that  is  seen  as  framed  by  territory.
12 Their  presupposed 
externality  also  works  to  define  the  relationship  between  intervening  actors  and 
domestic actors as that of cause and effect. It is thus presumed that if we can get one 
side of the equation ‘right’ then it is likely the rest will eventually fall into place. This 
formula, however, misses the most important aspect of SBIs – the ways in which these 
interventions seek to facilitate the transnationalisation of the state so that international-
transnational actors become part of its internal governance.  
In  contrast,  the  framework  provided  here  for  understanding  actors’  roles 
incorporates  the  simultaneously  political-contingent  and  structured  nature  of  the 
relationship between them in intervention regimes. Because SBIs constitute a complex 
and diffuse governance terrain, the categorisation of actors can only meaningfully be a 
relational one, thereby capturing the differential strategic capacity of various actors to 
shape and reshape multilevel regimes, the parameters of inclusion/exclusion and the 
rules within which other actors operate.
13  
                                                 
11  For  example,  Singer,  Corporate Warriors;  Jenkins,  Kate  and  William  Plowden,  Governance and 
Nationbuilding:  The  Failure  of  International  Intervention  (Cheltenham:  Edward  Elgar  Publishing 
Limited, 2006), pp. 121-22. 
12 On the relationship between methodological nationalism and the conceptualisation of various actors see 
Wimmer, Andreas and Nina Glick Schiller, ‘Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State 
Building, Migration and the Social Sciences’, Global Networks 2, no. 4 (2002), pp. 301-34. Bohle et al. 
make a similar argument in relation to the study of transitions from state socialism to capitalism in 
Eastern  Central  Europe.  See  Bohle,  Dorothee,  Hugo  Radice  and  Stuart  Shields,  ‘Introduction’, 
Competition and Change 11, no. 2 (2007), pp. 81-87, p. 84. 
13 See Jayasuriya, ‘The New Regulatory State’, p. 489. CHAPTER FOUR 
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In  previous  chapters  I  argued  that  the  concept  of  multilevel  governance 
encapsulates  the  ways  in  which  intervening  states  have  transformed,  as  well  as  the 
manner in which SBIs transform the internal governance of intervened states. Pierre and 
Peters define multilevel governance as a ‘political game’, in which ‘institutions from 
several levels of government may be engaged in bargaining over policy, each institution 
bringing with it a set of goals that may or may not be congruent with those of the other 
players.’
14 The primary question that this description raises is who determines the rules 
of  this  ‘game’?  And  perhaps  more  importantly,  who  establishes  this  ‘game’  and  its 
objectives in the first place?
15 While Pierre and  Peters rightly  criticise  much of the 
literature  on  multilevel  governance  for  its  inability  to  provide  clear  predictions  or 
explanations of outcomes in the governance process,
16 this weakness stems primarily 
from  the  tendency  of  this  literature  to  delink  questions  of  power  within  multilevel 
governance arrangements from broader structural issues pertaining to shifts in the global 
political  economy  and  the  associated  transformations  of  states  and  societies.  As  a 
consequence, the shifting locus of state power beyond the traditional power centres of 
government is explained as stemming from the exigencies of effective governance and 
not in relation to struggles over the distribution of power and wealth that run through 
these processes.  
As  we  have  seen,  the  regulatory  state  aims  to  maintain  domestic  stability 
through its commitment to ensuring the confidence of global markets and via its various 
risk management activities.
17 Achieving these often contradictory objectives in many 
cases  involves  locking  particular  issues  outside  of  political  contestation  within 
independently operating spaces of governance and in the hands of actors who are not 
politically  or  popularly  accountable.
18  Indeed,  the  emergence  of  such  governance 
                                                 
14 Pierre, Jon and B. Guy Peters, Governing Complex Societies: Trajectories and Scenarios (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 87-88. 
15  Adam Przeworski makes an entertaining and interesting comment in this regard. He criticises the 
‘institutions  matter’  mantra  of  recent  years  in  international  state  building  and  in  academia,  which 
presupposes  the  primacy  of  institutions  over  the  conditions  within  which  they  emerge, through  the 
example of a basketball game between a team of seven foot-tall players and another of five foot-tall 
players. Needless to say, he remarks, members  of the first team had a greater role in deciding how the 
game is to be played. See Przeworski, Adam, ‘Institutions Matter?’, Government and Opposition 39, 
no. 4 (2004), pp. 528-40. 
16 Pierre and Peters, Governing Complex Societies, p. 94. 
17 Jayasuriya, Kanishka. Reconstituting the Global Liberal Order: Legitimacy and Regulation (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 95-96. 
18  See  Papadopoulos,  Yannis,  ‘Problems  of  Democratic  Accountability  in  Network  and  Multilevel 
Governance’, European Law Journal 13, no. 4 (2007), pp. 469-86; Swyngedouw, Erik, ‘Governance 
Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus Face of Governance-Beyond-the-State’, Urban Studies 42, no. 
11 (2005), pp. 1991-2006. CHAPTER FOUR 
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arrangements ‘beyond-the-state’ or in which the state is only one actor among many 
cannot be seen as a random and voluntary process. The primary concept that links the 
transformation of the state with the organisation of new modes of governance and the 
agency of particular actors is that of meta-governance.    
Meta-governance has been defined as the ‘governance of governance’, or the 
‘governance of self-governance’,
19 and its rise as an important form of power is directly 
linked to the emergence and particular characteristics of the regulatory state:  
[T]he function of the regulatory state lies in the governance of governance, that is, in 
providing the framework around which new sites of governance are configured so that 
the state takes on the supervisory functions of metagovernance.
20  
Meta-governance  typically  refers  to  functions  such  as  ‘redesigning 
markets,…constitutional change and the juridical re-regulation of organizational forms 
and objectives… [and] organizing the conditions for self-organization’.
21 Guy  Peters 
argues that while a great deal of the actual work of governing in contemporary societies 
is performed by actors outside the formal public sector in new governance networks, 
these actors almost inevitably approach their roles from a narrow perspective that does 
not necessarily takes into sufficient consideration the broader goals of government and 
society  as  a  whole.  This  coherence  deficit,  he  says,  ‘makes  the  need  for  meta-
governance all the more apparent.’
22 While Peters’ account of the growing importance 
of meta-governance in contemporary governance is rather functional it highlights the 
role  of  centralised  forms  of  meta-governance  in  sustaining  increasingly  diffuse  and 
complex  modes  of  governance  that  regularly  transcend  the  boundaries  of  the 
Westphalian state.  
Indeed, Bob Jessop argues persuasively that much of the now-popular literature 
on  the  shift  to  networked  forms  of  governance,  which  emphasises  the  horizontal, 
voluntary  and  consensual  nature  of  network  interactions,  tends  to  neglect  the  meta-
steering role that the apparatus of the advanced capitalist states continues to perform. 
This omission is due in part to that literature’s prevalence to neglect the potential for 
and  reality  of  governance  (and  meta-governance)  failure,  says  Jessop.
23  Elsewhere 
                                                 
19 Peters, B. Guy, ‘The Meta-Governance of Policy Networks: Steering at a Distance but Still Steering’, 
Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Working Paper 78/2007, 2007, p. 4. 
20 Jayasuriya, ‘The New Regulatory State’, p. 489.  
21 Jessop, Bob, ‘Multi-Level Governance and Multi-Level Metagovernance’, in Multi-Level Governance, 
edited by Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 49-74, p. 65. 
22 Peters, ‘The Meta-governance of Policy Networks’, p. 1. 
23 Jessop, ‘Multi-Level Governance and Multi-Level Metagovernance’, pp. 61-62; also Jessop, Bob, ‘The 
Rise of Governance and the Risk of Failure’, International Social Science Journal 50, no. 155 (1998), 
pp. 29-45, pp. 42-44. CHAPTER FOUR 
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Jessop has argued that the social relations that produce and sustain capitalist economic 
forms, such as the market, require the extra-economic rules and institutions provided by 
the  state  in  order  to  function.
24  More  specifically,  Jayasuriya  has  argued  that  the 
decentring of the state has been paralleled by a concentration of meta-governance power 
within the ‘core executive’ of the regulatory state – the ‘governance of  governance 
becomes the pivot around which the ‘core executive’ swings.’
25 This means that while 
governance is becoming ever more diffuse, meta-governance is increasingly centralised 
in, for instance, the office of the prime minister and a handful of trusted advisors.  
These  seemingly  paradoxical  trends  of  diffusion  and  centralisation  are 
characterised by a shift towards ‘negative’ forms of coordination. Following Scharpf, 
Jayasuriya argues that what distinguishes the regulatory state from the welfare state and 
the developmental state is the transition from ‘positive co-ordination’ to ‘negative co-
ordination’.
26  While  positive  coordination  is  designed  to  actively  generate  better 
outcomes  through  compromise  and  bargaining  between  different  interests,  negative 
coordination  ‘is  concerned  with  the  construction  of  institutional  autonomy  and 
mechanisms  to  ensure  that  there  is  minimal  conflict  between  the  objectives  of 
independent  regulatory  institutions’.
27  The  logic  of  negative  coordination  becomes 
pervasive once bureaucratic units have to demonstrate, not so much their effectiveness 
in terms of generating particular outcomes, but the existence of proper legal frameworks 
and governance processes.  
Therefore,  meta-governance  is  not  only  directed  at  the  organisation  of 
governance hierarchies between various networks and markets, or the various levels of 
governance,  as  Jessop  would  have  it;  it  is  also  changing  the  nature  of  agency  and 
constituting hierarchical relations between various actors by delineating the rules of 
self-organisation. This means that meta-governance is not only a governance function 
but  also  a  kind  of  actor,  whose  emergence  is  related  to,  and  in  turn  shapes,  the 
transformation of the state.  
  Meta-governance  is  not  an  uncontested  field,  particularly  in  the  context  of 
multilevel  interventions,  which  usually  bring  together  various  national  governments, 
regional  and  global  multilateral  organisations,  as  well  as  the  formally  sovereign 
                                                 
24 Jessop, Bob, The Future of the Capitalist State (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 
25 Jayasuriya, ‘The New Regulatory State’, p. 490. 
26 Jayasuriya, Kanishka, ‘Globalization and the Changing Architecture of the State: The Regulatory State 
and the Politics of Negative Co-ordination’, Journal of European Public Policy 8, no. 1 (2001), pp. 
101-23. 
27 Ibid., p. 104. CHAPTER FOUR 
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governments of intervened states. Such diverse meta-governance actors may come into 
conflict on issues such as operational mandates, rules of engagement, the legal status of 
intervention, auditing and accountability requirements, who is to govern what, and so 
on. This terrain of ‘meta-conflict’ could be defined as ‘multilevel meta-governance’ – a 
concept originally coined by Jessop to describe the way in which the European Union 
(EU)  affects  the  strategic  selectivity  of  national  governments  and  other  subordinate 
levels of governance and meta-governance.
28  
While  SBIs  are  not  institutionalised  in  the  same  manner  as  the  EU,  in  such 
complex  governance  environments,  the  international  level  –  the  interaction  of 
governments with each other and with multilateral organisations – remains essential as 
an arena of meta-steering, meta-conflict and rule-making, which shapes the influence 
and choices of various meta-governance actors. There is, however, a crucial distinction 
between this framework and that of Robert Putnam and his many followers, who speak 
of a ‘two-level game’, where international action is constrained by domestic politics and 
vice  versa.
29  The  particular  nature  of  multilevel  regimes  means  that  the  national, 
international, regional or indeed sub-national are all constituted as levels of governance 
within  the  intervened  state  and  hence,  meta-conflicts  pertain  first  and  foremost  to 
conflicts over how the state is to be reconstituted and governed. Of course the integrated 
nature  of  multilevel  regimes  means  that  lower-level  conflicts  could  feed  into  meta-
conflicts and vice versa. 
Based on the above, SBI actors are defined as belonging to three primary groups 
– meta-governance, regulators and implementers. Meta-governance actors have already 
been discussed. Regulators are actors that regulate, monitor and set the policy objectives 
for  implementers  within  the  broad  parameters  set  by  meta-governance  actors. 
Implementers are actors that operationalise specific objectives within such governance 
spaces. Particular spaces of governance are usually governed by a regulatory actor – 
although this is always in the contested context of multilevel meta-governance – and 
include varying numbers of implementers. Regulatory actors, which can be public or 
private, may also function as auditors or reviewers of the performance of particular 
                                                 
28 Jessop, ‘Multi-Level Governance and Multi-Level Metagovernance’, pp. 71-72. 
29 Putnam, Robert D., ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-level games’, International 
Organization 42, no. 3 (1988), pp. 427-60; Barbara, Julien, ‘Antipodean Statebuilding: The Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Australian Intervention in the South Pacific’, Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 2, no. 2 (2008), pp. 123-49.  CHAPTER FOUR 
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components of SBIs or the regime as a whole.
30 The role of meta-governance is crucial 
in this context because it determines who is included and who is excluded by setting the 
parameters for the self-organisation of the governance spaces governed by regulatory 
actors. These actor categories are not fixed spatially or temporally and the same actor 
could be performing more than one role at any one time and place or at different times 
and places. The definition of ‘actor’ is itself problematic, context-specific and shifting, 
since  different  parts  of  the  same  organisation  could  perform  different  roles  within 
multilevel regimes. This means that the new modes of governance also cut through the 
formal boundaries of particular agencies and organisations and not only through the 
geographical  boundaries  of  states.  Furthermore,  the  actors  themselves  are  not  the 
rational-abstract and unchanging units of the kind we find in various rational choice 
theories. Rather, they change over time and need to be viewed in historical perspective 
in relation to the transformation of the state and broader shifts in the global political 
economy.  
These three categories should not be taken to suggest that the interests of actors 
are necessarily harmonised within SBIs, nor do they presuppose that actors are working 
towards stated policy objectives. Rather, the above typology aims to provide insight into 
the differential strategic capacity of various actors to influence the rules of the game for 
other actors at various levels – a capacity that is itself contested and changing. However, 
there is nothing in this to say that the political objectives of more powerful actors will 
actually  be  realised,  because  of  the  tendency  of  intervention  regimes  to  come  into 
conflict with other regimes within the state. Nevertheless, this framework highlights the 
interconnectedness  of  all  actors  in  SBIs.  It  is  this  complex  multilevel 
interconnectedness,  mostly  missing  from  the  literature  on  interventions,  that  is 
important for understanding the ways in which SBIs function as a form of political rule. 
  The  following  section  proceeds  to  examine  what  kinds  of  public  actors  – 
meaning actors from the apparatuses of states and multilateral organisations –participate 
in contemporary interventions. 
  
 
 
                                                 
30 This  is  a  function  King  describes as ‘regulatory intermediation’. See King,  Roger,  ‘Analysing  the 
Higher Education Regulatory State’, London: London School of Economics and Social Science, the 
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Public actors in state building interventions 
The twin processes that have framed the transformation in the role of public actors in 
SBIs  are  the  development  of  the  core  executive  of  both  states  and  multilateral 
organisations  as  pivotal  meta-governance  actors  within  multilevel  regimes  and  the 
incorporation of various parts of the executive branch of the state, including many that 
hitherto had a strictly domestic role, into multilevel governance arrangements in which 
they exercise authority over the internal governing functions of other states. The latter 
trend,  which  has  been  characterised  by  the  development  of  various  forms  of  WofG 
collaborations, has also been associated with a transformation of the internal structure of 
relevant state agencies,  the emergence of  a whole raft of new ‘unelected’ specialist 
regulatory bodies and a transformation of the interrelations between various parts of the 
state  apparatus.  The  transformation  in  the  role  of  the  core  executive  was  examined 
above and need not be repeated here. Below I briefly examine the other developments.  
International interventions are conventionally understood to belong in the realm 
of the ‘foreign policy’ apparatus of the state, involving such agencies as the department 
of foreign affairs, the department of defence, the military, the intelligence community 
and the overseas development aid bureaucracy. In contemporary SBIs, however, not 
only is it expected that such ‘traditional’ interveners would be better coordinated, but 
the  distinction  between  state  agencies  operating  internationally  or  domestically  is 
becoming quite blurry. For example, in Canada, the government’s WofG framework for 
dealing with fragile states includes, aside from the so-called 3D – the Department of 
National Defence, the Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the 
Canadian  International  Development  Agency  –  ‘a  range  of  technical  and  primarily 
domestic  agencies  such  as  the  Department  of  Justice,  Elections  Canada,  The  Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, Finance Canada, and the Department of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness.’
31 
Yet,  rather  than  reverse  the  devolution  trend  associated  with  NPM,  whereby 
service delivery and even policymaking have been outsourced, the intensification of 
cross-departmental  engagement  has  usually  not  meant  the  recentralising  of 
implementation capacities within line ministries in the traditional Weberian bureaucratic 
model,  but  rather  the  development  of  thicker  forms  of  negative coordination,  under 
                                                 
31  Patrick,  Stewart  and  Kaysie  Brown,  Greater  Than  the  Sum  of  Its  Parts?  Assessing  “Whole  of 
Government” Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), pp. 60-
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broad direction from the core executive. Crucially, this has involved the establishing of 
new  task-specific  governance  arrangements,  such  as  interdepartmental  committees, 
special taskforces or even new  regulatory  bodies, for  coordinating and/or regulating 
particular  governance activities. Typically, these governance arrangements are under 
limited  parliamentary  or  popular  oversight  because  they  extend  beyond  the  formal 
bureaucratic structure. But even more importantly, they function to reframe social and 
political conflicts in terms of problems to be solved through expert intervention. What is 
particularly striking in this regard is the expansion in the role and scope of transnational 
police  operations.  For  example,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  chapter,  the  Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) has in recent years shifted much of its attention and massively 
boosted resources to the evaluation and management of transnational risks. Aside from 
considerable organisational restructuring aimed at creating specialist units within the 
AFP for different types of transnational risk, a new unit – the International Deployment 
Group – was established in 2004 specifically for the purpose of providing the AFP with 
the capacity to intervene in Australia’s ‘unstable’ neighbouring states, as well as shape 
Australian government policy on these issues.
32   
As  the  AFP  example  indicates,  the  incorporation  of  state  agencies  into  new 
modes of governance involves the transformation of the agencies themselves, not only 
of the spaces between them. Many of the state and multilateral organisation agencies 
that are involved in SBIs have undergone considerable restructuring to make them more 
flexible and adaptable to shifting governance relations. This restructuring often, but not 
always,  includes  the  privatisation  of  most  ‘non-core’  activities  and  some  ‘core’ 
activities, as well as the development of new coordination and regulation capacities, 
often located in specialised or purposely set-up coordinating departments. It has also 
involved the development of specialised capacities, often in partnership with private 
consultants.   
  Aside  from  the  transformation  in  the  structure,  role  and  reach  of  existing 
agencies, new agencies have also emerged in the main Western states and multilateral 
organisations  that  are  specifically  concerned  with  state  building  and  post-conflict 
reconstruction. These units are usually not involved in implementing SBIs, but either 
with coordination of relevant WofG formations or with developing, accumulating and 
disseminating  knowledge  on  these  issues.  In  this  way,  they  play  a  central  role  in 
                                                 
32  See  Chapter  Five;  Peake,  Gordon  and  Kaysie  Studdard  Brown,  ‘Policebuilding:  The  International 
Deployment Group in Solomon Islands’, International Peacekeeping 12, no. 4 (2005), pp. 520-32. CHAPTER FOUR 
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generating the considerable degree of ideological consensus that has emerged in relation 
to dealing with fragile states.
33 It is important to point out, though, that in many cases 
the main function of these units is to coordinate and concentrate resources, while actual 
research is conducted by external, private consultants. Notable examples in multilateral 
organisations  include  the  Fragile  States  Group  of  the  Organisation  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)/Development  Assistance  Committee  (DAC), 
the  United  Nations’  (UN)  Department  for  Peacekeeping  Operations  and  the  World 
Bank’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPR). For instance, the Bank’s 
CPR – originally established as the Post-Conflict Unit in 1997 and renamed in 2001 – is 
primarily a research unit that seeks to develop theoretical and empirical tools to assist 
other Bank departments and organisations with conflict prevention and reconstruction 
efforts. The Unit’s name change in 2001 reflects a shift of emphasis in the Bank’s work 
from post-conflict reconstruction to more proactive approaches to conflict ‘prevention’, 
based in part on the research of Paul Collier and others into the economic causes of civil 
conflict.
34 The Unit also administers the Post-Conflict Fund, which provides funding for 
World  Bank  work  in  collaboration  with  governments  and  organisational  partners  in 
post-conflict situations.
35 In the United States (US), a new office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction  and  Stabilization  (S/CRS)  within  the  Department  of  State  was 
established in July 2004, to provide the US government with a ‘more robust capability 
to  prevent  conflict  when  possible,  and  if  necessary  manage  stabilization  and 
reconstruction  operations  in  countries  emerging  from  conflict  or  civil  strife.’
36  The 
S/CRS’s internal division into four primary organisational functions – early warning 
and prevention, planning, best practices and sectoral coordination, and response strategy 
and  resource  management  –  clearly  demonstrates  the  emphasis  on  coordination, 
monitoring and knowledge gathering, rather than on the development of independent 
                                                 
33 See Hameiri, Shahar, ‘Capacity and Its Fallacies: International State Building as State Transformation’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2009), forthcoming. 
34 World Bank, ‘The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda’, 
Washington  DC:  World  Bank,  2004,  pp.  8-9;  see  Collier,  Paul,  V.L.  Elliot,  Håvard  Hegre,  Anke 
Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol  and  Nicholas  Sambanis,  Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and 
Development Policy (Oxford: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003). 
35  World Bank, ‘The World Bank in Conflict and Development’, World Bank website, available at 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTCPR/
0,,contentMDK:20486307~menuPK:1260728~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:407740,00.ht
ml>, accessed 17 July 17 2007. 
36  Office  of  the  Coordinator  for  Reconstruction  and  Stabilization,  ‘About  S/CRS’,  US  Government 
Department of State website, available at <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm>, accessed 17 July 
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implementation  capacities.
37  Other  examples  include  the  Australian  government’s 
Fragile States and Peacebuilding Unit – a WofG collaboration under the leadership of 
the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) – and Britain’s Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Unit, another WofG arrangement, established jointly in 2004 
by  the  Ministry  of  Defence,  the  Department  for  International  Development  and  the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
 
Private actors in state building interventions 
Private actors have assumed significant roles in a multitude of areas that were formerly 
the preserve of state agencies, since the onset of the neoliberal revolution in the late 
1970. While in the early decades of neoliberalism the privatisation trend was uneven 
across national borders and different policy areas within the same state,
38 there was 
nevertheless a discernable push to reduce the scope of state activities in most countries. 
This was true for the state in the West and, in a different sense, for many postcolonial 
states, in which structural adjustment in the 1980s and early 1990s and the availability 
of  new  global  markets  led  to  increasing  debureaucratisation.
39  However,  while 
privatisation was initially associated with state reduction and the outsourcing of ‘non-
core’ state activities to the private sector, justified in terms of efficiency gains, what we 
see now is a qualitatively different process. Privatisation now is associated with the 
emergence of new modes of governance, such as SBIs, within which the distinction 
between public and private is increasingly difficult to ascertain and wherein the scope of 
state  activities  actually  expands,
40  but  often  through  the  agency  of  private  actors 
exercising public power. In this respect, we have seen private actors take on regulatory 
functions in SBIs and not only implementation roles. This changing role has also been 
associated  with  a  process  of  professionalisation  and  corporatisation  of  the  non-state 
sector and an increased emphasis on organisations’ expertise in both implementation 
and in developing and managing complex governance arrangements involving other, 
often local, sub-contractors.  
                                                 
37 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, ‘Core Organizational Functions’, US 
Government  Department  of  State  website,  available  at  <  http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c15213.htm>, 
accessed 17 July 2007. 
38  See  for  instance,  Saint-Martin,  Denis,  ‘The  New  Managerialism  and  the  Policy  Influence  of 
Consultants  in  Government:  An  Historical-Institutionalist Analysis of Britain, Canada and France’, 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 11, no. 3 (1998), pp. 319-56. 
39 Reno, William, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).  
40 See for example, Sbragia, Alberta M., ‘Governance, the State, and the Market: What Is Going On?’ 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13, no. 2 (2000), pp. 243-50. CHAPTER FOUR 
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  When one speaks of ‘private’ or ‘non-state’ actors a distinction is often drawn 
between  organisations  motivated  by  profit  and  non-profit  NGOs  that  have  other 
ideological or political drivers. There are at least two good reasons to believe, however, 
that there are similar forces driving the incorporation of both groups into contemporary 
SBIs. First, the NGOs that benefit from development and state building contracts tend to 
be  both  ideologically  and  politically  unthreatening  to  neoliberal  projects  of  market 
extension  and  institution  building  or  to  related  technocratic  exercises  in  risk 
management,  while  other  organisations  with  independent  funding-sources  and  more 
critical  views  are  often  marginalised.
41  Second,  both  non-profit  and  for-profit 
organisations now routinely compete for the same contracts and in this way a new breed 
of  organisation  has  emerged  that  has  a  strong  market  orientation,  but  also  a  public 
purpose.
42 Therefore, the issue is not so much whether non-state actors in interventions 
seek profit or not, but which particular organisation is included or excluded and why – a 
question that directly pertains to the matter of meta-governance and state transformation 
explored above.  
As in other areas of state activity, privatisation in SBIs has been partial and 
uneven, but the number of private actors involved, either directly through outsourcing 
and contracting, or indirectly through various forms of networking and monitoring, has 
ballooned. There has been, as Holm argues, a ‘disaggregation’ of the policy response to 
failed states, which means that the UN and traditional state actors have to a great extent 
been replaced by ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’ and complex policy, implementation 
and  regulation  apparatuses.
43  However,  what  Holm  and  others  neglect  is  that  this 
transformation of the intervention apparatus represents a new form of political rule. In 
this way, part-privatisation entails not only technical concerns with coordination and 
sequencing,  but  new  ways  of  managing  conflict,  within  transnational  spaces  of 
governance inside the state, which relocate important decision-making processes outside 
the formal governmental apparatus.  
                                                 
41 Duffield, Mark, ‘Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a Relations of 
Global Liberal Governance’, in State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction, edited by Jennifer Milliken 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 291-312., pp. 292-94; Rosser, Andrew, ‘Neo-Liberalism and 
the Politics of Australian Aid Policy-Making’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 3 
(2008), pp. 372-85, p. 380. 
42 Stubbs, Paul, ‘International Non-State Actors and Social Development Policy’, Global Social Policy 3, 
no.  3  (2003),  pp.  319-48,  pp.  321-22;  also  Carbonnier,  Gilles,  ‘Privatisation  and  Outsourcing  in 
Wartime: The Humanitarian Challenges’, Disasters 30, no. 4 (2006), pp. 402-16, p. 402. 
43 Holm, Hans-H e n r i k ,  ‘ A  D i s a g g r e g a t e d  W o r l d  O r d e r  i n  t h e  M a k i n g :  P o l i c y  T o w a r d s  F a i l e d  S t a t e s  a s  a n  
Example’, International Politics 38, no. 3 (2001), pp. 357-74. CHAPTER FOUR 
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The  most  important  characteristic  of  the  privatising  of  contemporary 
interventions is that unlike in earlier periods private actors have now become part of the 
intervention regime so that they perform public or authoritative functions.
44 In the past, 
when international humanitarian NGOs, most notably the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), operated in areas of conflict it was to provide humanitarian relief 
and  medical  assistance  to  suffering  individuals.  Traditional  humanitarian  NGOs 
proclaimed their absolute political neutrality and sought to obtain access to war-zones 
from all warring parties without siding with any of them. According to Chandler, the 
traditional humanitarian ‘sphere of involvement was focused on the protection of a basic 
level of human dignity in times of war or natural disaster.’
45 In fact, when the ICRC 
codified  its  work  in  1965,  independence  was  one  of  the  organisation’s  core  seven 
principles,  indicating  its  reluctance  to  become  embedded  within  larger  political 
structures.
46  
Aside  from  the  ICRC  and  similar  humanitarian  organisations  that  tended  to 
operate independently from governments, interventions and peacekeeping were mostly 
seen as a matter of ‘international relations’ and were dominated by the UN, regional 
multilateral organisations, national governments and diplomats. Change has happened 
incrementally,  but  in  two  major  waves.  The  first,  beginning  in  the  1970s,  saw  the 
emergence  of  a  new  breed  of  more  radical  and  activist  human  rights-based 
humanitarianism. The rise of human rights-based humanitarianism corresponded with a 
growth  in  the  number  and  influence  of  human  rights  and  development  NGOs  that 
lobbied Western governments to act on human rights abuses in other countries and in 
some cases participated in various ways in interventions, for example by running human 
rights education programs.
47 Before the end of the Cold War, such NGOs were often 
funded by Western governments that preferred an arm’s length approach to carry out 
various programs in the Third World. The second wave of privatisation, which began 
approximately in the mid 1990s with the various interventions in the Balkans but has 
                                                 
44 It is important to note that in many ways the rise of private power in interventions is not an entirely new 
phenomenon, but in fact a return to earlier practices from the colonial era. Most famously, the Dutch 
and British East India companies conquered and administered for decades vast territories that later 
became colonies of the Netherlands and Great Britain respectively. See Singer, Peter W., Corporate 
Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
2003), Ch. 2.  
45 Chandler, David, From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention, 
2
nd edition (London: Pluto Press, 2006), p. 23. 
46 Ibid. 
47  Ibid.,  Ch.  2;  Bellamy,  Alex  J.,  Paul  Williams  and  Stuart  Griffin,  Understanding  Peacekeeping 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 191-92. CHAPTER FOUR 
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gathered momentum in the new millennium, witnessed the entry of non-state actors into 
the  areas  of  security  and  governance,  as  well  as  the  consolidation  of  public-private 
development aid delivery complexes.
48   
Indeed,  the  involvement  of  private  actors  is  currently  seen  as  part  of  state 
‘building’ and not state ‘reduction’ as it had hitherto been. While in the 1980s and early 
1990s humanitarian and development NGOs were part of efforts to bypass governments 
in intervened states and set up alternative service delivery and development projects in 
partnership  with  local  NGOs  and  the  private  sector,  now  many  private  actors  are 
integrated into multilevel regimes and therefore into spaces of governance within the 
state  itself.  This  has  corresponded  with  a  relative  growth  of  funding  to  NGOs  and 
consultants with supposed expertise in capacity building and governance.
49 This is not 
to say that human rights and humanitarian NGOs are no longer important. Many of the 
activities associated with the ‘ethical’ activism of the 1970s and 1980s are still being 
carried out and some of the NGOs that featured then continue to operate today within a 
different  context,  with  different  sources  of  funding,  and  with  a  somewhat  modified 
orientation.
50 
Having discussed the nature of SBI privatisation, as well as the political and 
ideological implications of this, I will now examine in brief the three main groups of 
private actors that participate in these interventions – NGOs, consultants, and PMCs.  
 
Nongovernmental organisations 
NGOs come in a baffling variety sizes and serve a wide range of purposes. We can 
divide  the  NGOs  involved  in  SBIs  into  two  major  groups  –  international  NGOs 
(INGOs) and local NGOs. While some local NGOs have very limited funding and a 
handful of volunteer staff, other INGOs,
51 such as Oxfam or Amnesty International, 
operate  worldwide  and  have  thousands  of  paid  staff  and  members,  as  well  as 
independent research capacities. Regardless of size and the specific activities NGOs 
                                                 
48 In fact, NGOs are now responsible for the delivery of about a quarter of all development assistance, 
mostly through funds transferred to them by official donors. See Jenkins and Plowden, Governance and 
Nationbuilding, p. 27. 
49 Ibid. 
50 For example, Oxfam Australia has developed a good governance and citizenship program alongside the 
organisation’s more traditional concerns with humanitarian  relief  and  grassroots  development;  see 
<www.oxfam.org.au>. 
51 The definition of what constitutes ‘international’ NGOs is contested, with some arguing that this term 
tends to favour Western-based organisations that work outside these countries and ignore cross-border 
networks in the South. See Stubbs, ‘International Non-State Actors and Social Development Policy’, p. 
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undertake within SBIs, what is crucial to understand about their current role is that they 
are involved in establishing political relationships between state and citizen outside the 
institutions  of  representative  democracy.  Through  notions  such  as  ‘participation’, 
‘partnership’, ‘ownership’ and ‘inclusion’, these NGOs work to reframe political and 
social conflicts associated with capitalist economic development and market extension, 
which are usually more accentuated in poor states and societies, as problems to be fixed 
or managed within the market paradigm. Of course, some NGOs are highly critical of 
contemporary trends in aid delivery and intervention, but those are usually excluded 
from  playing  a  role  within  SBIs,  even  when  they  are  significant  organisations  with 
considerable resources. For example, the Solomon Islands office of Oxfam International 
produced two critical reports on RAMSI in 2003 and 2006, and while RAMSI does not 
work  directly  with  civil  society  groups,  AusAID  officials  in  Honiara  effectively 
‘blacklisted’ Oxfam staff to the point of even ignoring them on social occasions!
52  
The NGO sector has gone through considerable transformations in recent years, 
both in terms of its activities and in terms of its funding structure, which are important 
to understand to make sense of the sector’s current role in SBIs. The general trend has 
been towards: (a) greater reliance on funding from bilateral or multilateral donors; (b) 
the adoption of NPM operating models from the private sector, particularly in the major 
Western INGOs; (c) the development of consultancy-type activities in competition with 
the  private  sector;  (d)  the  increasing  ‘projectisation’  of  NGOs’  work  in  relation  to 
particular  contracts  (although  there  seems  to  be  a  more  recent  contrary  tendency 
towards  longer-term  programs);  and  finally  (e)  more  direct  linkages  between  donor 
agencies and local NGOs at the expense of INGOs.
53     
  In  1998,  governments,  either  directly  or  through  multilateral  organisations, 
provided an estimated 40 per cent of the funding for INGOs’ international activities, up 
from 1.5 per cent in 1970.
54 The trend of channelling official development assistance 
(ODA)  through  NGOs  accelerated  in  the  1980s  when  the  rate  of  growth  in  ODA 
allocated to NGOs exceeded the growth in ODA itself almost fivefold.
55 This was a 
manifestation of earlier forms of neoliberalism and in particular of donors’ preference to 
fund service-provision through NGOs, rather than through governments, which were 
                                                 
52 Interview with Oxfam International official, Solomon Islands office, 10 September 2007. 
53 Stubbs, ‘International Non-State Actors and Social Development Policy’, p. 324.  
54 Carbonnier,  ‘Privatisation  and  Outsourcing  in  Wartime’,  p.  407;  see  also  Powell,  Mike  and  David 
Seddon, ‘NGOs & the Development Industry’, Review of African Political Economy 71, no. 1 (1997), 
pp. 3-10, p. 5.  
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seen to be corrupt and an obstacle to structural adjustment. In those years the relative 
dependency of many INGOs (and hence of many dependent domestic NGOs) on public 
funding has been established. However, During the 1990s ODA spending decreased or 
stagnated in most of the OECD countries, as part of a general trend towards curbing 
social expenditure.
56 INGOs, which began to be criticised for their inefficiency and lack 
of transparency, were encouraged to act like private sector organisations and structure 
themselves along business models from the private sector to be eligible for government 
funding. Biekart argued that in the 1990s ‘it was…a matter of institutional survival to 
behave as “for profits” in a non-profit environment.’
57 At the same time, there was a 
massive  increase  in  funds  allocated  to  humanitarian  disasters  and  other  so-called 
complex political emergencies.
58 According to Stubbs, this change in the relationship 
between  donors  and  NGOs  ‘fuelled  short-termism,  “projectization”,  and  intense 
competition within the aid market, and detracted from wider development thinking and 
action.’
59 The funding problem of Western INGOs was compounded in the late 1990s 
by the post-Washington consensus-inspired preference of donors to work directly with 
local ‘civil society’ groups in the context of increased emphasis on ‘local ownership’, 
‘participation’, ‘partnership’ and ‘empowerment’ as key to successful implementation 
and maintenance of neoliberal reforms.
60  
  After the September 11 attacks in the US, the negative trend in aggregate ODA 
spending  in  the  West  has  been  reversed.  Most  importantly,  donors,  bilateral  and 
multilateral,  began  to  reengage  with  so-called  ‘poorly  performing  countries’,  which 
were earlier neglected in favour of countries that were seen to have better capacities to 
implement  economic  and  governance  reforms,  but  were  now  seen  as  a  source  of 
transnational  risk.
61  It  has  now  become  received  wisdom  to  argue  that  it  is  more 
economical and fruitful to maintain an ongoing program of ‘state building’ in those 
countries than to intervene when the situation has severely deteriorated. Consequently, 
                                                 
56 Carbonnier, ‘Privatisation and Outsourcing in Wartime’, p. 404. 
57 Quoted in Stubbs, ‘International Non-State Actors and Social Development Policy’, p. 329. 
58 For a definition of complex political emergencies see Goodhand, Jonathan and David Hulme, ‘From 
Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding Conflict and Peace-Building in the New World 
Disorder’, Third World Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1999), pp. 13-26. 
59 Stubbs, ‘International Non-State Actors and Social Development Policy’, p. 329. 
60 Ibid. 
61  Macrae, Joanna,  Andrew  Shepherd, Oliver Morrissey,  Adele Harmer, Ed  Anderson, Laure-Hélène 
Piron,  Andy  McKay,  Diana  Cammack  and  Nambusi  Kyegombe,  ‘Aid  to  “Poorly  Performing” 
Countries: a Critical Review of Debates and Issues’, London: Overseas Development Institute, July 
2004;  see  also  USAID,  ‘Fragile  States  Strategy’,  Washington  DC:  United  States  Agency  for 
International Development, January 2005; DfID, ‘Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile 
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there has been some shift away from ‘projects’ to larger-scale, long-term reconstruction 
‘programs’. This has been accompanied by an even more pervasive privatising of the 
donor agencies themselves, through their incorporation into multilevel regimes, so that 
some core activities of these agencies are now outsourced to non-state organisations. 
For  example,  the  Bush  administration’s  well-funded  Millennium  Challenge  Account 
that commenced operations in 2004 was designed specifically to award contracts to the 
private  sector  with  the  Millennium  Challenge  Corporation  having  no  independent 
implementation capacities.
62 As a result, the competition over aid contracts has become 
even fiercer, pitting NGOs against transnational corporations (TNCs) and consultancy 
agencies  and  fundamentally  shaping  the  ways  in  which  NGOs  now  operate.  Stubbs 
argues that, 
…the  shift  from  projects  to  programmes  could  reinforce  tendencies  towards 
concentration, oligopolization, mergers and consortia among non-state actors, since it will 
be these emerging supranational agencies and alliances who will be the only ones with 
sufficient capacity to engage in the more complex and coherent programming being 
developed and likely to increase in importance in the future.
63 
NGOs can also be distinguished according to their core activities, although this 
way of defining NGOs is only useful insofar as we reflect on the ways in which these 
activities relate to state transformation. Most of the NGOs involved in interventions 
tend to be defined as humanitarian NGOs, although the definition of humanitarianism is 
itself a matter of some debate. According to Duffield there are about 50,000 NGOs 
concerned  with  humanitarianism  that  are  eligible  within  the  UN  system  to  receive 
external  funding.  These  NGOs  are  responsible  for  disbursing  at  least  half  of  all 
humanitarian aid, not including food aid, to the developing world. However, more than 
75 per cent of this aid is disbursed through the largest twenty American and European 
NGOs and NGO networks, reflecting the concentration trend Stubbs identifies.
64 As 
mentioned  earlier,  the  traditional  idea  of  NGOs  as  providing  limited  assistance  to 
suffering individuals in war-zones has been supplanted in the past 25 years or so with a 
more activist and radical human rights-focused breed of humanitarian NGOs that see 
their role as actively promoting the construction of liberal societies.
65 In tandem there 
has been an explosion in the number of advocacy NGOs, both international and local, 
which focus on the promotion of particular rights and, in turn, help define certain issues 
                                                 
62 See the procurement section in the MCC website, available at 
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63 Stubbs, ‘International Non-State Actors and Social Development Policy’, p. 338. 
64 Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, pp. 53-57. 
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and even certain ‘client’ groups.
66 Examples include NGOs focusing on child labour or 
women’s rights.  
  But it is not only humanitarian NGOs that have been taking part in recent SBIs. 
Governance-oriented NGOs, such as Transparency International and its local partners, 
have  certainly  benefited  from  contemporary  state  building  projects,  becoming  key 
players in capacity building and ‘good governance’ frameworks, and assuming diverse 
consultancy, implementation and auditing roles. For example, the Australian branch of 
Transparency International was commissioned by AusAID in 2004 to write a report on 
the state of corruption in Solomon Islands.
67 At the same time, Transparency Solomon 
Islands has been partly funded by AusAID to monitor corruption in that country, for 
example in the logging industry.
68  
  In  the  interstices  of  humanitarianism/development  and  governance  there  is  a 
third prominent group – democracy promotion NGOs. This group is based primarily in 
the  US  and  Western  Europe  and  receives  generous  funding  from  states  and  private 
benefactors to support Southern pro-democracy groups and help develop democratic 
institutions  around  the  world.  Notable  examples  include  the  American  National 
Endowment for Democracy, the British Westminster Foundation for Democracy and the 
German Stifungen. This group of NGOs is of course more overtly political than the first 
two mentioned, and indeed some democracy promotion NGOs are directly funded by 
and affiliated with political parties in the West. However, the process of transition to 
liberal-democracy, as it is propagated by these NGOs, has largely been depoliticised and 
presented as equivalent to achieving particular institutional benchmarks. In post-conflict 
states, as Paris notes, the democracy promotion NGOs and their local counterparts have 
been  very  prominent  in  recent  years,  receiving  substantial  funding  from  Western 
governments, the EU and the UN.
69 Nevertheless, support for democratisation has to be 
understood  in  the  broader  context  of  state  transformation  and  the  relocation  of  key 
aspects  of  policymaking  away  from  the  governmental  apparatus.  So,  for  example, 
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alongside the expansion of political franchise in Iraq came pressure to enshrine investor 
rights in the constitution.
70   
  As  we  have  seen  there  is  considerable  diversity  in  the  sort  of  NGOs  that 
participate in SBIs. However, what these have in common is that they are all essentially 
involved in establishing political relationships between state and citizen that work to 
structure the field of possible political action. NGOs have been crucial in breathing life 
into nascent forms of ‘market citizenship’, whereby equality has been reframed to mean 
equal opportunity of access to, and participation in, market activities.
71 This is precisely 
the meaning of notions such as ‘ownership’, ‘participation’ and ‘inclusion’ that have 
recently become popular in those development projects run by NGOs as part of SBIs. 
Therefore, rather than expanding independent political space NGO activities in SBIs 
mark the growth of the sphere of transnational social and political regulation.
72 It is this 
role that links NGOs with state transformation and explains the inclusion or exclusion 
of particular NGOs in SBIs.     
 
Consultants 
The rise and rise of international consultancy companies (ICCs) in recent years mirrors 
some of the same trends associated with the transformation of the NGO sector discussed 
above and therefore need not be repeated here. However, no other development marks 
the extension of the new political logic of expertise to interventions as much as the 
growth in consultancy activities. Not only have consultants been wielding various forms 
of public power within multilevel regimes, but they have also become a crucial part of 
an expanding auditing apparatus that is used to legitimise these very interventions.
73 In 
this way, they are important political actors that both exercise power directly and shape 
the possible field of political action for other actors – within and without multilevel 
regimes. 
While there is much evidence that the involvement of ICCs in contemporary 
state building programs has increased significantly and is likely to grow in the future 
there is a relative dearth of empirical data available. This paucity makes it difficult to 
present  a  clear  and  accurate  picture  of  the  overall  funding  that  has  gone  to  these 
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companies.
74 Some data that does exist suggests that the consultancy industry of OECD 
member-states was worth about $4 billion in sub-Saharan Africa alone in 2004, or about 
30 per cent of total aid to Africa.
75 It is difficult to discern from this what proportion of 
funding went to for-profit ICCs. However, from the evidence available it appears that 
the for-profit ICC sector has been able, due to its supposed professional and apolitical 
character, to benefit from the expansion of new modes of governance at the expense of 
NGOs. While many NGOs have been suffering from an identity crisis brought on by 
contradictions  between  the  neoliberal  development  orthodoxies  that  underpin  the 
contracts they compete for and the political and ideological loyalties of many of their 
staff and supporters,
76 ICCs have no such ‘baggage’ and are therefore seen as more 
reliable and efficient than NGOs. At the same time, as we have seen, the NGO sector’s 
involvement in SBIs remains substantial, possibly due to the relatively positive public 
image of the non-profit sector.  
One report that clearly illustrates the current infiltration of consultants into the 
development industry and therefore provides some indication for their centrality in SBIs 
is Aid/Watch’s 2007 assessment of the Australian aid program. The report’s authors 
argue that: 
Private  companies,  consultants  and  advisors  manage  the  bulk  of  the  aid  activities  in 
recipient countries. They dominate to such an extent that it is more useful to describe an 
‘ a i d   i n d u s t r y ’   r a t h e r   t h a n   a n   a i d   p r o g r a m   a s   a i d   p a y s   t o p   p r i v a t e   s e c t o r   p r e m i u m s   w h e n   i t  
could  be  more  effectively  supporting  local  organisations.  Even  within  AusAID  [the 
Australian  Agency  for  International  Development], top positions have been contracted 
out  to  private  consultants  who  demand  a  much  higher  price  than  a  public  servant’s 
wage.
77 
And an industry it is indeed. Through processes of mergers and acquisitions there is an 
increasing trend towards corporatisation and concentration. In the case of the Australian 
aid program, most of the biggest contractors (in 2006 figures) – Cardno ACIL, GRM 
International and Coffey International, for example – belong to a category that can be 
termed ‘project management firms’. These companies have been able to diversify into 
many, often disparate, sectors ‘by moulding to fit project tenders when they become 
available by keeping large databases of private consultants who can then service the 
                                                 
74 Stubbs, ‘International Non-State Actors and Social Development Policy’, p. 331; also Hamilton-Hart, 
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various contracts that are tendered for.’
78 In this way, they ultimately offer a kind of 
expertise over governance itself. GRM, which is mostly owned by Australia’s richest 
man James Packer, is the biggest contractor for RAMSI in Solomon Islands, particularly 
in reforming the law and justice sector, receiving about A$60 million in 2006 alone.
79 
GRM’s  role  in  RAMSI  is  so  pivotal  that  the  company  is  allowed  to  have  its  own 
recruitment process for advisers, separate from the usual AusAID tendering system.
80 
Furthermore,  AusAID’s  ongoing  emphasis  on  ‘technical  assistance’  programs  to 
recipient countries, which is directly related to its current state building orientation,
81 
has also tended to benefit consultants who get the main share of contracts on offer.
82 
  As the emergence of integrative ‘project management firms’ suggests, the range 
of expertise provided by the ICC sector today is broad and relates essentially to all 
policy areas, as well as to meta-governance issues of setting up the ‘right’ governance 
systems and improving coordination. Initially ICCs tended to focus on development, 
economic reform, service provision and fiscal policy. However, more recently they have 
become  involved  in  developing  security  sector  and  political  institutions  reform 
programs.
83 In Iraq, for example, ICCs, as well as other mostly American TNCs, have 
had a massive input into the post-occupation restructuring of the country’s political and 
economic institutions, including the drafting of the new constitution.
84  
The recent growth of ICCs is usually explained in relation to the emergence of 
the ‘knowledge industry’ and a more flexible professional workforce in the West. For 
example, the vast public policy literature on policy transfer has been primarily occupied 
with explaining the role of transnational expert networks in the diffusion of policies and 
institutions from one polity to another.
85 Whether policies are indeed transferred or not 
is one matter, but what is certain is the considerable crossover of senior staff from the 
public sector to ICCs and back, thinning the lines between the latter and the former even 
further and once again demonstrating the way in which consultants have managed to 
capitalise  on  their  supposed  ‘expertise’.  For  example,  in  2005  a  senior  AusAID 
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79 Ibid., p. 11. 
80 Ibid., p. 26. 
81  Hameiri, Shahar,  ‘Risk  Management,  Neo-Liberalism  and  the  Securitisation  of  the  Australian  Aid 
Program’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 3 (2008), pp. 357-71, p. 362. 
82  Duxfield  and  Wheen,  ‘Fighting  Poverty  or  Fantasy  Figures?’,  p.  25;  see  also  Hamilton-Hart, 
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83 Carbonnier, ‘Privatisation and Outsourcing in Wartime’, pp. 404-5. 
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85 See for example, Stone, Diane, ‘Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the “Transnationalization” of 
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bureaucrat resigned from the agency and was one month later employed as a private 
contractor  by  AusAID,  receiving  A$467,000  per  anum,  double  the  highest  AusAID 
public service salary.
86     
Aside from ICCs of various descriptions, there are also local consultants and 
advisors involved in SBIs, usually as sub-contractors. While some of these consultants 
present themselves as affiliated with non-profit NGOs, in many instances these only 
emerge due to the availability of aid funding.
87 Local consultants are often hired to 
provide foreign consultants with insight into local culture and social structures. Here the 
role  of  returning  expatriates  is  particularly  important.  In  Afghanistan,  for  example, 
many returned Afghanis were recruited to various consultancy  roles within the new 
government  and  bureaucracy,  and  in  the  interface  between  government  and  foreign 
forces.
88 The role of such consultants is constrained in that they are seen as assisting the 
implementation of already-existing programs and not as regulatory actors in their own 
right. 
 
Private Military Companies and the Privatisation of Security  
Perhaps the most unpredictable development of the post-Cold War era has been the 
increasing privatisation of defence and security. The modern state’s monopoly over the 
exercise of organised violence has been seen for centuries as its foremost legitimising 
attribute and its most important function.
89 In fact, the state’s supposed monopoly of 
violence  formed  the  basis  for  the  traditional  distinction  between  people,  army  and 
government  that  was  at  the  heart  of  the  Clausewitzian  theory  of  war  and  many 
international conventions on the rules of war in the past few centuries.
90 While the 
loosening of centralised controls over violence in the world’s so-called weak or failed 
states has been noted widely as a symptom of their dysfunction,
91 the Western state’s 
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security role has been disaggregating too. Indeed, the degree to which PMCs and private 
sector contractors have become central to Western war-making and peacekeeping in the 
post-Cold War era is staggering.
92 To provide just one example, in the first Gulf War in 
Iraq in 1991, the ratio of PMC contractors to soldiers was one in 50. In the current war, 
which  began  in  March  2003,  there  were  an  estimated  100,000  private  security  and 
military on the ground in 2006 – a contingent almost as large as the US military in 
Iraq.
93  
  PMCs are divided into three types – military provider firms, military consultant 
firms  and  military  support  firms.
94  The  line  is  not  so  easily  drawn,  however,  since 
bigger  PMCs  tend  to  offer  consultancy,  training  and  logistics  services,  as  well  as 
military and security services.
95 Furthermore, military or security provider firms have 
been hired not only by governments, but also by NGOs, ICCs and TNCs to protect staff 
and property. In this way, they have become a common feature of interventions on a 
number of operating levels. What all three kinds of PMCs have in common is that they 
are  all  private  companies  providing  public  goods.  In  this  way  the  privatisation  of 
security  does  not  only  test  state  control  over  violence,  but  more  fundamentally 
challenges  prevailing  notions  of  stateness.  If  stateness  is  a  dynamic  and  contested 
process linked to projects of citizenship,
96 then the marketisation of security, though far 
from complete, demonstrates an important shift in the relationship between state and 
citizen.  This  relationship  becomes  one  in  which  security  is  no  longer  necessarily 
conceived as a basic right of every citizen but as a good extended to those capable of 
paying for it.
97 To understand the ways in which this is already played out, one needs to 
look no further than the massive and highly disruptive security operations associated 
with ‘global’ events, such as the Olympic Games or the World Bank and IMF annual 
directors meeting. These events appropriate public space for extended periods of time 
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for the benefit of narrow interests. In fact, cities and states already compete to attract 
such  events  by  promoting  their  capacity  to  mount  successful  large-scale  security 
operations.
98  
While the outsourcing of combat and training roles in recent  years has been 
substantial and has attracted much scholarly attention,
99 the defence sector as a whole 
has been massively privatised since the 1980s. For example, in the world’s greatest 
military  power,  the  US,  national  defence  ‘is  one  of  the  most  heavily  outsourced 
activities’, with private contractors holding 50 per cent of all defence-related jobs in 
2000, up from 36 per cent in 1972.
100 Private contractors in the US dominate research 
and development, weapon-system training, maintenance and operation of government 
facilities, data-processing and the production of a variety of defence-related products.
101 
The outsourcing of combat-supporting defence activities is not unique to the US, with 
similar trends emerging in other Western states. In the United Kingdom, for example, 
the Ministry of Defence has been increasingly relying on private finance initiatives to 
fund its capital projects, and public-private partnerships have been set up to develop 
Britain’s  new  defence  technologies,  such  as  the  Skynet  5  military  communications 
satellite.
102  
The privatising of the defence sector has attracted many critics. Markusen, for 
example, has pointed out that the development costs of today’s hi-tech communication 
and  weapon  systems  effectively  create  private  sector  monopolies  with  no  real 
competition – the rationale underlying privatisation in the first place. Outsourcing these 
functions also tends to erode the capacity of the public sector to monitor and evaluate 
the performance of private contractors, she says. For these reasons Markusen argues that 
privatisation tends to invest too much political power at the hands of a small number of 
private sector corporations without enough tangible gains to justify this erosion of the 
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state’s  role.
103 However,  it  is  not  that  the  state’s  role  is  being  eroded  through  such 
processes of privatisation. As we have seen, privatisation points at the changing nature 
of the relationship between state and society and the part-privatisation of security is 
simply another manifestation of a broader trend of state transformation.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the actors that participate in SBIs as a way of examining the 
nature  of  contemporary  interventions  as  a  form  of  political  rule.  The  increasingly 
important roles of private actors in SBIs – consultants, PMCs and NGOs – has not gone 
unnoticed,  but  this  has  usually  been  in  the  context  of  a  problematic  ‘zero-sum’ 
understanding of the relationship between public and private power. In contrast, it has 
been argued here that this kind of privatisation points at the transformation of the state, 
not  its  ‘weakening’.  This  becomes  apparent  when  we  relate  privatisation  to 
corresponding shifts in the apparatuses of states and multilateral organisations. Instead 
of a trend towards privatisation per se what we see is power increasingly placed in the 
hands of ‘experts’ who are not politically or popularly accountable, within new modes 
of governance associated with the regulatory state.  
In the first part, I began by theorising the relationship between individual actors 
and multilevel regimes – a necessary step, since the concept of regime does not include 
an inherent role for agency. Here,  I sought to move away from those accounts that 
define actors in relation to their capacity building tasks and therefore end up reifying 
‘state building’ as the objective of SBIs. Instead I provided a framework that identified 
the  differential  capacity  of  actors  to  shape  and  reshape  multilevel  regimes,  thereby 
highlighting the changing nature of state power. In particular, I focused on the role of 
meta-governance  actors,  which  were  usually  based  in  the  core  executive  of  the 
regulatory state and multilevel organisations, in sustaining highly diffuse and complex 
interventions and in shaping other actors, as well as key political questions, such as who 
was to govern what, on what basis and who was to be included or excluded. 
I then proceeded in the two subsequent sections to examine in brief the kinds of 
public and private actors that participated in contemporary interventions. In the public 
sector,  aside  from  the  shift  to  various  forms  of  meta-governance,  the  emphasis  on 
expertise  has  also  been  associated  with  the  incorporation  of  various  agencies  that 
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hitherto had a domestic role into new WofG collaborations and multilevel governance 
arrangements that provide them with power over the domestic governing functions of 
intervened states. Similarly, private organisations have been taking on governing and 
regulatory and not only implementation roles within SBIs. In particular, we have seen a 
trend towards professionalisation and concentration as NGOs and ICCs compete for 
complex contracts requiring multiple forms of technical and managerial expertise. The 
primary significance of these developments, I ultimately argue, is not that private actors 
acquire  public  power,  but  that  through  processes  of  state  transformation  social 
phenomena are framed and governed as technical problems to be fixed by experts away 
from political contestation. 
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Chapter Five 
The  Australian  Federal  Police  and  the  (Meta)  Governance  of 
Disorder in the Australian State’s New Regional Frontier  
 
Introduction  
In his October 2006 address to the National Press Club, Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
Commissioner Mick Keelty displayed a level of candour unusual for a public servant 
when he said his organisation was finding itself increasingly operating in a difficult 
‘foreign  policy  space’.
1  He  was  referring  to  the  AFP’s  recent  prominence  in  the 
planning  and  execution  of  Australian  and  Australian-led  state  building  interventions 
(SBIs),  mostly  in  Australia’s  near  region  of  the  South  Pacific  and  Southeast  Asia. 
Importantly, Keelty said that the AFP’s state building role ‘…raises issues about the 
well established principle of the Separation of Powers and in particular, the apolitical 
nature of policing as we know it in Australia.’
2 This, he added on a different occasion, 
was because the AFP no longer operated in the ‘very localised jurisdictional space in 
which we were operating before.’
3 While Keelty’s assertion at the top is to some extent 
accurate, particularly in identifying the growing disjuncture between the AFP’s policing 
activities, law and territory, in more substantive terms it is actually the opposite that is 
true: it is the Australian domestic ‘space’, at least that defined by and through police-
executive power, that has expanded into and is shaping the ‘space’ hitherto defined as 
belonging to ‘foreign policy’, as well as the domestic spaces of intervened states.  
The  increasing  centrality  of  police  within  contemporary  state  building 
apparatuses is not unique to Australia, with the United Nations (UN) Police Division 
expanding  and  now  operating  separately  from  the  Military  Division  within  the 
Department  of  Peacekeeping  Operations.
4  Indeed,  the  2000  Brahimi  Report 
recommended that UN member-states develop a pool of high quality civilian police 
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available for peacekeeping deployments at short notice. This was based on the report’s 
contention  that  the  nature  of  contemporary  peace  operations  meant  greater  policing 
capacity was required to deal with the breakdown of law and order common in post-
conflict  situations  –  a  task  for  which  the  military  was  deemed  ill-equipped.
5 
Nevertheless, no other government or multilateral organisation has to date developed 
capacity and organisation of comparable scope to the AFP’s International Deployment 
Group (IDG) – ‘a standing corps of over five hundred [now closer to 1,200] Australian 
Federal Police officers trained and made available for rapid deployments overseas for 
peacekeeping missions.’
6 The IDG model has attracted considerable attention from a 
variety of other governments, as the large number of high-level international visitors to 
the  IDG’s  Majura  compound  near  Canberra  surely  attests,  however,  it  is  not  the 
development of international/transnational policing per se that is the core interest of this 
chapter.  Rather,  the  AFP  is  used  as  a  conduit  through  which  to  investigate  the 
relationship between the transformation of intervening states and contemporary SBIs. It 
thus provides insights into the nature of SBIs as a new mode of governance, or form of 
political rule.  
The chapter focuses on the recent transformation and expansion of the AFP as a 
way of understanding the emergence of a new partly (and strategically) deterritorialised, 
‘regional’, frontier of the Australian state. Within this new frontier, whose fluctuating 
outlines the AFP not only polices but also to a considerable extent shapes and reshapes, 
due to its position as one of the primary expert agencies on identifying and managing 
transnational security risks, Australian security is portrayed as contingent on the quality 
of the domestic governance of neighbouring states, thereby creating linkages between 
the hitherto domestic governing apparatus of the Australian state and those of other 
countries. This allows for the rearticulation of the problems affecting intervened states 
and societies – indeed, their very social and political structures – in the depoliticised 
terms of the breakdown of ‘law and order’ and the absence of ‘good governance’, which 
not only rationalises emergency interventions to stabilise volatile situations, but also 
delegitimises  and  potentially  criminalises  oppositional  forms  of  politics.  The  AFP, 
however, does more than merely provide justification for intrusive state transformation 
projects. Its transnational policing activities open up a field of multilevel governance 
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within the apparatus of intervened states that exists in separation from international and 
domestic  law.  SBIs’  constitution  within  the  state  leaves  intact  the  legal  distinction 
between the domestic and international spheres and therefore circumvents the difficult 
issue of sovereignty. As a result, police and other executive-administrative actors obtain 
discretionary  ordering  powers,  without  dislodging  the  sovereign  governments  of 
intervened  countries.  The  AFP,  thus,  plays  a  key  role  in  the  constitution  and 
development of multilevel regimes of the kind discussed in the second chapter; these 
regimes and not Australia’s territorial boundaries in effect mark out the new frontier of 
the Australian state.  
In  adopting  this  perspective,  the  chapter  moves  beyond  the  limited 
preoccupation  of  the  expanding  ‘policekeeping’  and  ‘police-building’  literature  with 
assessing  the  effectiveness  of  police  interventions,  to  identify  the  emergence  and 
characteristics of these interventions in relation to the transformation of the state in the 
context of neoliberal globalisation. It is argued here that to assess the AFP’s role we 
need to examine the agency’s position within, and effect upon, an emergent regulatory 
regionalism centred on a transforming Australian state.
7 Indeed, SBIs are not simply 
about reaching governance benchmarks, but about establishing a particular relationship 
between ‘rulers’ and ‘ruled’, as well as reconstituting power relationships between the 
various  groups  that  make  up  the  former,  through  the  transnationalisation  of  the 
governing apparatus of intervened states.  
This is not to say, however, that more traditional ‘foreign policy’ issues, such as 
sovereignty,  international  law  and  nationalism,  have  not  affected  or  constrained  the 
AFP’s involvement in SBIs. For example, the IDG’s key role in the comprehensive 
Enhanced  Cooperation  Program  (ECP)  in  Papua  New  Guinea  (PNG)  was  abruptly 
brought to an end in May 2005, after the legal immunity of its personnel, which the 
PNG Parliament initially approved, was declared unconstitutional by the PNG Supreme 
Court.
8 However, what this example and others demonstrate is that such conflicts, while 
often employing the familiar language of international relations, are essentially about 
the  nature  of  emerging  state  forms.  These  are  not  conflicts  between  states  or 
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governments, taking place in a ‘foreign policy space’ as Keelty seems to suggest, but 
struggles between different regimes within a transnationalising state.   
 The chapter is structured as follows: the first section locates the AFP within the 
contemporary  Australian  state  apparatus.  The  second  section  then  examines  the 
emergence  of  an  Australian  regional  frontier,  with  a  focus  on  the  IDG  and  the 
governance of disorder across Australian borders.  
 
The Australian state and the Australian Federal Police 
The  AFP  has  undergone  substantial  transformation  since  the  terrorist  attacks  of 
September  11  2001.  The  agency  was  established  in  1979  by  combining  the 
Commonwealth Police and the Australian Capital Territory Police, following the 13 
February 1978 bombing of the Hilton hotel in Sydney during the Commonwealth Heads 
of  Government  Regional  Meeting.
9  For  most  of  its  history,  the  AFP  remained  a 
relatively small organisation, focused primarily on federal law enforcement and policing 
duties in the national capital Canberra, with a limited international presence – mainly 
through a network of liaison offices and small-scale UN peacekeeping duties. However, 
from an annual budget of approximately A$385 million and a staff of 2,500 in 2001, the 
AFP has become a powerful agency of nearly 7,000 personnel, with a budget of more 
than A$1.7 billion in 2008.
10 Aside from counter-terrorism, one of the main areas of 
growth  for  the  AFP  in  this  period  has  been  trans-border  stabilisation  and  capacity 
building activities in so-called fragile states. These were assigned to the IDG, which 
was established in February 2004 specifically for that purpose. As of February 2008, the 
IDG had 393 officers deployed in: Solomon Islands (208), Timor Leste (130), Nauru 
(17), Cyprus (14), Sudan (8), Vanuatu (8), Afghanistan (4), Tonga (1), PNG (1) and 
Cambodia  (1).
11  In  August  2006,  then  Australian  Prime  Minister  John  Howard 
announced the IDG was to expand to reach 1,200 officers by the end of 2008 at a cost of 
A$493 million – the largest single expansion drive in AFP history.
12 The IDG was also 
                                                 
9 AFP Museum, ‘A   B r i e f   H i s t o r y   o f   t h e   A u s t r alian  Federal  Police  1979-2004’, Canberra:  Australian 
Federal Police, 2004, p. 1. 
10 AFP,  ‘2008-09 Portfolio Budget Statement’, Canberra: Australian Federal Police, 2008, Table 1.1; 
Moore, Keith, ‘The Chief’, Herald Sun, 8 April 2006, Weekend section, p. 4. 
11 AAP, ‘Keelty confident of reaching International Deployment Group’, 18 February 2008, Factiva Dow 
Jones  database,  Murdoch  University  library,  available  at  <http://0-
global.factiva.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/ha/default.aspx>, accessed 9 May 2008. 
12 O’Reilly, Juani, ‘Policing the Neighbourhood and Keeping Peace in the Pacific’, Platypus, September 
2007, pp. 11-15, p. 11; AFP, ‘Annual Report 2006-07’, Canberra: Australian Federal Police, 2006, p. 
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to establish a rapid response riot squad of 200 officers, ready to be dispatched within 24 
hours  to  stabilise  flashpoints  in  Australia’s  near  region.
13  The  Kevin  Rudd  Labor 
government, which defeated the Howard-led Coalition government in the November 
2007 federal election, announced it would provide more funding to boost the AFP’s 
capacity for tackling domestic crime, but confirmed it had no plans to reduce the size of 
the IDG or scale down existing operations.
14 In fact, at the time of writing the IDG was 
being redeployed to PNG with generous funding allocations made available in the May 
2008 budget after an in-principle agreement was reached between the Australian and 
PNG governments in April 2008.
15  
While impressive, the figures above of massive and rapid growth only tell part 
of the story, since they do not reveal the extent and nature of the transformation of the 
governance landscape in which the AFP operates. As we shall see, in the context of a 
broad transformation of the Australian state in the past 25 years, the AFP has acquired 
new policymaking and governance functions, but mostly without substantial changes to 
its accountability requirements.  
 
The  neoliberalisation  of  the  Australian  state:  disaggregation  and  new  modes  of 
coordination  
The  expansion  and  transformation  of  the  AFP’s  role  and  structure,  while  more 
immediately related to the Australian government’s reaction to the events of September 
11 and the various high-profile Islamic terrorist attacks of the following years and to 
Commissioner  Keelty’s  exceptional  entrepreneurial  streak,  can  only  be  understood 
against the broader historical backdrop of the longer term and ongoing transformation 
of  the  Australian  governing  apparatus  in  the  context  of  neoliberalisation.  Beginning 
with  the  introduction  of  portfolio  ‘super-departments’  by  the  Hawke  government  in 
1987, followed by the politicisation of the upper echelons of the bureaucracy in the 
Keating  years  (1991-1996),  and  intensifying  in  the  early  years  of  the  Howard 
government (1996-2007), the Australian public service has undergone a New Public 
Management  (NPM)  revolution.
16  Inspired  by  dominant  neoliberal  notions  of 
                                                 
13  Cordell,  Marni,  ‘AFP  Expansion:  Don’t  Mention  the  Riots’,  New  Matilda,  12  September  2007, 
available at <http://newmatilda.com/2007/09/12/dont-mention-riots>, accessed 5 June 2008;  
14 Maley, Paul, ‘Service abroad cuts AFP crime focus’, The Australian, 11 January 2008, p. 6. 
15 AFP, ‘Portfolio Budget Statement’; The 18th Papua New Guinea – Australia Ministerial Forum, ‘Joint 
Statement’, Madang: Madang Resort Hotel, 23 April 2008, par. 14.  
16 Kelly, Paul, ‘Re-thinking Australian Governance: The Howard Legacy’, Australian Journal of Public 
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competition  and  contractualism,
17  the  Australian  state  apparatus  became  highly 
devolved and disaggregated:
18 
[NPM] emphasised  devolution  of  responsibility  to  agency  heads  with  direct  agency 
accountability through them, and emphasised the importance of each agency pursuing 
its own business and policy agenda encouraging organisational stovepipes—the ‘silo 
effect’.
19 
With state agencies encouraged if not compelled to outsource ‘non-core’ activities, new 
governance structures involving the public sector, the private sector and third sector 
organisations have become increasingly common from the late 1980s.     
Starting from 2001, not least due to the perceived implications of the emergence 
of global terrorism and other trans-boundary risks, the direction of reform has somewhat 
shifted: 
The  overriding  trend  for  over  a  decade –  to  devolve  responsibilities  to  agencies  – 
remains a feature of the Australian system, but it has been modified in two respects 
involving central agencies:  first, through the  whole-of-government agenda driven by 
the  Department  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  Cabinet;  and  second,  through  a  more 
prominent  role  for  central  agencies  in  espousing  and  enforcing  principles  and 
monitoring and guiding in the areas of budgeting, performance and values.
20 
The concept of ‘whole of government’ (WofG), while having a history in Australia that 
dates  back  to  the  Whitlam  government  in  the  early  1970s,  had  under  the  Howard 
government been expanded and embraced as a priority for the public service.
21 The 
contemporary notion of WofG, which the Howard and later Rudd governments adopted, 
differs from that of the Whitlam era and is particularly associated with New Labour in 
the  UK,  although  it  has  since  spread  to  many  other  Organisation  for  Economic 
Cooperation and Development states.
22 New Labour employed  
‘joined up’ approaches to public policy development and implementatio n   a s   p a r t   o f   i t s  
vision for a ‘stakeholder society’ based on partnerships and networks, where the role of 
government as an ‘enabler’ balances the market.
23  
In this formulation, WofG is in essence a kind of multilevel governance, which enables 
an encompassing set of regulatory ideas and concepts that work to discipline otherwise 
independent agencies. 
                                                                                                                                               
Government’, Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 5, no. 2 (2007), pp. 203-17, p. 203; 
Halligan,  John  and  Jill  Adams,  ‘Security, Capacity and Post-Market  Reforms:  Public  Management 
Change in 2003’, Australian Journal of Public Administration 63, no. 1 (2004), pp. 85-93, p. 89. 
17 Beeson,  Mark  and  Ann  Firth,  ‘Neoliberalism as a Political Rationality: Australian Public Policy in 
since the 1980s’, Journal of Sociology 34, no. 3 (1998), pp. 215-31, p. 223. 
18 Halligan and Adams, ‘Security, Capacity and Post-Market Reforms’, p. 85. 
19 Ibid., p. 90. 
20 Halligan, ‘Horizontal Coordination in Australian Government’, p. 207. 
21 Hunt,  Sue,  ‘Whole-of-Government:  Does  Working  Together  Work?’ Canberra: Australian National 
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The  Howard  government  announced  nine  WofG  portfolio-spanning  ‘strategic 
priorities’ in July 2002,
24 and these were to be pursued through a range of traditional 
coordinating and new processes, mainly involving changes aimed at strengthening the 
strategic leadership role of cabinet and the prime minister.
25 In general, the Howard 
government  sought  to  build  coordinating  mechanisms  into  existing  government 
structures,  rather  than  establish  new  ones,
26  with  Howard,  for  example,  strongly 
opposing the establishing of a US-style mega-department of Homeland Security.
27 In 
Canberra, interdepartmental committees (IDCs) have been a long-existing coordinating 
mechanism and they remain an important feature of contemporary coordination efforts 
of routine activities, ‘although they are less valued now as the main mode of cross-
departmental coordination for programme design, review and management’.
28 Notably, 
purposely set up task forces have become the preferred way for Australian governments 
to approach WofG issues, with the Management Advisory Committee report stating that 
‘a task force is a discrete, time-and-purpose limited agency responsible for producing a 
result in its own right.’
29 The incumbent Rudd government, for example, has set up 
numerous task forces and independent reviews of almost all areas of government. In 
another  important  example,  the  Council  of  Australian  Governments  (COAG)  – 
traditionally a consultative forum for Australian federal and state governments – has 
also  been  transformed  into  a  coordinating  policymaking  mechanism  for  issues  as 
diverse as counter-terrorism, water management and immigration.  
  In their stock-take of current WofG approaches to state fragility in a number of 
key donor states, Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown argue that ‘Australia struggles to 
translate its many policy statements into real action.’
30 However, while inter-a g e n c y  
coordination may be flawed in practice and fail to produce expected outcomes such 
critique misses out the main significance of this development. The WofG agenda, as a 
number of well-known observers noted,
31 has political significance in that it tends to 
                                                 
24 Kelly, ‘Re-thinking Australian Governance’, p. 15. 
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26 See Management Advisory Committee, ‘Connecting government: Whole of Government responses to 
Australia’s priority challenges’, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2004. 
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place  considerable  strategic  power  within  particular  parts  of  the  executive  arm  of 
government – in Australia’s case in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
(PM&C) and the office of the prime minister. It allows the prime minister and his staff 
to exert great influence over how policy issues are to be framed, in what fora they are to 
be  examined,  by  whom,  and  perhaps  more  importantly  by  whom  not.  In  short,  the 
PM&C and the office of the prime minister perform a crucial meta-governance role 
within  a  complex  and  constantly  morphing  governance  terrain  centred  on,  but  not 
restricted to, the Australian state apparatus. To John Howard, with his personalistic style 
of rule, WofG allowed to concentrate steering power in the hands of a trusted group of 
advisers, or in purposely set up taskforces.
32 WofG also has appeal to political leaders 
with more technocratic tendencies, such as Australia’s incumbent prime minister, Kevin 
Rudd,  in  that  it  allows  for  the  insulation  of  political  conflicts  within  bureaucratic-
administrative structures, such as committees of inquiry, and for the reframing of such 
conflicts in managerial, ‘consensual’ terms. For example, the new head of the PM&C 
under Rudd, Terry Moran, has been known to make extensive use of private sector 
management consulting firms when developing economic and social policy, because ‘he 
respects their economic approach to social policy, basing their research on intensive use 
of data.’
33  
It is important to reemphasise at this point that WofG is not only a strategic 
policy choice made by the prime minister, as Kelly and Jennings seem to imply. Its 
emergence and form can only be understood in light of the preceding two decades of 
devolution, decentring and neoliberalisation; indeed, as mentioned above, WofG has 
usually not meant a recentralisation of policymaking. Rather, it is a form of negative 
coordination, designed primarily to delineate the responsibilities of and parameters for 
agencies and departments in their areas of expertise.
34 Its primary point of departure 
from NPM is in that it seeks to establish horizontal and not only vertical coordination 
processes under rules set by central agencies like the PM&C and the Department of 
Finance and for this reason it acts as a disciplining devise.
35 WofG in its current form, 
therefore, strongly resonates with Leys’ assertion that in the neoliberal state, the task of 
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government has changed from managing the national economy to managing ‘national 
politics in such a way as to adapt them to the pressures of transnational market forces.’
36 
 
Whole of government and the Australian national security apparatus 
As mentioned, WofG’s political appeal to leaders of diverging hues is strongly related 
to the strategic meta-governance power it invests within the central coordinating bodies, 
which allows them to frame policy issues and parameters for other actors and agencies. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of national security and defence policy. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, national security had been one of the Howard government’s 
earliest and foremost WofG priorities. Upon assuming power in 1996, the Coalition 
government  established  the  National  Security  Committee  of  Cabinet  (NSC)  and  its 
supporting administrative mechanism, the Secretaries Committee on National Security 
(SCNS).
37 The NSC’s decisions are binding and need not be ratified by the full cabinet. 
According to Anne Tiernan, the Committee has ‘a broad ambit, spanning a spectrum 
from  defence  and  foreign  affairs  strategy  to  defence  procurement,  workforce 
development and international economic issues.’
38 From 1996 to 1998 the NSC was a 
ministers-only  Committee  that  met  infrequently;
39  however,  since  the  East  Timor 
intervention of 1999 the significance of the NSC has increased as it has become the 
government’s  primary  crisis  decision-making  centre  and  a  number  of  key  officials 
began playing more active roles.
40 
Paul  Kelly  argues  that  the  NSC’s  composition  and  its  internal  balance  are 
critical for understanding its outlook as a decision-making body.
41 The Committee is 
chaired  by  the  prime  minister,  and  also  includes  the  deputy  prime  minister,  the 
treasurer,  the  foreign  minister,  the  defence  minister  and  the  attorney-general.  Other 
ministers are invited to participate if their portfolios are deemed relevant to the issues at 
hand. However, the NSC differs from other cabinet committees in that it includes a 
number of senior officials who ‘not only attend but sit at the table and participate as co-
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equals  with  ministers’,  remaining  even  when  decisions  are  taken.
42  These  officials 
include the Chief of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), the heads of three major 
government departments – Defence, Foreign Affairs and PM&C – as well as the heads 
of the Office of National Assessment, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO) and the AFP. Tiernan argues that the active participation of officials ‘ensures 
the prime minister has access to the widest possible range of advice – direct from people 
he knows and trusts and who have the relevant experience and expertise.’
43 The real 
significance of the NSC, however, 
…is that [the Committee] anchors military, intelligence and police chiefs at the heart of 
government. These collective  chiefs,  by  dint  of  institutional  power  and  personality, 
have a position within government more influential than before. This represents a shift 
in bureaucratic and political power whose viability remains to be fully tested but whose 
results are on display.
44   
The  principal  issue  is  not  whether  the  NSC  is  an  effective  way  of  keeping 
Australia safe. Rather, with the government’s primary coordinating body for national 
security policy structured in this way a whole raft of issues can become ‘securitised’ – 
presented as above politics
45 – thereby limiting the scope of political contestation over 
these matters, with NSC decisions presented as flowing from the impartial and apolitical 
advice of security professionals. This is not to say that public sentiment does not affect 
‘security’ policy and what is defined as such; indeed, few other prime ministers were 
more attuned to popular mood swings than John Howard, the ‘permanent campaigner’, 
and Kevin Rudd appears no different in this respect. However, the spectrum of ‘national 
security’ has undoubtedly tended to expand in recent years and so have the ‘emergency’ 
powers of security agencies and their influence over policy formation. The NSC has 
also  anchored  the  role  of  the  prime  minister  and  the  PM&C  at  the  centre  of  the 
Australian national security apparatus.
46 In mid 2008, a report by former Department of 
Defence  head  Ric  Smith  on  proposed  reform  of  the  domestic  national  security 
architecture was submitted to the Rudd government for consideration. While the report 
was  not  yet  made  public  at  the  time  of  writing,  it  was  believed  that  its  main 
recommendation would be to strengthen the role of the PM&C as ‘the lead national 
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security  co-ordination  agency  with  policy  oversight  of  both  intelligence  and  border 
security.’
47 This recommendation supports the argument made here, highlighting the 
fact that the general trend of state transformation cannot be seen as a partisan issue in 
Australia and elsewhere. 
The political nature of the NSC as a form of meta-governance, which allows the 
selective ‘securitisation’ of a wide range of policy issues, from military intervention to 
immigration policy, as well as the strategic articulation of the spectrum of responses to 
such ‘security’ problems, is exposed in those instances in which public conflict emerges 
between  the  ‘experts’  and  the  politicians  on  the  Committee.  For  example,  AFP 
Commissioner Keelty’s tendency to voice independent views on controversial issues got 
him into strife with Howard and fellow Coalition ministers on at least two occasions. 
On the first, following the Madrid bombings in 2004, Keelty was in hot water for saying 
Australia’s involvement in the American-led war in Iraq had made it more of a target 
for terrorist attacks.
48 Later in September 2007, Keelty’s claim that climate change was 
the biggest security risk Australia faced, particularly due to predicted food shortages 
and  population  movements  in  the  region,  drew  fire  from  Howard  and  his  Defence 
Minister  Brendan  Nelson,  who  argued  terrorism  remained  the  gravest  threat  to 
Australia.
49    
 
The AFP’s new policy role and accountability requirements  
Such disagreements aside, the inclusion of AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty within the 
NSC  demonstrates  the  transformation  of  the  AFP’s  role  in  recent  years  and,  more 
broadly, the ways in which Australian executive power has extended transnationally. In 
the same speech highlighted at the top of the chapter, Keelty said: 
I think one of the strengths of the [Howard] Government has been the creation of the 
National Security Committee of Cabinet where issues such as the arming of police in 
offshore deployments can be debated between officials and the inner Cabinet. While I 
understand that a similar structure existed under some previous Labor Governments, I 
can only speak from experience and observe that for me as Commissioner, this has been 
a very effective way to deal with policy making.
50 
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Peter Shergold, Howard’s PM&C Secretary and one of the principal architects of WofG 
in Australia, said in this regard in 2004 that the ‘good and bad news’ for the AFP were 
that it was ‘firmly located at the centre of government.’
51 The AFP has in the process 
shifted from a largely passive policy implementation role to one of increasing policy 
activism  within  the  WofG  framework.  This  is  demonstrated  by  the  internal 
transformation  of  the  agency  in  2004  from  a  geographically  to  a  function-based 
organisational structure. The AFP’s new structure is based on six functions representing 
the agency’s main operational activities – counter terrorism, border and international 
network,  economic  and  special  operations,  intelligence,  protection  and  international 
deployment group.
52 These functions are each headed by a National Manager, who ‘is 
accountable  for…providing  high  level  leadership  and  guidance,  including  policy 
advice.’
53 In this way, the AFP has been able to play both a strategic role in the NSC 
and an activist role within lower level IDCs and other implementation frameworks. The 
new organisational structure has allowed the AFP to frame policy issues around its areas 
of expertise and take the leadership on developing and coordinating policy responses to 
these.  
The shift from reacting to policy activism is clearly outlined by an IDG senior 
policy adviser:  
From the policy perspective, initially it was through [Australian] government request – 
the government makes the commitment and consults the IDG and AFP…But this is 
beginning to change now. With the experience gathered by the IDG especially, we’d 
like  to  believe  we  have  a  lot  more  relevant  information  and  expertise  and  we  can 
contribute to the general decision-making process.
54  
This is echoed by Judy Lind, AFP National Manager for Policy and Future Strategies: 
AFP  is  formally  under  the  Attorney-General’s  department.  Ten  years  ago  the 
department  would  have  seen  itself  as  driving  policy  with  AFP  as  implementation 
instrument. Now the AFP has knowledge and perspective that no-one else has.
55  
In  the  process  of  becoming  a  policymaking  agency,  the  IDG  senior  policy  adviser 
argues, the AFP has begun supplanting traditional foreign policy actors, like DFAT:  
[It’s about] making government work better by giving ideas, like what kind of operation 
we should be committing to, and how much commitment we should be making, based 
on our own information about the political and strategic situation in those theatres, as to 
the implications. Because DFAT has their own information network but they are not as 
grassroots-level  based  as  IDG,  we  can  add  value  to  the  system…  DFAT  has  been 
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traditionally the adviser to government, based on their expertise at that level, so we 
h a v e   t o   b r e a k   i n   t o   t h a t   s y s t e m   a n d   i t   t a k e s   a   b i t   o f   t i m e. From our point of view it’s 
about creating confidence… Because we are requested to intervene at times of civil 
s t r i f e ,  i n  t h o s e  k i n d s  o f  i s s u e s  w e  c a n ’ t  r e l y  e n t i r e l y  on other departments like DFAT to 
make that assessment for us.
56 
Aside from policy activism, there is some evidence that Keelty has used his influence in 
the NSC to shape the jurisdictional environment within which the AFP operates:  
It was recommendations from the AFP – and personal lobbying of decision-makers by 
Keelty – that led to the creation of many of the tough new terrorism laws now available 
to the AFP and ASIO.
57 
Despite  the  immense  growth  in  the  size  of  the  AFP  and  in  its  policy  and 
operational activities, the agency’s political accountability requirements have remained 
mostly  unchanged  throughout  the  past  decade.  That  said,  at  the  time  of  writing  it 
became  known  that  the  Clarke  report  into  the  bungled  investigation  of  Mohamed 
Haneef  –  an  Indian  doctor  practising  in  a  Gold  Coast  hospital,  who  was  wrongly 
accused  in  2007  of  having  links  with  militant  Islamist  terrorist  groups,  arrested, 
investigated and then deported from Australia – would recommend changes to AFP 
accountability requirements, which would make it directly answerable to a new joint 
House of Representatives and Senate committee.
58 Australian Attorney-General Robert 
McClelland  accepted  these  recommendations  in  principle,  though  he  qualified  his 
support by saying the primary objective remained preventing a terrorist attack from 
happening.
59 The precise nature of the new measures was not specified by the minister 
and the Clarke inquiry did not have judicial powers. For this reason I shall proceed with 
outlining the accountability framework known at the time of writing. 
Former Australian diplomat and AFP watcher,  Bruce Haigh, has argued that 
Howard and Keelty developed a ‘symbiotic relationship’, in which Keelty was allowed 
to develop and announce government policy in relation to federal policing issues. Haigh 
also  claimed  that  the  AFP’s  increased  power  and  influence  had  come  without 
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‘concomitant  change  in  the  level  of  ministerial  control  or  parliamentary  scrutiny.’
60 
Haigh is only partially right to attribute the AFP’s current clout and operational space to 
the personal relationship between Howard and  Keelty.  In fact, despite  Labor’s very 
public dissatisfaction with the AFP’s handling of the investigation of Dr Haneef, Keelty 
did not lose his job as some predicted
61 nor his seat on the NSC when Labor won 
power. In fact, the AFP was one of only few state agencies to enjoy funding increases in 
the  May  2008  budget  of  the  new  government.  Haigh  was,  however,  correct  in 
identifying the agency’s limited political accountability framework. 
  As a police force in the Westminster tradition the AFP, unlike the military, has 
historically  been  independent  from  government  and  subject  to  law.  It  receives  its 
funding from the federal government and while section 37(2) of the Australian Federal 
Police Act 1979 allows the Justice Minister, under whose portfolio the AFP is located, 
to  issue  ‘Ministerial  Directions’  to  shape  the  agency’s  priorities  according  to 
government expectations, in its day to day operations the AFP is independent, ‘so that 
nobody’s above the law.’
62 Aside from adhering to relevant legislation, the AFP is also 
required to report on major contracts, consultancies and proposed procurement activity 
and to provide an annual budget statement.
63 The Auditor-General examines the AFP, 
but only in terms of administrative procedures, not policy. The AFP does not have a 
Senate Committee regularly monitoring its activities like the ADF, though this is set to 
change, nor does it have a dedicated government minister.
64 When the Senate Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade examined the AFP’s state building 
role as part of its 2007 Inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations 
the limitations of this form of accountability were clear. In its submission to the Senate 
Committee, World Vision Australia alleged that an IDG team leader in Solomon Islands 
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January 2008, available at <http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/has-federal-police-boss-reached-
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ment>, accessed 11 June 2008.  
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instructed police to aim at a person’s neck with a 12 gauge bean bag and shoot people in 
the  back  while  fleeing  during  the  April  2006  Honiara  riots,  in  contravention  of  the 
Commissioner’s Order 3, which outlines acceptable use of force.
65 The claims were 
investigated internally within the AFP and were found to be unsubstantiated, although 
the AFP officer who reported the incident to World Vision was not interviewed for the 
inquiry. Commissioner’s Order 3 was also changed retroactively for 28 days after the 
riots to allow the use of such measures. The Senate Committee finally responded to 
World  Vision’s  claims  by  saying  it  would  not  examine  specific  grievances  and  no 
further  scrutiny  has  been  given  to  these  allegations  since.
66  Furthermore,  Senate 
Committees, while undoubtedly useful for airing matters in public, have no decision-
making authority and can only make recommendations. In any case, the main issue for 
accountability is not so much whether AFP personnel who engage in criminal activities 
while on deployment will be punished, since all AFP overseas appointees fall under 
Australian  jurisdiction.
67  Rather,  since  the  AFP/IDG  has  considerable  operational 
independence the main issue is the political accountability of the agency’s decision-
making process.   
For its part, the AFP has in recent years aimed to demonstrate its transparency 
and accountability credentials by inviting external reviewers to examine the operation 
and effectiveness of the IDG. In particular, the AFP in partnership with researchers 
from the Australian National University and Flinders University has secured substantial 
Australia  Research  Council  funding  for  the  ongoing  ‘Policing  the  Neighbourhood’ 
project. The project’s primary aim is, ‘to develop an analytical framework by which 
Australian police assistance missions can be understood, assessed, and in the future, be 
guided so as to contribute effectively, equitably, and sensitively to the improvement of 
law and order in host countries.’
68 The AFP’s support for the research was rationalised 
by then IDG National Manager Paul Jevtovic in terms of its operational utility: 
Regional assistance missions are a relatively new area of business for the AFP, so it is 
important our approach is constantly monitored and reviewed to ensure it meets desired 
objectives and, most importantly, the needs of the local people… This partnership with 
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the academic community is vital for obtaining a considered and independent assessment 
of our work, not just in the Solomon Islands, but other IDG missions as well.
69                
The  IDG  has  also  more  recently  entered  into  partnership  with  researchers  from  the 
University of Queensland and is currently funding a large-scale study, including two 
PhD  scholarships,  for  the  purpose  of  developing  a  comprehensive  performance 
evaluation framework for deployments.
70  
While AFP and IDG executives have made much of the agency’s willingness to 
invite close scrutiny from academics,
71 and there is certainly no suggestion here that 
researchers’ integrity has been compromised in any way, the AFP is under no obligation 
to implement all or any of the recommendations of these studies, nor is it obliged to 
provide researchers with full access to information.
72 Furthermore, since these research 
partnerships  were  invited  if  not  wholly  funded  by  the  IDG,  they  are  somewhat 
constrained in their choice of objectives and priorities. For example, Goldsmith and 
Dinnen  from  the  ‘Policing  the  Neighbourhood’  project  make  the  crucial  point  that 
‘police-building’ is inherently political in that it almost inevitably challenges existing 
power  structures.
73  They  argue  that  ‘most  police-building  exercises  flounder  or  fail 
because  of  their  narrow  technical  focus  and  of  an  inadequate  understanding  of  the 
environmental  and  political  contexts  in  which  they  occur.’
74  The  latter  comment, 
however, suggests that the study remains focused on ways to refine implementation and 
is  therefore  examining  these  deployments  in  their  own  terms.  While  they  criticise 
dominant  approaches  to  police  building  for  their  narrow  institutionalist  bias,  they 
remain wedded to the objective of understanding why such interventions succeed or fail 
in achieving their stated objectives. It appears that the main recommendation from the 
project to be picked up and implemented thus far has been lengthening pre-deployment 
training to police officers from 12 to 35 days and placing more emphasis on ‘cultural’ 
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training and attention to local sensitivities,
75 thus revealing the functional way in which 
such reviews are incorporated into the IDG’s mode of operation.      
  Crucially, the AFP’s accountability requirements are not outlined above in order 
to identify a ‘problem’. Rather, it is argued that these provide part of the explanation for 
the  AFP’s  enhanced  involvement  in  Australian-led  state  building.  It  is  not  that  the 
Australian government has aimed to escape scrutiny by selecting the AFP to carry out 
missions  normally  associated  with  the  ADF,  but  that  the  currency  of  transnational 
policing is a manifestation of the anti-political, or anti-pluralist, nature of current SBIs. 
This  is  perhaps  unsurprising  if  we  consider  the  particular  historical  and  political 
backdrop to the emergence of this mode of governance, which has been detailed earlier 
in the thesis. In this regard, Mitchell Dean reminds us of Carl Schmitt’s contention that 
war  is  conducted  between  two  recognised  sovereigns  and  therefore  morality  is  not 
relevant in that situation, whereas ‘Police is conducted on the basis of a fundamental 
moral discrimination.’
76 This means that while the military confronts an ‘enemy’ – a 
political  agent  –  police  is  concerned  with  ‘disorder’–  a  faceless  and  supposedly 
apolitical  phenomenon.  Police  is  therefore  not  interested  in  attaining  victory,  but  in 
restoring order;
77 indeed, it is a form of political rule concerned with the regulation and 
ordering  of  the  everyday.  In  this  sense  it  shares  a  family  resemblance  with 
‘development’  and  both  are  to  be  found  within  contemporary  SBIs;
78  but  unlike 
development,  police  is  not  a  ‘liberal’  mode  of  governance  in  that  it  is  inherently 
coercive and disciplinary.  
 
The International Deployment Group and the Australian state’s new frontiers  
In this section I examine the transnationalisation of Australian state power, particularly 
in the form of SBIs, focusing on the role played by the AFP and IDG in this. Australian 
governments’ approach to the territories and peoples to Australia’s east and north has 
historically  been  shaped  predominantly  by  security  considerations.
79  But  in  turn, 
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perceptions  of  the  nature  of  the  security  environment  and  the  real-existing  policy 
approaches  and  structures  developed  to  deal  with  such  security  concerns  cannot  be 
dissociated from the political economy of the Australian state. We have already seen in 
the first section the ways in which the governing apparatus of the Australian state has 
transformed in the context of neoliberalisation, leading to the emergence of new forms 
of  coordination  that  transform  established  policymaking  structures.  It  is  through the 
intersection of these with other historical processes – in particular, the perceived rise of 
fundamentalist Islamist terrorism in the wake of the September 11 and October 2002 
Bali bombings, but also Australian experience in previous UN interventions and shifting 
trends in development orthodoxy – that we should understand the particular form the 
transformation-transnationalisation  of  Australian  state  power  has  assumed  and  the 
AFP’s position within these structures.  
 
The contours of the Australian state’s regionalisation 
To  argue  the  Australian  state  is  ‘regionalising’  is  not  to  say  that  the  Australian 
government is necessarily interested in capturing territory or governing the peoples who 
live there. Australian governments of both sides of politics have in fact had very little 
appetite for assuming direct responsibility for managing the internal affairs of Pacific 
states  and  societies  in  the  decolonisation  era;  indeed,  the  Australian  government’s 
reluctance  to  rule  directly  is  not  unique  or  unusual,  according  to  Chandler  and 
Ignatieff.
80  The  process  we  now  witness  is  of  the  regionalisation  of  Australian 
governance,  not  government.  It  involves  the  establishing  of  coordinated  spaces  of 
governance  in  which  Australian  state  agencies  play  a  pivotal  meta-governance  role, 
although not necessarily a direct governing role, within the fabric of other ‘sovereign’ 
states. The ‘regionalised’ Australian state has thus become a level of governance within 
intervened states.
81 It is important that this level of transnationalisation, in contrast with 
traditional forms of inter-state relations, develops and morphs mostly according to the 
needs  identified  by  ‘specialist’  agencies,  like  the  AFP,  and  not  through 
intergovernmental  negotiations.  The  intergovernmental  level  remains  essential  for 
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establishing  the  legal  space  within  which  these  ‘bureaucratic’  forms  of  intervention 
exist, but in most cases such agreements stop short of laying out specified plans for 
action.  The  resulting  independent  spaces  of  governance  are  coordinated  primarily 
through  WofG  and  ‘sector-wide  approaches’  to  create  multilevel  regimes – existing 
simultaneously  within  and  without  the  intervened  state.  This  emerging  regulatory 
regionalism  in  practice  can  take  a  bilateral  or  multilateral  form,  or  a  combination 
thereof,  though  the  fundamental  characteristics  are  similar.  The  Australian 
government’s choice of whether to take a bilateral or multilateral approach has been 
explained as relating to the trade-off between better coordination and coherence on one 
hand and more legitimacy on the other.
82 Below are notable examples for multilateral 
and bilateral manifestations of the regionalisation of the Australian state.    
Since its formal ratification by Pacific countries’ leaders in late 2005, the Pacific 
Plan of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has advanced programs aimed at promoting a 
broad set of governance objectives in all PIF member-states, not only in post-conflict 
situations or ‘fragile’ states.
83 While police-military coercive power is absent in the 
Plan’s  implementation,  it  nevertheless  constitutes  a  template  for  establishing  the 
Southwest Pacific ‘region’, not as a supranational entity, but as a level of governance 
within member-states. This does not mean that more traditional forms of regionalism 
based  around  non-intervention,  respect  for  state  sovereignty  and  state-to-state 
diplomacy have altogether disappeared. Rather, the persistence of existing state borders 
and the state-to-state terrain it opens up are coterminous with the Plan’s objectives of 
containing the potential spill-overs of security risks from one state to another in the 
region. In turn, notions of sovereignty have on occasion been used by Pacific leaders to 
resist reform.  
It  is  widely  accepted  that  the  new  regionalism  push,  which  began  with  the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) intervention in July 2003, 
has  to  a  great  extent  been  driven  by  the  Australian  government,  concerned  by  the 
potential  implications  of  disengagement  from  the  ‘fragile  states’  in  the  region  for 
Australian national security. The Howard government also succeeded in 2004 in placing 
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the now-deceased Australian diplomat Greg Urwin at the helm of the PIF Secretariat – 
the first time for a non-islander to serve as the organisation’s Secretary-General. To be 
sure, Pacific regionalism has always been to some extent a patron-client regionalism.
84 
For example, while strong in anti-colonial rhetoric, the South Pacific Forum (now PIF) 
has nevertheless been reliant on funding from Australia and New Zealand for its more 
ambitious programs, such as the Forum Fisheries Agency.
85 There is also nothing new 
about Australian security interests shaping the South Pacific’s regionalisation agenda. 
For example, Soviet overtures to Tonga in 1976 led the Fraser government to quadruple 
its aid to the Pacific and weigh in to pressure the Forum to accept Australia’s Cold War 
security agenda as its own.
86 What is unique about the new regionalism, which sets it 
apart  from  earlier  forms  of  regionalism  in  the  Pacific,  is  that  it  primarily  seeks  to 
transform the member-states themselves, not merely the terrain of cooperation between 
them.  
The Pacific Plan posits ‘good governance’ as necessary to ensure the benefits of 
regionalism.  The  economic  rationale  of  helping  small  states  realise  ‘economies  of 
scale’, which is the ‘carrot’ offered by the Plan to convince Pacific leaders to join in, ‘is 
assumed to be unworkable without significant improvements in governance throughout 
the region.’
87 While this seems to validate the importance of political leadership to the 
Plan’s success, it effectively delegitimises political opposition to its governance agenda 
and  thus  encourages  the  limiting  of  political  interference  in  the  programs  advanced 
through the Pacific Plan. These are developed, coordinated and implemented at the level 
of  bureaucrats.  While  formal  commitment  to  ‘good  governance’  in  the  Pacific  was 
already granted in the PIF’s 1997 ‘Eight Principles of Public Accountability’, the 2000 
Biketawa Declaration, and the 2003 ‘Forum principles of good leadership,
88 the Pacific 
Plan  goes  beyond  such  proclamations  to  establish  regulation  and  monitoring 
mechanisms  within  the  state  for  the  implementation  of  these  principles  and  other 
security-related ones.  
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The goal of the Pacific Plan is to: ‘Enhance and stimulate economic growth, 
sustainable development, good governance and security for Pacific countries through 
regionalism.’
89 Notably, the implementation of the Plan is to occur within states, not so 
much in the spaces between them – ‘the development and implementation of national 
policies and strategies on regionalism is a critical Strategic Objective of the Pacific 
Plan.’
90 Monitoring and evaluation of implementation at a national-level is the role of 
the  PIF  Secretariat,  through  its  implementation  unit  and  the  Pacific  Plan  Action 
Committee. The various initiatives flagged in the Plan under the rubric of improving 
governance are instructive of the intrusive nature of the emerging implementation and 
monitoring processes that are to be developed within member-states and coordinated at 
the regional level. For example, the Plan’s Background Paper no. 5 proposed ‘economic 
and statistical technical assistance’ for macroeconomic and tax policy; ‘assistance to 
custom  officials’  to  collect  revenue;  establishing  a  ‘regional  ombudsman’;  and  a 
‘regional  panel  of  auditors’.
91  In  the  Pacific  Plan  document  itself,  the  high  priority 
issues  for  immediate  implementation  in  the  area  of  governance  include:  institution 
building (mainly accountability, audit and law and justice institutions), as well as the 
enhancement of governance mechanisms in resource management and the somewhat 
ambitious  ‘harmonisation  of  traditional  and  modern  values  and  structures’.
92  The 
monitoring  and  evaluation  framework  for  assessing  the  state  of  governance  in  the 
Pacific is based on six indicators developed by the World Bank Institute – voice and 
accountability; political stability; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of 
law; and control of corruption. These indicators are meant to be composite assessments 
of many sources, such as Freedom House and Global Insight. However, as Roberts et al. 
argue, even if one accepts the validity of the World Bank  Institute’s indicators, the 
dataset available in the Pacific is ‘astonishingly thin’.
93 In any case, this framework 
places considerable power in the hands of governance experts: 
As  expert  knowledges  about  the  Pacific  are  generated  in  the  indicator  industries  of 
(predominantly  US)  universities,  corporations  and  development  organizations,  the 
possibilities for Pacific islanders to define themselves are severely compromised.
94  
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What is also compromised is the ability of Pacific islanders to advance political agendas 
that are not aligned with the Plan’s definition of ‘good governance’.  
  Aside from governance issues, the Pacific Plan also puts considerable emphasis 
on  more  immediate  security-related  issues.  In  particular,  the  Plan  calls  for  the 
‘development and implementation of strategies and associated legislation for maritime 
and aviation security and surveillance’, as well as the ‘[i]mplementation of the Pacific 
Islands Regional Security Technical Cooperation Strategy in border security, including 
for trans-national crime, bio-security, and mentoring for national financial intelligence 
units’.
95  As  we  can  see,  the  emphasis  within  the  Plan  is  on  the  management  and 
containment of transnational risks of various kinds within the geographical borders of 
member-countries  through  the  establishing  of  ‘regional’  forms  of  country-level 
regulation.  There  are  also  provisions  made  in  the  Plan  for  increased  training  and 
capacity building to domestic law enforcement agencies, a role that has primarily been 
awarded to the IDG. 
  Another scheme, this time a bilateral one, to ‘regionalise’ the Australian state 
apparatus is the Australian Agency for International Development’s (AusAID) Pacific 
Governance  Support  Program  (PGSP).  PGSP  is  designed  to  link  government 
departments  from  Pacific  island  countries  directly  with  their  Australian  federal 
counterparts. The PGSP attempts to strengthen the governance of states in the Pacific 
through  personnel  exchanges  and  secondments,  training  and  mentoring  programs, 
institutional capacity building and technical assistance. So far PGSP initiatives included 
electoral  processes  and  judicial  administration;  customs  compliance  and  financial 
intelligence  capacity;  increasing  capacity  to  comply  with  international  taxation 
regulations;  strengthening  the  role  of  ombudsmen;  health  and  therapeutic  goods 
administration; environmental management and disaster warning services; governance 
of  fisheries  resources;  and  maritime  and  aviation  security.
96  In  this  respect,  Stewart 
Firth has argued that:  
Australia’s role in the region is beginning to resemble that of the US in the Micronesian 
freely  associated  states,  where  the  Compacts  provide  for  American  government 
agencies to intervene directly in administering former American territories.
97   
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Aside from the Pacific Plan and the PGSP, which are of a more general pre-
emptive  nature,  the  Australian  government  has  also  sought  to  intervene  more 
comprehensively in states seen to be at a more immediate risk of failure. In a similar 
manner,  however,  such  interventions  rely  on  the  establishing  of  independent,  if 
coordinated,  spaces  of  governance  within  the  state  through  an  enabling 
intergovernmental agreement. In such cases, where the security implications are seen to 
be more imminent, the IDG has played a key role. For example, in an agreement signed 
between  the  Australian  and  Nauru  governments  in  May  2004,  designed  to  prevent 
‘economic collapse and ultimately…Nauru’s failure as a state, creating a humanitarian 
crisis and the possibility that Nauru would become a haven for trans-national crime’,
98 
the Nauru government agreed to have an AFP officer as its police commissioner, as well 
as let in a number of other IDG personnel in advisory roles. Police assistance was meant 
to manage a program of police infrastructure, development and training for the Nauru 
Police Force and provide advice to the Nauru Government on law and justice reforms. 
Police  assistance  is  part  of  a  WofG  state  building  effort  in  Nauru,  for  which  the 
Australian  government  has  provided  a  number  of  other  key  in-line  positions  in  the 
Nauru public sector, including secretary of finance, director of health and director of 
education. A planning specialist and resident magistrate are also provided under the 
Pacific Islands Forum’s Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru (PRAN) program.
99 The 
Nauru deployment does not involve IDG police officers in day-to-day policing duties, 
but by placing Australian police officers in the commissioner’s role and in key advisory 
positions, the AFP has effectively taken charge of the management and future policy 
direction of the tiny Nauru police force:  
Based on the [Nauru Police Force] Commissioner’s   a s s e s s m e n t ,   t h e   N P F   w i l l   b e   r e -
structured to best meet Nauru’s law and order needs. Along with providing training and 
guidance  to  the  NPF,  the  Australian  police  team  will  facilitate  the  provision  of 
Australian support for legislative drafting, including updating Nauru’s criminal code.
100 
In  Nauru,  the  IDG  has  become  part  of  the  state  apparatus,  carving  out  an 
independent albeit coordinated role, which intersects in complex ways with other spaces 
of  governance  in  which  other  Australian  government  agencies  play  similar  roles, 
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through both coordination on the ground and in Canberra. For this reason, it is more 
accurate to define the outlines of the emerging regional governance terrain in terms of 
shifting frontiers of governance, rather than in terms of fixed national borders. These 
governance  frontiers  are  not  indifferent,  however,  to  the  existence  of  borders, 
particularly due to the issue of jurisdiction but also because SBIs seek to manage risk by 
containing it geographically. Nevertheless, the ‘regional’ Australian state’s definitive 
attribute is not that it operates across borders, but that it attempts to manage and police 
complex  social  phenomena  through  the  establishing  of  a  variety  of  governance 
structures  within  which  these  conflicts  are  depoliticised,  securitised  and  treated  as 
matters  of  good  governance  and  law  and  order.  This,  in  turn,  serves  to  construct  a 
particular relationship between rulers and ruled – one defined through the discretion 
abrogated by the former to deny legitimate political agency to, and even criminalise, the 
latter.       
That  the  regionalisation  of  the  Australian  state  is  about  the  articulation  of  a 
securitised  form  of  political  rule,  in  which  social  problems  are  policed  through  the 
activation  of  discretionary  administrative  powers,  and  not  simply  about  Australian 
government  agencies  operating  across  borders,  is  made  apparent  by  the  parallels 
between  Pacific  interventions  and  the  ongoing  Australian  federal  government’s 
intervention in Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory (NT) of Australia. The 
AFP-IDG has played a key role in this intervention too. In fact, it is not a coincidence 
that  former  IDG  National  Manager  and  ousted  Royal  Solomon  Islands  Police 
Commissioner  Shane  Castles  was  initially  offered  leadership  of  the  intervention 
taskforce.  Castles  declined  and  the  position  was  eventually  filled  by  ADF  Major-
General David Chalmers. Of course, having taken place within Australian jurisdiction 
and not even within the jurisdiction of one of Australia’s states, the NT intervention was 
unencumbered by issues of international law and sovereignty and has therefore assumed 
a more direct and coercive form than most Australian-led trans-boundary interventions, 
perhaps with the exception of RAMSI in its earlier stages. However, the crucial aspect 
that the NT intervention shares with ‘international’ interventions is the constitution of 
new governance subjects through the securitised treatment of social phenomena. In the 
course of this ‘domestic’ intervention, the citizen rights of the Aborigines living in NT 
remote communities and towns were suspended for five years in the name of restoring 
public order and good governance.  CHAPTER FIVE 
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The  NT  intervention  was  unexpectedly  announced  in  June  2007  by  then 
Australian federal indigenous affairs minister Mal Brough to tackle a supposed endemic 
problem of child sexual abuse in remote Aboriginal communities, following the release 
of  the  NT  government’s  special  taskforce  report  Little  Children  are  Sacred.  Sex 
offenders  were  already  considered  criminals  under  pre-existing  laws,  but  the 
intervention in effect has aimed to bring about a comprehensive transformation of the 
entire social order in Aboriginal communities. In this regard, Chalmers said:  
This is about targeting what it is that creates an environment that allows sex abuse  to 
o c c u r   a t   a   r a t e   t h a t   i s   m u c h   l a r g e r   t h a n   t h e   r e s t   o f   t h e   c o m m u n i t y …   S o   i t   i s   l o o k i n g   a t  
issues of employment, housing, health and education are all addressed so that the next 
generation  of  Aboriginal  children  have  some  chance  of  growing  up  safe,  happy  and 
healthy.
101  
The federal government forcibly acquired control over the communities for five years 
from the NT government and brought in a large number of police officers (mostly from 
the AFP) and troops to monitor implementation. Among other things, the government 
instigated compulsory 99-year land lease arrangements (later changed by the incoming 
Labor  government  to  either  40+40  or  99  year  leases)  to  develop  the  private  sector, 
commissioned  business  managers  to  run  communities,  placed  bans  on  alcohol  and 
pornography  consumption,  and  imposed  stringent  controls  on  how  50  per  cent  of 
welfare payments were to be spent.
102 Interestingly, Neil Westbury, the main intellectual 
force  in  a  taskforce  set  up  by  Labor  Indigenous  Affairs  Minister Jenny  Macklin  to 
develop future policy directions for the intervention, previously co-authored Beyond 
Humbug – a book in which he and Mike Dillon, another Labor aboriginal affairs expert, 
argue Aboriginal Australia constitutes a ‘failed state’ from which the rest of the nation 
has chosen to disengage.
103  
While the NT intervention was probably motivated by a mix of election year 
political opportunism and real humanitarian concern for the well-being of Aboriginal 
children,
104  the  Australian  government’s  increased  willingness  to  countenance 
intervention across borders has been associated with the perception that state fragility or 
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failure  constitutes  an  unacceptable  security  risk  to  Australia.
105  In  the  wake  of  the 
September 11 terrorist attacks and others closer to Australia, it became commonplace to 
view fragile states as a source of risk, not in a direct sense but through the potential 
cross-border flow of transnational crime, disease and terrorism, to name but a few.
106 
However, as with the NT intervention, since the source of social and political conflict is 
seen  to  be  the  flawed  nature  of  existing  governance  arrangements  –  whether  as  a 
consequence  of  design,  culture,  or  both  –  the  result  is  the  securitisation  of  social 
phenomena and the denial of equal political agency to actors in intervened states. For 
example, former IDG National Manager Paul Jevtovic has argued: ‘Policing deals with 
the breakdown of social and institutional structures; underneath that are unemployment 
and other issues that are not the responsibility of police.’
107 The very definition of state 
fragility  in  terms  of  whether  states  meet  certain  performance  benchmarks  serves  to 
obfuscate both the historical processes that have led to the emergence of particular state 
forms  and  the  political  and  ideological  underpinnings  of  the  definition  of  fragility 
itself.
108 Next we shall examine the particular role the AFP has played in the emerging 
Australian regional frontier. 
 
The AFP and Australian regionalisation  
The AFP has assumed a central position, not only in implementing government policy, 
but also, as the ‘expert’ agency on law and order issues within the Australian WofG 
state  apparatus,  in  defining  the  very  nature  of  potential  de-bounded  risk  in  various 
settings and the sorts of policy responses required to meet perceived challenges. The 
role of police in defining and responding to state fragility serves to create a field of 
governance  that  enables  the  limiting  of  political  space  in  practice,  without  treating 
conflict – both pre-existing and that generated by intervention – in political terms. The 
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IDG’s modus operandi is laid out clearly in the AFP’s submission to the Senate inquiry 
into Australia’s involvement in peacekeeping operations:  
The  AFP,  in  partnership  with  other  Departments  and  agencies,  is  focussed  on 
addressing weaknesses in law enforcement and the judicial sector in our region through 
building capacity in order to reduce conflict. However, should conflict emerge, the AFP 
is structured to respond in positive, dynamic and meaningful ways in our region and 
beyond as part of the whole of government process.
109 
The  assumed  relationship  between  conflict  and  poor  governance  and  the 
implications for police has also been articulated by AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty. 
He has argued that one of the main challenges the IDG is facing is ‘[e]stablishing law 
and  order  in  these  “imperfectly  governed  democracies”’.
110  While  he  argues  that 
operating in an ‘international space’ also necessarily means operating in a ‘political 
space’, it is implicit that Keelty believes international policing becomes politicised, not 
because of its inherent political nature, but due to the inadequacies of the governance 
systems in which it has to operate. Indeed, Keelty seems to suggest that the roots of 
conflict  and  instability  are  to  be  found  in  the  ways  in  which  intervened  states  are 
governed. Because these systems are often compromised, he says, police can become 
embroiled in political conflict:  
If you, for example, arrest and charge a Cabinet Minister for corruption, you actually 
change  the  makeup  of  the  Cabinet  and  therefore,  conceivably,  could  change  the 
i n v i t a t i o n   t o   b e   t h e r e   i n   t h e   f i r s t   p l a c e .   S o   i n   t e r m s   o f   e x e r c i s i n g   o f   police discretion, 
what is the most valuable work to do first?
111    
In the same vein, Jevtovic has proclaimed: ‘IDG is apolitical – it is there to deliver law 
and order… The energy spent on responding to accusations [of misconduct] should be 
spent elsewhere.’
112 A senior IDG policy adviser has argued that the main stumbling 
block for generating domestic consensus over police reform is that, 
…there are parties  with vested interests,  for example bribery, and issues cannot be 
resolved because there are people benefiting from that. It becomes a matter of setting 
realistic objectives. What can we achieve under the circumstances? And maybe it is 
smarter to aim for achievement of objectives over a longer period of time.
113  
IDG  Manager,  Governance  and  Future  Strategies,  Dr  Tony  Murney  has  gone  even 
further to argue that conflict with local elites is a sign the IDG is hitting the right spot: 
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These tensions [between former Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare 
and the AFP] are viewed as failure. The exchange between AFP and Sogavare has been 
one about change. Without heat being generated, you’re not having an effect. Had there 
not been tension there wouldn’t have been change.
114 
The  AFP  management  team  recognises  that  there  may  be  practical  limitations  to 
establishing  ideal-typical  criminal  justice  systems  and  that  IDG  officers  should  not 
ignore these limitations in the interests of achieving the broader objective of mitigating 
the security risk to Australia. Nevertheless, the degree to which different law and order 
issues are prosecuted is seen as a matter for the discretion of police. Indeed, independent 
in  its  day-to-day  operations,  the  IDG  has  considerable  discretion  over  how  law 
enforcement issues are to be approached on the ground – ‘Police command, rather than 
an elected Government, decide where…force will be used.’
115  
The  IDG’s  operational  independence  does  not  extend,  however,  to  making 
decisions about deploying across borders, although the agency has been developing its 
capacity to provide comprehensive intelligence and advice on law and order issues in 
Australia’s  neighbouring  countries  in  order  to  exert  greater  influence  over  such 
decisions.  Cross-border  IDG  deployments  still  require  explicit  government  request, 
primarily for legal reasons. To date, the IDG has not assumed policing duties across 
borders without legal immunity provisions first entered into law by the legislature in 
intervened states. Keelty has justified the AFP’s demand for legal immunity on the basis 
of the weakness of the law and justice sector in countries where the IDG is asked to 
intervene. He said IDG officers may become victims of politically motivated witch-hunt 
by corrupt interests: 
T h e   c a l l   f o r   a   j u d i c i a l   i n q u i r y   i n t o   t h e   [ A p r i l   2 0 0 6 ]   r i o t s   b y   t h e   S o l o m o n s   I s l a n d s  
government should silence any critic of the AFP who thought we were being precious 
when  we  were  adamant  about  having  immunity  from  prosecution  as  part  of  the 
conditions applying to our earlier deployments to Papua New Guinea where we no 
longer serve.
116 
The  IDG’s  legal  immunity  provisions  mean  that  although  it  is  tasked  with 
strengthening  the  criminal  justice  systems  of  intervened  states,  either  directly  or 
indirectly  through  capacity  building,  its  officers  are  not  accountable  to  these  laws. 
Consequently, the distinction between ‘police’ and ‘law’, which is usually masked in 
liberal democracies by the supposed primacy of the ‘rule of law’, is exposed, thereby 
revealing the true nature of these interventions as a form of emergency rule. Police 
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power  is  used  to  regularise  emergency  rule  in  the  form  of  administrative  rules  and 
regulations. Indeed, as Levi and Hagan argue, the separation of law and police provides 
the main impetus of employing this type of force internationally:  
Police  represents  both  the  capacity  to  enforce  obligations  as  well  as  the  desire  to 
produce  orderly  government  and  civilized  society—and  it  was  not  bound  to  any 
particular legal logic or norms but was instead an independent axis on which to turn 
international relations and achieve security’.
117      
Rather than limited by law, police is instead redefined as administrative action and is 
justified in terms of aiding the development of good governance, but it is a form of 
power that stands outside the legal order. While Levi and Hagan discuss policing in an 
international  context  –  the  policing  of  ‘rogue’  states  by  other  states  –  the  IDG’s 
interventions are premised on the separation of law and police power within the state. 
This ironically means that Australian-led SBIs open up illiberal spaces of governance 
within the state as a way of establishing a liberal political order. The crucial issue is that 
through such interventions social phenomena are securitised and depoliticised. 
 
IDG operations and the limits to regulatory regionalisation in practice 
It is important to distinguish between the more recent role of police in the development 
of an Australian ‘regional’ state with its flexible governance frontiers and other forms of 
international police engagement, some of which have long histories. Australian police, 
in various forms and guises, has operated beyond Australia’s borders long before the 
establishment  of  the  IDG  in  2004.  The  AFP  maintains  an  extensive  network  of  33 
international liaison officers in 27 countries and Transnational Crime Units in countries 
as diverse as Cambodia, Tonga and Colombia.
118 These are for most part traditional 
intelligence gathering and international crime-fighting cooperation channels, although 
in  states  where  the  IDG  is  operating  there  have  been  attempts  to  create  synergies 
between state building and crime-fighting activities. Australian police also has a history 
of involvement in peacekeeping and capacity building. For example, Commonwealth 
Police and later AFP officers have been part of the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus 
since 1964 and, through AusAID and its predecessors, Australian police officers have 
been  undertaking  capacity  building  assignments  in  the  Pacific  and  elsewhere  since 
decolonisation  in  the  1970s.  In  particular,  the  Australian  aid  program  supported  a 
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substantial three-phase project of capacity building and institutional strengthening in 
PNG from 1989 to 2005.
119  
According to the mainstream view, the establishing of the IDG is related to the 
negative experience of AFP officers in UN interventions in East Timor in 1999 and 
earlier  in  Cambodia  and  Mozambique,  and  was  given  special  impetus  by  the 
recommendations of the 2000 Brahimi report. The IDG was designed, it is argued, to 
address the poor institutional capacity and the coordination and coherence problems 
associated with the ad hoc nature of UN missions, in the context of increasing demand 
for police in peace and capacity building operations.
120 However, while mostly negative 
Australian experience in UN interventions was undoubtedly important in prompting the 
Australian  government  to  fund  the  IDG,  recent  SBIs,  in  which  the  IDG  has  been 
involved, cannot be conceptualised merely in terms of the deepening and bolstering of 
pre-existing activities; indeed, this is one of the primary limitations of the emerging 
literature on police interventions, including that which has the IDG as its focus. Rather, 
as we have seen in Chapter Three, contemporary SBIs must be seen in the broader 
context of the transformation of the state in the context of shifts in the global political 
economy.  
Goldsmith and Dinnen, for example, use the concept of ‘transnational police 
building’ to define the AFP’s new role. Transnational police building, they argue, refers 
to ‘a range of internationally assisted police-related activities in post-conflict, fragile 
and  so-called  “failed”  states.’
121  Other  definitions,  which  Goldsmith  and  Dinnen 
criticise for being too narrow, include Peake and Brown’s – ‘reforming and rebuilding a 
police system’
122 – and Bayley’s – ‘police reconstruction and reform’.
123 Regardless of 
nuance, what all have in common is that they examine their subject matter in terms of 
expected  governance  output.  In  particular,  these  studies  emphasise  two  primary 
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functions for police interventions – stabilisation and capacity building.
124 Goldsmith and 
Dinnen make the important point that ‘the settings in which external police building is 
employed vary greatly’,
125 leading to varying combinations of stabilisation and capacity 
building  activities.  It  is  implicit,  however,  that  they  conceive  such  interventions  as 
existing somewhere on a graph with ‘scope’ and ‘depth’ axes, so that earlier AusAID-
managed capacity building projects are mostly distinguished from current interventions 
in Solomon Islands, Nauru and Timor Leste by degree and not substance.   
Since police interventions are defined through their stabilisation and capacity 
building  functions,  the  literature’s  main  research  concern  tends  to  be  assessing  the 
extent to which police interventions manage to achieve both aims, and particularly the 
latter, as well as identifying the constraints on success. This literature also attempts to 
provide practical means for improving implementation and its outcomes. Dinnen and 
Braithwaite, for example, argue for resurrecting the colonial era kiap as a model for 
contemporary  police-building  in  PNG,  while  Abby  McLeod  focuses  on  ways  of 
overcoming the cultural challenges and perception gaps associated with adapting police 
capacity development to local contexts.
126 However, while it is true that IDG operations 
usually contain a mix of stabilisation and capacity building activities, it is problematic 
to see these as defining what it does. As we have seen, unlike earlier aid programs, 
police is now part of a regime of intervention that functions as a form of internalised 
transnational rule. Therefore, IDG and other police operations cannot be understood nor 
assessed on their own – they can only provide a lens through which to examine the 
properties of an emerging order, in this case one associated with the transnationalisation 
of the Australian state as a level of governance within neighbouring states.   
As a consequence, challenges to various aspects of Australian SBIs, including 
police, should be understood not in terms of policy failure or flawed implementation, 
but  in  terms  of  political  conflicts  between  regimes  within  a  transnationalising  state. 
Such conflicts may assume the familiar language of international relations and raise 
issues of international law and sovereignty, but since interventions effectively become 
part of the state, these are not about inter-state relations, but rather about the nature of 
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future statehood. In turn, SBIs may be limited or even forced to roll back as a result of 
conflicts playing out at the inter-state level, but affecting governance within the state.  
The most notable example, which was briefly mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter, is the fate of the ECP in PNG. The terms of the ECP were negotiated in 
late 2003 between the PNG government and the Australian government, which was 
concerned  about  the  perceived  deterioration  of  law  and  order  in  Australia’s  former 
colony and the biggest Melanesian state and buoyed by its early successes in Solomon 
Islands. It was not until July 2004 that the final agreement was signed because of the 
Australian government’s insistence on immunity from PNG laws for its officials and 
public servants.
127 The ECP was aimed, according to then Australian Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer, at achieving ‘a functioning police force, a court system that can 
administer the law, a government that can generate revenue and manage budgets based 
on need and affordability, and an immigration system that protects border integrity.’
128 
The Australian government pledged A$1.1 billion for the ECP, of which A$800 million 
was  allocated  to  the  IDG  component,  in  addition  to  the  A$1.75  billion  it  already 
intended to spend in the same five year period on other aid programs in PNG. The ECP 
involved the insertion of 230 Australian police, legal specialists and fifty or so officials 
into in-line positions across the legal sector, economic and public administration and 
border protection and transport security.
129 As Fry and Kabutaulaka note, the ‘long term 
objective  was  to  build  institution-to-institution  relationships  between  PNG  and 
Australia,’
130  an  aim  consistent  with  other  manifestations  of  the  Australian  state’s 
‘regionalisation’.   
  The ECP was fraught with problems from the outset, but ran into serious trouble 
when  Luther  Wenge,  governor  of  Morobe  Province  and  former  judge,  initiated  a 
constitutional  challenge  in  the  PNG  Supreme  Court  arguing  that  the  immunity 
provisions breached the PNG Constitution. A unanimous panel of five judges upheld 
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June 2008. 
129 Fry and Kabutaulaka, ‘Political Legitimacy and State-Building Intervention in the Pacific’, p. 7. 
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Wenge’s  challenge  in  May  2005  and  the  police  deployment  was  hastily  pulled  out, 
leaving  behind  approximately  40  public  servants.
131  Protracted  negotiations  ensued 
between the two governments. The PNG government initially wanted Australian police 
officers  to  return  to  the  ‘beat’,  as  did  many  other  Papua  New  Guineans  who  were 
hoping to see Port Moresby’s notorious raskol gangs brought under control, however 
PNG Prime Minister Michael Somare rejected the Howard government’s demand that 
the PNG Constitution be changed as condition for redeployment.
132 A later agreement 
for a ‘second-best’ non-policing advisory component was reached in August 2005 but 
not realised due to the deterioration of the diplomatic relationship between the PNG and 
Australian  governments,  after  Somare  was  asked  to  remove  his  shoes  for  security 
inspection  upon  arrival  at  Brisbane  airport.  In  fact,  Somare  opposed  the  immunity 
clause from the beginning and said it amounted to PNG ceding parts of its sovereignty 
to Australia. He was particularly incensed over the Australian government’s suggestion 
that PNG failed to provide ‘good governance’ after 30 years of independence, saying 
that democracy in PNG was ‘working well’ and threatening to seek financial assistance 
with less strings attached elsewhere, particularly from China.
133  
   The ECP and its premature demise provide an instructive example of the kinds 
of conflicts emerging in the context of a transnationalising state. This was not an inter-
state matter, although it was framed as a diplomatic dispute, but a conflict over the 
character  of  PNG’s  governance  structures,  the  degree  to  which  these  would  be 
transnationalised and to some extent deterritorialised, and what forms of accountability 
are to prevail.  
 
Conclusion 
The chapter began with Mick Keelty’s observation that the AFP was now increasingly 
operating in a ‘foreign policy space’, due to its role in SBIs. Indeed, the AFP, through 
the  newly  established  IDG,  has  been  involved  in  a  variety  of  trans-border  policing 
operations, as part of more comprehensive WofG interventions, primarily to stabilise 
the  law  and  order  situation  and  build  the  capacity  of  police  forces  in  neighbouring 
                                                 
131 Dinnen, McLeod and Peake, Police-Building in Weak States’, pp. 102-3. 
132 Fry and Kabutaulaka, ‘Political Legitimacy and State-Building Intervention in the Pacific’, p. 8. 
133  Reuters,  ‘PNG  wants  to  cut  Australian  aid  “umbilical  cord”’,  19  July  2005,  Factiva  electronic 
database,  Murdoch  University  library,  available  at  <http://0-
global.factiva.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/ha/default.aspx>, accessed 26 June 2008; The Age, ‘PNG 
Snubs the Big Brother Approach’, The Age, 27 July 2005, p. 16; Allard, Tom, ‘PNG threatens to seek 
other allies’, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 July 2005, p. 2.  CHAPTER FIVE 
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states. However, as we have seen, the IDG operates in spaces of governance opened up 
within intervened states. Therefore, it is more accurately understood as a manifestation 
of  the  emergence  of  a  ‘regionalising’  Australian  state  that  is  defined  not  by  fixed 
borders but by shifting governance frontiers that exist within neighbouring states. In this 
sense, it is actually the domestic ‘space’ of the Australian state that has expanded to 
swallow that traditionally understood as ‘foreign policy’, as reflected by the new roles 
of agencies like the AFP.  
In the first section I examined the characteristics of the contemporary Australian 
state. In the context of neoliberalisation, the Australian state apparatus has gone through 
a process of disaggregation, which in recent years has also involved the development of 
a variety of horizontal, as well as vertical, modes of coordination. The shift to WofG 
has  not  meant  the  recentralisation  of  governance,  but  rather  the  concentration  of 
strategic meta-governance power within the PM&C and the office of the prime minister. 
Through WofG processes and with terrorism and failed states becoming central security 
concerns  for  the  government  the  AFP  has  begun  taking  a  more  active  policy  role, 
assisted by the inclusion of AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty in the NSC – the highest-
level strategic coordination mechanism for national security policy – and the internal 
restructuring of the agency itself along functional lines.  
In  the  second  section,  I  examined  the  contours  of  Australian  regulatory 
regionalism, bilateral or multilateral, and the associated SBIs, focusing on the IDG’s 
approach  to  the  relationship  between  conflict  and  governance.  Since  the  Australian 
‘regional’  state  has  emerged  in  response  to  the  securitisation  of  the  Australian 
government’s approach to the domestic governance of neighbouring states the AFP/IDG 
has  been  able  to  apply  considerable  discretion  over  how  it  exercises  its  power  in 
practice.  Nevertheless,  the  Australian  government’s  reluctance  to  assume  direct 
responsibility  for  the  governing  of  intervened  states  has  meant  that  the 
intergovernmental level has remained crucial to the creation of legal space within these 
states for the IDG to operate. In PNG, conflicts over the extent to which the state was to 
be  transnationalised  led  to  a  successful  constitutional  challenge  to  the  legality  of 
Australian  police  officers’  immunity  from  prosecution  and  eventually  to  the  full 
withdrawal of the police component of the ECP.    
  To  conclude,  the  chapter  on  the  AFP  and  the  governance  of  disorder  in  the 
Australian state’s new regional frontier demonstrates a couple of key contentions made 
in the thesis. First, it shows that contemporary SBIs cannot be understood merely as CHAPTER FIVE 
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constituting  a  functional  response  to  the  emergence  of  new  transnational  risks, 
associated with the growing incidence of state fragility. Rather, the particular nature of 
these  interventions  can  only  be  appreciated  when  placed  in  the  context  of  broader, 
ongoing, processes of state transformation and the various ways in which these have 
interacted with events like the September 11 attacks. In shaping these contingencies the 
role  of  agency  and  chance  is  very  important  –  indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  explain  the 
transformation  and  expansion  of  the  AFP  without  giving  some  consideration  to  the 
highly entrepreneurial personality of Mick Keelty and his exceptional ability to carve 
out new operational turf for the AFP. Nevertheless, the increased role played by the 
AFP in devising policy and implementing contemporary Australian-led SBIs cannot be 
understood  without  relating  these  to  the  bigger-picture  circumstances  of  state 
transformation and in particular to the hierarchical and anti-political character of the 
modes of  governance associated with the deepening of neoliberalisation, within and 
beyond the state.  
  Second  and  related  to  the  first  point,  the  AFP  case  demonstrates  that  it  is 
problematic to evaluate SBIs in their own terms. This is because these interventions are 
both  a  product  of  particular  historical  circumstances  with  identifiable  political  and 
ideological underpinnings and a mechanism for the establishing of particular social and 
political power relationships. The state becomes the main site of conflict in this process 
and as we have seen, conflicts over the extent of intervention are in effect conflicts over 
the nature of statehood. The next chapter examines the Australian-led RAMSI as a case 
study of the politics of multilevel regimes and their limitations.    
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Chapter Six 
The  Regional  Assistance  Mission  to  Solomon  Islands:  State 
Transformation and Its Limitations 
 
Introduction 
The  Australian-led  Regional  Assistance  Mission  to  Solomon  Islands  (RAMSI)  has 
attracted considerable attention in policymaking and academic circles worldwide since 
its  inception  in  July  2003.  Despite  the  Solomons’  small  population  and  relative 
marginalisation in world affairs, the Australian government’s comprehensive response 
to the country’s perceived descent to state failure was on several occasions lauded by 
the  Development  Assistance  Committee  (DAC)  of  the  Organisation  for  Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a model for ‘good practice’ to be followed 
by future interveners elsewhere. For this reason, RAMSI has significance that extends 
far beyond the South Pacific. RAMSI has had its share of critics too, but much of this 
criticism has centred on whether it was building a viable state and paying sufficient 
attention  to  the  Melanesian  social  and  cultural  context.  What  such  accounts  fail  to 
recognise is that to understand what RAMSI does, and therefore its limitations, it has to 
be viewed not as an exercise in state building and capacity development by outsiders, 
but as a multilevel regime that seeks to transform the state by shifting the purpose of 
state power, its location, and the actors exercising state power in Solomon Islands. 
  Premised upon a prevailing perception in Australian policymaking circles that 
Australia’s security is put at risk by the absence and/or poor functioning of governance 
structures of a particular kind in neighbouring countries, RAMSI’s programs constitute 
an attempt to circumscribe political choices for Solomon Islanders, primarily by seeking 
to  shift  power  from  majoritarian  political  institutions  to  transnational-regional 
regulatory spaces of governance that are located within the state and by attempting to 
reshape  the  purpose  of  state  power  towards  the  provision  of  suitable  conditions  for 
market-led development. The latter is seen as essential to the long-term viability of the 
Solomons as a state. Key to this process of state transformation has been the concept of 
‘capacity  building’ and  the gradations in sovereignty it denotes. Under  the guise of 
capacity building there is extensive policy determination and institutional restructuring 
occurring, mostly neoliberal in nature, within Solomon Islands’ governing apparatus.  CHAPTER SIX 
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Notwithstanding the transformation of the state, its existence as a juridical entity 
has remained crucial to RAMSI’s project, designed as it is to contain the potential flow 
of  transnational  risks  from  Solomon  Islands  to  its  neighbours  and  to  Australia  in 
particular. The internal reconstitution of the state has essentially entailed a strategic 
rearticulation of the relationship between political authority, legality and territory, not 
the demise of Solomon Islands’ legal spatiality per se. This insistence on the continuing 
sovereignty  of  Solomon  Islands  is  not  a  mere  façade  for  wholesale  domination  by 
outsiders,  since  diplomatic  conflicts  over  the  extent  to  which  the  Solomon  Islands 
government, as a sovereign power, could pursue its own policy objectives have arisen 
time and again since RAMSI’s deployment. In turn, since the mission’s legal mandate 
depends on the annual ratification of an enabling legislation by the Solomon Islands 
Parliament,  RAMSI  and  Australian  officials  cannot  afford  to  ignore  such  incidents 
entirely.    
Despite  attempts  to  establish  RAMSI  as  a  multilevel  regime  consisting  of 
‘regional’  spaces  of  governance  within  the  state,  RAMSI’s  intervention  generates 
considerable  and  irreconcilable  contradictions  that  denote  the  limitations  of  state 
transformation  of  this  kind.  Crucially,  despite  their  presumed  complementarity,  the 
establishing  of  neoliberal  governance  structures  in  Solomon  Islands  has  regularly 
contrasted  with  RAMSI’s  security  objective  of  alleviating  conflict.  In  fact,  through 
RAMSI some of the very same policies that have been associated with the emergence of 
violent  conflict  in  Solomon  Islands  in  the  first  place  are  being  relaunched.
1  The 
hegemony  of  neoliberal  notions  of  good  governance  and  state  building  in  the 
formulation of RAMSI’s objectives has meant that challenges to neoliberalism have 
been perceived as threatening to both political stability and the prospects of market-led 
economic recovery and hence as security risks to be contained. Indeed, there has been a 
tendency in Australian and RAMSI policymaking circles to delegitimise opposition to 
RAMSI and characterise such expressions as ‘bad’ leadership or the work of corrupt 
individuals. Most notably, former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer was 
strident and forthright in his attacks on the quality of political leadership in Solomon 
Islands.  In early October 2007, for example, Downer said that the Solomon  Islands 
government should ‘start thinking more about the nation’s people and stop being so 
                                                 
1 Hameiri, Shahar, ‘The Trouble with RAMSI: Reexamining the Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands’, 
The Contemporary Pacific 19, no. 2 (2007), pp. 409-41. CHAPTER SIX 
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self-serving.’
2 This negative view of politics in Solomon Islands is shared by many 
RAMSI officials, Australian politicians of both major parties and even some prominent 
Solomon  Islanders,  notwithstanding  their  criticism  of  Downer’s  less-than-subtle 
approach. Therefore, attempts to resolve the contradictions of state transformation have 
mainly included the suppression of violent conflict by force, either directly or through 
deterrence,  and  the  intensification  of  efforts  to  depoliticise  important  areas  of 
governance  and  insulate  those  from  ‘undesirable’  forms  of  popular  or  political 
interference  from  above  or  below.  This,  in  turn,  has  led  to  the  emergence  of  new 
conflicts and contradictions, which then have had to be managed in a similar manner. In 
this way, RAMSI has actually limited the capacity of the state to absorb social and 
political conflict in a non-coercive fashion and the prospects of a sustainable political 
accommodation  to  emerge  in  Solomon  Islands.  RAMSI’s  inability  to  resolve  the 
conflicts of state transformation without coercion reinforces David Harvey’s insightful 
observation, taken up by Mark Duffield,
3 that capitalist development cannot overcome 
its  internal  contradictions  without  the  existence  of  a  power  that  is  external  to  the 
seemingly voluntary façade of capitalist social relations. The deployment of such force 
in moments of acute crisis, such as the April 2006 riots in the capital city Honiara, 
reveals the true nature of RAMSI’s state building, not as a recipe for governance, but as 
a form of emergency rule and crisis management.   
Instead of fostering a supply of, or popular demand for, good governance of the 
kind RAMSI is meant to establish, the promotion of private sector-led development and 
‘good governance’ has tended to benefit a small Honiara-based elite and increase the 
already considerable gap between the capital and the provinces, not only in terms of 
income inequality but also in terms of the latter’s inclusion in the state and ability to 
affect  political  processes  and  outcomes.  Investor-friendly  laws,  pushed  by  the 
expatriate-dominated Economic Reform Unit (ERU) in the Solomon Islands Ministry of 
Finance and Treasury (MoFT), have been embraced by powerful logging and fishing 
interests. The massive increase in foreign direct investment since 2006 is directly linked 
to further investments in these already unsustainable sectors and not to the expansion of 
the  economy’s  very  narrow  base.  The  anticipated  exhaustion  of  Solomon  Islands’ 
timber resources by 2012 and subsequent steep decline in state revenue is certain to 
                                                 
2 Jones, Lloyd, ‘PAC: Solomon PM, Others, Out to Destroy RAMSI: Downer’, Australian Associated 
Press, 3 October 2007. 
3 Harvey,  David,  The Limits to Capital (London: Verso, 2006 [1982]); Duffield, Mark, Development, 
Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 10. CHAPTER SIX 
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strain the curious political alliance we currently see between technocrats and political 
elites who depend for their survival on money politics and patronage.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section I provide some necessary 
background information on RAMSI and examine why it has been seen as a model for 
state builders. I also briefly look at some of the main criticisms levelled at it. In the 
second  section  I  proceed  to  examine  RAMSI  as  a  multilevel  regime  of  state 
transformation. To demonstrate the implications of state transformation in practice, I 
use as examples the ERU and the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG). The third and 
final section identifies the limits to state transformation of this kind in Solomon Islands. 
 
RAMSI and its critics 
At early morning, 24 July 2003, when the first plane carrying troops from Australia 
touched  down  at  Honiara’s  Henderson  Airport,  began  the  most  comprehensive  and 
expensive Australian international engagement since the decolonisation of Papua New 
Guinea  three  decades  earlier.  In  this  section  I  briefly  outline  the  background  to 
RAMSI’s deployment, its objectives and structure, and finally some of the plaudits for 
and criticism of RAMSI. 
  RAMSI, also known as Operation Helpem Fren,
4 was put together at the request 
of  then  Solomon  Islands  Prime  Minister  Sir  Allan  Kemakeza.  The  Howard 
government’s decision to lead  an intervention into Solomon  Islands came after  five 
years of instability and a number of unanswered pleas for Australian assistance from 
former  Prime  Ministers  Bart  Ulufa’alu  and  Manasseh  Sogavare  in  2000  and  2001 
respectively.
5 However, once the decision to intervene was taken in June 2003, after 
Kemakeza  was  flown  in  to  Canberra  for  consultation  with  then  Australian  Prime 
Minister  John  Howard,  the  Australian  government  acted  fast.  On  30  June  2003,  a 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) foreign ministers meeting in Sydney ratified the Australian 
government’s  plan  for  intervention  under  the  auspices  of  the  PIF  2000  Biketawa 
Declaration,  and  approximately  three  weeks  later  RAMSI  was  already  deployed  in 
Solomon Islands.
6 
                                                 
4 Literally ‘helping a friend’ in Solomon Islands Pijin. 
5 Ulufa’alu’s government was removed at gunpoint by armed Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) militants in 
June 2000. Moore, Clive, Happy Isles in Crisis: The Historical Causes for a Failing State in Solomon 
Islands, 1998-2004 (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2004), p. 201. 
6 ‘Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting Outcome Statement’, Australian Government Department of 
Foreign  Affairs  and  Trade,  30  June  2003,  available  at 
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The scope of this chapter does not allow for a full exploration of the lead-up to 
and the events of the 1998 to 2003 period known in Solomon Islands as ‘the tensions’.
7 
In brief, however, the crisis had two main stages. The first, which lasted approximately 
from late 1998 to the signing of the Australian and New Zealand-brokered Townsville 
Peace  Agreement  (TPA)  in  October  2000  was  characterised  as  an  ethnic  conflict 
between  the  Isatabu  Freedom  Movement  (IFM),
8  a  group  claiming  to  represent 
indigenous Guadalcanalese people, and the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), who claimed to 
fight for Malaitan migrants. The conflict’s eruption constituted the culmination of a 
decade-long process of radicalisation of some Guadalcanal youth, particularly incensed 
over inter-island migration from Malaita. Malaitans not only dominated Honiara, which 
has been built on alienated Guadalcanalese land, and the public service, but also settled 
in large numbers from the end of the Second World War on land outside Honiara they 
bought from local tribes on Guadalcanal – the most fertile of Solomon Islands’ main 
islands.
9 After the signing of the TPA and the formal dissolution of the militias,
10 the 
conflict  developed  into  a  protracted  period  of  low-level  violence,  intimidation  and 
general lawlessness, in which ethnicity often served as guise to the criminalisation of 
the state for the benefit of a small group of thugs.
11 This second phase lasted until 
RAMSI’s arrival in mid 2003. Overall, the crisis is estimated to have caused about 200 
                                                                                                                                               
2005;  Pacific  Islands  Forum  Secretariat,  ‘Biketawa  Declaration’,  28  October  2000,  available  at 
<http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2000/Oct06.htm>, accessed 23 August 2005. 
7 There is now a substantial literature on these issues. See Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis; Fraenkel, Jon, 
The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands  (Wellington: 
Victoria  University  Press,  2004);  Kabutaulaka,  Tarcisius  Tara,  ‘Beyond  Ethnicity:  The  Political 
Economy of the Guadalcanal Crisis in Solomon Islands’, State Society and Governance in Melanesia 
Project Working Paper 1/2001, Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian 
National University, 2001; Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara, ‘A Weak State and the Solomon Islands Peace 
Process’,  Pacific  Islands  Development  Series,  Working  Paper  No.  14,  Hawai’i:  East-West  Center, 
2002; Wainwright, Elsina, ‘Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands’, ASPI 
Policy  Report,  Canberra:  Australian  Strategic  Policy  Institute,  2003;  Hameiri,  ‘The  Trouble  with 
RAMSI’;  Bennett,  Judith,  ‘Roots  of  Conflict  in  Solomon  Islands  – Though  Much  Is  Taken  Much 
Abides:  Legacies  of  Tradition  and  Colonialism’,  State,  Society  and  Governance  in  Melanesia 
Discussion Paper 2002/5, Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National 
University, 2002; Dinnen, Sinclair, ‘Political Chronicles – Winners and Losers: Politics and Disorder in 
the Solomon Islands 2000-2002’, The Journal of Pacific History 37, no. 3 (2002), pp. 285-98.  
8  Initially  the  movement  was  called  the  Guadalcanal  Revolutionary  Army,  a  direct  reference  to  the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army. 
9 Kabutaulaka, ‘The Political Economy of the Guadalcanal Crisis’. See also George Gray in Tanis, James 
and George Gray, ‘In Between: Personal Experience in the 9-Year Long Conflict on Bougainville & 
Habuna  Momoruqu  (the  Blood  of  My  Island):  Violence  and  the  Guadalcanal  Uprising  in  Solomon 
Islands’, paper presented at the Australian Anthropological Society Annual Conference 2002. 
10 A large number of guns remained in the community, however, until RAMSI’s arrival. Furthermore, an 
IFM  splinter-group  led  by  Weathercoast  rebel  Harold  Keke  continued  to  fight  under  the  name 
Guadalcanal Liberation Front. 
11 Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom, Ch. 12. CHAPTER SIX 
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deaths  and  the  displacement  of  about  35,000  Solomon  Islanders,  mostly  Malaitans 
evicted from rural Guadalcanal.
12 The tensions also caused the devastation of Solomon 
Islands’ formal economy with gross domestic product (GDP) freefalling 14 per cent in 
2000 and 9 per cent in 2001. With the major export income earners – palm oil producers 
Solomon Islands Plantations Limited and the Gold Ridge goldmine – shut down as a 
result of the conflict and with most Western donors withholding funds, the government 
became almost entirely reliant on rampant logging and Taiwanese aid for revenue.
13 The 
situation was worsened by a blow-out in public expenditure due to the cost of recruiting 
hundreds of ‘special constables’ – former militants – by the Royal Solomon Islands 
Police (RSIP).
14 The government also had to fund increasingly exorbitant compensation 
claims by former militants and politicians, many of whom were either ex-militants or 
had strong links with the militias.
15 At the same time, central government funding for 
the provinces, services, and public servants’ salaries almost ceased. Under this difficult 
set  of  circumstances  it  is  plain  to  see  why  RAMSI  received  such  an  enthusiastic 
welcome upon arrival from most Solomon Islanders, who saw it as a ‘circuit-breaker’ 
capable of disarming the militants. 
It  is  difficult  to  establish  precisely  why  the  Australian  government  chose  to 
accept  Kemakeza’s  request  and  intervene  in  July  2003  and  not  earlier.  As  late  as 
January 2003, Alexander Downer argued in a newspaper op-ed that intervention would 
be  ‘folly  in  the  extreme’.
16  Regardless  of  the  exact  trigger,  if  there  was  any,  that 
precipitated  the  decision  to  intervene,  crucial  to  the  Australian  government’s 
rationalisation of the intervention in Solomon Islands, as well as to RAMSI’s structure 
and objectives has been the portrayal of the small Pacific country as ‘failing’ and at risk 
                                                 
12 Hameiri, ‘The Trouble with RAMSI’, p. 410. 
13  IMF,  ‘Solomon  Islands:  Selected  Issues  and  Statistical  Appendix’,  IMF  Country  Report  04/255, 
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, August 2004, p. 40. Most other donors chose to either 
suspend their aid to Solomon Islands or work directly with local partners, bypassing the government. 
See Wainwright, ‘Our Failing Neighbour’, p. 28. The Solomon Islands government formally recognises 
Taiwan and is rewarded for its support with mostly unconditional Taiwanese aid. 
14 IMF, ‘Solomon Islands:  Selected Issues and Statistical  Appendix’, p. 41. The RSIP has also been 
known as the Solomon Islands Police Force (SIPF). 
15 Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis, p. 162. 
16 Downer, Alexander, ‘Neighbours cannot be recolonised’, The Australian, 8 January 2003, p. 11. On 
possible explanations for Australia’s new interventionism see, Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara, ‘Australian 
Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention in Solomon Islands’, The Contemporary Pacific 17, no. 2 
(2005), pp. 283-308; Dinnen, Sinclair, ‘Australia’s New Interventionism in the Southwest Pacific’, in 
Governance Challenges for PNG and the Pacific Islands, edited by Nancy Sullivan (Madang: Divine 
Word University Press, 2004), pp. 59-72; Fry, Greg, ‘The “War Against Terror” and Australia’s New 
Interventionism in the Pacific’, in Governance Challenges for PNG and the Pacific Islands, edited by 
Nancy  Sullivan  (Madang:  Divine  Word  University  Press,  2004), pp. 50-58; Moore,  Happy Isles in 
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of complete failure  and even collapse.
17 Particularly influential in promulgating this 
approach  to  Solomon  Islands  was  the  Australian  Strategic  Policy  Institute’s  Elsina 
Wainwright. In a report published a few weeks before the intervention commenced and 
formally launched by Foreign Affairs Minister Downer,
18 Wainwright laid out the case 
for intervention in terms of the potential spill-over of transnational risks to Australia. 
She used the metaphor of a ‘Petri-dish’ to argue that Australia could not afford to have a 
failing  state  at  its  doorstep,  since  such  a  state  could  become  a  breeding-ground  for 
terrorists and international criminals.
19 While RAMSI’s  eventual form differed from 
Wainwright’s proposed intervention model, the theme of protecting Australia from the 
yet-unknown  dangers  of  state  failure  in  the  region  was  taken  up  by  Howard  and 
Downer, perhaps to some extent as a way of ‘selling’ RAMSI to their conservative 
constituents,  who  otherwise  would  have  been  disinclined  to  support  ‘humanitarian’ 
intervention.
20  For  example,  shortly  after  RAMSI’s  commencement  John  Howard 
argued that it was incumbent upon Australia to,  
arrest this downward spiral, which, if not addressed, could result in the total collapse of 
the  Solomon  Islands’  governance  and  sovereignty…A  failed  state  would  not  only 
devastate the lives of the peoples of the Solomons but could also pose  a  significant 
security risk for the whole region.
21   
If Wainwright set the tone for RAMSI by linking state failure with Australia’s 
national security interests, her analysis of the underlying causes of the Solomon Islands’ 
crisis  also  became  common-wisdom  among  Australian  and  RAMSI  policymakers. 
Wainwright argued that the conflict in Solomon Islands was a result of unsuccessful 
state  building  in  the  post-colonial  era,  which  had  its  roots  in  the  colonial  era.  In 
particular,  she  claimed  that  the  weakness  of  modern  state  institutions  vis-à-vis 
traditional societal institutions was due to the British colonialists’ lack of interest in 
                                                 
17  Hameiri,  ‘The  Trouble  with  RAMSI’,  p.  411;  Nguyen,  Minh,  ‘The  Question  of  “Failed  States”: 
Australia and the Notion of State Failure’, Uniya (Jesuit Social Justice Centre), March 2005, p. 9.  
18 Wainwright, ‘Our Failing Neighbour’; Downer, Alexander, ‘Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the 
Future of Solomon Islands: Speech at the Launch of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Report’, 
Australian  Government  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Trade,  10  June  2003,  available  at 
<http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030610_solomonislands.html>,  accessed  23 
August 2005. 
19 Wainwright, ‘Our Failing Neighbour’, p. 13. 
20 The  theme  of  ‘risk  management’  as  national  security  policy  was  also  taken  up by then Opposition 
leader,  now  Prime  Minister  Kevin  Rudd.  See  Rudd,  Kevin,  ‘Fresh  Ideas  for  Future  Challenges: 
National Security Policy under a Labor Government’, Canberra: Address to the Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, Parliament House, 8 August 2007.  
21  Howard,  John,  ‘Ministerial  Statement  to  Parliament  on  the  Regional  Assistance  Mission  to  the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI)’, Australian Government Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 12 
August  2003,  available  at  <http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech422.html>,  accessed  24 
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establishing a strong modern state before their hasty and premature departure in 1978.
22 
In this view, the state’s inability to deliver positive political goods to citizens led to its 
delegitimation and finally to its near failure.
23 Wainwright argued that the Solomon 
Islands’  crisis  represented  the  ‘unravelling  of  the  apparatus  of  colonial  rule.’
24  The 
intervention’s role was, thus, to give the modern state another chance by rebuilding and 
strengthening its governing institutions.  
Based on this analysis, RAMSI was established as a three-step process. The first 
involved  the  immediate  stabilisation  of  the  law  and  order  situation  through  an 
overwhelming display of force. With about 1,800 troops on the ground in the early 
months of the intervention, RAMSI was the biggest military deployment in the South 
Pacific in the postwar era. That phase was successful in meeting its objectives with the 
peaceful surrendering of around 3,700 firearms by the end of 2003, an estimated 90-95 
of the total stockpile.
25 RAMSI police officers also made several thousands of arrests, 
including  of  160  former  RSIP  officers.
26  The  second  phase,  which  began  almost 
simultaneously with the first, involved the stabilisation of government finances and the 
preparation  of  the  national  budget.  After  initial  budgetary  stabilisation  was  secured 
came the third and long-term phase of state building and capacity development, which 
at the time of writing is still underway.
27  
Although the Kemakeza government requested external intervention as a way of 
getting rid of militants, the Australian government of the day refused to provide support 
unless the Solomon Islands government signed up to a comprehensive state building 
program,  not  least  due  to  the  perception  that  the  weakness  of  the  state  led  to  the 
escalation of the crisis in the first place. RAMSI’s indivisibility as a ‘package’ of state 
building  remains  unequivocal  to  Australian  and  RAMSI  officials,
28  despite  later 
attempts  by  Solomon  Islander  politicians,  most  notably  former  Prime  Minister 
                                                 
22 Wainwright, ‘Our Failing Neighbour’, p. 20. 
23 This is similar to Rotberg’s explanation for state failure. Indeed Wainwright references Rotberg’s work 
in the report. See  Rotberg, Robert I., ‘The  New  Nature  of  Nation-State  Failure’,  The Washington 
Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002), pp. 85-96. 
24 Wainwright, ‘Our Failing Neighbour’, p. 27. 
25 Muggah, Robert, ‘Diagnosing Demand: Assessing the Motivations and Means for Firearms Acquisition 
in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea’, State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project 
Working Paper 2004/7, Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National 
University, 2004, p. 6. 
26 Fullilove, Michael, ‘The Testament of Solomons: RAMSI  and International State-Building’, Sydney: 
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006, p. 9. 
27  RAMSI,  ‘RAMSI  Medium  Term  Strategy  2007-2012’,  Honiara:  Regional  Assistance  Mission  to 
Solomon Islands, January 2007, pp. 3-4. 
28  Personal  interview  with  Tim  George,  RAMSI  Special Coordinator, Honiara, 13 September 2007; 
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Manasseh  Sogavare,  to  seek  the  downscaling  of  RAMSI’s  economic  reform  and 
governance programs. The Australian government also asked for RAMSI to be formally 
invited to Solomon Islands. The intervention was only given the ‘green light’ by the 
Australian  government  and  its  regional  counterparts  after  the  Solomon  Islands 
Parliament unanimously supported the Facilitation of International Assistance (FIA) Act 
on  17  July  2003.
29  The  FIA  provides  the  legal  foundations  for  the  intervention, 
including  legal  immunity  to  RAMSI  personnel  from  prosecution  under  Solomon 
Islands’  laws.  It  has  to  be  ratified  on  23  July  each  year  by  the  Solomon  Islands 
Parliament.
30 The legislation, in effect, means that in international legal terms RAMSI is 
not strictly speaking an ‘intervention’.
31 It is defined as ‘collaboration between Solomon 
Islands  and  contributing  countries’,
32  or  in  Alexander  Downer’s  words  ‘cooperative 
intervention’.
33 While this means that the Solomon Islands government could request 
RAMSI to leave at will, in reality the fragility of the security situation and the reliance 
of the government on foreign aid has meant that even the belligerent Sogavare was 
reluctant to do so, despite his strong criticism of many of RAMSI’s programs. At the 
same time, RAMSI’s reliance on domestic political support has made it vulnerable, to 
some extent, to rapidly shifting political alliances in Solomon Islands.
34  
The  exact  reasons  for  the  Australian  government’s  decision  to  set  the 
intervention  up  as  a  regional-multilateral  operation  are  also  difficult  to  pinpoint. 
Personnel  and  funding  contributions  from  other  Pacific  countries,  aside  from  New 
Zealand,  have  consistently  been  marginal,  particularly  in  the  mission’s  civilian 
contingent. In May 2006, for example, 88 per cent of RAMSI’s civilian advisers were 
Australian, 6 per cent were from New Zealand, and only 5 out of 173 were from island 
nations.
35 Nonetheless, all 15 PIF member-states are currently represented in RAMSI, 
mostly  within  the  Participating  Police  Force  (PPF).  Rumours  abounded  that  the 
                                                 
29 Available at <http://www.paclii.org/sb/legis/num_act/foiaa2003386/>, accessed 18 January 2008.  
30 PIF, ‘Pacific Islands Forum Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands’, Suva: 
Pacific Islands Forum, 2007, p. 18. 
31 Fry, Greg and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, ‘Political Legitimacy and State-Building Intervention in the 
Pacific’, in Intervention and State-Building in the Pacific: The Political Legitimacy of “Cooperative 
Intervention”, edited by Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2008), pp. 1-36. 
32  Winter,  John  and  Kaye  Schofield,  ‘Annual  Performance  Report  2006/2007:  A  Report  on  the 
Performance of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, RAMSI Performance Assessment 
Advisory Team, July 2007, n.p. 
33 Downer, ‘Our Failing Neighbour’. 
34 Dinnen, Sinclair, ‘A Comment on State-Building in Solomon Islands’, The Journal of Pacific History 
42, no. 2 (2007), pp. 255-63, p. 260. 
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Australian government avoided the United Nations (UN) Security Council in 2003 since 
there  were  concerns  the  Chinese  government  would  veto  the  mission  because  of 
Solomon Islands’ formal diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.
36 RAMSI was retroactively 
endorsed  by  then  UN  Secretary-General  Kofi  Annan  and  Council  President  Fayssal 
Mekdad.
37  Nevertheless,  Alexander  Downer  could  not  resist  using  RAMSI’s  initial 
successes as a way of having a stab at the UN’s peacekeeping record and defending the 
controversial occupation of Iraq by describing RAMSI as a ‘coalition of the willing’.
38 
RAMSI’s regional character was seen as a way of increasing the perceived legitimacy 
of the intervention, as well as having some operational advantages linked to the relative 
familiarity of other Pacific islanders with Melanesian culture.
39 In any case, the PIF 
Secretariat  has  no  direct  authority  over  RAMSI,  although  regional  oversight 
mechanisms  have  recently  been  established  following  recommendations  of  the  PIF 
review committee.
40  
Regardless of whether RAMSI has ‘true’ regional character or not, and this has 
been a matter of some contention,
41 careful attempts have been made, particularly in 
recent  years,  to  distinguish  between  RAMSI,  as  a  multilateral  intervention,  and 
Australia. In mid 2007, for example, the Australian government moved, at the request of 
the  Solomon  Islands  government,  to  more  clearly  demarcate  Australian  aid  from 
RAMSI’s contributions by appointing a different Australian Agency for International 
Development  (AusAID)  official  to  manage  the  bilateral  portfolio.  Arguments  over 
whether  RAMSI  is  regional  or  Australia-dominated  miss  the  crucial  point  that  the 
previous chapter highlighted: RAMSI constitutes a new form of regionalism that is not 
so  much  about  strengthening  the  level  of  governance  above  states,  but  about 
establishing ‘regional’ forms of regulation within states. Therefore, the new regionalism 
in the Pacific should be seen as a form of state transformation and not as a form of inter-
state cooperation.  
                                                 
36 McDougall, Derek, ‘Intervention in Solomon Islands’, The Round Table 93, no. 374 (2004), pp. 213-
23, p. 218. 
37 Fullilove, ‘The Testament of Solomons’, p. 14. 
38 Fullilove,  Michael,  ‘Don’t  be  fooled – there’ll  be  more  change  than  continuity  in  foreign  policy’, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 20 December 2007, p. 13. RAMSI began its operations only four months after 
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39 Fullilove, ‘The Testament of Solomons’, p. 11. 
40 PIF, ‘Pacific Islands Forum Review’, p. 9. 
41 See PIF, ‘Pacific Islands Forum Review’; PIF Eminent Persons Group, ‘A Review of  the Regional 
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In  terms  of  its  operational  structure,  RAMSI  is  comprised  of  three  program 
pillars – law and justice, economic governance and machinery of government – with a 
central coordinating mechanism. The law and justice pillar is responsible for security 
and policing, corrections and the legal system and the courts. The economic governance 
pillar is responsible for government financial management and economic reform. And, 
finally,  the  machinery  of  government  pillar  is  responsible  for  government  services, 
public administration, accountability of government and accountability institutions, the 
functioning  of  the  executive  and  legislative  arms  of  government,  and  media 
development. There are overarching RAMSI-wide objectives, as well as program-level 
objectives for each pillar.
42 Similarly, there are performance assessments for the whole 
of  RAMSI,  as  well  as  pillar-level  evaluations.
43  Importantly,  RAMSI’s  Special 
Coordinator, a career diplomat from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT),
44 does not control the pillars. The Special Coordinator is responsible for 
coordinating the work of RAMSI’s pillars, both internally and vis-à-vis the Solomon 
Islands  government,  the  PIF  and  other  member-countries  and  to  some  extent  the 
interdepartmental committee (IDC) in Canberra. At the same time, RAMSI pillar heads 
also have direct relationships with their home departments in Canberra and with the 
relevant Solomon Islands government ministers.  
Crucial  to  RAMSI’s  operational  structure  is  the  concept  of  ‘whole  of 
government’  (WofG).  Building  on  already-existing  trends  in  Australian  public 
administration, which were examined in Chapter Five, RAMSI is WofG all the way up 
and  down.  In  Canberra,  it  brings  together,  through  the  high-level  RAMSI  IDC 
(departmental  secretaries)  and  other  lower-level  IDCs,  a  multitude  of  government 
agencies, such as DFAT, AusAID, the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Attorney-
General’s Office, the Treasury and others. The Fragile States and Peacebuilding Unit, 
which is led and hosted by AusAID, is another example of a relevant WofG construct, 
with seconded officials from agencies such as the AFP and Treasury, that works on 
developing  policy  approaches  to,  and  accumulating  knowledge  on,  fragile  states, 
including Solomon Islands. The Unit also serves as the main linkage point between the 
Australian  government  and  the  DAC’s  Fragile  States  Group.  In  Honiara,  RAMSI’s 
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pillars are structured within a WofG framework, where the Special Coordinator has the 
responsibility of establishing and coordinating formal, informal and ad hoc problem-
solving  working  groups.  But  even  more  than  that,  one  of  RAMSI’s  operational 
objectives  is  to  introduce  WofG  processes  to  the  Solomon  Islands  government  and 
public sector.
45  
Since RAMSI’s inception, WofG approaches have become increasingly popular 
as a way of addressing the perceived problems of fragile states, which are currently seen 
as  located  on  the  so-called  development-security  nexus.  The  DAC  commissioned  a 
report  into  WofG  ‘best  practice’  with  the  aim  of  providing  guidelines  to  future 
interveners and donors based on the experience of success stories around the world.
46 In 
the recently published report it is argued that WofG Approaches are needed in fragile 
states because ‘the political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: 
failure in one risks failure in all others.’
47 WofG is deemed by the report as essential for 
promoting  greater  coherence  between  security  and  development  policies  in  fragile 
states.
48 
RAMSI’s  perceived  success  in  Solomon  Islands  is  one  of  the  main  reasons 
WofG approaches have gained so much traction worldwide as a way of shoring up 
fragile states. Indeed, RAMSI is seen as relatively successful in finding the balance 
between  short-term  security  objectives  and  longer  term  development  objectives.  For 
example,  in  the  area  of  security  sector  reform  (SSR),  which  the  DAC  has  recently 
emphasised as crucial to the strengthening of fragile states and to positive development 
outcomes,
49 the Australian ‘integrated’ approach in Solomon Islands was praised for 
allowing  a  broader  perspective  on  security  issues  than  that  provided  by  traditional 
security actors.
50 Since the OECD’s current approach positions SSR as somewhere on 
the nexus between security and development, SSR is seen as essential for putting in 
place  the  necessary  conditions  for  economic  growth  and  therefore  for  development. 
RAMSI is seen as successful in turning SSR into a WofG matter and thus for reducing 
the inconsistencies between the work of security agencies and other actors. We should 
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47 Ibid., p. 7. 
48 Ibid., p. 18. 
49  See  OECD  DAC,  ‘OECD  DAC  Handbook  on  Security  Sector  Reform:  Supporting  Security  and 
Justice’, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
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be  careful,  however,  in  assuming  that  RAMSI’s  WofG  approach  actually  produces 
policy coherence in Solomon Islands. As we shall later see, conflicting policy objectives 
often  make  coherence  impossible.  Furthermore,  we  should  not  assume  that  policy 
coherence at the level of planning translates into policy coherence in practice.
51  
RAMSI programs at all levels also emphasise ‘capacity building’ as crucial to 
achieving  the  mission’s  ultimate  objective  of  a  ‘peaceful,  well-governed  and 
prosperous’ Solomon Islands. In fact, RAMSI is predominantly a technical assistance 
operation, with the majority of funding and personnel working to supposedly improve 
governance processes and outcomes.
52 RAMSI’s personnel, whether occupying in-line 
positions in the administration of Solomon Islands or formally working as ‘advisers’ to 
their  Solomon  Islander  counterparts,  have  what  has  been  described  as  a  ‘double 
mandate’  –  ‘to  carry  out  some  specific  tasks  and  to  strengthen  Solomon  Islands 
capacity.’
53 The two are sometimes seen to be in tension, particularly in those cases 
where short-term security considerations require that RAMSI personnel step in and ‘get 
the job done’.
54 With capacity building now considered RAMSI’s primary activity, a 
capacity building expert was recruited in early 2007 to the Performance Assessment 
Advisory Team, which is responsible for RAMSI’s internal reviewing process. That 
expert was tasked with developing a systematic framework for evaluating the processes 
and outcomes of capacity development across all of RAMSI’s program areas.
55 As a 
result,  a  new  performance  indicator  was  introduced  into  RAMSI’s  monitoring  and 
evaluation  process  –  ‘level  of  agreement  or  gap  between  Solomon  Islanders’  and 
RAMSI personnel’s perceptions around the success or otherwise of capacity building 
efforts’.  This  indicator  reflects  the  realisation  within  RAMSI’s  upper  echelons  that 
capacity building has ‘intangible’ elements that cannot be measured quantitatively.
56 
Nevertheless,  the  bulk  of  the  monitoring  and  evaluation  framework  for  capacity 
building continues to rely on tangible and measurable outcomes. The supposed shift 
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from ‘doing’ to ‘capacity building’ is also apparent in the relative numbers of RAMSI 
personnel working in-line vis-à-vis those working as advisers. Currently there are 13 
permanent in-line positions occupied by RAMSI personnel, with a further 32 temporary 
in-line  positions  created  to  handle  the  backlog  in  Solomon  Islands’  courts.  The 
remainder of RAMSI’s  264 personnel are advisers with ‘no formal delegation, staff 
management or decision-making authority’.
57 The advisers’ only formal task is capacity 
development,  although  in  reality  the  distinction  between  in-line  and  advisory  staff 
should not be overstated.   
In  this  area  of  capacity  building,  prevalent  opinion  both  within  and  without 
RAMSI is that despite important short-term gains, more work needs to be done to make 
RAMSI’s  achievements  sustainable  in  the  long-term.  RAMSI’s  2006-2007  internal 
review, for example, argues that: ‘If it is to tell a better story about capacity, RAMSI 
needs to go still further in articulating its methods and objectives and finding a common 
language and vision with Solomon Islands counterparts and senior managers.’
58 In the 
most recent internal review it has been argued  that assessing progress towards self-
reliance is inherently difficult and ‘highly subjective’.
59 Similarly, public opinion in 
Solomon  Islands,  as  reflected  in  the  comprehensive  RAMSI-commissioned  2007 
People’s Survey, has overwhelmingly been that violent conflict was likely to return in 
the event of RAMSI’s near departure.
60 In the two PIF reviews of RAMSI to-date, the 
main criticisms of RAMSI focused on the relative lack of local ownership of reform and 
on  the  flimsy  reporting  processes  between  RAMSI  and  the  Solomon  Islands 
government.
61 
Despite this acknowledged ‘capacity building’ deficit, the April 2006 riots in 
Honiara,  and  a  serious  rift  with  then  Solomon  Islands  Prime  Minister  Manasseh 
Sogavare, the Howard government proclaimed RAMSI a major success. The Australian 
Labor Party Opposition tended to accept this claim prior to winning office in late 2007, 
                                                 
57 Ibid., p. 11. 
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while  criticising  Alexander  Downer’s  heavy-handed  approach  to  diplomacy  in  the 
Pacific.
62  As  we  have  seen,  RAMSI  was  also  lauded  by  the  OECD–DAC  for  its 
innovative and flexible structure and for its success in restoring peace and economic 
growth to Solomon Islands. In Solomon Islands, the People’s Survey recorded very high 
levels of support for RAMSI, with about 90 per cent of respondents wanting RAMSI to 
stay on.
63 It is important to note, though, that the vast majority of Solomon Islanders 
who live in small, often isolated, rural communities have limited understanding of what 
RAMSI  does  and  the  mission  tends  to  be  associated  only  with  the  more  visible, 
uniform-wearing, PPF and Combined Task Force, who are recognised for improving the 
personal safety of villagers.    
Such  plaudits  aside,  however,  RAMSI  has  also  had  a  significant  number  of 
critics. The main criticism levelled at RAMSI, and to some extent this links up with the 
capacity building issue we mentioned above, has been that it has focused too much on 
the  central  state  and  in  so  doing  neglected  other  important  sources  of  power  and 
legitimacy in Melanesian societies.
64 Critics have argued that by attempting to build a 
Western-style  state  in  the  Solomons,  as  a  technical  and  functional  exercise,  the 
sustainability of RAMSI’s programs is deeply suspect. Morgan and McLeod argue for 
example that:  
While  indigenous  ownership  is  seen  as  fundamental  to  state-building,  state-building 
initiatives—such  as  the  RAMSI  intervention—are  typically  evaluated  against 
international benchmarks, rather than criteria based upon local circumstances and  the 
long-term prospects of sustaining imported ideas and institutions.
65      
Sinclair  Dinnen  has  taken  a  less  anthropological  approach  than  Morgan  and 
McLeod,  situating  RAMSI  within  the  broader  state  building  project  and  Australia’s 
foreign policy objectives in the South Pacific. Dinnen argues that RAMSI’s programs 
are based on a technical and functional approach to state building that cannot meet its 
ambitious objectives. The more substantial issue, he says, relates to the weakness of 
‘nation building’ – ‘a shared sense of political community’ – an objective which may 
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not  necessarily  be  compatible  with  mainstream  understandings  of  state  building.
66 
Similarly,  notable  Solomon  Islands  commentator  and  later  Permanent  Secretary  for 
rural development in the Sogavare government John Roughan, who initially was very 
enthusiastic  in  his  support  for  RAMSI,
67  criticised  RAMSI  for  neglecting  nation 
building.
68 More recently, Roughan lamented that RAMSI ‘failed’ the Solomons during 
the April 2006 riots. He argued that ‘Canberra should be informed of its failure in trying 
to micro-manage the Solomons scene. Place an embargo on all “experts” jetting in from 
all over Australia but set up a local reference group—pastors, elders, women’s groups, 
youth reps—to help re-direct RAMSI in its work.’
69 
  While  these  critiques  are  important,  they  are  limited  by  their  propensity  to 
evaluate RAMSI as an exercise in ‘state building’ and capacity development. Though 
they tend to criticise RAMSI for focusing on the ‘state’ and ignoring ‘society’ what they 
fail to recognise is that RAMSI’s programs are aimed precisely at reconstituting state-
society relations. As we shall see in the next section, rather than being about ‘state 
building’,  to  be  evaluated  against  one  or  another  ideal-typical  notion  of  statehood, 
RAMSI  should  be  understood  and  evaluated  as  a  multilevel  regime  of  state 
transformation,  which  aims  to  fundamentally  circumscribe  political  choices  for 
Solomon Islanders by opening up transnational-regional spaces of governance within 
the state. 
 
State transformation and RAMSI: politics as risk, anti-politics as risk management 
Whether supportive or critical, most accounts of RAMSI’s work remain tied to and 
bounded by the language of state building. However, to examine RAMSI in terms of its 
success  or  otherwise  in  ‘building’  the  capacity  of  Solomon  Islands’  governing 
institutions to perform particular tasks is also to assume that the state is an amalgam of 
service-providing  institutions  and  not  a  dynamic  set  of  power  relationships.
70  The 
former  not  only  confuses  description  with  explanation,  but  also  dehistoricises  and 
naturalises the notion of statehood, particularly as it relates to the development of post-
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colonial states.
71 The most important dimension of RAMSI, as well as any other SBI, 
pertains to the ways in which it affects the production and reproduction of political 
power. Since the reconstitution of the social and political relationships that underpin the 
exercise of state power is effectively what its programs aim to achieve, RAMSI cannot 
be seen as ‘building’ the state from the outside. Rather, it is a multilevel political regime 
that  aims  to  transform  the  state  from  within  through  the  establishing  of  spaces  of 
‘regional’ multilevel governance inside or near the state apparatus. State transformation, 
as we have seen in previous chapters, involves shifting the purpose of state power, its 
location, and the actors exercising state power. To understand the particular nature of 
this attempted transformation in Solomon Islands, it is crucial to identify its links to 
current concerns with de-bounded risk. 
  RAMSI has emerged out of a prevailing perception in Australian policymaking 
circles (which was itself affected by the current mood in Washington and Europe
72) that 
the absence and/or poor functioning of governance structures of a particular kind in 
neighbouring  countries,  or  indeed  in  faraway  countries,  constitutes  a  serious  and 
unacceptable security risk that should not be allowed to fester unchecked. So while the 
crisis in Solomon Islands was initially seen as a humanitarian issue, its ‘securitisation’ 
has  radically  altered  the  Australian  government’s  response,  leading  to  large-scale 
intervention  within  a  WofG  framework.  From  this  perspective,  risk  management  is 
effectively equated with the establishing and proper functioning of systems of ‘good 
governance’  in  the  neoliberal  mould.  Therefore,  the  long-term  stability  of  Pacific 
countries, and hence Australia’s own security, is seen to depend to a great extent on 
circumscribing the political choices of leaders in those states to ensure they make the 
‘right’ decisions. While the necessity of domestic ‘ownership’ to successful reform is 
constantly invoked by RAMSI practitioners and officials at all levels, such ownership is 
mostly limited to supporting predetermined policy objectives to be achieved through 
predetermined processes. In essence, risk management functions in this context as a 
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form of anti-politics, or more accurately, as a form of anti-pluralist and hierarchical 
politics.
73  
  The perception that politics in Solomon Islands, with its chaotic and fast-moving 
pace,  constitutes  a,  or  exacerbates  the,  security  risk  to  Australia  has  meant  that 
RAMSI’s programs have aimed to shift power away from majoritarian institutions to 
transnational-regional spaces of governance and away from popularly elected leaders to 
experts and managers, many of whom are expatriates. The purpose of state power has 
also  been  reorientated  towards  the  provision  of  suitable  conditions  for  market-led 
development, with improved economic growth seen as a necessary, albeit not the only, 
precondition for resolving the small state’s problems of political and social instability.
74 
Therefore, RAMSI’s WofG structure, with its constant moulding and remoulding of 
Solomon Islands’ spaces of governance, should be seen not in the functional terms of 
whether it assists state building, but as a way of organising power.  
Notwithstanding the attempted transformation of Solomon Islands, its existence 
as  a  juridical  entity  has  remained  crucial  to  RAMSI’s  project,  designed  as  it  is  to 
contain the potential flow of transnational risks from the small Pacific archipelago state 
to its neighbours and to Australia in particular. By circumscribing the political choices 
of Solomon Islanders, yet leaving formal authority in their hands, RAMSI constitutes a 
form of power without responsibility and without accountability to those most affected 
by its programs.
75 This is another manifestation of risk management – the management 
of the potential political fallout from such operations in intervening countries.
76 The 
persistence of Solomon Islands as an independent state that serves as a security ‘buffer 
zone’ to its more developed neighbours invites comparisons to the Central and Eastern 
European experience with the Schengen system and European Union (EU) accession.
77 
While Solomon Islands has little prospects of being admitted into an EU-style regional 
framework, the similarities do not end there. In both cases ‘regional’ regulatory spaces 
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have been established within the intervened state to secure immediate security ends and 
longer-term governance reforms.  
Key to the operationalisation of state transformation in RAMSI is the notion of 
capacity  building  (or  capacity  development).  In  the  current  post-colonial  age,  state 
capacity serves as the equivalent of the nineteenth century’s ‘civilisation standard’ – it 
simultaneously rates states on the basis of their domestic characteristics and justifies a 
hierarchical liberal global order in which the sovereignty of ‘ineffective’ states can be 
partially, or even wholly, suspended by ‘effective’ states.
78 Unlike in the nineteenth 
century, though, such hierarchy is now justified primarily in terms of global security 
and not in terms of the betterment of other peoples. As a number of prominent authors 
have  pointed  out,  this  means  the  ‘unbundling’  of  sovereignty  and  in  particular  the 
separation of formal-legal sovereignty from empirical sovereignty.
79 While the former is 
usually seen as indivisible, the latter is equated with state capacity, which could, from 
this  perspective,  be  uneven  across  different  state  functions  and  across  geographical 
regions.  While  the  latter  is  constantly  moulded  and  remoulded  by  interventions  at 
various levels, the former is almost never challenged, even in the most extreme cases of 
the  collapse  of  central  authority,  such  as  Somalia.  This  linking  of  sovereignty  and 
capacity  allowed  RAMSI’s  second  Special  Coordinator  James  Batley  to  argue  that 
RAMSI  was  ‘restoring’  sovereignty  to  Solomon  Islands  by  helping  the  government 
rebuild the capacity of the country’s governing institutions.
80  
Gradations in sovereignty are, thus, implicit in and inherent to the notion of 
capacity  building,  despite  its  ‘objective’  and  technical  connotations,  in  that  full 
authority is handed over to those formally in charge only once indigenous counterparts 
have managed to satisfy particular criteria set up by capacity builders. In this sense, 
capacity building can only be a power relationship and not a ‘partnership’, as it is often 
called. In other words, capacity building is a technique of political rule that naturalises 
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and  depoliticises  both  the  particular  ideological  and  political  underpinnings  of  the 
notion of state capacity itself and the inequalities inherent in the governance structures 
being established.
81 It also places considerable power in the hands of people who are not 
politically  accountable  to  those  populations  over  whom  they  exercise  that  power. 
However,  because  capacity  building  refers  to  a  power  relationship  rather  than  a 
technical  performance  standard,  in  reality  it  is  limited  in  its  ability  to  advance  the 
outcomes sought by interveners.  
State transformation works in practice on a number of levels in Solomon Islands. 
Firstly, at the diplomatic level a variety of mechanisms have been established to, at least 
formally, align RAMSI’s work with the wishes and policies of the Solomon Islands 
government. In reality, such processes have been mostly about negotiating the limits of 
the latter’s spectrum of acceptable political action. Secondly, state transformation also 
occurs  at  the  level  of  the  different  programs.  RAMSI’s  dual  existence,  being 
simultaneously  within  and  outside  the  state,  is  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  Two  a 
fundamental feature of multilevel regimes.   
One  of  the  most  interesting  aspects  of  RAMSI,  which  is  no  surprise  if  we 
examine RAMSI as attempting state transformation, is the apparent disjuncture between 
the diplomatic and bureaucratic levels of engagement. While the high-level political 
relationship had at times been very rancorous, particularly during the prime ministership 
of Manasseh Sogavare from April 2006 to December 2007, working relations between 
RAMSI advisers and their Solomon Islander counterparts have on the whole been quite 
genial. A number of RAMSI advisers remarked in interviews with the author on the gap 
between  public  perceptions  of  political  conflict  and  their  own  experience  of 
cooperation.
82  For  example,  after  lamenting  that  the  mechanisms  for  engagement 
between  the  Solomon  Islands  government  and  RAMSI  had  fallen  into  disarray,  the 
authors of the 2007 PIF review of RAMSI argue that:  
At  cabinet  level,  it  appeared  that  many  Ministers  were  not  working  off  a  clear 
understanding of the thinking behind RAMSI’s civilian programs, and were not aware of 
the considerable input of their officials into the design and running of these programs.
83 
This observation should be qualified by the difficulty in distinguishing between policy 
devised by Solomon Islander bureaucrats and their RAMSI advisers, who are typically 
embedded within Solomon Islands government departments. Nevertheless, the support 
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usually given to RAMSI by the higher levels of the bureaucracy is mostly explained by 
the fact that the Solomon Islands public service had been the hardest hit by the tensions 
and is one of the biggest beneficiaries of the intervention. However, more importantly, 
the gulf between the political echelons and the bureaucracy is a manifestation of the 
ways in which RAMSI’s programs separate day-to-day governance from popular or 
political influence, something which the small Solomon Islands middle class, which is 
located mostly in the public service, tends to be comfortable with. Therefore, what we 
see is not so much a diplomatic conflict between outsiders and Solomon Islanders, but a 
schism  between  two  regimes  within  the  state,  which  has  found  expression  at  the 
diplomatic level.    
Following the 2007 PIF review of RAMSI, as well as a result of the troubled 
relationship between the Sogavare government and the Australian government, greater 
effort has been placed by Australian and RAMSI officials on involving the PIF as a way 
of ‘managing conflict’ in the diplomatic relationship.
84 A complex coordination and 
mediation  structure  was  put  in  place,  with  the  so-called  ‘troika’  at  its  centre  –  the 
Solomon Islands government’s special envoy Sir Michael Maina, then RAMSI Special 
Coordinator  Tim  George  and  PIF  permanent  representative  to  Honiara  Dr  Lesie 
Koravavala.  The  troika  meetings  collapsed  in  September  2007  after  the  relationship 
between  Sogavare  and  the  Australian  government  reached  its  nadir  and  Maina  was 
sacked.  It  was  re-established  in  January  2008  following  the  election  of  new  Prime 
Minister  Derek  Sikua.
85  However,  the  limits  of  this  negotiating  process  are  clear. 
Michael Maina, who acquired the dubious moniker ‘Mr Ten Percent’ because of his 
past  relationship  with  the  logging  industry,
86  said  that  without  a  Solomon  Islands 
government  tick-off  on  RAMSI’s  Mid  Term  Strategy,  the  perception  of  two 
governments  operating  in  Solomon  Islands  will  remain.
87  Yet,  despite  the  Solomon 
Islands  government’s  neglect  to  ratify  the  document  until  early  2008,  RAMSI’s 
programs continued unchanged and RAMSI’s 2006/2007 performance review took the 
Mid Term Strategy as its point of reference. For his part, Dr Koravavala argued that his 
role was to represent the PIF Leaders’ decision, which was to set up RAMSI as an 
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‘integrated  mission’,  not  to  be  dismembered.  Consequently,  he  insisted  that  conflict 
between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands government was a matter of appearances and 
not substance. Dr Koravavala said that in those occasions in which RAMSI appears to 
be infringing on Solomon Islands’ sovereignty the PIF could help mediate between the 
two sides.
88 However, at the centre of the conflict between RAMSI and the Solomon 
Islands  government  at  that  time  was  Sogavare’s  desire  to  see  RAMSI’s  civilian 
functions reduced and his frustration with his inability to affect such change
89 – this was 
not a matter of appearances, it cut to the core of what RAMSI’s programs attempted to 
achieve. 
  Another  issue  that  has  featured  highly  in  the  RAMSI–Solomon  Islands 
government relationship, particularly during Manasseh Sogavare’s tenure, has been that 
of the mission’s review process. RAMSI officials fought hard to derail Sogavare’s plan 
to establish a Solomon Islands parliamentary review of the mission, arguing that such a 
review would be politically motivated and biased.
90 Australian Foreign Affairs Minister 
Alexander Downer also weighed in to warn Sogavare that his proposed review would 
destroy RAMSI.
91 Simultaneously, RAMSI officials took great efforts to demonstrate 
the impartiality and quality of RAMSI’s internal review process, with private consulting 
agencies  contracted  to  carry  out  performance  audits  and  the  Australian  National 
University (ANU) hired to compile an annual People’s Survey. Sogavare attempted to 
discredit the independence and methodology of the People’s Survey, alleging among 
other  things  that  the  survey  team  made  secret  payments  to  people  in  the  Solomon 
Islands National Statistics Office, an accusation strongly denied by the ANU team.
92  
There is little doubt that Sogavare planned to use the review process as a way of 
applying pressure on the Australian government, perhaps to make it forego its demand 
that his embattled Attorney-General Julian Moti be turned in to Australian authorities to 
face statutory rape charges. However, it also remains true that RAMSI’s commissioned 
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and internal reviews are limited in their critique of RAMSI’s work, focused as they are 
on  evaluating  RAMSI’s  effectiveness  within  the  parameters  set  by  the  programs 
themselves. In fact, a senior RAMSI policy adviser confided that the consultancy firm 
commissioned to conduct the first review in 2005/06 was so eager to please its client 
that  it  failed  to  provide  almost  any  critical  assessment  of  RAMSI,  leading  to  its 
subsequent replacement.
93 Since RAMSI’s programs in effect become Solomon Islands 
public policy, such reviews work to depoliticise highly contentious political issues and 
reframe  those  in  terms  of  effectiveness.  For  example,  the  effectiveness  of  the 
coordinating mechanisms between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands government was 
assessed  and  evaluated  according  to  the  capacity  of  the  former  to  implement  and 
maintain reforms. It is important to note that despite resistance from RAMSI officials a 
parliamentary review of RAMSI by the Foreign Relations Committee was eventually 
announced in mid 2008 and conducted between September and November of that year, 
though at the time of writing the Committee’s report was yet to be published and the 
implications for RAMSI were unknown.
94    
Unlike the internal reviews, the two PIF reviews of RAMSI did engage with 
broader  political  issues,  particularly  those  relating  to  Solomon  Islands’  sovereignty, 
however,  since  the  Forum  has  no  direct  oversight  powers  over  RAMSI  its 
recommendations  have  been  selectively  or  partially  implemented.  For  example,  the 
2005 Eminent Persons Group (EPG) review recommended that a Pacific islander lead 
RAMSI’s PPF,
95 but that has not happened to-date and is unlikely to happen in the 
future in light of the close relationship between the PPF and the AFP’s International 
Deployment Group (IDG). In any case, the PIF reviews have been focused on the ‘how’ 
and not the ‘what’ of RAMSI. For example, the latest review has argued that conflict 
resolution  and  reconciliation  lie  outside  RAMSI’s  mandate  –  ‘[t]hese  activities  are 
squarely the responsibility and prerogative of the SIG’s [Solomon Islands government] 
political leadership’
96 – thereby neglecting the effect of RAMSI’s own programs on 
these issues, as well as the ways in which RAMSI shapes the policies of the Solomon 
Islands government by being located inside the state.  
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At the program level, there are numerous examples for state transformation in 
action. I shall briefly examine the ERU and the OAG, because both reflect SBIs’ twin 
emphases on economic reform and good governance. The ERU is a department within 
MoFT. It was established after RAMSI’s commencement and has since been primarily 
staffed with Australian advisers, particularly from the Australian federal department of 
Treasury,  although  current  staffing  levels  are  more  balanced  with  five  expatriate 
advisers and five Solomon Islanders. The official long-term objective of the ERU as 
stipulated in RAMSI’s Mid Term Strategy is to improve the capacity of the Solomon 
Islands government to develop and implement sound and equitable economic reforms.
97 
The Unit’s medium term objectives comprise a ubiquitous neoliberal ensemble – stable 
macroeconomic management; central bank effective and independent; economic policy 
is  developed  in  consultation  with  key  stakeholders;  significant  improvements  in  the 
capacity of MoFT staff for independent analysis and provision of timely and accurate 
advice; reform of business regulatory environment and state-owned enterprises (SOEs); 
increased competition; and taxation system reform.
98  
  Among its achievements, the ERU counts the implementation of the Foreign 
Investment Act; macroeconomic stability; the reduction of tariff rates on imports to a 
flat 10 per cent duty; the introduction of competition in the telecommunications and 
international  civil  aviation  sectors;  the  sale  of  several  state-owned  enterprises;  and 
improved state revenue collection through the introduction of a more predictable and 
transparent exemptions regime.      
Assessments of the ERU’s work to-date have been mostly positive, although a 
recurring criticism is the need for Solomon Islander leadership to support economic 
reform in the longer term. The 2007 IMF Article IV Consultation Staff Report, while 
not  focusing  specifically  on  the  ERU,  noted  the  progress  made  in  ensuring 
macroeconomic  stability  and  stimulating  private  sector-led  growth.
99  The  RAMSI-
commissioned Gilling and Hughes report commended the ERU for its enthusiasm and 
achievements,  but  argued  that:  ‘The  ERU’s  image  as  a  Canberra-controlled  implant 
needs to be progressively replaced by that of a fully integrated part of SIG’s [Solomon 
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Islands government] machinery of fiscal, monetary and real sector policy-making.’
100 In 
a similar vein, Winter and Schofield’s review of the whole of RAMSI notes:  
The evidence suggests that RAMSI assistance is meeting its objectives…and contributing 
significantly to economic recovery. However…the level of service provided, the initiative 
for new policies and the way in which the agenda is pursued, still depend almost entirely 
o n   a d v i s e r s ,   a n d   a   s i g n i f i c a n t   s h i f t   i n   l e a d e r s h i p   f r o m   S I G   a n d   / o r   s p e c i f i c   c h a n g e   i n  
approach by RAMSI will be required to provide a prospect  of  transition  to  Solomon 
Islander capability in the long term.
101     
  Gilling and Hughes argued that to make the ERU more effective, emphasis must 
be placed on capacity building and local consultation.
102 Indeed, both are now important 
medium term objectives of the Unit. However, in this context capacity building and 
local consultation appear to be contingent on their utility for advancing the ERU’s pre-
existing  objectives.  In  the  ERU’s  Staged  Capacity  Building  Model,  ‘[c]apacity 
development outcomes are linked to performance outcomes, specified as annual targets 
to  be  achieved  and  all  are  expressed  generically  as  steps  along  the 
dependent/guided/assisted/independent  spectrum.’
103  ‘Independence’  in  this  context 
clearly does not extend to policies which stray from advisers’ prescriptions. 
Local consultation is also seen in functional terms: ‘each major piece of work 
needs to be backed by an assessment to identify those stakeholders who may support or 
frustrate  efforts  to  bring  about  change…This  strategy  would  also  facilitate  the 
identification  of  major  risks;  that  is  those  stakeholders  most  likely  to  frustrate 
change.’
104 The 2006/2007 review of RAMSI found that although consultation did often 
take place, ‘[t]here [was] as yet no mechanism to record information on stakeholder 
mapping, poverty analysis or consultation over economic reform.’
105 In fact, it seems 
that  reform  implementation  has  been  the  ERU’s  primary  concern.  As  one  RAMSI 
adviser  in  the  Solomon  Islands  Ministry  of  Development  Planning  and  Aid 
Coordination  said  to  the  author,  ERU  staff  often  ignored  stakeholders  from  within 
RAMSI  when  these  were  seen  as  impeding  reform:  ‘they’re  more  focused  on  tax 
reform, for example. Are we trying to build capacity or implement reform?’
106 Heinz 
Vaekesa, the Director of Trade in the under-resourced Solomon  Islands Ministry of 
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Trade also complained that no effort was made to consult his department when the ERU 
managed to push through a sweeping tariff reduction on imports. He argued that this 
policy would hurt the fledgling domestic private sector, as well as Solomon Islands’ 
bargaining position in any future discussions on regional trade agreements or economic 
integration.
107  Mr  Vaekesa  pointed  out  the  conflict  of  interest  between  RAMSI’s 
domination  by  Australians  on  one  hand,  and  Australia’s  trade  relationship  with 
Solomon Islands and the South Pacific as a whole on the other. Notably, trade is an area 
in  which  RAMSI  does  not  provide  any  technical  assistance  to  the  Solomon  Islands 
government.  
The ERU has also attempted in recent years to build capacity for ‘economic 
understanding and ability to apply basic economic analysis across government’.
108 Unit 
staff  is  increasingly  involved  in  departmental  economic  planning  and  goal-setting 
exercises in an effort to turn those into a WofG issue. Gilling and Hughes recommended 
that  ERU  staff  build  the  capacity  of  staff  in  other  departments  to  recognise  when 
specialised economic advice is needed and in this way involve the Unit more intimately 
in the work of other government departments. In reality, this WofG initiative was never 
properly implemented, with the ERU having close working relations primarily with the 
Ministry of Commerce.
109      
The  OAG  is  another  example  for  RAMSI-driven  state  transformation  from 
within. Unlike the ERU, the OAG is not a new bureaucratic unit; it was established 
under  the  British  colonial  administration  and  is  mandated  by  Section  108  of  the 
Constitution of Solomon Islands to audit the public accounts of all state agencies and 
report its findings to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in parliament.
110 While the 
auditing of public accounts is not a new function, RAMSI’s programs have aimed to 
strengthen  the  links  between  the  OAG  and  regional/global  auditing  standard-setting 
institutions  such  as  the  South  Pacific  Association  of  Supreme  Audit  Institutions 
(SPASAI) and the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), 
as  well  as  find  ways  to  overcome  the  perceived  ineffectiveness  of  parliamentary 
oversight in Solomon Islands.  
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As part of RAMSI’s machinery of governance pillar’s strengthening of Solomon 
Islands’ institutions of accountability, the OAG has received a considerable influx of 
funding and personnel. From a low-point of only three auditors in mid 2003, the OAG 
was up to its pre-decolonisation staffing level of 28 auditors by 2007. At the time of 
writing  the  Auditor-General’s  position  was  staffed  by  an  Australian,  who  was  the 
previous Deputy Auditor-General, following the death of Solomon Islander Auditor-
General, Floyd Augostine Fatai, in July 2008. Most other senior positions are also filled 
by RAMSI advisers.
111 The OAG also went on a recruiting drive in late 2005 and hired 
11 new Solomon Islander auditors that were to be trained specifically for the job, both 
in-house and in tertiary institutions.
112 In addition, the OAG has contracted out some of 
its auditing tasks to private accounting firms; however, the long-term goal is to conduct 
all audits internally.
113 Funding for the OAG has increased by 978.6 per cent since 
RAMSI’s  arrival  to  approximately  SI$3.78  million  in  2006.
114  This  figure  does  not 
include the salaries of RAMSI personnel, which are paid by the Australian government 
through project management firm GRM, and the substantial amounts of money spent on 
improving the OAG’s infrastructure. Even a cursory examination reveals that the OAG, 
with its new offices and shiny laptop computers, has currently much better facilities and 
equipment at its disposal than most other Solomon Islands government departments, 
which  are  often  housed  in  dilapidated  buildings  with  outdated  and  unreliable 
infrastructure. 
The rapid expansion of the OAG is related to the now almost-commonsensical, 
if  contestable,  view  in  the  major  bilateral  and  multilateral  donor  agencies  that 
corruption, within a broader context of weak governance, is one of the main problems 
inhibiting sustained and equitably shared economic growth in developing countries, as 
well  as  reducing  aid  effectiveness.
115  A  greater  emphasis  on  accountability  and 
transparency is, thus, seen as crucial for the promotion of market-led development and 
stability  more  generally.  Consequently,  alongside  the  OAG,  RAMSI’s  machinery  of 
government  programs  have  also  supported  Solomon  Islands’  other  accountability 
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institutions, the Ombudsman and the Leadership Code Commission, as well as sought to 
facilitate closer coordination between these agencies.  
In the OAG Strategic Plan 2008-2012 document the relationship between OAG, 
Parliament and government is stated clearly: 
The Auditor General serves as the external auditor of government with a duty to report 
independently  and  directly  to  Parliament  on  the  results  of  audits  examinations 
performed, ensuring government transparency and accountability to Parliament and the 
public.
116 
However,  a  common  perception  is  that  one  of  the  main  problems  limiting  the 
effectiveness of the OAG is the ineffectual nature of the parliamentary review process – 
‘the  laws,  regulations  and  rules  are  there  but  no-one  follows  them.’
117  There  is  a 
prevailing perception within the OAG and in the machinery of government pillar of 
RAMSI more broadly that the parliamentary process, while ultimately appropriate, is 
currently constrained in its capacity to produce desired governance outcomes. Although 
by the end of 2007 10 Special Audit Reports were reviewed by the PAC, concerns 
remain in RAMSI and the OAG as to whether the PAC’s recommendations have been 
properly implemented by the relevant government departments and state agencies.
118 
The OAG’s efforts to overcome the supposed ineffectiveness of the Solomon 
Islands  Parliament  are  indicative  of  the  sorts  of  strategies  employed  more  broadly 
within RAMSI programs. Aside from ongoing attempts to build the PAC’s capacity to 
fulfil its role through, for example, facilitating training programs for MPs, there have 
also been attempts to improve implementation in other ways, which to some extent aim 
to bypass or supplement the parliamentary process. Firstly, the OAG has attempted to 
establish  a  WofG  structure  for  combating  corruption,  which  involves  setting  up 
regulation mechanisms and internal audit mechanisms within government departments 
that  the  OAG  supervises  and  trains.  Secondly,  the  OAG  has  been  promoting  the 
criminalisation  and  judicialisation  of  corruption  offences.  Already  a  high  degree  of 
cooperation  exists  between  the  OAG  and  the  PPF’s  Corruption  Targeting  Team, 
however the OAG report on combating corruption recommends establishing an inter-
agency task force combining these two agencies with the Leadership Code Commission, 
the Inland Revenue Division and the Director of Public Prosecutions to investigate and 
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prosecute identified breaches of law. It was also recommended that the Auditor-General 
be  given  the  authority  to  report  directly  to  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions.
119 
However, the report goes further to propose changes to the Solomon Islands Penal Code 
to  remove  barriers  to  successful  prosecution  of  corruption  cases  by  expanding  the 
definition  of  corruption.  The  current  legislation  applies  only  to  those  ‘…being 
employed in the public service’, thereby excluding many others in public life, including 
politicians  and  police  officers  for  example.
120  To  be  prosecutable  in  a  particular 
jurisdiction corruption allegations require domestic legal foundations. In this case, there 
is  a  considerable  gap  between  international  definitions  of  corruption  and 
maladministration, as espoused by donors or INTOSAI, and the Solomon Islands legal 
framework.
121 The OAG’s reports adopt a broader definition of corruption than that 
stipulated  in  the  legislation.
122  This  brings  into  question  the  agency’s  proclaimed 
subservience to Parliament and parliamentary processes.  Finally, the OAG has been 
interacting  directly  with  donors,  notifying  them  of  corruption-related  concerns  in 
Solomon Islands with the aim of producing pressure on the government to implement 
the OAG’s findings, as well as encouraging targeted approaches by donors to reduce 
opportunities for corruption and maladministration.
123 Indeed, the OAG Strategic Plan 
specifically mentions donors as part of the agency’s group of key stakeholders.
124 Of 
course, with RAMSI being the biggest donor in Solomon Islands as well as part of the 
state, the distinction between donor and state becomes difficult to ascertain. 
  After examining RAMSI as attempted state transformation, in the next section I 
look into the limitations of state transformation of this kind in Solomon Islands. 
 
The limits to RAMSI’s state transformation: bringing politics back in 
RAMSI’s programs and structure, as we have seen, are premised on the view that to 
achieve long-term stability in Solomon Islands and thus to mitigate the potential for 
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transnational  risks  to  spill-over  to  neighbouring  countries,  the  political  choices  of 
Solomon Islanders must be narrowed so that ‘good governance’ can prevail.
125 Since 
Solomons  Islands’  problems  are  seen  to  be  somewhere  on  the  so-called  security-
development nexus, ensuring security in the short term and strengthening governance is 
said to set off a virtuous cycle in which development and security reinforce each other. 
To  survive,  it  is  argued  that  Solomon  Islands  must  learn  to  benefit  from  the 
opportunities presented by the global economy and become more attractive to foreign 
investors and that for this to occur security and good governance are essential. Since 
poor  governance, in particular bad leadership  and corruption, is seen as the root of 
Solomon Islands’ past and present ailments this approach is inherently anti-political – 
seeking to insulate processes of governance from political or popular influence. This 
antipolitics is not only an ideological disposition, but the premise for a wide-ranging 
attempted process of state transformation that aims to relocate state power away from 
the  potentially  deleterious  influence  of  majoritarian  institutions  and  popular 
interference. Meanwhile, narrow political and economic interests are benefiting from 
RAMSI’s neoliberal agenda of ‘good governance’. 
The hegemony of neoliberal notions of good governance and state building in 
the formulation of RAMSI’s objectives has meant that challenges to neoliberalism have 
been perceived as threatening to both political stability and the prospects of market-led 
economic  recovery  and  hence  as  security  risks  to  be  contained.  Indeed,  political 
opposition  to  RAMSI’s  programs  has  been  routinely  depoliticised,  criminalised  and 
delegitimised as dangerous and as an expression of bad leadership and vested interests. 
There is more than a trace of irony in that despite ongoing efforts to limit their ability to 
influence political outcomes, the blame for any future fall-out is almost certain to be 
laid  firmly  at  the  feet  of  Solomon  Islands  political  leaders.  I  already  mentioned 
Alexander  Downer’s  derogatory  comments  on  the  quality  of  political  leadership  in 
Solomon Islands. While not so blunt, Australian and RAMSI officials at all levels, as 
well as many Solomon Islanders from the small Honiara middle class, share similar 
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views about the relationship between politics in the Solomons, the implementation of 
RAMSI’s  programs  and  Solomon  Islands’  future  prospects.  Australian  High 
Commissioner to Solomon Islands Peter Hooton, for example, said that: ‘Politics in 
Solomon Islands is about relationships and shifting alliances. [In this process] money is 
important.’
126 A RAMSI adviser in the Debt Management Unit argued: 
The challenge is how to develop Solomon Islands’ capacity at the ministerial level and 
that’s where RAMSI is struggling… It’s one thing to develop technical skills but how do 
you  influence  political  outcomes?  That’s  the  challenge,  but  I’m  not  sure  it’s  being 
addressed and I’m not sure whether anyone knows how to influence that.
127  
Another senior RAMSI policy adviser, exasperated by the difficult relationship between 
RAMSI and the Sogavare government, said off the record that if RAMSI was to fail, the 
Solomon  Islands  government  would  be  at  fault.
128  Former  Transparency  Solomon 
Islands Executive Officer, government minister and trade union leader, Joses Tuhanuku 
argued in an interview that: 
The biggest problem that destroyed this country was corruption and it’s still there… 
Parliament is still very corrupt… He [Manasseh Sogavare] talks about the sovereignty 
o f   S o l o m o n   I s l a n d s ,   b u t   t h e   t h i n g   i s   t h a t   w h e n   i t   c o m e s   t o   t h e   e l e c t i o n   o f   t h e   p r i m e  
minister it’s always controlled by outsiders, people with the money to bribe members 
of parliament.
129  
Tuhanuku  went  on  to  argue  that  Sogavare  was  willing  to  compromise  everything 
RAMSI had achieved to save Julian Moti.  
The collapse of the Sogavare government and subsequent election of relative 
newcomer, former public servant Derek Sikua, to prime minister in December 2007 
were seen as signs that the diplomatic relations between Australia and Solomon Islands, 
and hence the RAMSI-Solomon Islands government relationship, were set to improve. 
Indeed, since the election of Sikua in Solomon Islands and the Rudd government in 
Australia, the working relationship has recovered remarkably. This is despite the fact 
that in substantive terms the Sikua government is not all that different from those it 
succeeded. Journalist Craig Skehan described the new government as a ‘mixed bag’:  
Some ministers have previously been accused or convicted of corruption and several 
are  known  to  have  financial  interests  in  logging.  Others  have  previously  accused 
foreign logging operator of bribery and know where skeletons are buried.
130  
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This shows that the political scene in Solomon Islands cannot be characterised in terms 
of coalitions of ‘goodies’ – the champions of ‘good governance’ – versus ‘baddies’ – 
those who serve corrupt vested interests – as it is often described in Australian media 
and policy publications.
131 RAMSI has certainly had considerable effect on politics in 
Solomon Islands, but not necessarily that intended by the intervention’s planners. 
While  political  opposition  to  RAMSI  and  its  neoliberal  platform  for 
reconstruction through market-led development has been cast as illegitimate by both 
Australian  and  RAMSI  policymakers,  the  establishing  of  neoliberal  governance 
structures in Solomon Islands has often clashed with RAMSI’s security objective of 
alleviating  conflict.  Indeed,  with  trade  in  natural  resources  the  only  viable  option 
Solomon Islands has for engaging with global markets, it is worthwhile bearing in mind 
that conflicts over access to, usage of, and the distribution of benefits from, resources 
have  been  a  constant  feature  of  colonial  and  post-colonial  life  in  the  Solomons.
132 
Therefore, attempts to manage the contradictions of state transformation have mainly 
included the suppression of violent conflict when it emerged, and the intensification of 
efforts  to  depoliticise  important  areas  of  governance  and  insulate  those  from 
‘undesirable’  forms  of  interference.  This,  in  turn,  has  led  to  the  emergence  of  new 
conflicts and contradictions which then have had to be managed in the same way. In 
attempting to create a powerful bureaucracy, insulated from ‘unwanted’ pressures from 
above and from below, RAMSI’s programs have only served to further weaken the 
bonds  of  mutual  obligation  attaching  politicians  in  Honiara  to  the  provinces,  while 
nevertheless still allowing powerful interests to often manipulate governance reforms to 
their advantage.  
For example, the April 2006 riots that shook Honiara to the core were at least in 
part politically driven (although an element of opportunism undoubtedly existed in the 
looting and vandalising that followed). This much was recognised by the Commission 
of  Inquiry  established  by  the  Solomon  Islands  Parliament.
133  The  election  of  the 
unpopular  Snyder  Rini  to  prime  minister  surprised  many  Solomon  Islanders  and 
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allegations of large sums of money changing hands prior to his election were rife. The 
money allegedly came mostly from Taiwan and China or from local residents of East 
Asian  descent  who  had  close  links  with  commercial  interests  from  those  countries, 
particularly in the logging and fishing industries.
134 RAMSI’s arrival tended to benefit 
the small expatriate elite that dominated the services and retail industries in Honiara, 
but had few links to the provinces and little inclination to cultivate such networks. 
Indeed, most of the damage during the riots was done to Chinese-owned businesses.
135 
The rioters were not an organised movement, but it seems anger at RAMSI stemmed 
from two primary sources. Some rioters accused RAMSI of supposedly sheltering the 
so-called  ‘Big  Fish’,  like  Rini  and  Kemakeza,  who  personally  benefited  from  the 
tensions and from links to shady business characters. Another group was incited into 
action by well-known political figures like MPs Charles Dausabea and Nelson Ne’e 
who were at least in part worried about being arrested for their role in the MEF and 
therefore wanted to see RAMSI leave or scaled back. Onlookers remarked that despite 
the PPF’s use of protective gear, no RSIP officer was hurt during the riots, while six 
Australian PPF officers were injured.
136  
In response to the riots the Australian government redeployed the Australian 
Defence Force to Solomon Islands (now part of the Combined Task Force with New 
Zealand,  Tonga  and  PNG).  Security  at  political  events  was  also  stepped  up 
considerably. During the December 2007 parliamentary election of the prime minister 
the PPF and RSIP deployed in large numbers, preventing unauthorised people from 
coming  near  Parliament  House  and  crowds  from  gathering  anywhere  in  Honiara.
137 
Also, riot-control training to RSIP has been enhanced and so has pre-deployment riot 
training to PPF officers. The IDG has also established three rapid response teams with a 
total of 200 officers, specifically for the purpose of providing immediate stabilisation 
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capacity in the event of future rioting in Solomon Islands and elsewhere in Australia’s 
near region.
138     
RAMSI  planners’  assessment  of  the  situation  in  Solomon  Islands  prior  to 
intervention, which was adopted from Wainwright’s report,
139 had been that conflict 
was the result of the absence of robust governance systems of a particular kind in that 
country. For this reason, the programmatic response to the April 2006 riots was more of 
the same, but with heightened levels of security to ensure violence was kept at bay. 
However, as I argued elsewhere, the tensions actually resulted from deep challenges to 
the  stability  of  real-existing  governance  structures  in  Solomon  Islands  in  the  late 
1990s.
140 These governance structures were already unstable due to the difficulties of 
forming lasting political coalitions in Solomon Islands’ fragmented political and ethnic 
environment. State power in the Solomons had since independence been based on the 
distribution of patronage in the form of state funds from Honiara down to the provinces 
through  fluid  and  shifting  networks.  The  British  administration  relied  for  export 
revenue on a small number of foreign-owned, large-scale resource extraction operations 
on alienated or leased land (mainly on Guadalcanal), leaving the rest of the protectorate 
mostly undeveloped with customary land ownership protected by law. For this reason, 
the main avenue of wealth and power accumulation for indigenous Solomon Islanders 
had been the state apparatus, but to sustain their power they had to cultivate patronage 
networks,  both  within  the  state  apparatus  and  at  the  local  level.  The  British 
development model was kept unchanged at independence, with the important exception 
of the introduction of logging on customary lands in the early 1980s. The Solomon 
Mamaloni government then allowed logging companies, which were usually from East 
and Southeast Asia, to negotiate logging rights directly with landowners, with the state 
acting  as  the  regulator.
141  In  the  following  years,  while  logging  became  the  most 
significant export-earner in Solomon Islands the incidence of social conflict at the local 
level  increased,  as  communities  became  divided  over  the  unevenly  distributed  and 
unsustained  gains  from  the  destruction  of  their  habitats  by  logging  companies.
142 
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Nevertheless,  political  leaders  in  the  1980s  and  early-to-mid  1990s  made  sure  they 
continued to use state revenue for patronage; therefore, personal wealth accumulation 
was relatively modest in the upper echelons of politics and the public service and the 
anti-logging movement never quite managed to become national in scope.
143  
In 1997, however, the Asian crisis, which softened demand for timber, caused 
state  revenue  to  plummet  and  government  debt  to  skyrocket,  leading  the  Ulufa’alu 
government to attempt the implementation of a wide-ranging public sector restructuring 
program (PSRP) advocated by the IMF and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). As 
part of the PSRP large-scale public sector redundancies were announced, the local-level 
area councils were abolished and government spending was slashed. The government 
also  announced  its  intentions  to  privatise  some  SOEs.  While  praised  by  ADB 
economists as home-grown,
144 the PSRP had few domestic powerbases aside from a 
handful  of  high-level  bureaucrats.  Discontent  Guadalcanal  leaders,  such  as  former 
Prime Minister Ezekiel Alebua, who were suddenly cut off from patronage networks, 
used  the  opportunity  to  galvanise  already-existing  feelings  of  resentment  among 
disenfranchised  Guadalcanalese  youth  into  violent  action.  With  large  numbers  of 
combatants and guns coming over from neighbouring Bougainville, violence quickly 
spiralled out of the control of those who incited it and sought to use it to their benefit.  
This unfortunate turn of events should serve as a warning to contemporary state 
builders, since, arguably, there is still no constituency for reform of that nature today. 
Although  RAMSI’s  programs,  in  the  spirit  of  currently  fashionable  neoliberal 
institutionalist  approaches  to  development,  have  actually  increased  the  number  of 
public servants rather than attempt public sector reduction, the emphasis on market-led 
development and on attracting foreign investment as the overarching purpose of the 
state has been kept. However, it remains the case that the glue connecting Honiara to 
the  provinces  is  state-based  funding  and  patronage.  RAMSI’s  work  has  made  the 
transfer of such funds increasingly difficult and also reduced the reliance of politicians 
on deep-reaching patronage networks. Nevertheless, the People’s Survey 2007 reveals 
that  most  Solomon  Islanders  still  expect  their  elected  representatives  to  directly 
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improve their household’s economic well-being.
145 Patronage has not completely gone 
away. For example, as a response to RAMSI’s pressure on off-budget spending, the 
discretionary Constituency Development Fund, which was funded by Taiwanese aid, 
went up to SI$1 million per MP during the Sogavare prime ministership. At the same 
time, the absence of any  meaningful ideological or programmatic cleavages – what 
Steeves characterised as ‘unbounded politics’
146 – has meant that money politics has 
remained  crucial  to  the  formation  of  political  coalitions  in  Solomon  Islands.  The 
funding,  however,  comes  increasingly  from  the  private  sector  or  from  Taiwan  and 
China and not from the state’s coffers. The importance of these external sources of 
funding has risen since the state does not serve that purpose any longer. This also means 
that the allegiance of elected politicians is increasingly given to business interests, who 
are becoming indispensable in getting them elected in the first place, thus undermining 
even further the tenuous links between Honiara and the provinces. For example, during 
the 2006 national election, notable Solomon Islander businessman of Chinese descent 
Sir Thomas Chan chartered boats for shipping Malaitan voters from Honiara to Malaita 
to help his preferred candidate, Edward Huniehu, win the seat of East Are’ Are.
147 
Indeed,  the  increasing  competitiveness  of  elections  to  Parliament  demonstrates  how 
much is at stake.
148 Another creative effort at adapting money politics to the RAMSI 
climate has been the marked increase in the number of government ministers. In the 
Sogavare government there were 24 ministers out of a coalition of 26 MPs in total. As 
we can see, rather than eliminate money politics, RAMSI has ironically made it even 
more important as a source of power in Solomon Islands. 
To the limited extent that RAMSI has managed to stabilise politics in Solomon 
Islands, this has had more to do with the current high levels of economic activity, as a 
result  of  unsustainable  logging  and  an  unsustainable  services  and  housing  bubble 
created by the presence of a large number of well-paid aid workers and advisers in 
Honiara.
149  High  levels  of  economic  growth  have  allowed  for  a  temporary 
accommodation to emerge between technocrats and the business interests associated 
                                                 
145 ANU Enterprise, ‘People’s Survey 2007’, p. 9. 
146 Steeves, Jeffrey S., ‘Unbounded Politics in the Solomon Islands: Leadership and Party Alignments’, 
Pacific Studies 19, no. 1 (1996), pp. 115-38.  
147 Huniehu, Edward J., ‘Political Corruption’, Solomon Star, 11 September 2007, p. 8. 
148 Fraenkel, Jon, ‘The Impact of RAMSI on the 2006 Elections in Solomon Islands’, Political Science 
58, no. 2 (2006), pp. 63-85. 
149 Solomon Islands registered the highest levels of GDP growth per capita in the South Pacific in 2004, 
2005 and 2006. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the destruction of the 1998-2000 years 
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with the resource-extraction industries and their politician allies. For example, the 2006 
Foreign Investment Act was promoted and designed by the ERU and heralded as a huge 
success in terms of fostering improved economic growth, with foreign investment up to 
SI$2.3 billion in the July 2006 to July 2007 period, up from SI$315 million for the 
same  period  before  the  Act  came  into  force.
150  However,  a  closer  scrutiny  of  new 
investment pledges made between July 2006 and July 2007 shows the vast majority are 
in the over-exploited forestry and fishing sectors.
151 RAMSI officials have argued in 
response that economic diversification is not part of the mission’s mandate, which is 
only  concerned  with  establishing  the  right  conditions  for  market-led  economic 
development to thrive. While this may be the case, such legislative reform does not 
occur in a political vacuum. Logging interests were well-placed to benefit from the 
legislation and it is no coincidence that former Finance Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo, 
who was praised as very reform-minded by RAMSI advisers,
152 was also affiliated with 
logging  interests.  It  is  likely  that  with  the  imminent  decline  of  logging  revenue  by 
approximately 2012, the unlikely coalition between technocrats and politicians who rely 
on money politics for their survival would be sorely tested.         
While neoliberal solutions have been hegemonic in defining RAMSI’s  long-
term objectives, this is not to say that RAMSI’s programs have been persistent in their 
application  of  a  neoliberal  reform  agenda  at  all  costs.  Despite  the  presumed 
complementarity of market-led development and conflict alleviation, some recognition 
has emerged in recent years that market-led economic development can generate social 
conflict.
153  While  political  challenges  to  reform  have  been  cast  as  illegitimate, 
concessions have been made in areas that were perceived as too sensitive for RAMSI to 
get involved in. The most prominent example is the issue of land tenure, which a recent 
Centre for Independent Studies report has argued is essential for improved sustained 
economic  growth  through  market-led  development  in  Solomon  Islands.
154  R A M S I  
officials responded to the report by arguing land reform was beyond RAMSI’s mandate. 
                                                 
150 Solomon Times, ‘New Foreign Investment Act Attracts Investors, Solomon Times Online, 22 August 
2007, available at <http://solomontimes.com/news.aspx?nwID=537&print=1>, accessed 12 November 
2007. 
151 Data obtained by author from the Office of the Registrar of Foreign Investments, Ministry of Trade.   
152 Phone interview with former ERU adviser. 
153 This has occurred mainly through the influence of anthropological research on aid programs. See for 
example, Spence, Rebecca and Iris Wielders, ‘Conflict Prevention in the Pacific’, Canberra: Australian 
National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, the State, Society and Governance 
in Melanesia Program, targeted research papers for AusAID, February 2006. 
154 Sodhi, Gaurav, ‘Five out of Ten: A Performance Report on the Regional Assistance Mission to the 
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But  more  than  merely  an  issue  of  mandate,  Australian  government  and  RAMSI 
analyses  have  been  acutely  aware  of  the  heightened  sensitivity  of  land  issues  in 
Solomon Islands and advocated no major overhaul of the land ownership system.
155 
This is not to say that rural development has been ignored by RAMSI, but the policy 
that was  adopted through a joint study with the World Bank and other donors and 
worked  through  the  Solomon  Islands  government  has  emphasised  working  within 
‘existing  capacity  and  resource  constraints’  to  improve  rural  livelihoods.
156  While 
careful not to privatise land, this rural development policy could still be seen within the 
context  of  state  transformation,  as  it  advocates  the  restructuring  of  provincial-level 
governance as service-provider to the small-holder private sector on customary lands. 
Thus,  instead  of  developing  the  province  as  a  meaningful  channel  for  political 
participation  and  representation  that  is  closer  to  local  level  communities  than  the 
increasingly distant Honiara, the rural development plan aims to transform these into 
well-functioning  administrative  units,  regulated  and  monitored  by  RAMSI,  for 
supporting market-led development on customary land.   
 
Conclusion 
Almost five years after its inception RAMSI continues to divide opinion. For some, it is 
a success story, bringing back a small impoverished Pacific country from the brink of 
collapse. For others, RAMSI has failed in its main task of ‘state building’ by imposing 
external  solutions  on  Solomon  Islands,  which  are  inappropriate  for  the  Melanesian 
context.  Because  of  their  insistence  on  resuscitating  central  state  institutions,  which 
according to some were partly to blame for Solomon Islands’ descent into violence, the 
sustainability  of  RAMSI’s  programs  is  seen  as  highly  suspect.
157 Such  plaudits  and 
critiques alike are based on a presumption that RAMSI’s programs are aimed at state 
building and that state building is aimed at establishing a Weberian legal-rational state. 
However, to say that RAMSI is unlikely to establish a ‘strong’ state in Solomon Islands 
                                                 
155 See for example, DFAT,  ‘Solomon Islands:  Rebuilding  an  Island  Economy’, Canberra: Australian 
Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Economic Analytical Unit, 2004. There  is, 
h o w e v e r ,   a   v o l u n t a r y   l a n d   r e g i s t r a t i o n   p r o g r a m   r u n   b y   A u s A I D   a s   p a r t   o f   t h e   b i l a t e r a l   a i d   p r o g r a m   i n  
Solomon Islands. 
156 Solomon Islands Government Department of Development Planning and Aid Coordination, ‘Solomon 
Islands Agriculture and Rural Development Strategy’, Honiara: Solomon Islands Government, March 
2007, p. viii, italics in original. 
157 See for example, Dinnen, Sinclair, ‘Beyond State-Centrism: External Solutions and the Governance of 
Security in Melanesia’, in Intervention and State-Building in the Pacific: The Political Legitimacy of 
‘Cooperative  Intervention’,   e d i t e d   b y   G r e g   F r y   a n d  Tarcisius  Tara  Kabutaulaka  (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2008), pp. 102-18. CHAPTER SIX 
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does not tell us how the intervention affects the real-existing power relations that run 
through state and society in Solomon Islands.        
  As  we  have  seen,  rather  than  be  characterised  as  state  building,  we  should 
examine RAMSI as a multilevel regime of state transformation, whose programs aim to 
change the state from within by shifting power away from majoritarian institutions to 
‘regional’ spaces of governance established inside or near the state apparatus. Based on 
an  assumption  that  poor  governance  is  at  the  root  of  conflict  in  Solomon  Islands, 
RAMSI’s  programs  have  been  designed  to  narrow  the  political  choices  available  to 
Solomon Islands political leaders. However, the limits of state transformation of this 
kind are apparent when we examine RAMSI’s record. While undoubtedly affecting the 
production  and  reproduction  of  political  power  in  Solomon  Islands,  by  making  it 
difficult to use the state apparatus as a means for creating and sustaining patronage 
structures supported by money politics, the intervention has ended up undermining the 
capacity of the state to absorb social and political conflict in a non-coercive fashion. 
The contradictions of state transformation are contained by force, but this is precisely 
the lesson we can draw from RAMSI for our broader examination of contemporary 
SBIs  –  rather  than  being  the  recipe  for  governance  they  are  meant  to  be,  these 
interventions end up relying on stopgap measures to put out ‘spot-fires’ when those 
emerge, thereby remaining little more than a form of attempted crisis management.  
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Chapter Seven 
One  State,  Two  Regimes,  No  Conflict?  Patronage,  State 
Building, and the Anti-Pluralist Politics of Stability in Cambodia 
 
Introduction 
With a perspective of over fifteen years since the initial deployment of United Nations 
(UN) troops and civilian administrators to end a protracted and bloody civil war and set 
Cambodia  on  a  path  of  development  and  democracy,  the  Southeast  Asian  country 
provides  a  useful  case  study  for  illuminating  both  the  changing  character  of 
international intervention since the early 1990s and the nature of emergent state forms 
under conditions of heightened transnationalisation.  
Cambodia  constitutes  a  particularly  salient  case  study  for  examining  the 
transformation of both international interventionism and the intervened state in the post-
Cold War era for at least two reasons. First, with a total cost of US$1.7 billion and 
22,000 personnel, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 
deployed  between  November  1991  and  September  1993,  was  at  the  time  the  most 
ambitious and expensive undertaking in UN peacekeeping history.
1 Initially billed as a 
great  success,  it  was  the  first  time  the  UN  took  control  of  the  administration  of  a 
member state and organised national elections.
2 Second, while foreign troops and police 
had  left  Cambodia  along  with  UNTAC  in  1993,  massive  international  presence  has 
remained constant in the form of very high levels of development aid disbursements 
relative to the overall size of the economy. Although armed civil conflict finally ended a 
decade ago, official development assistance (ODA) from Cambodia’s 30 or so bilateral 
and  multilateral  development  partners  and  many  international  nongovernmental 
organisations  (INGOs),  at  about  US$600  million  per  annum,  still  accounts  for 
approximately  half  the  national  budget,  at  least  according  to  official  figures.
3 
Furthermore,  from  1998  development  aid,  with  the  important  exception  of  Chinese 
ODA, has become increasingly focused on improving governance and strengthening the 
                                                 
1 Berdal, Mats and Michael Leifer, ‘Cambodia’, in The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations 
Experience  in  Cambodia,  Former  Yugoslavia  and  Somalia,  edited  by  James  Mayall  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 25-58, p. 25. 
2  Hughes,  Caroline,  ‘UNTAC  in Cambodia:  The  Impact  on  Human  Rights’,  Singapore: Institute  of 
Southeast Asian Studies Occasional Paper No. 92, 1996, p. 1. 
3 Royal Government of Cambodia, ‘The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report’, Phnom Penh: Cambodian 
Rehabilitation and Development Board of the Council for the Development of Cambodia, May 2007, 
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capacity of the state. This is reflected by the very high proportion of ODA Cambodia 
receives – around 50 per cent – that is defined and disbursed as ‘technical cooperation’ 
(or  technical  assistance).
4  However,  to  say  that  international  presence  has  been 
substantial since 1991 does not reveal how this has affected the ways in which political 
power is produced, reproduced and distributed in Cambodia.     
From  the  late  1990s,  and  particularly  since  2004,  we  have  witnessed  the 
paradoxical emergence  of two apparently incompatible regimes – defined as sets of 
interests  and  institutions  that  take  on  a  specific  ideological  form  –  within  the 
Cambodian state. The first is a regime of ‘transformed’ patronage
5 – an elaborate and 
far-reaching  system,  whose  roots  date  back  to  the  post-Khmer  Rouge,  Vietnamese-
backed, People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK) government of the 1980s. 
The patronage system is centred upon Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen and other 
key figures from the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) but penetrates Cambodian 
state and society down to the village level. This regime’s survival depends upon the 
distribution  of  resources  (such  as  economic  resources  or  protection)  that  are  made 
available  by,  and  in  turn  reinforce,  the  domination  of  this  faction  of  the  CPP  over 
strategic parts of the state apparatus. The second, a regime of ‘state building’, comprises 
a variety of transnationalised governance spaces opened up either within or in relation 
to the state apparatus, as well as the coordinating mechanisms linking these and the 
various  levels  of  governance  that  run  through  them.  This  multilevel  regime  – 
simultaneously existing within and outside the state – is primarily associated with the 
international donor community, although Cambodian groups have at times attempted to 
use  the  resources  made  available  by  international  intervention  to  pursue  political 
agendas independently of the CPP. While distinct, these regimes should not be seen as 
monolithic, as they contain many internal tensions and contradictions; nor should they 
be seen as static, since they are formed around dynamic social and political coalitions. 
Clashes between the regimes have been common – at times over contentious 
issues,  such  as  demobilisation,  public  administration  reform,  and  judicial  and  legal 
                                                 
4 Land, Tony and Peter Morgan, ‘Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development in Cambodia: Making 
the System Work Better’, Phnom Penh: Cambodia Rehabilitation and Development Board, Council for 
the Development of Cambodia, November 2007, p. 1. 
5  The term is used by Hughes to mark out contemporary forms of patronage from historical forms 
associated  with  pre-colonial  Khmer  society.  See  Hughes,  Caroline,  The  Political  Economy  of 
Cambodia’s Transition, 1991-2001 (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 60-67. For a 
discussion of traditional Southeast Asian patronage see Scott, James C., ‘The Erosion of Patron-Client 
Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia’, The Journal of Asian Studies 32, no.1 (1972), pp. 
5-37.  CHAPTER SEVEN 
  221 
reform,  that  threaten  the  central  role  of  the  patronage  system  in  determining  the 
distribution of power in public life. However, Hun Sen and his associates have become 
adept  at  using  the  state  building  agenda  with  its  emphasis  on  building  ‘effective’ 
institutions as a way of displacing and transforming social and political conflicts in 
Cambodia, primarily those pertaining to the highly unequal distribution of resources 
associated  with  Cambodia’s  post-communist  development  trajectory,  into  technical 
matters  now  framed  and  managed  in  the  context  of  the  ‘international’  relationship 
between  the  Cambodian  government  and  its  development  partners.  In  this  manner, 
inherently  political  arrangements,  fundamental  to  the  exercise  of  power  and  to  the 
preservation  of  the  patronage  regime  that  supports  CPP  rule,  have  become 
technocratised and depoliticised – reframed as matters requiring ‘capacity building’ and 
improved coordination  between donors or between donors and the government.  
Further,  Hun  Sen’s  ability  to  dominate  an  emerging  constellation  of  aid 
coordination mechanisms, whose development is partly linked to the aid effectiveness 
agenda of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which 
emphasises state building as the ultimate objective of foreign aid, has helped position 
his  government  as  the  primary  gatekeeper  to  the  external  resources  flowing  into 
Cambodia  and  as  an  important  meta-governance  actor  able  to  exert  considerable 
influence over the organisation of the state building regime. It has thus also served to 
limit,  though  not  eliminate,  the  leeway  donors  hitherto  had  to  form  alliances  with 
opposition parties and civil society organisations, as well as the capacity of these groups 
to advance their agendas by forming transnational alliances. The donors for their part, 
lacking powerful societal powerbases in Cambodia, have been vulnerable and therefore 
very responsive to Hun Sen’s thinly veiled threats, as he warns time and time again only 
he could guarantee Cambodia’s political stability.  
Nevertheless, since the Cambodian government remains highly aid dependent, 
particularly  in  areas  of  service  delivery,  some  apparent  successes  in  reform 
implementation  have  been  noted  in  recent  years,  for  example,  in  public  financial 
management, decentralisation and deconcentration, and the establishing of the National 
Audit Authority (NAA). However, in the context of an impoverished society, in which 
the  vast  majority  depends  on  subsistence  agriculture  and  fishing  for  survival,  the 
governance reforms donors promote as part of their overall state building agenda, even 
when  successfully  implemented,  remain  for  the  most  part  irrelevant  to  all  bar  a 
relatively small urbanised elite. Such reforms are also fundamentally unchallenging to CHAPTER SEVEN 
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the CPP’s strong grip over the countryside – the party’s primary source of electoral and 
political power. In fact, the most significant reform of recent years – decentralisation 
and deconcentration – actually works to reinforce CPP power in the provinces. People 
in Cambodia’s remote villages, who often have to worry about putting enough food on 
the table, find little currency in vague promises of future improvements in government 
accountability and transparency. Also unappealing are expensive and time-consuming 
legalistic mechanisms for conflict resolution that could potentially undo painstakingly 
cultivated relationships with local powerbrokers.  
Therefore,  although  the  donors’  shift  to  ‘state  building’  in  recent  years  has 
presented Cambodia’s ruling cabal with new challenges, primarily by opening up non-
competitive, ‘administrative’, channels for contesting arbitrary executive power, it has 
also provided new opportunities for regime consolidation. Indeed, the two seemingly 
conflicting  regimes  of  patronage  and  intervention  are  highly  compatible  in  their 
disempowering effect on the emergence of meaningful political and civil oppositions. 
This  is  because  both  regimes,  implicitly  or  explicitly,  advance  anti-competitive  and 
hierarchical  visions  of  social  and  political  organisation  as  essential  for  Cambodia’s 
stability  and  future  development,  as  well  as  act,  in  different  ways,  to  contain 
unregulated political mobilisation. In sum, the social and political interests associated 
with Hun Sen and his cohorts hold sway in contemporary Cambodia, but the way power 
is  exercised  is  dependent  upon  a  complex  relationship  of  institutions  and  interests 
within the state.  
The  chapter  proceeds  in  the  following  order.  The  first  section  discusses  the 
emergence  of  Cambodia’s  ‘transformed’  patronage  regime  in  the  late  1980s  and  its 
characteristics. The second section examines the effects of international intervention in 
Cambodia  from  the  early  1990s  on  the  organisation  and  interrelations  of  state  and 
society, with a particular focus on the transnationalised nature of political space and 
opposition in Cambodia. The final section then examines the development of the state 
building  regime,  focusing  on  the  interrelations  of  the  two  regimes  within  the  state 
through, for example, new mechanisms for aid coordination, and the ways in which 
these have assisted the consolidation of increasingly authoritarian forms of political rule 
in Cambodia.  CHAPTER SEVEN 
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Cambodia’s regime of ‘transformed’ patronage 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that 1989 was a pivotal year in the emergence of 
Cambodia’s  contemporary  governance  arrangements.  After  repelling  the  genocidal 
Khmer Rouge in January 1979, a new Leninist state-socialist government, formally led 
by  the  PRPK,  under  Vietnamese  tutelage  with  the  backing  of  Vietnamese  troops, 
managed to establish a degree of control over about 90 per cent of Cambodian territory. 
Largely due to Cold War geopolitics, the new government was declared an illegitimate 
Vietnamese ‘puppet’ and was not recognised by the UN and most of its member-states, 
apart from the Soviet Union and its allies. Under these circumstances, the Khmer Rouge 
(or the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, as it was officially called) remarkably retained 
Cambodia’s  seat  in  the  General  Assembly.
6  Generous  support  from  Western 
governments, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Thai military-
led government and the Chinese government, allowed the Khmer Rouge and two other 
non-communist resistance groups – the royalist FUNCINPEC (Front Uni National pour 
un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif) and the republican Khmer 
People’s  National  Liberation  Front  (KPNLF)  –  who  together  formed  the  Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), to continue fighting the Phnom Penh 
government throughout the 1980s from the Thai border area.
7  
Frozen  out  from  accessing  Western  aid,  and  facing  a  monumental  task  of 
national and political reconstruction, due to the extreme devastation caused by Khmer 
Rouge rule (1975-1979), as well as because of sustained, if mostly passive, domestic 
resistance  to  its  agriculture  collectivisation  efforts,  the  PRPK  government  became 
highly dependent on foreign aid from Soviet bloc states. This was to some extent caused 
by  Vietnam’s  own  increasing  reliance  on  aid  from  the  Soviet  Union  following  its 
invasion  of  Cambodia.
8  In  fact,  until  1990,  aid  from  the  Soviet  bloc’s  Council  for 
Mutual Economic Assistance amounted to about 80 per cent of the PRPK government’s 
budget.
9 
                                                 
6 Berdal and Leifer, ‘Cambodia’, pp. 30-31; Jones, Lee, ‘ASEAN Intervention in Cambodia: From Cold 
War to Conditionality’, The Pacific Review 20, no. 4 (2007), pp. 523-50.  
7  Hughes,  The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, p. 2; Peou, Sorpong, Intervention and 
Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy? (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 
pp.  142-42;  Heder,  Steve,  ‘Cambodia’s  Democratic  Transition  to  Neoauthoritarianism’,  Current 
History 94, no. 596 (1995), pp. 425-29, p. 427.  
8 Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia, pp. 132-38.  
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From  the  mid  1980s,  Soviet  perestroika  and  Vietnamese  doi  moi  forced  the 
PRPK to reconsider its political strategy. Finally, in 1989, and broadly coinciding with 
the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodian territory, the cessation of Soviet 
aid  to  Cambodia,
10  and  the  commencement  of  UN-brokered  peace  talks  between 
Cambodia’s  warring  sides,
11  the  Phnom  Penh  government  officially  abandoned  its 
socialist agenda and ideology and announced a raft of economic reform measures aimed 
at liberalising Cambodia’s economy. Among other things, the ruling party recognised 
the de facto incremental privatisation of land that had been taking place since it first 
took power. The state apparatus also disengaged from production through the reduction 
of subsidies and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Central controls on prices, 
imports  and  the  movement  of  goods  were  reduced  and  then  abolished,  as  were 
agricultural taxes and forced state purchases of agricultural produce.
12 Apart from these 
reforms  the  ruling  party  symbolically  changed  its  name  to  the  Cambodian  People’s 
Party (CPP) and the official name of the country was also changed from the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea to the State of Cambodia (subsequently renamed the Kingdom 
of Cambodia after the reinstatement of the monarchy in 1993).  
As Caroline Hughes argues, by the end of the 1980s the PRPK/CPP government 
was  running  out  of  options,  indicated  by  its  reluctant  acceptance  of  the  UN  peace 
process,  which  involved  the  much-feared  Khmer  Rouge.  The  liberalisation  drive, 
however,  provided  the  ruling  party  with  a  new  foundation  upon  which  to  establish 
political power: 
[T]he  CPP  designed  a  solution  which  drew  economic  reform  into  the  service  of 
political  strategy.  The  emergence  of  a  free  market  in  land  and  goods  before  the 
initiation of a peace process was initially popular with ordinary farmers; it also quickly 
permitted the establishment of networks of protection and patronage permitting wealth 
accumulation  by  members  of  the  state  and  military.  By  these  means,  the  fragile 
ideological basis of state cohesion of the 1980s could be replaced by a more solid 
structure  of  material  self-interest.  Economic  reform  was  not  merely  designed  to 
facilitate Western aid and investment but to ensure that both existing domestic and new 
incoming assets were concentrated in the hands of loyalists.
13 
                                                 
10 In 1989 the Soviet Union was forced to forego its international aid program in exchange for 
International Monetary Fund loans. 
11  For  an  overview  of  the  negotiation  process  leading  to  the  Paris  Peace  Agreement  of  1991  see 
Heininger, Janet E., Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia (New York: The 
Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), pp. 12-22. 
12 Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, p. 32. 
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Elsewhere, Hughes argues that the 1989 reforms were ‘crucial in transforming the field 
of opportunities available to the Cambodian state, and to the population for influencing 
and resisting state action, thus determining the trajectory of political reforms.’
14 It is not 
so much that the trajectory of political reform has been ‘determined’ by the economic 
reforms of the late 1980s, but that these reforms have been crucial in facilitating the 
political and social forces and coalitions thereof that have played an instrumental role in 
shaping the nature of Cambodia’s political order ever since.
15  
While economic liberalisation greatly disadvantaged the poor and those without 
political connections, it proved an effective way of establishing a political and social 
structure capable of supporting CPP rule through Cambodia’s ‘triple-transition’ of the 
late  1980s  and  early  1990s.
16  In  particular,  it  worked  to  transform  the  relationship 
between  the  various  levels  of  government  and  between  local  government  and  local 
populations. In the 1980s, the Phnom Penh government attempted with limited success 
to  impose  centralised  socialist  planning  upon  often  recalcitrant  local  leaders  and 
communities,  while  fighting  a  protracted  civil  war  against  the  CGDK,  which  again 
required  the  unpopular  and  often  coerced  extraction  of  resources  and  people  from 
villages.
17 However, after 1989 the role of central government has shifted to that of 
‘protecting civil servants and military units in their entrepreneurial activities vis-à-vis 
the local population and locally available resources.’
18  
This shift, together with the arrival of large amounts of foreign aid, worked to 
reduce  the  dependence  of  the  central  government  on  local  authorities  for  resource 
extraction, replacing it with efforts to secure the latter’s political loyalty through their 
inclusion in flexible patronage networks of personal enrichment. This has particularly 
been the case since the introduction of democratic elections and the secret ballot by 
UNTAC in 1993 – a development that required the CPP to find more sophisticated ways 
                                                 
14 Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, p. 19. 
15 In contrast with dominant assumptions, market reforms in practice often depend on effective patronage 
coalitions. These coalitions may well co-opt the technocratic language and governance agenda of the 
World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. See Hadiz, Vedi R. and Richard Robison, ‘Neo-liberal 
Reforms and Illiberal Consolidations: The Indonesian Paradox’, Journal of Development Studies 41, 
no. 2 (2005), pp. 220-41.  
16 These are the transitions from war to peace, from central planning to free market capitalism and from 
authoritarianism to democracy. 
17 Öjendal and Kim describe villagers’ v ie w  of local authorities in the 1980s as ‘klach, in some cases 
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kaud, klach’, which means ‘respect, admiration, fear’. See Öjendal, Joakim and Kim Sedara, ‘Korob, 
Kaud, Klach: In Search of Agency in Rural Cambodia’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 37, no. 3 
(2006), pp. 507-26. 
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of ensuring the support of the country’s vast majority rural population. Kheang Un has 
characterised the resulting structure of Cambodian politics as composed of ‘a number of 
supra-networks that are made up of smaller networks. Each network has a patron who is 
the backer, or khnang of his clients.’
19 In turn, interlocking pyramids of patron-client 
networks serve as a means of exclusion and inclusion in a multi-network competition.
20  
Crucial to CPP power and to Hun Sen’s position in particular, as well as to the 
success of the peace process, has been the inclusion of the Royal Cambodian Armed 
Forces (RCAF) in these networks.
21 RCAF top-brass support has allowed Hun Sen to 
credibly employ the threat of violence as a political strategy vis-à-vis voters, opposition 
parties and donors.
22 RCAF generals control many of Cambodia’s natural resources and 
also act as a system of welfare for thousands of soldiers, many of which former Khmer 
Rouge – a situation which makes demobilisation a highly unpalatable policy for the 
government.
23 Furthermore, the promise of personal enrichment had played a pivotal 
role in the defection of Khmer Rouge combatants in the late 1990s to the government’s 
side,  thereby  contributing  directly  to  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  as  well  as  to  the 
consolidation  of  the  RCAF  since  the  1990s  from  an  ‘unlikely  amalgam  of  partisan 
groups’.
24  The  consolidation  of  the  RCAF  behind  Hun  Sen  was  also  aided  by  the 
systematic marginalisation or assassination of FUNCINPEC-affiliated military leaders 
between 1997 and 1999. 
The persistence of patronage in Cambodian political and social life has attracted 
much scholarly attention and has often been described as stemming from the cultural 
propensity  of  Cambodians  and  the  related  passivity  and  submissiveness  of  rural 
Cambodians, who still comprise about 80 per cent of the total population. As Öjendal 
and Kim argue, there has been a tendency in the literature to view Cambodia’s modern 
disasters,  as  well  as  its  current  hierarchical  political  structure,  as  ‘a  “natural” 
                                                 
19 Un, Kheang, ‘State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia’, Pacific Affairs 79, 
no. 2 (2006), pp. 225-45, p. 227. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Hughes, ‘Cambodia’, p. 72. 
22 An Asia Foundation survey from 2003 has shown that military support is an important electoral issue 
with 24 per cent of voters voting primarily in order to preserve the peace and prevent a return to 
warfare. See Asia Foundation, ‘Democracy in Cambodia – 2003’, Phnom Penh: Asia Foundation, 2003. 
23 Indeed, a World Bank-funded demobilisation program had to be suspended in 2003 after massive 
irregularities  were discovered. See Hughes, ‘Cambodia’, p. 73. For an analysis of the relationship 
between  the  military  and  the  CPP  see  Hendrickson,  Dylan,  ‘Cambodia’s  Security  Sector  Reform: 
Limi t s   o f   a   D o w n -Sizing Strategy’, Conflict, Security and Development 1, no. 1 (2001), pp. 67-82. For 
a contemporary examination of the military and other elites’ role in illegal logging in Cambodia see 
Global Witness,  ‘Cambodia’s Family Trees: Illegal  Logging  and  the  Stripping  of  Public  Assets  by 
Cambodia’s Elite’, Washington: Global Witness, June 2007. 
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consequence of this culturally defined history.’
25 Perhaps, this is to some extent related 
to  the  prevalence  of  the  discourse  of  ‘Khmerness’  as  a  legitimising  myth  for 
authoritarian  rule  for  political  leaders  from  Sihanouk  to  Hun  Sen.  In  particular,  the 
‘culturalist’ approach views democracy as antagonistic to Khmer culture because of that 
culture’s  ‘innate  tendencies  towards  hierarchy,  deference  and  intolerance  of 
difference.’
26 David Roberts, for example, argues: 
Complex webs of interdependent power relationships based on informal relationships, 
hierarchical  loyalties  and  corrupt,  cronyist  practices,  have  sustained  elitism  in 
Cambodia. Pre-French internal relationships had changed little by the early 1990s.
27   
It is telling that Roberts chooses to employ James Scott’s and Einsenstadt and Roniger’s 
classic  accounts  of  traditional  forms  of  patronage  in  Southeast  Asian  societies  and 
elsewhere as a way of defining existing social and political relations in Cambodia.
28 
Culturalist accounts, by essentialising Cambodian-Khmer culture and its relationship to 
politics,  also  end  up  arguing  one  of  two  positions  in  relation  to  international 
intervention – either that it pursues desirable goals that are sadly unachievable due to 
cultural constraints, or alternatively that intervention is undesirable because it destroys 
the social fabric of local communities.
29 Both positions deny the political agency of 
Cambodians, as well as the possibility for alignments of interest between domestic and 
external actors to emerge, thereby reifying a problematic internal-external dichotomy 
that fails to examine the ways in which intervention has transformed the state and hence 
the nature of contemporary patronage relations.  
Writing about political regimes in contemporary Africa, Michael Bratton and 
Nicolas van de Walle have sought to define a system blending patronage and modern 
state structures as neo-patrimony. Neo-patrimony, they argue is a regime where:    
                                                 
25 Öjendal and Kim, ‘Korob, Kaud, Klach’, p. 508. 
26 Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, p. 7. 
27 Roberts, David W., ‘The Superficiality of Statebuilding in Cambodia: Patronage and Clientilism as 
Enduring Forms of Politics’, Research Partnership on Postwar State-Building, October 2006, p. 9. See 
also Roberts, David W., Political Transition in Cambodia, 1991-1999: Power, Elitism and Democracy 
(London:  Curzon,  2001);  Roberts,  David,  ‘Hybrid  Polities  and  Indigenous  Pluralities:  Advanced 
Lessons in Statebuilding from Cambodia’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2, no. 1 (2008), 
pp. 63-86. Chandler, David P., ‘The Burden of Cambodia’s Past’, in Cambodia and the International 
Community: The Quest for Peace, Development and Democracy, edited by Frederick Z. Brown and 
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Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998). 
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University Press, 1985); Eisenstadt, Shmuel and Luis Roniger, ‘Patron-Client Relations as a Model of 
Structuring Social Exchange’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 22, no. 1 (1980), pp. 42-77. 
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[T]he  chief  executive  maintains  authority  through  personal  patronage,  rather  than 
through ideology or law. As with classic patrimonialism, the right to rule is ascribed to 
a person rather than an office. In contemporary neo-patrimonialism,  relationship  of 
loyalty and dependence pervade a formal politics and administrative system and leaders 
occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal 
wealth  and  status.  The  distinction  between  public  and  private  interest  is  purposely 
blurred. The essence of neo-patrimonialism   i s   t h e   a w a r d   b y   p u b l i c   o f f i c i a l s   o f   p e r s o n a l  
favours, both  within the state and in society. In return  for material rewards, clients 
mobilise political support and refer all decisions upwards as a mark of deference to 
patrons.
30      
Bratton and van de Walle’s definition is based upon Max Weber’s famous governance 
typology.  Neo-patrimonialism  is  thus  defined  as  a  hybrid  of  patrimonialism  –  a 
traditional form of power – and modern legal-rational power.
31 From this perspective, 
the  two  forms  of  power  are  in  competition  within  neo-patrimonial  governance 
arrangements, leading to the emergence of varying spatial and temporal hybridisations. 
Bratton and van de Walle’s position is adopted by Pak and others in their recent analysis 
of accountability in contemporary Cambodian  governance.
32 However, to view such 
governance arrangements as a mix of old and new disguises the dynamic nature of these 
regimes  and  their  relationship  to  processes  of  capitalist  economic  development  and 
intervention.  
The culturalist view of patronage is problematic because it fails to capture the 
historically  specific  nature  of  the  contemporary  patronage  system  in  Cambodia  –  a 
regime which differs markedly from Scott’s depiction of pre-colonial patron-clientilism, 
although both forms of patronage work to naturalise hierarchical social relations.
33 Pre-
colonial patronage was a far more flexible arrangement, in which the patron extracted 
resources from clients, but in return guaranteed the social and spiritual fabric of village 
life,  by,  for  example,  building  temples,  contributing  to  funerals  and  weddings,  or 
assisting poorer villagers in times of hardship or emergency. The pre-colonial and pre-
capitalist  system  bound  together  ‘members  of  the  same  community,  entangled  in  a 
common  set  of  social  relations  and  cemented  by  adherence  to  the  same  ritual 
calendar.’
34 While villagers were involved in unequal dyadic relationships with patrons, 
the latter were also obliged by strong social norms to fulfil their part of the bargain in 
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31 Weber, Max, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated, edited and with an introduction by 
Hans Heinrich Gerth and Charles Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 1991).   
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times of need.
35 This system was already transformed during the French colonial era by 
the  uneven  integration  of  local  Cambodian  communities  into  the  imperial  capitalist 
economy and the emergence of absentee landlords who were not bound by the same 
social commitments as earlier patrons. 
  In contrast with pre-colonial patronage, the patronage system that emerged in 
Cambodia in 1989 is a top-down regime of political rule that operates through zones of 
inclusion and exclusion that are not so much founded upon village social hierarchies, 
but are transformative of these. This is in particular by creating linkages between local-
level governance and national/global markets, as well as links between local elites and 
national ones that alter the relationship between the former and the communities in 
which they reside. Transformed patronage consists of relationships in which a patron 
based  within  a  ministry  or  military  command  provides  another  person  with 
opportunities  for  rent-seeking  and  protects  their  activities  in  exchange  for  political 
support. The client is permitted through these arrangements to go out and exploit a third 
party that does not benefit, nor is part of, the patron-client network.
36 The survival of 
these arrangements depends to a great extent on the existence of modern bureaucratic 
methods of surveillance and intimidation, as well as on the availability of markets for 
the resources expropriated by clients. Transformed patronage is also less flexible than 
traditional  forms  of  patronage.  This  is  because  in  the  latter  the  power  relationship 
between patron and client tended to shift in relation to their relative bargaining power – 
the  goods  and  services  patrons  could  provide  vis-à-vis  how  desperately  the  clients 
needed these.
37 In contrast, clients in contemporary Cambodia have no real choice in 
accepting or rejecting patrons’ offers – to refuse support, however pitiful it may be, is 
not only to be denied material well-being, but often to put one’s life at peril, whether 
directly through the use of violence, or indirectly due to the potentially devastating loss 
of livelihood in a very poor subsistence-based existence.
38   
Indeed, the extension of opportunities for predation made available by control of 
the state apparatus is a crucial characteristic of the patronage system in contemporary 
Cambodia. These networks, which were initially controlled exclusively by the CPP – 
the  state-party  of  the  1980s  –  expanded  following  the  UNTAC  elections  of  1993. 
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FUNCINPEC’s surprise electoral victory effectively led to the royalist party leaders 
attempting  to  establish  their  own  patronage  regime  within  the  state,  comprising 
networks in the bureaucracy and the military in competition with those of its supposedly 
junior coalition partner the CPP. FUNCINPEC enjoyed relatively little success in this 
endeavour,  as  demonstrated  by  the  July  1997  coup.
39  Subsequently,  after  the  2003 
general election, which was followed by an 11 month stalemate that meant there was 
formally no government in Cambodia, changes were introduced to legal requirements. 
Political parties in Cambodia now only require a 50 per cent-plus-one majority in the 
National  Assembly,  rather  than  the  two-thirds  majority  they  needed  to  form  a 
government previously.  As a result, the ruling  CPP no longer needs to maintain its 
coalition with FUNCINPEC and the handing out of political positions to FUNCINPEC 
members as a way of shoring up political support has largely ceased, leading to the 
decline of FUNCINPEC’s patronage networks.
40 FUNCINPEC’s decline is illustrated 
by Hun Sen’s dismissal in March 2006 of the royalist party’s long-time leader Prince 
Norodom Ranariddh (son of former King Sihanouk) from his position as co-chairman of 
the  Council  for  the  Development  of  Cambodia  (CDC) – the  ‘lucrative’  government 
agency  responsible  for  approving  all  foreign  direct  investment  in  Cambodia  and 
coordinating aid with donors – a role Ranariddh held since the CDC was established in 
1994.
41 FUNCINPEC finally reached its nadir when it only managed to attract 350,000 
votes, or two seats, in the July 2008 elections, with former leader Prince Ranariddh 
leaving to form his own, modestly successful, political party.
42 As the above example 
demonstrates, the patronage regime has been sensitive to, and affected by, changes in 
the  institutional  and  legal  environment  wrought  by  international  intervention.  It  has 
nevertheless  remained  crucial  to  the  formation  of  sustainable  political  coalitions  in 
Cambodia  in  the  absence  of  powerful  social  forces  with  alternative  resource 
mobilisation capacities. 
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Indeed, the persistence and form of patronage can not merely be seen as shaped 
by choices made by unscrupulous politicians at the top – it is a political balancing act. 
Despite its effectiveness as a way of shoring up CPP rule since 1989, the patronage 
regime contains internal tensions between different factions of the CPP. Calavan et al., 
for example, argue in a report on corruption in Cambodia, prepared for the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID): 
From outside, the regime appears monolithic, an efficient mechanism for absorbing 
resources and maintaining power. Inside, there are factional struggles and constant 
efforts to build and maintain, or undercut and shift, alliances. Hun Sen must balance 
the interests and concerns of hard liners and moderates. In any case, members of both 
factions are involved in corruption, and are dedicated to maintaining CPP power. 
When  under serious threat, the system mobilizes innumerable resources to oppose 
and neutralize opponents, and for all practical purposes, reacts as a monolith.
43 
Also contested has been the CPP elite’s tendency to justify the system of obligation they 
have created in terms of a revival of traditional Khmer cultural practices. As early as 
December 1991, massive protests of public servants and students – both considered 
regime  client-groups  –  took  place  on  the  streets  of  Phnom  Penh.  Although  framed 
around  the  issue  of  corruption,  these  demonstrations  ‘represented  a  failure  of  the 
patronage  system  to  meet  its  obligations  in  the  crisis  period  surrounding  the  UN’s 
arrival.’
44 More recently, Caroline Hughes has written that rural voters, and victims of 
dispossession in particular, despite their ostensible gratitude to gift-bearing politicians 
who visit their communities, refuse in private to accept such practices as ‘traditional’ 
and find the poor-quality gifts they receive demeaning. They are nevertheless unable to 
resist  the  gifts  openly  for  fear  of  exclusion  and  retribution  and  so  these  become  a 
symbolic manifestation of villagers’ lack of power.
45 
  As we have seen to this point, the origins of the patronage regime in Cambodia 
predate UNTAC and the other variants of liberal intervention that followed; indeed, 
economic liberalisation in 1989 was a means by which the CPP political elite and Hun 
Sen in particular sought to ensure its continued hold on power even after UNTAC’s 
arrival. Nevertheless, as indicated by the discussion of the rise and fall of FUNCINPEC 
and its patronage networks, international intervention has had a real effect, though not 
necessarily the one intended, on the production and distribution of power and wealth. 
This, as well shall see in the next section, has been in part through the ways it has 
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affected political liberalisation, the nature and scope of political space in Cambodia, and 
the  external  resources  provided  to  Cambodian  groups  and  organisations  outside  the 
state. The links between intervention and the emergence and characteristics of political 
and civil opposition to the CPP regime in the course of the 1990s are important to 
understand before we proceed to examine the ways in which the subsequent shift to 
state building from the late 1990s has aided the consolidation of Hun Sen’s rule, despite 
the considerable transnationalisation of Cambodia’s governing apparatus.   
 
International intervention and political liberalisation in Cambodia 
This section briefly outlines the relationship between international intervention and the 
nature  and  scope  of  political  space  and  organisation  in  Cambodia.  International 
intervention  and  resources  coming  from  outside  Cambodia’s  borders  have  played  a 
pivotal  role  in  opening  up  and  shaping  political  space  in  Cambodia  since  the  early 
1990s. The scarcity of  resources, particularly for groups and organisations excluded 
from patronage, and the CPP government’s intolerance of political dissent, have made 
the material, moral and ideational resources provided through international intervention 
indispensable to the expansion of political space and the emergence of political and 
nongovernmental  actors  outside  CPP  patronage.  Yet,  expansion  has  in  effect  meant 
transnationalisation  and  that  has  proved  a  mixed  blessing.  This  is  because  although 
transnationalisation has opened up new arenas for contention and political participation, 
it has also to a considerable extent militated against the emergence of political forces 
capable  of  challenging  the  CPP  and  its  patronage  networks  both  in  the  cities  and, 
particularly,  in  rural  areas.  International  support  to  local  groups  has  been  highly 
conditional and with a strong preference for channelling political participation into what 
Caroline  Hughes  has  defined  as  ‘atomizing  and  problem-solving,  rather  than 
representative modes of participation’.
46 She argues that, 
…since 1991, the focus of international actors has been upon eliciting forms of political 
participation that are atomizing and heavily policed, rather than spontaneous and mass-
based, and that the promotion of stability rather than empowered representation of the 
collective interests of the poor, has been the overriding concern.
47   
While this is an accurate depiction of the effects of transnationalisation on political 
space in post-UNTAC Cambodia, the more recent shift to state building, which will be 
                                                 
46 Hughes, Caroline, ‘Transnational Networks, International Organizations and Political Participation in 
Cambodia: Human Rights, Labour Rights and Common Rights’, Democratization 14, no. 5 (2007), pp. 
834-52, p. 835, her emphasis. 
47 Ibid., p. 836. CHAPTER SEVEN 
  233 
taken up in the final section, has worked to reduce what little political space had been 
created by earlier intervention. 
Roland Paris categorises UNTAC as one of the first and most ambitious post-
Cold  War  peace-building  operations.
48  The  October  1991  Paris  Agreement,  signed 
between Cambodia’s warring sides of the 1980s under UN supervision, set out a plan to 
transform Cambodia into a liberal democracy. UNTAC’s mandate reflected the then 
ubiquitous  assumptions  of  the  ‘liberal  peace’  thesis  that  political  and  economic 
liberalisation would facilitate a transition from civil war to lasting peace; though, unlike 
some of the missions that followed, UNTAC was not permitted by the UN Security 
Council to enforce the peace, only to observe the ceasefire and organise the cantonment 
and demobilisation of combatants. Most importantly, however, UNTAC was mandated 
to oversee and organise Cambodia’s first ‘free and fair’ democratic elections of the 
post-Khmer Rouge era.
49 Indeed, despite many difficulties and the Khmer Rouge’s late 
withdrawal  from  the  peace  process,  the  UNTAC  elections  were  considered  a  great 
success by international observers.
50 Following the elections, and 18 months after it first 
arrived, UNTAC left Cambodia, reflecting the typical pattern of many humanitarian 
interventions  in  the  early  1990s  –  democratisation,  marketisation  and  then  a  quick 
exit.
51  
  From the outset, UNTAC, and the numerous donor agencies and international 
NGOs that continued to operate in Cambodia after its departure, were divided, often 
internally,  into  an  ‘idealist’  strand,  focused  on  fostering  political  openness,  liberal 
values and the promotion of human rights, and an ‘economist’ strand, emphasising the 
primacy  of  encouraging  economic  development  and  stability.
52  Generally  speaking, 
UNTAC’s  time  in  Cambodia  was  one  in  which  relative  emphasis  was  placed  on 
political  liberalisation.  Not  only  were  national  elections  organised  but  UNTAC’s 
Human  Rights  Component  also  continued  to  closely  monitor  human  right  abuses 
throughout  the  1990s  and  supported  the  establishing  and  operation  of  a  number  of 
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Cambodian human rights NGOs.
53 This was based on the well-known liberal principle 
that a thriving civil society is essential for democratisation.  
Civil society organisations proliferated in the early 1990s, in part due to the 
UNTAC-inspired  establishment  of  a  more  conducive  legal  framework.
54  The  new 
constitution, drafted as part of the 1991 Peace Agreement, enshrined in principle the 
freedom  of  association  in  Article  42,  although  the  drafting  and  passing  of  a 
complementary NGO law has been delayed ever since.
55 However, Landau argues that 
the 
…strongest impetus behind the proliferation of indigenous non-state organisations in 
the 1990s appears to have been the provision of large-scale financial and technical 
assistance  by  international  donor  agencies.  Many  foreign  non-governmental 
organisations  (NGOs)  helped  establish  civil  society  organisations  in  Cambodia  that 
were  later  repatriated  to  Khmer  control.  In  mid-2000,  there  were  more  than  400 
indigenous NGOs in Cambodia. Many of these organisations, however, remain heavily 
dependent on foreign aid and heavily influenced by foreign agendas and values.
56 
The  Cambodian  human  rights  movement,  for  example,  has  initially  emerged 
under UNTAC tutelage. It has focused primarily on training Cambodian in human rights 
concepts, with the idea that these norms would over time permeate Cambodian polity 
and  society.  More  confrontational  forms  of  public  advocacy,  such  as  protests  or 
demonstrations, have usually been avoided by these groups in favour of behind-the-
scenes efforts to alter Cambodian political culture.
57 Hughes suggests that the human 
rights movement’s soft approach and its emphasis on teaching Cambodians their ‘rights 
and  responsibilities’  is  a  manifestation  of  a  tacit  consensus  between  donors,  state 
officials and the leaders of human rights groups on the need to prevent the potentially 
devastating spectre of an uprising of the rural poor; the main point of disagreement 
between these groups, she argues, is on how to go about it.
58 While CPP leaders tend to 
view patronage as a necessary evil, NGO critics of Hun Sen’s highly corrupt form of 
rule argue that if he was to continue in this manner,  
public frustration will only continue to grow, fed by entrenched poverty, transparent 
corruption, government mismanagement, and abuse by political and business elites… 
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The prospect of renewed mass unrest would be cause for concern in any country; it is 
doubly so in Cambodia, given its long history of violence.
59  
In  other  sectors,  most  notably  the  urbanised  garment  industry,  in  which 
independent organisations did emerge from the grassroots to represent the interests and 
grievances of Cambodians, the subsequent involvement of international agencies, such 
as  the  International  Labour  Organisation,  has  worked  to  defuse  more  radical 
redistributive  demands  in  favour  of  atomised  conflict  resolution  and  arbitration 
mechanisms.  Work  disputes  no  longer  became  mass  protests,  but  were  fed  into  a 
regularised, professional process that ordinary workers had no access to and no real 
way  of  influencing.
60  International  involvement  has  also  failed  to  respond  in  a 
meaningful  way  to  the  wave  of  assassinations  of  union  leaders  in  the  past  decade, 
including the 2004 assassination of the charismatic Chea Vichea in broad daylight in 
Phnom Penh.
61   
   Intervention  also  had  an  important  effect  on  political  parties  and  political 
organisation in Cambodia. This has occurred in two related ways. First, the supposed 
availability of an ‘international audience’, coupled with the difficulty of penetrating the 
CPP’s  dense  web  in  the  countryside,  has  led  Cambodia’s  opposition  parties  to  rely 
increasingly  on  appealing  to  external  actors  to  intervene  on  their  behalf,  instead  of 
cultivating their own domestic support-bases: 
[T]he multidimensional nature of political party opposition in Cambodia may reflect 
not  so  much  the  teething  troubles  of  transition  as  the  difficulty  of  establishing 
democracy as ‘the only game  in town’ in the context of intervention. Intervention itself 
has produced a ‘town’ with discontinuous and highly porous borders, while failing to 
reduce the political and practical problems of access to the hinterland.
62  
This has primarily been the strategy of Cambodia’s main opposition party, the Sam 
Rainsy Party (SRP). Party leader Sam Rainsy, once the FUNCINPEC Finance Minister 
in the first post-UNTAC government, has made repeated pleas to donors to tighten their 
supervision of the Cambodian government and use aid conditionality to limit the CPP’s 
power and help level the political playing field.
63 After the July 2008 elections, for 
example, which Sam Rainsy initially refused to recognise as free and fair, he said he 
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would be travelling to New York and Europe to bring his election grievances to the UN 
and European governments.
64 Ironically, even when the SRP attempted to develop solid 
domestic support-bases by forging an alliance with the trade union movement in the 
mid 1990, donors’ pressure on unions not to be politically affiliated had led to the 
partnership’s demise.
65  
Second,  international  involvement  has  also  had  an  effect  on  Cambodians’ 
perception of politics and the political process. To the extent that donors promoted 
political participation by the poor this has primarily been through highly regulated and 
policed  fora  –  in  particular,  through  voting  in  elections  at  both  the  national  and 
commune  levels;  spontaneous  action  is  shunned  and  discouraged  and  public 
participation  in  political  debate  is  not  accorded  high  priority.  Public  education 
programs, run by donors and local NGO partners, have tended to present an idea of 
democracy as a conflict-free zone, in which voters privately contemplate the merits of 
political  parties’  policies  and  cast  their  votes  accordingly  every  few  years.  This 
circumvented  the  problems  faced  by  voters  and  ran  the  risk  of  making  democracy 
irrelevant to most Cambodians: 
The perpetual concern expressed by voters—that a vote for the opposition would entail 
a  return  to  war,  because  the  CPP  is  an  immovable  feature  of  life  throughout  the 
country—is swept aside by these programmes, which act as if the main concern of 
politics was to be found in the detail of policy programmes. In treating the question of 
military and bureaucratic allegiances and the sticky problem of transition as at best 
irrelevant  and  at  worst  taboo,  such  programmes  risk  promoting  a  perception  of 
democracy as an irrelevant game played by the rich with the cooperation of donors.
66        
  This brings us to the core issue of political and social stability. While donors 
have  sought  to  promote  political  liberalisation  in  various  ways,  particularly  in  the 
1990s,  including  by  opening  up  and  monitoring  non-CPP-dominated  modes  of 
participation  and  human  right  abuses  by  the  government,
67  this  objective  has  been 
mostly subjected to a more fundamental concern with maintaining political and social 
stability.
68 Indeed, many donor representatives have concurred in private with Roland 
Paris’  argument  that  stability  has  been  maintained  in  Cambodia,  not  because  of 
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democratisation, but because democracy has been averted through the actions of Hun 
Sen and the CPP.
69 For example, when large-scale post-election political protests in 
September 1998 were brutally smashed by the police, donors did not reduce their aid 
contributions to Cambodia. In fact, from about 1998 donors began to work more closely 
with government as part of the shift to ‘good governance’ and state building.   
Because  of  Cambodia’s  unusually  brutal  recent  history,  the  concern  with 
stability has been married with  a pseudo-psychoanalytical tendency to  ‘pathologise’ 
Cambodian  society  as  ‘traumatised  and  brutalised’,  thereby  supposedly  requiring 
donors to tread particularly softly.
70 For example, capacity building consultants Land 
and Morgan posit that ‘it should not be surprising in the Cambodian context if the 
conventional  development  goals  of  effectiveness,  equity  and  efficiency  have  to  be 
balanced off against goals to do with stability, security and the avoidance of internal 
conflict.’
71 A UN Development Programme (UNDP) official has also said: ‘How can 
you expect Cambodia to be any different? They killed half their people 20 to 30 years 
ago. They started with nothing. In ’92 when the UN mission came in there were banana 
trees in the middle of the streets.’
72  
This pathologisation depoliticises Cambodian society and its relationship with 
the state, while denying Cambodians equal political agency by characterising them as 
incapable  of  self-government  without  external  intervention  and  supervision.  Hughes 
and Pupavac argue: 
Although the avowed aim of the international presence remains to promote democracy, 
doubts about the capacity of the populations of Cambodia and former Yugoslavia for 
liberal citizenship prompt curtailment of their political rights. In both cases distrust of 
local populations has prompted strict policing of collective action and perceptions of 
the  need  to  discipline  damaged  and  culturally  mal-programmed  citizens  into 
appropriate behavioural norms. Consequently, while responsibility for politics is to be 
placed back on the shoulders of local people, this is a disciplined politics, regulated by 
international  norms.  Debate  over  these  norms  is  discouraged, producing ‘choiceless 
democracies’,  in  which  parties  and  electorates  offer  anodyne  and  identical  policy 
platforms that accord with international principles.
73 
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In turn, donors’ fear of unregulated social conflict is something that Hun Sen has both 
enjoyed  and  fanned  through  countless  public  pronouncements  in  which  he  warned 
about the potentially hazardous consequences to Cambodia’s stability of challenges to 
CPP  rule.  In  a  recent  example,  shortly  before  the  July  2008  elections,  Hun  Sen 
threatened severe action against planned protests in Phnom Penh, as well as any other 
anti-CPP efforts, reminding listeners he remained a four-star general:  
If you talk about the wild law, you know Hun Sen. I attacked in 1997. If you want to 
wage war, Hun Sen will join you… Hun Sen can transform into a military figure. When 
Hun Sen orders the military, the military commanders know Hun Sen’s mind. I am a 
soldier.
74  
An important shift in the donors’ approach has occurred in the late 1990s, after 
Hun  Sen  managed  to  cripple  FUNCINPEC  in  July  1997  and  emerge  as  the  senior 
coalition partner after the 1998 elections. Broadly coinciding with the transition within 
neoliberal development orthodoxy towards focusing on institutions, which was outlined 
in  Chapter  Three,  international  concern  with  fostering  liberal-democracy  has 
transformed into a concern with promoting ‘good governance’. This has entailed an 
increasing focus on the state, as opposed to the promotion of civil society activism, with 
donor  funding  shifting  accordingly.
75  The  trend  away  from  supporting  political 
liberalisation  was  further  reinforced  by  the  events  of  September  11  2001,  which 
strengthened the perception that fragile states posed a security risk to Western states 
and societies. Indeed, the major donor agencies became disillusioned with Cambodian 
NGOs,  particularly  with  those  advocacy  NGOs  that  were  meant  to  bring  about 
attitudinal  change  and  promote  liberal  values  in  Cambodian  society.  Hughes  and 
Pupavac quote one donor official in Cambodia as saying that his organisation retreated 
from supporting NGOs because they ‘crowd out the private sector while failing to exert 
its salutary disciplinary effect.’
76 Currently, donors tend to view NGOs from a more 
narrow neoliberal perspective as agents of accountability, but not as drivers of political 
liberalisation.  As  limited  and  limiting  as  it  was,  the  availability  of  transnationally 
established and monitored political space to Cambodian actors, away from the reach of 
the state-centred patronage regime, appears to be declining.  
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State building in Cambodia: good governance, coordination and the consolidation 
of Hun Sen’s rule 
The  history  of  international  intervention  in  Cambodia  since  the  late  1990s  presents 
observers  with  an  apparent  paradox.  While  it  has  been  commonly  thought  that  the 
Cambodian  government  ‘prefers  to  deal  with  donors  one  at  a  time,  or  in  isolated 
sectoral  working  groups’,
77  in  reality  the  government  has  actively  promoted  and 
facilitated  the  development  of  increasingly  centralised  coordination  mechanisms  for 
engaging donors since the late 1990s and particularly since 2004.
78 Indeed, it was not 
the government, but some of the donors who had been hesitant to sign a declaration on 
aid harmonisation and alignment in October 2006, even though it was non-binding.
79 
Framed  broadly  as  necessary  for  promoting  good  governance  and  improving  aid 
effectiveness, new processes of aid coordination in Cambodia, which are supposed to 
strengthen domestic ownership of the development process, have to some extent been 
propelled and influenced by developments at the global level, such as the Rome and 
Paris Declarations of the OECD.
80 However, the Cambodian case actually predates the 
global aid effectiveness push, going back to the donor-driven working groups of the late 
1990s,  the  Governance  Action  Plan  (GAP)  of  2001  and  Cambodia’s  subsequent 
participation in the OECD aid harmonisation pilot.
81  
The notion of domestic ownership of the development process, which is closely 
associated  with  the  Paris  Declaration  and  the  post-Washington  Consensus  more 
broadly, has been subjected to strong criticism. John Pender, for example, has argued 
convincingly that ‘country ownership’ really amounts to donors shedding accountability 
for  the  outcomes  of  the  deep  interventions  they  instigate,  which  effectively  rework 
state-society relations in recipient-states.
82 Much less has been written, however, about 
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the  ways  in  which  the  governments  of  recipient-states  can  use  the  donors’  ‘power 
without responsibility’
83 and the associated disjuncture between the various levels of 
donor intervention – the intergovernmental and internalised – to sustain and consolidate 
forms of rule that are radically different to those purportedly promoted by donors. The 
emergence  of  an  increasingly  centralised  and  government-coordinated  apparatus  for 
negotiating and monitoring aid intervention in Cambodia has enabled the Cambodian 
government  to  better  manage  the  ways  in  which  social  and  political  conflict  in 
Cambodia  is  internationalised/transnationalised.  This  has  primarily  occurred  through 
the transformation of issues pertaining to Cambodia’s highly unequal and exploitative 
development  trajectory  into  technical  matters  relating  to  the  quality  of  donors’ 
programs and partnership with the government, in particular framed around the notion 
of  capacity  building.  In  its  ‘international’  relationship  with  donors,  the  Cambodian 
government’s  bargaining  position  has  also  been  bolstered  by  the  discovery  of 
potentially vast underwater oil reserves off Cambodia’s shore, the recent availability of 
very high levels of foreign investment, mostly from China, South Korea and repatriated 
Khmer capital, which has driven extraordinarily high economic growth figures, as well 
as  the  increasing  availability  of  ‘no  strings  attached’  aid  from  the  Chinese 
government.
84 Much of this newfound wealth, of course, has found its way into the 
hands of regime insiders. Below I briefly discuss the development and structure of the 
state building regime and aid coordination apparatus and their significance for the form 
of political rule in Cambodia.  
  It is useful to divide the development of the state building regime in Cambodia 
into two periods – from 1998 to 2004 and from 2004 to the present. The distinction 
between the two periods is not so much in the prescriptive content of interventionist 
objectives – which has remained consistently focused, at least rhetorically, on achieving 
international  standards  of  governance  –  but  in  the  ways  in  which  such  spaces  of 
governance  are  organised  in  relation  to  each  other,  the  state  and  the  Cambodian 
government, as well as the breadth and nature of the political space they allow for other 
actors.  In  particular,  from  2004  hitherto  loose  coordination  structures  have  been 
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significantly  consolidated  through  the  Technical  Working  Group  (TWG)/Cambodia 
Development  Cooperation  Forum  (CDCF)  mechanism  and  the  Cambodian 
Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB) of the CDC. In turn, while emphasis in 
the  earlier  period  was  placed  on  monitoring  and,  often  publicly,  evaluating  the 
performance and deficiencies of the Cambodian state and the quality of governance 
provided by its institutions, it has later somewhat shifted to the broader theme of aid 
effectiveness  and  capacity  building,  thus  allowing  the  government  to  apply  more 
pressure on donors and emphasise their conduct, rather than the government’s, as the 
main determinant of successful reform implementation and capacity building. This new 
tendency  to  point  the  finger  at  donors  has  not  necessarily  been  accepted  by  donor 
officials,  who  continue  to  stress  the  importance  of  often-lacking  political  will  for 
implementing  and  sustaining  reform  and  hammer  the  Cambodian  government  in 
government-donor meetings for lack of progress on difficult issues.
85 But since the state 
building agenda, which the donors drive, essentially emphasises similar technical issues 
as those raised by the government, international donors, who are also often internally 
divided  and  lack  strong  support-bases  in  Cambodian  society,  have  been  unable  or 
unwilling to cultivate alternative political platforms, opting instead to make progress 
where  it  is  forthcoming  in  the  hope  that  this  would  gradually  permeate  more 
contentious areas of reform.
86   
Good  governance  has  become  an  important  objective  of  international 
intervention  in  Cambodia  from  1998  onwards.  Between  1993  and  1997  donors 
generally  avoided  attaching  governance  reform  conditionalities  to  their  programs.
87 
This was in part due to the poor state of Cambodia’s infrastructure and services at the 
time, but also because unanimity between donors was difficult to achieve as long as the 
economy was growing strongly.
88 Following the coup of 1997, donors began to focus 
increasingly on affecting governance at a day-to-day level.   
The  emergence  in  1998  of  good  governance  as  an  objective  of  ODA  in 
Cambodia can be attributed to a number of developments. First, as mentioned earlier, 
development orthodoxy had undergone a transformation in the late 1990s, under the 
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leadership  of  Joseph  Stiglitz,  then  Chief  Economist  of  the  World  Bank.  More 
specifically, however, the 1997 coup led to a 27 per cent reduction of aid to Cambodia, 
particularly of budgetary aid/balance of payments support, with the US suspending its 
non-humanitarian  development  assistance  program  completely,  and  other  donors 
decreasing  their  contributions  to  government.
89  This  combined  with  a  reduction  in 
investment from crisis-stricken East and Southeast Asia to place the government in a 
difficult  position  and  increase  donor  leverage.  Hun  Sen  was  also  eager  to  gain 
international legitimacy for the 1998 election results, in which the CPP cemented its 
position as the senior coalition partner and undisputed winner, but which took place 
after FUNCINPEC and SRP leaders were forced to leave Cambodia, to return only on 
the eve of the elections. On the other hand, due to the CPP’s victory in the streets and in 
the  ballot  boxes,  donors  and  their  governments  became  disillusioned  with 
FUNCINPEC,  realising  that  the  party  was  much  weaker  than  previously  thought. 
Consequently, donor strategy has generally shifted from that of encouraging political 
pluralism (within the limits outlined in the previous section) to that of attempting to 
more directly affect the ways in which the state apparatus functions.  
In 1999 the state building regime began to take shape. Under donor pressure, the 
frequency of Consultative Group (CG) meetings – then the primary donor-government 
coordination  mechanism  –  was  increased  to  once  in  every  quarter.
90  A  number  of 
donor-government  working  groups,  which  were  at  that  time  donor-driven,  were 
established  in  February  1999  to  tackle  reform  in  key  areas,  identified  as  crucial  to 
maintaining  and  building  upon  Cambodia’s  post-UNTAC  recovery  –  law  and  the 
judiciary, public financial management, anti-corruption, gender equity, demobilisation 
and  natural  resource  management.
91 The  GAP,  which  was  published  in  early  2001, 
provided detailed action plans for operationalising these objectives, as well as priorities 
and  evaluation  benchmarks.  By  2004,  however,  an  IMF  report  concluded  that  little 
progress  had  been  achieved,  particularly  in  demobilisation,  public  administration 
reform  and  legal  and  judicial  reform,  which  as  we  have  seen  are  important  for 
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maintaining the centrality of the patronage system for the reproduction and distribution 
of power.
92  
In the initial good governance phase from 1998 to 2004, governance objectives 
were primarily pursued  through  a  great multitude of distinct projects,  managed and 
coordinated  by  the  various  donors,  mainly  within  Cambodia’s  line  ministries. 
Governance was seen then essentially as one of a number of sectors, such as health and 
education, in which donors operated. Typically, governance projects were agreed to by 
direct negotiation between line ministry or state agency and donor and implemented 
through especially set up project implementation units (PIUs), located inside the state 
apparatus.  These  PIUs  were  usually  contracted  out  by  donors  to  non-Cambodian 
operators – consultants or NGOs – who then also hired and supplemented the income of 
local staff, mostly drawn from the same bureaucratic unit.
93 This resulted in a massive 
field  of  unrelated  projects,  often  with  contradictory  objectives,  as  well  as  fierce 
competition between donors over relatively few skilled Cambodian staff, which resulted 
in  many  cases  in  bidding  wars  or  employees  drawing  salaries  from  more  than  one 
project without their employers’ knowledge. These projects relied heavily on technical 
assistance:  the  combined  salaries  of  the  approximately  800  expatriate  advisors  who 
were working in the Cambodian state apparatus in 2004 cost donors collectively more 
than the government’s entire wage bill.
94  
In the early twenty-first century, and particularly from 2004, two important and 
interrelated shifts began taking place simultaneously under the rubric  of shoring up 
fragile states: governance has become a programmatic concern for some donors, instead 
of  only  a  project-based  objective,  and  the  aid  effectiveness  agenda  emerged,  both 
locally and internationally, with the explicit aim of using aid to build the capacity of 
recipient governments through an increased emphasis on harmonisation, alignment and 
coordination  of  aid  interventions,  both  among  donors  and  between  donors  and  the 
government. Earlier in the thesis, I have argued that, particularly in the aftermath of 
September 11, good governance came to be viewed as more than simply a prescription 
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for improved and more equitably shared economic development, but the key for and 
objective of state building – a form of risk management designed to prevent the flow of 
transnational risks from within the borders of so-called failed/fragile states to Western 
states and societies. In tandem, the focus for international intervention has shifted from 
‘post-conflict’ environments and ‘complex political emergencies’
95 to developing ways 
of  more  rigorously  evaluating,  engaging  with,  and  ‘building’  the  capacity  of 
fragile/failed states – a category itself defined in relation to governance indicators and 
not necessarily conflict.
96  
Cambodia  too  has  been  categorised  as  fragile  by  a  number  of  institutional 
quality assessment exercises. In one notable example, the World Bank’s Independent 
Evaluation  Group  Low-Income  Countries  Under  Stress  (LICUS)  project  identified 
Cambodia as one of the world’s 25 most fragile states in 2002 and 2005 – an evaluation 
premised primarily on the Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
framework.
97 Cambodia’s supposed fragility led the Bank and other donors to make 
good governance and capacity building the core objectives of development assistance 
programs in Cambodia. A World Bank official explains: 
The  starting  point  for  a  discussion  on  the  World  Bank  and  state  building  and 
governance  issues  in  Cambodia  would  be  the  [2005] Country  Assistance  Strategy. 
There’s also a preceding analytical document called ‘Cambodia at the Crossroads’. 
That’s when the focus on governance starts to emerge. It says that given the resources 
we  have as donors available  there’s a  very strong argument  for investing  heavily in 
governance upfront… It doesn’t mean we’re going   t o   w i t h d r a w   f r o m   t h e   s e c t o ral areas 
where we were working...bu t   f o r   e a c h   o f   t h o s e , governance becomes an overarching 
theme. If you look at the sort of programming that has emerged since then each project 
has quite a strong element of governance.
98                
This  means  that  governance  outcomes  are  now  prosecuted  either  through  distinct 
projects  that  are  integrated  into  an  overarching  sectoral  strategy  or  by  introducing 
governance-related conditionalities into the aid program, with disbursements linked to 
the achievement of agreed-upon milestones.
99    
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  While  the  introduction  of  the  good  governance  agenda  in  its  various 
incarnations to Cambodia has undoubtedly been donor-driven,
100 the aid harmonisation-
alignment  agenda  and  the  coordination  mechanisms  associated  with  it,  which 
increasingly frame the organisation of the state building regime and its relations with 
the  Cambodian  state  apparatus,  are  primarily  associated  with  the  agency  of  the 
Cambodian  government.  As  early  as  2000,  at  the  fourth  CG  meeting  in  Paris,  the 
Cambodian  government  presented  a  new  development  cooperation  management 
framework  to  the  donors.  In  the  new  proposed  framework,  the  CRDB  was  to  be 
appointed  the  nodal  agency  within  government  for  aid  coordination  and  resource 
mobilisation  for  public  investment.  In  the  following  year’s  meeting  in  Tokyo,  the 
Cambodian government continued to further articulate the framework’s implementation 
requirements. At the sixth CG meeting in 2002, which was held in Phnom Penh for the 
first time, donors finally agreed to set up a working group for developing possible aid 
coordination modalities.
101  
  In September 2004 a tri-level coordination structure was formally established 
and  announced  by  Hun  Sen  at  a  pre-CG  meeting.
102  At  the  lowest  level,  18  joint 
sector/thematic  TWGs  were  set  up.  Co-chaired  by  government  and  donor 
representatives, TWGs have extensive responsibilities:  
They serve as the primary forum for policy dialogue, and support the responsible 
ministries in reviewing or elaborating sectoral policies and strategies under the NSDP 
[the government’s National Strategic Development Plan]. They are each required to 
formulate an Action Plan for their sector, setting out short-term targets and actions. 
They  formulate  results-oriented  indicators,  known  as  Joint  Monitoring  Indicators 
(JMIs). They are responsible for mobilising and coordinating donor support to the 
implementation of sectoral strategies and Action Plans. They are tasked with carrying 
out a capacity assessment in each sector, and integrating capacity building  into  all 
strategies  and  programmes.  They  oversee  the  provision  of  technical  assistance,  to 
ensure complementarity and avoid overlap. They should review existing programmes 
for consistency with the NSDP, and coordinate new donor support and activities.  They 
are tasked with developing sector-wide or programme-based approaches, and therefore 
carry  primary  responsibility  for  implementing  the  RGC’s  [Royal  Government  of 
Cambodia] aid effectiveness vision.
103  
  Above the TWGs is the Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) – 
‘a high level forum for coordination, dialogue and information sharing on policies and 
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matters of key concern and importance related to the socio-economic development of 
Cambodia’.
104  The  GDCC  meets  four  times  each  year  and  is  supposed  to  ‘ensure 
coordination  among  the  TWGs,  provide  policy  guidance,  set  priorities  and  propose 
measures to solve problems raised by TWGs.’
105  
While TWGs and GDCC are ‘regular mechanisms for in-country coordination, 
review and monitoring’,
106 the CDCF (previously the CG) is the highest level forum for 
government-donor discussions, in which the strategic direction of the aid program in 
Cambodia  is  decided  and  the  performance  of  ongoing  intervention  is  assessed.  The 
CDCF is a large public event, usually attended by Hun Sen and senior ministers, as well 
as  high  level  representatives  from  donor  governments  and  organisational 
headquarters.
107  
  Aside from the three levels of government-donor interaction, the Cambodian 
government  has  designated  the  CRDB  as  the  ‘focal  point’  for  the  mobilisation  and 
coordination of ODA with all donors (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs) and for intra-
governmental coordination of ODA allocation and utilisation.
108 The CRDB/CDC is 
also  tasked  with  developing  strategic  and  conceptual  frameworks  for  development 
assistance  in  Cambodia  –  such  as  the  Rectangular  Strategy,  the  NSDP  and  the 
Harmonisation,  Alignment  and  Results  (H-A-R)  Action  Plan  –  which  are  to  be 
implemented  through  the  coordination  mechanism,
109  and  is  meant  to  serve  as  the 
secretariat  of  the  GDCC  and  as  Cambodia’s  primary  research  body  for  providing 
empirical data on socio-economic developments. The CRDB is supported by a UNDP-
led multi-donor capacity development program that aims to primarily  strengthen its 
ability to coordinate and monitor the work of other government departments.
110  
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  The government’s assertiveness in developing the aid coordination framework 
has led some observers to conclude it was taking charge of Cambodia’s development 
relationships.
111 This perception is partly inaccurate since the policy content of donor 
interventions  has  remained  for  the  most  part  insulated  from  government  influence. 
Indeed, the government is not necessarily interested in reducing fragmentation in the 
way aid is delivered. One recent government report suggests that ‘diversity must be 
preserved while working in partnership to address the symptoms of fragmentation.’
112 
However, by increasingly centralising coordination, the government has been able to 
internationalise  policymaking,  while  exercising  greater  control  over  who  gets  to  be 
included  in  and  who  is  excluded  from  the  negotiation  process.  In  turn, 
internationalisation allows the government to frame implementation difficulties, which 
are manifestations of powerful resistance from patronage-related interests, in terms of 
lacking  capacity  or  deficient  coordination  between  various  donors  and  between  the 
donors and the government. This has the effect of turning political and social conflicts 
into matters for bureaucrats and experts to negotiate and refine – something that donors 
are  mostly  comfortable  with,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  section.  As  a  result, 
donors have been able to report progress in some sectors and praise the government for 
its leadership,
113 while at the same time, the abuses of power – land grabs, for example 
– have become in recent years even more prevalent and brazen than in the 1990s. A 
recent  World  Bank  report  on  governance  has  concluded  that  corruption  control  has 
actually worsened in Cambodia since 1996.
114       
  The  government’s  propensity  to  justify  the  limited  implementation  of 
contentious good governance projects in terms of weak state capacity and poorly funded 
and designed donor intervention is exemplified by the recently established NAA. The 
NAA  –  Cambodia’s  supreme  auditing  institution  –  became  operational  in  2002, 
following the tabling of the Audit Law in 2000. The Audit Law was passed after the 
Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB),  then  Cambodia’s  second  largest  donor,  applied 
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considerable pressure on the government and provided extensive technical assistance 
for  that  purpose,  which  included  drafting  the  Audit  Law  itself  in  accordance  with 
‘international best practice’.
115 Supporting the establishing of the NAA forms part of 
ADB’s  broader  concern  with  reforming  Cambodia’s  public  financial  management 
systems – a key  component of  which is seen to be  establishing ‘effective financial 
accountability’ mechanisms.
116 The NAA currently has approximately 220 auditors and 
receives  ongoing  training  and  capacity  building  support  from  a  German  Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) project, which is based inside the authority. It is also supported by 
occasional grants and capacity building assistance from the World Bank, the Danish 
International  Development  Agency  (Danida)  and  some  members  of  the  Asian 
Organisation  of  Supreme  Audit  Institutions  (ASOSAI).
117  The  stated  aim  of  these 
various  capacity  building  projects  is  to  train  NAA  auditors  and  develop  auditing 
practices  in  Cambodia  that  meet  international  standards  as  set  by  the  International 
Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) and ASOSAI.
118  
While  the  passing  of  the  Audit  Law  and  the  establishing  of  the  NAA  were 
recently described by an ADB official as ‘a major achievement of ADB’,
119 not even a 
single audit report has been made public from 2002 to the time of writing. Reports were 
sent to the National Assembly’s Second Committee on Finance and Banking but did not 
go any further despite legal provisions. This is usually explained by NAA staff as an 
issue of weak capacity and inadequate donor support:  
Much has been achieved already through the NAA’s commitment and support by the 
RGC and development partners. But the development of audit techniques, and the 
computer and office equipment has not been enough to sustain the NAA’s operations, 
to equip hands-on experience and practices, and to further transform the NAA into a 
competent audit institution matching international INTOSAI standards.
120  
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The  NAA’s  Secretary-General  further  explained  in  an  interview  that  as  a  new 
institution, the NAA could not afford to release a deficient report that could jeopardise 
its credibility.
121  
  However, the NAA’s performance as an independent supreme audit institution 
is  not  related  to  technical  issues  of  audit  standards,  rules  and  modules,  but  to  the 
inability  of  donors  to  insulate  the  NAA  from  the  patronage  regime.  The  Auditor-
General and his Deputies are affiliated with the CPP, with the former a member of the 
CPP’s Standing Committee, and are appointed by a vote of absolute majority in the 
National Assembly. While the Audit Law stipulates that the NAA is to report directly to 
the  National  Assembly  and  the  Senate  and  this  implies  neutrality,  the  legislature  is 
almost entirely dominated by the executive. For example, CPP Assembly members are 
made  to  sign  an  undated  resignation  letter  before  being  added  to  the  party  list. 
Furthermore, the NAA’s budget is still controlled by the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance.
122 A GTZ consultant has pointed out that although uncovering corruption is 
one of the NAA’s main tasks, no audit report to date has discovered corruption. The 
government, she says, will never abolish the NAA though, ‘because of the donors – 
World  Bank,  ADB.  They  [the  donors]  are  strong  and  why  should  they  [the 
government]? It’s so easy… You have that institution, you let them work a little bit, 
you let them write some reports; it won’t hurt.’
123 Indeed, while according to the Audit 
Law  citizens  are  able  to  address  grievances  regarding  budget  irregularities  by 
approaching the NAA, no one has done so in practice yet.
124 This is not a reflection of 
the NAA’s lack of capacity, but of the serious limitations on opening up governance 
spaces within the state that are independent from the power relationships that support 
CPP rule.    
While the donors’ capacity building imperative has allowed the government to 
reframe contentious political issues in technocratic terms that help circumvent direct 
assaults on the patronage system, the global aid effectiveness agenda, marked by the 
Paris Declaration, has also been used as a way of pressuring donors into channelling 
their interventions through the CRDB. This has worked to direct donors activities into 
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government-coordinated  governance  spaces,  thereby  limiting  their  independence  to 
form alliances with other organisations or state agencies in Cambodia.  
Crucially, the Cambodian government and the Hun Sen faction within it cannot 
physically prevent donors from engaging with other actors without its consent. Indeed, 
a recent OECD review of the worldwide implementation of the Paris Declaration has 
found that although some progress towards greater aid harmonisation and alignment has 
taken  place  in  Cambodia,  it  is  still  a  long  way  from  reaching  the  Declaration’s 
objectives  and  the  delivery  of  aid  remains  highly  fragmented,  though  less  so  than 
before.
125 What the state building agenda has done, though, is enable the government to 
assume the moral high-ground in its negotiations with donors and shift the blame for 
implementation failure on to donors’ tendency to undercut government ownership:    
The  Royal  Government  is  also  aware  that  while  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of 
institutions have been laid out in Royal decrees and Sub-Decrees, the current practices 
of some government institutions and some development partners do not adhere to the 
provisions  of  the  existing  rules  and  regulations.  The  current  practice  of  some 
development partners to enter into agreements with individual government ministries 
and  agencies  without  any  prior  coordination  through  the  Royal  Government’s 
designated  focal  point  for  aid  coordination,  the  Cambodian  Rehabilitation  and 
Development Board at the Council  for  the  Development of Cambodia, is a serious 
problem  that  hampers  Royal  Government’s  efforts  to  efficiently  manage  its  aid 
coordination functions.
126 
In  the  same  report  the  government  has  also  emphasised  that  the  new  development 
paradigm  is  aimed  at  building  development  cooperation  partnerships  based  on  ‘a 
common  vision,  shared  objectives,  mutual  trust,  mutual  accountability,  and  mutual 
transparency.’
127 This means, according to the government, that a consensus has to be 
reached  internally  within  the  aid  coordination  process  before  public  statements  are 
made by any party:
128  
Notwithstanding these positive developments, there have been a few occasions where this 
partnership was perhaps not taken in good faith by some partners. There were issues that 
may have been discussed and resolved through closer dialogue and information sharing at 
technical level, but have been prematurely over-publicized by some partners so that they 
could be identified as advocates of those issues. The political ramifications associated 
with  this  seriously  undermine RGC’s drive toward greater ownership of reforms and 
development processes. RGC believes that the complex and longer-term  nature  of  the 
reform issues that have been identified in national development strategy requires not only 
                                                 
125 OECD, ‘Aid Effectiveness: A Progress Report on Implementing the Paris Declaration’, 3
rd High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Accra, 2-4 September 2008. 
126 Royal Government of Cambodia, ‘Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation Management’, 
pp. 3-4. 
127 Ibid., p. 4. 
128 Cox, ‘What Structures and Processes Are Emerging at Country Level to Support a More Effective and 
Accountable Development Partnership?’, p. 14. CHAPTER SEVEN 
  251 
firm political commitments from both sides to move forward, but also that principles of 
partnership, as embodied most recently in the Paris Declaration, be adhered to.
129 
A  recent  example for  the  ways  in  which  the  government  has  used  the  state 
building imperative to limit donors’ ability to address contentious issues in the open is 
presented by the very public falling out between Hun Sen and the former UN human 
rights special representative to Cambodia Yash Ghai. Ghai strongly criticised what he 
saw as the massive centralisation of power in Cambodia and the repressive nature of 
existing political order in a June 2006 report that was published days before the CG 
meeting.
130 Hun Sen reacted angrily and was quoted as saying, ‘I don't like [UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General Yash] Ghai. I am leaving [Ghai] a message 
refuse to meet you [sic], I refuse to meet you forever.’
131 Ghai and Hun Sen continued 
to clash over the following two years, until Ghai finally resigned in September 2008, 
amid rumours of internal pressure on him to be less confrontational in his dealings with 
government. He was subsequently replaced by Christophe Peschoux, under a different 
title of ‘special rapporteur’. Unlike a special representative, a special rapporteur reports 
to  the  UN  Human  Rights  Council  and  not  directly  to  the  Secretary-General  and 
therefore  has  limited  influence  on  the  mandate  under  which  the  UN  mission  in 
Cambodia operates.
132 The decline in the stature and activities of the UN Human Rights 
Centre exemplifies the transformed nature of international intervention since the 1990s, 
since  the  Centre’s  monitoring  role  in  the  1990s  was  very  important  and  its  reports 
embarrassed the Cambodian government on a number of occasions.  
The  government’s  domination  of  the  aid  coordination  mechanism  has  also 
allowed  it  to  have  considerable  control  over  who  gets  to  be  included  in  policy 
negotiations and on what basis. According to the CRDB review of the aid coordination 
mechanism,  the  TWGs  are  ‘coordinating,  operational  and  monitoring  bodies,  not 
“advocacy” forums for “pressure groups” to pursue their agendas.
133 This means that 
while NGOs are not entirely excluded from participating in TWG meetings and from 
making submissions, they are not regular members and have to be invited in order to 
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attend. The NGOs that are allowed in are usually not ‘advocacy’ NGOs, but ones with 
specific technical expertise relevant to the TWG. The GDCC does provide some space 
for public advocacy, but NGOs must be first invited in order to participate, a process 
that  requires  government  approval.
134  In  any  case,  the  TWG  and  GDCC  are  highly 
controlled  environments  for  expressing  dissent  that  represent  little  genuine  political 
threat to CPP rule. The government has also sought to exclude non-technical input from 
donors in the TWG policy formulation process by expressing its dissatisfaction at the 
lack of technical expertise of donor representatives to TWGs – ‘The Royal Government 
strongly discourages the use of donor personnel in the work of the TWGs who lack 
substantive  technical  expertise  in  the  sector/thematic  area  of  the  TWG  and  lack 
experience in strategic policy formulation processes.’
135  
While the government has set conditions for donor and NGO participation in 
policymaking,  Cambodian  political  parties  have  been  entirely  excluded  from 
participating in the aid coordination process, since it is defined as an ‘international’ 
matter, relating to the government’s relationship with its external development partners, 
regardless of the fact that what is being negotiated is Cambodia’s internal governance 
arrangement. Donors for the most part have played along. For example, after an internal 
World Bank audit discovered massive procurement irregularities in three projects in 
Cambodia, the Bank has suspended the projects and then hired an international agency 
to  manage  procurement  for  the  government.
136  However,  SRP  parliamentarian  Son 
Chhay  was  quoted  as  saying:  ‘We  are  disappointed  with  the  World  Bank  for  not 
informing  us  about  the  corruption.  The  World  Bank  always  conspires  with  the 
government to hide information about corruption from us. This causes the corruption to 
get more serious.’
137  
Indeed,  instead  of  political  accountability,  the  new  state  building  agenda  in 
Cambodia  enshrines  the  notion  of  ‘mutual  accountability’.  Mutual  accountability  is 
‘intended to restore balance to the development partnership by emphasising that donors 
and partner countries are accountable not only to their respective constituents but also 
to  each  other…  [It]  includes  mutual  arrangements  for  assessing  the  development 
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partnership as well as the results that have been achieved.’
138 TWGs are asked to come 
up with JMIs for monitoring development in their respective sectors and then report 
their  progress  on  meeting  JMIs  to  the  GDCC.  The  GDCC  has  also  agreed  on  an 
overarching set of 12 JMIs for monitoring and evaluating overall progress across the 
whole program.
139 While it is telling that none of the 12 JMIs attempts to measure 
political liberalisation or human rights, more important for our purposes is the fact that 
while the TWGs are asked to assume a domestic policymaking function, particularly in 
the services sectors, they are primarily accountable to the GDCC and the CDCF and not 
to  Cambodian  voters.
140  The  result  is  to  internationalise  the  government’s 
accountability requirements and further limit the opportunities domestic actors find to 
contest executive power. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the characteristics of the state forms emerging through state 
building and heightened transnationalisation. Cambodia provides a useful case study 
because of the relatively long and varied record and extensive nature of international 
intervention  in  the  post-Cold  War  era.  International  intervention  in  Cambodia  has 
changed since the early 1990s from a time-delimited UN-led peacekeeping operation 
designed  to  quickly  democratise,  liberalise  and  disengage  to  an  increasingly  open-
ended, consolidated and coordinated state building intervention in the last five to 10 
years, in the form of development assistance programs, designed to transform the state 
from  within.  While  some  of  the  objectives  associated  with  the  contemporary  state 
building agenda challenge the centrality of the patronage regime for the production and 
distribution  of  power  and  wealth  in  Cambodia,  we  have  seen  that  the  Hun  Sen 
government has been able to use the transformation of the state to consolidate its rule 
and marginalise political and civil oppositions. In particular, the government has been 
able to ‘internationalise’ contentious political issues and channel these into arenas of 
donor-government interaction, which are increasingly government-coordinated and to 
which other domestic actors have no independent access. Indeed, despite their long-
standing professed support of political liberalisation, donors are guided by their own 
                                                 
138  Chhieng  Yanara  and  Phillip  Courtnadge,  ‘Mutual  Accountability:  An  Imperative  for  Capacity 
Development’, paper presented at the conference Capacity Development Strategies: Let the Evidence 
Speak, Madrid, November 2006, p. 1. 
139 See Royal Government of Cambodia, ‘Policy Performance of the Royal Government of Cambodia’. 
140 Cox, ‘What Structures and Processes Are Emerging at Country Level to Support a More Effective and 
Accountable Development Partnership?’, p. 9. CHAPTER SEVEN 
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notion  of  hierarchical  governance,  albeit  one  in  which  limited  and  highly  regulated 
political  competition  is  permissible.  Since  the  conditions  supportive  of  ‘good 
governance’ do not exist in Cambodia and are unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable 
future,  international  state  building,  by  attempting  to  depoliticise  policymaking,  has 
ironically ended up supporting a radically different and authoritarian political order.  
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Conclusion 
On 20 January 2009, new American President Barack Obama was sworn into office, 
replacing the highly unpopular George W. Bush. The inauguration of the first African-
American President, a man who spent part of his childhood in Indonesia and whose 
father was a Kenyan, has been seen by many as a sign that American foreign policy is 
about  to  change  and  that  a  new  era  of  international  cooperation  is  in  the  offing, 
following  the  acrimony  and  unilateralism  of  the  Bush  era.  In  particular,  Obama’s 
longstanding  resistance  to  the  war  in  Iraq  and  his  election  promise  to  call  back 
American troops from the Middle Eastern country as soon as feasibly possible, seem to 
suggest, though this is far from certain, that the neoconservative ‘Bush doctrine’ of 
military intervention in ‘rogue states’ to coerce regime change has come to its final end. 
But are we also witnessing the end of ‘state building’? The answer to this question has 
to  be  an  unequivocal  ‘no’,  if  one  examines  state  building  interventions  (SBIs)  as  a 
historically  specific,  dynamic  (even  if  contested)  mode  of  governance  that  is 
transformative  of  the  state,  as  well  as  of  the  very  notion  of  statehood.  From  this 
perspective – the one advanced in this thesis – SBIs are manifestations of long-term 
shifts  in  the  global  order  and  not  merely  a  set  of  policies  associated  with  one 
government or another.  
  Contemporary  SBIs  are  established  upon  a  perception  that  the  absence  or 
weakness of domestic governance institutions of a particular kind – that associated with 
the  ability  of  state  institutions  to  provide  supportive  conditions  for  the  effective 
functioning of liberal markets – represents a serious security risk to the world’s major 
states and their societies. This is because fragile or failed states are seen to increase the 
likelihood of trans-boundary risks, such as terrorism, crime, disease, refugees, people 
trafficking  and  environmental  degradation,  festering  within  their  borders  and  then 
migrating  elsewhere.  Therefore, managing this  risk in the longer term is thought to 
necessitate the ‘strengthening’, or in actual fact reconstitution, of domestic governance 
structures and their outputs in the intervened states. This highly political process, which 
requires  an  often  radical  rearticulation  of  the  ways  in  which  political  power  is 
distributed, produced and reproduced in these countries, is mostly attempted without the 
exercise  of  direct  rule  by  interveners  over  intervened  territories  and  their  peoples. 
Rather, SBIs, for the most part, are set up to influence political outcomes by limiting the 
spectrum of political choices available to domestic leaders and constituents. CONCLUSION  
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  Indeed, SBIs transform intervened states from within – they are structured to 
shift policymaking into transnationalised spaces of governance opened up inside or near 
the domestic governing apparatus of these states and into the hands of ‘experts’ and 
managers who are not politically or popularly accountable to affected populations (and 
often  not  politically  or  popularly  accountable  in  intervening  countries  as  well),  but 
without  doing  away  with  their  formal-legal  sovereignty.  For  example,  the  Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), examined in Chapter Six, has been 
construed  as  a  ‘partnership’  between  Solomon  Islands  and  its  Pacific  neighbouring 
states  under  the  auspices  of  the  Pacific  Islands  Forum  (PIF).  While  the  elected 
government of Solomon Islands retains its sovereign status, RAMSI’s penetration of the 
state apparatus and the control its various pillars exert over the distribution of resources 
means  that  the  Solomons  government  is  unable  to  pursue  some  political  agendas, 
regardless of its popular mandate.  
It  is  the  simultaneously  internal-external  nature  of  SBIs  that  gives  these 
interventions  their  unique  ‘multilevel’  character.  SBIs  are  constituted  as  regimes  – 
constellations of social and political coalitions, institutions and ideologies – within the 
state,  but  they  are  also  outside  the  state  to  the  extent  that  they  retain  the 
intergovernmental level of interaction and preserve the formal authority of domestic 
governments. Crucially, the ‘intergovernmental’ or ‘regional’ levels form part of the 
way in which intervened states are governed internally. A case in point is provided by 
the example of the Australian Federal Police’s (AFP) rapid withdrawal from Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) in 2005, following a ruling by the PNG Supreme Court that its legal 
immunity was unconstitutional. That conflict was framed in terms of sovereignty and 
law, but in reality concerned the nature of domestic rule in PNG and the degree to 
which  it  was  to  be  transnationalised.  The  methodological  nationalism  of  prevalent 
accounts  of  SBIs  dictates  that  debates  regarding  these  interventions  tend  to  revolve 
around the question of whether they create ‘more’ or ‘less’ state, however, it is the 
reconstitution of the state itself – both ideologically and physically – and the emergence 
of a transnationalising and transnationally regulated form of statehood that marks the 
true significance of SBIs.   
  The rise of this mode of governance cannot simply be attributed, as we have 
seen, to evolutionary processes within the narrow sphere of international peacekeeping, 
though  such  developments  are  not  irrelevant.  Rather,  the  transformation  of 
interventionism  points  at  broader  shifts  in  the  global  political  economy  and  the CONCLUSION  
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concomitant  and  ongoing  transformation  of  the  intervening  Western  states.  In  the 
context  of  a  transition  from  the  postwar  Keynesian  welfare  state  to  the  neoliberal 
regulatory state, the role of government has gradually shifted, though this process is far 
from complete, from that of supporting the ‘embedded liberalism’ political settlement 
between labour and capital to that of providing environments suited to the effective 
functioning of global liberal markets. The latter has meant a considerable disaggregation 
of the state apparatus and its functions, characterised as a shift from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’.
1 In the regulatory state, state power and authority are now often relocated 
outside the scope of the formal institutions of representative democracy, within new 
multilevel and networked forms of governance inhabited by a variety of ‘unelected’ 
governance actors, both public and private.
2 In the process, a new politics of ‘expertise’ 
has emerged to rationalise the exercise of state power, replacing the earlier framing of 
politics as interest-representation with an ideology of competent managerialism. This is 
the  politics  of  ‘anti-politics’
3  –  an  anti-competitive  and  highly  hierarchical  form  of 
politics that denies its political nature. Along with the denial of material conflict, social 
values have emerged as the main point of difference between the Right and Left of 
politics in many Western states. The current concern with de-bounded risk, which is 
shared by conservatives and progressives alike (though they often disagree on issues 
relating to risk evaluation), as well as the technocratic mechanisms that have emerged to 
assess and manage risk, are therefore not natural phenomena, but manifestations of the 
anti-pluralist politics of the regulatory state. 
The anti-pluralist nature of the transformation of the intervening states and the 
implications for SBIs was highlighted by the examination of the ‘regionalisation’ of 
Australian governance and the related transformation of the AFP. As we have seen, the 
Australian state apparatus has in recent years, particularly since September 11 and the 
October  2002  Bali  bombings,  become  involved  in  various  ways  in  attempting  to 
transform  the  internal  governance  of  neighbouring  states  and  police  disorder  in 
Australia’s emerging regional ‘frontier’. There is little doubt that the expansion of the 
AFP,  including  the  formation  of  its  transnational  policing  force,  the  International 
Deployment Group, is more immediately related to the rise of Islamic terrorism, as well 
                                                 
1 See Pierre, Jon and B. Guy Peters, Governance, Politics and the State (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 
2000), pp. 2-3. 
2  See  Vibert,  Frank,  The  Rise  of  the  Unelected:  Democracy  and  the  New  Separation  of  Powers 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
3 Jayasuriya, Kanishka and Kevin Hewison, ‘The Antipolitics of Good Governance: From Global Social 
Policy to a Global Populism?’, Critical Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (2004), pp. 571-90. CONCLUSION  
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as to AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty’s exceptional entrepreneurial skills. However, 
the  particular  nature  of  the  AFP’s  transformation  and  its  increasingly  active 
policymaking role cannot be understood in isolation from the broader transformation of 
the Australian state since the early 1980s. In particular, the more recent shift to ‘whole 
of  government’,  under  the  leadership  of  the  office  of  the  prime  minister  and  the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, permits the securitised, bureaucratised and 
depoliticised  treatment  of  a  variety  of  social  phenomena,  both  within  and  beyond 
Australia’s borders.  
  SBIs are often seen as a kind of ‘enlightened self-interest’ in that by building the 
capacity of intervened states to govern well they simultaneously reduce the potential 
security risk to other states and societies and improve the development prospects and 
living  conditions  of  the  populations  of  these  states.
4  However,  in  actual  fact,  the 
merging of security and development leads to the securitisation and criminalisation of 
the social and political orders of intervened states. This, in turn, works to delegitimise 
opposition  to  the  neoliberal  reform  agenda  of  these  interventions,  so  that  risk 
management also encompasses the attempted containment of challenges to neoliberal 
governance. The RAMSI chapter outlined not only the inherent contradictions between 
that intervention’s objectives of alleviating conflict and promoting ‘good governance’, 
but  also  the  political  limits  to  RAMSI’s  perceived  successes.  Stability  in  Solomon 
Islands  currently  depends  on  an  unstable  political  coalition,  made  possible  by  the 
availability of unsustainable logging and fishing revenues, a services boom related to 
the arrival of many well-paid expatriates and RAMSI’s superior coercive capacities. In 
short, rather than providing a blueprint for governance, RAMSI remains essentially an 
exercise in crisis management. Since RAMSI is often proclaimed a model for ‘good 
practice’ in international state building, its apparent limitations should not be ignored by 
policymakers elsewhere.  
The  thesis  also  examined  the  characteristics  of  ‘transformed’  statehood, 
emerging  under  conditions  of  heightened  transnationalisation  and  state  building,  by 
reflecting on the case of Cambodia. Cambodia has experienced nearly two decades of 
international liberal intervention,
5 although state building in its current form only began 
                                                 
4  See  Duffield,  Mark,  Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the  World of Peoples 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); Wesley, Michael, ‘Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention’, Ethics 
and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005), pp. 55-72. 
5 Of course, the civil conflict of the 1970s and 1980s cannot be understood in isolation from other forms 
of intervention, associated with Cold War geopolitics. CONCLUSION  
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to appear in the late 1990s. Over the past decade we have witnessed the consolidation of 
two regimes – patronage and state building – within the Cambodian state. The ability of 
Prime  Minister  Hun  Sen  and  his  cohorts  to  dominate  the  coordination  apparatus 
between his government and Cambodia’s donors has enabled them to limit the latter’s 
ability to form meaningful alliances with social and political forces in Cambodia outside 
the patronage regime. Indeed, despite their differences both regimes are compatible in 
their  disempowering  effect  on  the  emergence  of  meaningful  political  and  civil 
oppositions. This is because both promote anti-competitive and hierarchical visions of 
Cambodia’s social and political order as necessary for maintaining political stability, as 
well  as  act,  in  very  different  ways,  to  contain  unregulated  political  action.  The 
conclusion we can draw from the Cambodian case is that regardless of whether SBIs are 
successful  or  otherwise  in  achieving  their  stated  objectives  –  and  in  Cambodia 
intervention has mostly failed in this respect – they are associated with the emergence of 
increasingly hierarchical, anti-competitive and at times outright authoritarian forms of 
political rule, both within and between states. 
         Finally, the framework developed in this thesis has relevance that extends beyond 
the issue of SBIs into other new modes of governance. For example, by applying this 
framework,  we  can  also  make  sense  of  some  of  the  newly  emerging  modes  of 
governance associated with governmental response around the world to the financial 
crisis that began with the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market  in the United 
States. While learning about the particular nature of the politics of the financial crisis 
would  require  substantial  future  research  before  any  conclusive  evidence  becomes 
available, it is particularly telling that governments around the world have sought to 
define the crisis as stemming from the failure of regulation and the unrestrained greed of 
individual market players. Proposed solutions have tended to focus on reinvigorated and 
refined  forms  of  regulation,  mostly  requiring  a  strengthened  role  for  specialised 
regulatory  agencies,  as  well  as  enhanced  transnational  cooperation  between  such 
agencies.
6  Developments  of  this  kind  further  the  trend  identified  here  of  narrowing 
down  the  spectrum  of  politics,  leaving  a  worrying  gap  between  the  hardship 
experienced by individuals and their capacity to mobilise collectively to advance their 
interests. Indeed, discussions of ‘state failure’ and ‘regulatory failure’ share an affinity, 
                                                 
6 See for example, G-20, ‘G-20 Study Group on Global Credit Market Disruptions’, G-20 website, 31 
October  2008,  available  at  <http://www.g20.org/G20/webapp/publicEN/publication/further/doc/SG 
Report on Global Credit Market Disruptions (7_11_08).pdf>, accessed 6 January 2008. CONCLUSION  
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in  that  both  attempt  to  steer  debate  towards  apparently  technical  deliberations  and 
solutions. In both instances, however, there are potentially considerable challenges to 
this. The degree to which the new governance ideology takes root or not in particular 
settings forms one possible future research agenda, emanating from this thesis, that is 
worth other scholars’ attention.                    
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